Showing posts with label defence cuts. Show all posts
Showing posts with label defence cuts. Show all posts

Tuesday, 25 February 2014

Hagel Proposes Retiring A-10, Cutting LCS to 32 Ships

Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel made official Monday many of the expected cuts to legacy and modernization weapons programs across the military to include historic favorites like the A-10 and controversial platforms like the Littoral Combat Ship.
 
 
Hagel and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Gen. Martin Dempsey outlined the Pentagon’s proposed budget for fiscal year 2015 as the Defense Department set the tone ahead of a series of expected battles with Congress who have fought cuts to these programs in the past.
 
The Pentagon announced its plan to cut the entire A-10 and U-2 fleets as the Air Force transitions to the F-35 and Global Hawk respectively. Air Force leaders had said in the months leading up to the announcement that the service can no longer afford aircraft that fly niche missions
 
 
The Army saw the service’s number one vehicle modernization priority get whacked when the Pentagon announced the end of the Ground Combat Vehicle program. Slated to replace the Bradley, Army leaders struggled to settle on requirements and costs continued to spiral for the vehicle that didn’t seem to match the Army’s push to become lighter and more agile.
 
 
Hagel seemed to poke the Army for another failed modernization program with his request that the Army deliver “realistic visions” for vehicle modernization  in the coming year.
 
Meanwhile, the defense secretary took a shot at the Navy’s plan to build 52 Littoral Combat Ships. He said the Navy is “relying too heavily on the LCS to achieve its long term goals for ship numbers.” The defense secretary said there will be no new contract negotiations beyond 32 ships even though Navy Secretary Ray Mabus has supported the ship in the face of critical evaluations that questioned the ship’s combat worthiness.
 
Hagel also outlined how the Pentagon plans to follow through on President Obama’s promise to keep an 11-ship aircraft carrier fleet. The Navy needs to pay about $6 billion to complete the mid-life refueling and overhaul of the USS George Washington to keep the carrier in service.
 
It was unclear until Monday where the Navy was going to find the extra funding. Hagel announced that half of the Navy’s cruiser fleet – or 11 ships – will be laid up and placed in reduced operational status in order to find savings as the fleet is modernized.
 
However, Hagel said the Navy can only keep 11 carriers in the fleet if Congress can repeal the sequestration cuts the military is facing.
 
“We would have no other choice than to retire [the USS George Washington] should sequestration-level cuts be re-imposed,” Hagel said.
 
The Navy’s variant of the Joint Strike Fighter, the F-35C, is similarly under pressure from sequestration cuts. Hagel said the Pentagon would have to halt procurement of the carrier variant for two years if sequestration remains.
 
Of course, the Pentagon and Congress have already waged many of the battles where lines were drawn by Hagel and the military brass Monday afternoon. Few expect these proposals to work their way through Congress in a mid-term election year as many lawmakers have a lot to lose if these legacy fleets get retired.
 
The A-10 is a good example. Air Force leaders and lawmakers in both houses have battled for the past two years to retire large chunks of the A-10 fleet. Congress has stymied the Air Force’s past attempts and few analysts expect the service to succeed this year either.

Tuesday, 30 April 2013

France aims to keep firepower while cutting military

France, which launched an armed intervention in Mali earlier this year, has declared its determination to sustain its punch as a leading military power, despite making fresh cuts to its defence forces.

Juggling severe budgetary pressures with its longstanding strategic ambitions, President François Hollande’s socialist government on Monday laid out plans to retain the country’s nuclear deterrent as well as preserve its ability to project significant force beyond its borders, both on its own and with its allies.

A white paper, or policy document, on defence, delayed for several months by wrangles over the potential budget consequences, said the armed forces would be reduced by 34,000 between 2014 and 2019, from a total of 218,000 today and on top of a 40,000 reduction over the past five years

Saturday, 20 October 2012

Navy Fears Pentagon Neglects New Missile Sub; SSBN(X) Must Survive Almost 80 Years



Right now, the US Navy is designing the ballistic missile submarine that will provide 70 percent of the nation's nuclear deterrent until 2080. Yet even as the service prepares to award research and development contracts this December, the submarine community is deeply worried that the rest of the military is neglecting the program -- which has already had to make some painful trade-offs on schedule, numbers, and capability. And the service has not even started work on whatever nuclear missile the new sub will end up carrying for the latter half of its life.

The SSBN(X) program to replace the 1980s-vintage Ohio missile subs is a massive effort that few non-submariners talk about. "People are assuming it away," said Rear Adm. Robert Thomas, a submarine officer who is now head of the strategic plans and policy section (J-5) on the Joint Staff.

Even Strategic Command, whose nuclear deterrence role is often overshadowed by its space and cyber missions, isn't focused on the aging missile subs, Thomas told the audience at the Naval Submarine League's annual conference: "I sit in the Tank and I listen to STRATCOM and frankly I don't hear them talking about Ohio replacement. We need to do better missionary work."

It's easy to procrastinate because the timelines are so long. The first SSBN(X) will not deploy until 2031 -- which is already two years later than the original plan and starts after four Ohios will have already retired. That means the missile submarine fleet will drop to just 10 subs for over a decade. Even when all the new subs are in service, the fleet will stand at only 12 missile submarines, compared to 14 today.

What's less well known than the total numbers is how the Navy has cut back the new submarine's capabilities, something the top brass were remarkably candid about at the conference, especially for a service known for its persistent silence.

"The Ohio replacement is not, is not a multi-mission platform," program manager Capt. William Brougham said at the conference. "My team is designing Ohio replacement with the singular mission of being the nation's [nuclear] strategic deterrent."

The original vision for the SSBN(X) would have cost $7 billion a sub, a figure the Navy has brought down to $5.6 billion and hopes to reduce to $4.9 billion. To cut those costs, the Navy has cut capabilities across the board, but particularly for conventional combat against enemy subs and warships. According to official briefing slides, the revised design will have the "minimum [torpedo] capacity," "minimum acoustic sensors," and "reduced force protection features" in general, suited only for self-defense against enemy hunter-killer subs rather than for taking the offensive. (It will also have fewer and smaller launch tubes for nuclear missiles: 16 87-inch tubes instead of 20 97-inchers).

Some of the older warriors at the conference were skeptical. So what can SSBN(X) contribute to the fight, one asked, after it launches its ballistic missiles? The official Navy answer: They will remain focused on their strategic deterrent mission, not on conventional naval combat. The unspoken answer, of course, is that if things get bad enough that a sub has fired all its nuclear weapons, there won't be much of a planet left to fight over anyway.

"This is not like an SSN [attack sub]," Rear Adm. Barry Bruner, director of submarine warfare, summed up for reporters at the conference. "It's not a hunter-killer submarine."

So the Ohio replacement's job is not to hunt: It's job is the traditional role of a boomer -- to hide and to hope its onboard Armageddon is never unleashed. The question in some quarters is whether it can hide well enough.

The threat is not so much from traditional sonar as from "non-acoustic" systems, like magnetic detectors that can find the metal hull or satellites that can peer below the surface of the water. The Navy insists this is one area where they have not cut back, "not in terms of stealthiness and survivability," said Bruner.

The SSBN(X) will be built to evolve with the threats, as past subs have, including the possibility of new sensors and new stealth coatings, added Rear Adm. David Johnson, the program executive officer for all Navy submarines. But "there are some things you have to build in from the start," he said. "We haven't compromised on the stealth."

Given the long lifespan of the sub, it's immensely difficult "to envision what the world's going to be like in 2050 or 2060," Bruner admitted. "There are technical breakthroughs all the time, but we've looked at trends in acoustic quieting and trends in non-acoustic performance, [and] we're convinced that the Ohio replacement is the right ship to take us through the rest of this century."

That extraordinary lifespan creates more complications than just forecasting anti-submarine threats. Most critical to the SSBN(X) mission is that the ballistic missile it will carry for the last half of its life hasn't been invented yet.

When it enters service circa 2031, the Ohio replacement will carry the same Trident II D5 missile now standard on the Ohios, and as long as the D5s can do the job, said Bruner, "we'll wait as long as we can before we tackle that next big bill."

Major investment in the missile can only be put off so long, added Rear Adm. Terry Benedict, the Navy's director of strategic systems. "We will need to do something with the current D5 design between now and 2080," he said. "The system's not going to last that long."

"We're not alone," Benedict added. The Air Force's mainstay Minuteman missile is aging, too, as is both service's inventory of nuclear warheads -- and there's no plan on the books to replace any of them. The minimum would be perpetual upgrades and service-life extensions to keep old missiles in service, as is already being done for the workhorse B-52 bomber. The maximum would be all-new missiles for each service -- or, perhaps, a single common missile for both.

Given budget constraints, "we may be forced to go to a revolutionary position of a joint ballistic missile," Benedict declared. That's a tremendous technical challenge. Submarine-launched missiles have to launch from underwater, something Air Force ICBMs do not. They have to fit not in roomy silos but in narrow tubes -- especially since the Navy shrank the SSBN(X)'s tubes from 97 inch diameter to 84 inches to save costs. A new missile could be, at maximum, no larger than today's D5.

Benedict assured the assembled submariners at the conference that the Navy would not compromise its unique requirements, and a common missile with the Air Force may not be practical. But the two services will definitely collaborate on research, development, and building components that can be used in both their arsenals, like gyroscopes and constituents for rocket fuel. (The Navy needs a unique fuel mix, but some of the ingredients can be shared with the Air Force and NASA).

Just before the Submarine League conference, Benedict said, he had visited Barksdale Air Force Base to talk missile cooperation with 20 Air Force generals and Senior Executive Service civilians. "The future is going to be much more intertwined between these two services," Benedict said. "Collaboration and commonality is not an option, it is a requirement."

The other crucial partner on ballistic missiles is the United Kingdom, whose only remaining nuclear weapons are on its Vanguard submarines. Ironically, the Navy has a better record of collaboration with the Brits than with America's Air Force. The Royal Navy has relied on U.S.-designed missiles since the Polaris Sales Agreement was signed in 1963.

Even after the Americans delayed the SSBN(X) program by two years, they stuck to the original schedule to develop the missile compartment so it would be ready in time for the British could use the design in their own new missile submarine, which must enter service two years before the American sub.

So all together, the new submarine and its missiles are an extremely costly, complex, international effort with long lead times. Chief of Naval Operations Adm. Jonathan Greenert signed off on the requirements for SSBN(X) this August; the Capability Development Document, or CDD, must now pass muster before the all-service Joint Requirements Oversight Council in time for detailed design work to begin in 2017. Even though the first sub will not hit the water until 2028, once those requirements and designs are set, changing them is a recipe for disastrous cost overruns and delays, as the Navy found out with its first two Littoral Combat Ships.

"This ship is going to take us through this century, so not only through my children's lives but through my children's children's lives and maybe even their children," said Bruner, "so we have to make sure we're building the right ship."

Tuesday, 24 July 2012

Defense Cuts: How Do You Buy 1.8 Submarines?

The Defense Department planned to buy two Virginia-class submarines, like the USS Virginia, per year. A 10 percent across-the-board cut would fund only 1.8 submarines, making the purchase impossible.

Congress created a monster when it decided that the entire government will face across-the-board cuts in January, unless an agreement on deficit reduction is reached.

The deadline for the automatic spending cuts — called sequestration — is now approaching, and the Pentagon, Congress and the defense industry say those cuts would be horrible.

The Pentagon, perhaps the world's premier planning agency, views the threat of a 10 percent budget cut like an invasion from Mars. It's too awful, too scary and, as Pentagon press secretary George Little puts it, too "absurd."

Companies are limiting hiring and halting investments, largely due to the uncertainty of how sequestration cuts would be applied.

- David Hess, CEO Pratty & Whitney

"We typically don't plan against absurdities," Little says.

Sequestration is an absurdity, so terrible it was never supposed to happen. Why is it absurd? Because it requires that all programs be cut equally, and many analysts say that the nature of defense spending does make it very hard to cut that way.

Todd Harrison with the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments says some weapons systems are particularly tough to trim.

"Take for example your Virginia-class submarine [that] we were planning to buy two per year," Harrison says, "if we're planning to cut back by 10 percent, well you can't buy 1.8 subs."

California Republican Rep. Buck McKeon, chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, also believes the Pentagon cuts are scary but says it's best to confront our fears, and talk about them.

"I worry that the cavernous silence from the president will lead many to exit the industry or to walk away from capital investments that are in the best interest of our troops," McKeon says.

Actually, he wants the White House to explain how it will manage defense cuts, hoping the administration will end up with the blame for job losses that many say will result from a smaller military. McKeon invited defense contractors to testify before Congress this past week to share their anxieties over the coming sequestration cuts.

David Hess, CEO of aerospace manufacturer Pratt & Whitney, testified that if the administration would only talk about how it will manage these cuts, he could at least manage his business.

"Companies are limiting hiring and halting investments, largely due to the uncertainty of how sequestration cuts would be applied," Hess said.

The industry has been staging anti-sequestration rallies and releasing reports that claim 1 million people would lose their defense jobs if the cuts go forward. After a lot of prodding, the Office of Management and Budget and the Pentagon have agreed to appear at a sequestration hearing next month.

Both agencies, however, have refused to discuss actual plans so far, and there's no reason to think that will change.

Some say that this irrational fear of sequestration has made it impossible to embrace the only rational treatment in this Beltway psychodrama: looking for manageable cuts to defense. Heather Hurlburt of the National Security Network says any cuts would follow years of spending growth.

"This enormous department has grown by 50 percent over the last decade," Hurlburt says.

Sequestration would be a nightmare, Hurlburt agrees, but she says Congress is virtually guaranteeing the worst will happen by refusing to consider even limited cuts.

"There's been a lot of discussion about whether we might have a modest copay as part of military health care," she says, "and Congress has vigorously acted to prevent any kind of discussion of cost-saving reform in military health."

So there are two strategies for dealing with fear of defense sequestration: refuse to talk about it, or talk at length about how awful it will be. More research is needed to say which technique is most effective, but neither will cure the underlying disease of failure to agree on a deficit reduction package. Congress' clinical trial ends in January, when the sequestration nightmare becomes real.

Friday, 20 July 2012

Nuclear and Missile Systems the U.S. Can't Afford, Don't Need

If  the U.S. Congress and the White House are serious about reducing the booming federal deficit, they must work together to scale back previous schemes for a new generation of strategic nuclear weapons delivery systems and unnecessary spending on a ground-based missile defense system that doesn't work for a threat that doesn't exist.

It has been more than two decades since the end of the Cold War, yet the United States maintains--and is poised to rebuild--a costly strategic nuclear triad that is sized to launch far more nuclear weapons than necessary to deter nuclear attack against the U.S. or its allies.

Today, the United States deploys some 1,737 strategic nuclear warheads, while Russia deploys some 1,492 strategic nuclear warheads. Each side has thousands more warheads in reserve.

Other than Russia, the only potential adversary with a long-range nuclear capability is China, which has no more than 40-50 warheads on intercontinental ballistic missiles. The United States' has more than 30 times as many. Just one U.S. nuclear-armed submarine--loaded with 24 missiles, each armed with four 455-kilaton warheads--could kill millions.

As the Pentagon's new defense strategy correctly asserts, "It is possible that our deterrence goals can be achieved with a smaller nuclear force...."

However, current plans call for 12 new nuclear-armed ballistic missile submarines to carry more than 1,000 strategic nuclear warheads into the 2070s, at a total cost of almost $350 billion.

The Air Force is seeking a new, nuclear-armed strategic bomber that would cost at least $68 billion, as well as a new fleet of land-based ballistic missiles. Modernization and operation of the United States' 450 Minuteman III land-based ballistic missiles would cost billions more.

As, then-Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Gen. James Cartwright explained last year, "... we have to recapitalize all three legs [of the nuclear triad], and we don't have the money to do it."

In a time of budget austerity, these ambitious and expensive schemes for a new generation of strategic nuclear weapons delivery systems can and must be scaled back in manageable, cost-effective way.

Likewise, U.S. ballistic missile interceptor programs should be cost-effective, proven through real-world testing, and sized to address threats that actually exist. The fiscal year 2013 budget request would already provide $9.7 billion for all ballistic missile defense programs, and the administration projects spend another $47.4 billion for these programs from 2013 to 2017.

The administration's missile defense budget includes $903 million for operating 30 ground-based interceptor (GBI) missiles in Alaska and California to deal with a potential limited limited, long-range missile attacks from North Korea or Iran, neither of which have successfully tested such missiles. The system failed in their last two intercept tests, in January and December 2010. The MDA plans to have 52 GBI missiles by 2017.

Despite the GBI program's severe shortcomings and high-costs, some would have the taxpayer spend even more on the program than the administration has requested.

There are four principal ways in which the president and the Congress can trim unnecessary strategic nuclear force modernization programs and trim excess spending from the unproven Ground-Based Mid-Course strategic missile interceptor program--and still retain more than enough megatonnage to deter nuclear attack by any current or future adversary.

1. RIGHTSIZE THE STRATEGIC NUCLEAR SUB FLEET

The first step is to reevaluate and reduce the size of the future nuclear-armed strategic submarine force. In January 2012, the Pentagon said it would delay procurement of the proposed Ohio-class replacement nuclear-armed submarine (SSBNX) by two years, starting in 2031 not 2029, which could save some $6-7 billion in the next ten years.

However, without a reduction in the size of the force, the overall cost of the program will remain the same, and take resources away from the Navy's other priority shipbuilding projects. The Pentagon has requested $565 billion for the SSBNX program for fiscal 2013.

By reducing the Trident nuclear-armed sub fleet from 14 to 8 or fewer boats and building no more than 8 new nuclear-armed subs, the United States could save roughly $27 billion over 10 years, and $120 billion over the 50-year lifespan of the program.

Furthermore, by changing prompt launch requirements developed during the Cold War and increasing the number of missile tubes and warhead loadings on each submarine, the Navy could still deploy the same number of strategic nuclear warheads at sea on a smaller, 8 sub fleet, as currently planned under the New START treaty (about 1,000).

2. POSTPONE WORK ON A NEW STRATEGIC BOMBER

Second, work on a new strategic bomber should be delayed. There is no rush to field a fleet of new bombers given the Pentagon's plan to retain 60 of its existing nuclear-capable, long-range B-2 and B-52 bombers into the 2040s, which will already cost approximately $4 billion to refurbish over the next 4 years. Delaying work on the new bomber program would save $18 billion over the next decade and approximately $292 million in fiscal year 2013 alone, according to the Pentagon.

3. TRIM THE COLD WAR ICBM FORCE

For additional savings, the Pentagon should reduce its land-based intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) force from 420 to 300 by cutting one squadron at each of the three Air Force bases where such missiles are deployed and foregoing a follow-on missile program to replace the existing force. This move would save approximately $360 million in operations and maintenance costs in fiscal 2013 alone and far more in future years.

Prudent U.S. strategic nuclear force reductions could also induce Russia to further reduce its deployed strategic nuclear arsenal, which is already 200 warheads fewer than the United States, and prompt Moscow to delay or cancel some of its own costly plans for modernizing its strategic nuclear delivery systems.

4. DON'T SPEND MORE TAXPAYER MONEY GROUND-BASED MID-COURSE MISSILE INTERCEPTORS THAT DON'T WORK

The United States already has two GMD sites on the west coast, with 30 interceptors deployed in California and Alaska, to counter a potential, limited long-range ballistic missile volley from a rogue state. Neither Iran nor North Korea has yet deployed long-range missiles that could reach the United States.

The administration's budget request also includes $1.5 billion for the European Phased Adaptive Approach, which involves the SM-3 interceptor system to handle potential attacks involving short- and medium-range missiles from Iran. Iran does have such missiles.

Spending even more for the GBI system--which has not had a successful intercept test since 2008; has had two flight test failures in 2010; and cannot yet deal with decoys--is not prudent. Because the GBI cannot be relied upon to work in real-world conditions and because Iran and North Korea has not successfully tested long-range missiles, pouring more money into the program doesn't improve U.S. national security and drains resources from other, higher priority programs.

MORE SECURITY FOR LESS MONEY

Fresh thinking is in order. Programs that address low-priority threats must be scaled back to make room for more pressing national priorities and reduce the deficit. Smart reductions in spending on unnecessary new nuclear weapons systems would enhance U.S. security.

Monday, 16 July 2012

Failure to disclose on Guard cuts causes anger

It’s been a rough spring and summer for the Air Force: Its planned cuts to the Air National Guard have been met with wholesale rejection, and lawmakers and state officials alike have rapped the service for its lack of transparency in the budget process.

In several hearings — the latest one Thursday — and letters, their message has been simple: Do better next time.

“We just don’t feel that we got the response we should have, and from the beginning, we didn’t have the consultation that’s supposed to be required,” said Iowa Gov. Terry Branstad, co-chairman of the bipartisan Council of Governors panel, while testifying at the hearing before the House Armed Services readiness subcommittee.

“This last year was a disaster,” he said.

In February, the Air Force released its planned fiscal 2013 budget request, which called for cutting 9,900 active-duty, Reserve and Guard airmen, and more than 200 aircraft. The majority of the cuts — 5,100 guardsmen — targeted mobility, primarily a Guard mission.

Following the request, the council put forth a plan to cut fewer guardsmen, which was rejected by the Air Force almost immediately. After rejecting a compromise suggested by Defense Secretary Leon Panetta, state leaders decided to push Congress to block all cuts to the Air National Guard, and that move has succeeded.

“I think we all feel now we really had to go to the Hill on this issue,” Branstad said. “We were not able to make the progress we hoped to with the Pentagon and with the Air Force.”
Lack of communication

The state leaders’ issues with the budget began almost immediately, as governors and state adjutants general said they had to read about the proposed cutbacks in the newspaper.

The Air Force “did not comply with any of the statutory requirements, presidential executive order directives or policy commitments to communicate with governors and consult with the Council of Governors,” said Maj. Gen. Timothy Lowenberg, Washington state adjutant general, in his testimony at the House hearing.

Speaking for the Air Force, Lt. Gen. Christopher Miller, deputy chief of staff for strategic plans and programs, said budget planners in the Air Force and Defense Department faced “additional constraints” in sharing information on the budget cuts, because of additional budget pressures such as the Budget Control Act.

“There was certainly more control over information as most years, but not absolute,” Miller said.

But that direction amounted to a “gag order,” leaving state leaders in the dark and unprepared for the proposed cuts, lawmakers have said repeatedly.

“These gag orders have just got to stop coming out of the Pentagon, because it serves no purpose not to be transparent and get this information out,” said Rep. Randy Forbes, R-Va., chairman of the House Armed Services readiness subcommittee. “We don’t do transparency because it is easy; we do it because it is right for the American people. This is a pattern.”

The budget was “developed, debated and validated” and would build an Air Force to ensure success in any challenge, even though it will create the smallest Air Force ever, Miller said.

But proposing to cut Guard units at what lawmakers regarded as an unfair ratio compared with the active force stirred up a predictable hornet’s nest from politicians looking to save jobs in home districts.

A plan to move the 18th Aggressor Squadron from Eielson Air Force Base, Alaska, to Joint Base Elmendorf-Richardson prompted that state’s Democratic Sen. Mark Begich to place a hold on Air Force promotions, even after the Air Force crafted a report on the proposed move. The Eielson move is now on hold for at least a year and Begich lifted his hold.

Similar examples abound throughout the budget. The proposed closure of the 911th Airlift Wing in Pittsburgh was targeted by lawmakers, including Rep. Tim Murphy, R-Pa., who said the wing was “low-hanging fruit” and the Air Force lacked adequate research on closing the base. That, too, has been put on hold.

The Air Force proposed cutting all 17 of the Air National Guard explosive ordnance disposal teams, a decision reached because of the drawdowns in Iraq and Afghanistan and more manpower positions were needed for new missions, such as new National Guard MC-12 Liberty and remotely piloted aircraft squadrons. However, in some states, such as Vermont, the Air National Guard EOD team is the only military-rated bomb squad available.

“It looks to me like what they did was just hand you a bill to pay, and then you had to make state and local cuts, including bomb squad cuts, to meet those targets,” said Sen. Patrick Leahy, D-Vt., in a May hearing.

The EOD cuts are also under review.

Moving forward, lawmakers and state leaders say they are willing to accept some cuts, just as long as they are involved in the process.

“This needs to be really carefully thought out,” Rep. Leonard Boswell, D-Iowa, said. “You better pull those governors in and let them be a part of it.”

Thursday, 5 July 2012

UK Defence Cuts Revealed: The Infantry Battalions To Be Axed


Five battalions will be disbanded under planned reductions to the army from more than 100,000 troops to 82,000 by 2020.

The five infantry battalions that are to be scrapped as part of Government cuts.

They are 

  • 5 Scots - The Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders
  • One Battalion of The Yorkshire Regiment
  • 2nd Battalion The Royal Regiment of Fusiliers 
  • 3rd Battalion The Mercian Regiment (The Staffords)
  • 2nd Battalion The Royal Welsh Regiment.

The battalions will be disbanded under planned reductions to the army from more than 100,000 troops to 82,000 by 2020.

The controversial reforms are being seen as a revolution and their success will depend on the ability of the army to recruit 30,000 reservists.

The army plans to lean heavily on reserves and they will be expected to shoulder a third of the burden of long-term operations.

Saturday, 23 June 2012

Fears for South Australia defence program


South Australia is unlikely to get a fourth Air Warfare Destroyer shipbuilding contract and concern is growing that there will be a lack of industry work after 2016.

Defence Industries Minister Jack Snelling has told Parliament the Federal Government "has not been receptive" to his lobbying to have a fourth Air Warfare Destroyer built at Outer Harbor's Techport facility.

The Federal Government has pledged to build 12 submarines, valued about $36 billion, at the site. However, it is not expected that program will begin until the early stages of the next decade.

The current Air Warfare Destroyer build program is expected to conclude at Techport in 2016.

It has raised industry concerns that small firms will run out of work to carry them through until the submarine build takes off in earnest, and lead high-skilled defence engineering workers to abandon the state.

Mr Snelling has told Budget Estimates he is investigating "strategies" to overcome the shortfall.

"We clearly are concerned about there being a gap between the wind-down of the Air Warfare Destroyer project and the start-up of the future submarine project," Mr Snelling said. "Obviously we strongly believe that the fourth Air Warfare Destroyer would help fix that, but Commonwealth has not been receptive.

"We are looking at other strategies that we might be able to formulate in order to overcome that problem."

The delay in the start-up of the future submarines program has been caused by lack of federal funding.

However, it is expected more work will be needed at Techport to extend the life of the current Collins Class submarine fleet.

Opposition defence industries spokesman Steven Marshall said the Federal Government has created "chaos" for the SA sector by denying it full details on future plans.

Mr Marshall said an extended period without a major federal boat-building project would undermine plans to build an advanced manufacturing industry and retain skilled workers in SA.