Developing a non-nuclear alternative for winning wars

There is increased international demand for conventional weapons that can be used to meet strategic objectives in localised conflict.

Nuclear weapons remain Russia’s chief means of deterrence ‒ the final argument in a possible large-scale military conflict. The international situation, which is characterised by an increasing number of localised wars, is however creating a demand for non-nuclear weaponns that can be used to achieve strategic objectives from time to time.

Towards the end of November, when commander of Russia’s strategic missile forces, Col. Gen. Sergei Karakayev, was commenting on the results of military training exercises in 2012, he confirmed that Russia was developing advanced missile systems, including a new intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM).

“This year, as part of the State Weapons Programme for 2011–2020, we have been working on creating advanced missile systems and, in particular, a heavy-class missile,” the commander said.

The military operational requirement for the development of a new heavy ICBM was approved in 2011. The lead developer for the new missile was the Makeyev State Rocket Center (Miass, Chelyabinsk Region). The military-industrial corporation NPO Mashinostroyenia (Reutov, Moscow Region) is also involved in the development project. The missile will be manufactured by Krasnoyarsk Engineering Works.

Still, no matter what exceptional potential the new missile or nuclear warhead might have, it is impossible to fight with nuclear missiles unless the objective is to destroy all life on the planet. It is, however, still necessary to fight and to fight effectively, with minimum losses and maximum results.

The Iranian “nuclear crisis” (and the possible use of non-nuclear weapons to resolve the issue by force), as well as the latest Israel-Palestine confrontation serve as graphic confirmation of the fact that strategic objectives can also be achieved with non-strategic weapons.

In the final decade of the last century alone, the world experienced 34 major and minor wars, including an international war in the Persian Gulf, two campaigns in Chechnya and a large-scale war in Yugoslavia.

There were also unseen terrorists, whom the fight against has become a super-objective for the entire planet. In other words, there is no way to get by without weapons. Recent armed conflict has been characterised by brief combat operations that take place within a limited area and without a clearly defined front line, and this trend is likely to continue in the future.

t must be said that, in both America and Russia, there is a heightened emphasis on improving conventional weapons. Thus, the U.S. decided a few years ago to focus on plans to create penetrating ammunition capable of dealing a guaranteed blow against highly defended underground enemy targets.

In anticipation of possible combat operations in Iran, the U.S. Air Force armed itself with the so-called Massive Ordnance Penetrator. This penetrator turned out to be a 15-ton monster, designed to destroy the underground structures where Americans think Iranian nuclear weapons might be housed.

Incidentally, its “parent,” the GBU-28 bomb, developed at the end of the 1980s, very nearly blew Gaddafi himself, in his bunker residence in Bab al-Azizia, to kingdom come in August 2011. According to NATO intelligence, the leader was supposed to be there, having been lured there by his treacherous deputy head of intelligence, Khalifa Muhammad Ali. Thirty minutes before the attack, however, Gaddafi left the bunker with his sons and his closest associates.

Russia, for its part, decided to strengthen its position in the area of so-called “vacuum” bombing. Resonance testing of what is still the most powerful vacuum bomb in the world was carried out in fall 2007.

The U.S. used vacuum munitions as far back as the 1960s in Vietnam. Russia fired shells from its TOS-1 flamethrower rocket-firing vehicle at mujahedeen positions in Afghanistan; the shells contained a thermobaric mixture that operated on the same principle as the U.S munitions. Russia later used the same shells in a conflict against Chechen separatists.

The aerial thermobaric bomb features a container (or containers) of an explosive mixture based, for example, on volatile hydrocarbons. When it hits the target, or when the ammunition explodes above the surface, the mixture is released. When the mixture combines with oxygen in the atmosphere, it forms a very powerful explosive cloud that detonates within 100-140 milliseconds of being released.

In such an explosion, excess pressure, which can reach 6.1 pounds per square foot, is created by the shock wave as it advances at a supersonic speed of 1.8 miles per second. Conversely, a deep vacuum is formed in the wake of this wave, capable of sucking in air and solid particles like a vacuum cleaner.

The ability of the fuel-air mix to damage or destroy an obstacle is very low. However, for a person, it is probably difficult to imagine a more deadly weapon. When it explodes, anyone who does not die in the flames is subjected to the effect of a very powerful shock wave and vacuum.

This kind of weapon is becoming the main mode of fighting enemy troops. It will, perhaps, be prioritised by those who are drawing up future military plans.

Nuclear and Missile Systems the U.S. Can't Afford, Don't Need

If  the U.S. Congress and the White House are serious about reducing the booming federal deficit, they must work together to scale back previous schemes for a new generation of strategic nuclear weapons delivery systems and unnecessary spending on a ground-based missile defense system that doesn't work for a threat that doesn't exist.

It has been more than two decades since the end of the Cold War, yet the United States maintains--and is poised to rebuild--a costly strategic nuclear triad that is sized to launch far more nuclear weapons than necessary to deter nuclear attack against the U.S. or its allies.

Today, the United States deploys some 1,737 strategic nuclear warheads, while Russia deploys some 1,492 strategic nuclear warheads. Each side has thousands more warheads in reserve.

Other than Russia, the only potential adversary with a long-range nuclear capability is China, which has no more than 40-50 warheads on intercontinental ballistic missiles. The United States' has more than 30 times as many. Just one U.S. nuclear-armed submarine--loaded with 24 missiles, each armed with four 455-kilaton warheads--could kill millions.

As the Pentagon's new defense strategy correctly asserts, "It is possible that our deterrence goals can be achieved with a smaller nuclear force...."

However, current plans call for 12 new nuclear-armed ballistic missile submarines to carry more than 1,000 strategic nuclear warheads into the 2070s, at a total cost of almost $350 billion.

The Air Force is seeking a new, nuclear-armed strategic bomber that would cost at least $68 billion, as well as a new fleet of land-based ballistic missiles. Modernization and operation of the United States' 450 Minuteman III land-based ballistic missiles would cost billions more.

As, then-Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Gen. James Cartwright explained last year, "... we have to recapitalize all three legs [of the nuclear triad], and we don't have the money to do it."

In a time of budget austerity, these ambitious and expensive schemes for a new generation of strategic nuclear weapons delivery systems can and must be scaled back in manageable, cost-effective way.

Likewise, U.S. ballistic missile interceptor programs should be cost-effective, proven through real-world testing, and sized to address threats that actually exist. The fiscal year 2013 budget request would already provide $9.7 billion for all ballistic missile defense programs, and the administration projects spend another $47.4 billion for these programs from 2013 to 2017.

The administration's missile defense budget includes $903 million for operating 30 ground-based interceptor (GBI) missiles in Alaska and California to deal with a potential limited limited, long-range missile attacks from North Korea or Iran, neither of which have successfully tested such missiles. The system failed in their last two intercept tests, in January and December 2010. The MDA plans to have 52 GBI missiles by 2017.

Despite the GBI program's severe shortcomings and high-costs, some would have the taxpayer spend even more on the program than the administration has requested.

There are four principal ways in which the president and the Congress can trim unnecessary strategic nuclear force modernization programs and trim excess spending from the unproven Ground-Based Mid-Course strategic missile interceptor program--and still retain more than enough megatonnage to deter nuclear attack by any current or future adversary.

1. RIGHTSIZE THE STRATEGIC NUCLEAR SUB FLEET

The first step is to reevaluate and reduce the size of the future nuclear-armed strategic submarine force. In January 2012, the Pentagon said it would delay procurement of the proposed Ohio-class replacement nuclear-armed submarine (SSBNX) by two years, starting in 2031 not 2029, which could save some $6-7 billion in the next ten years.

However, without a reduction in the size of the force, the overall cost of the program will remain the same, and take resources away from the Navy's other priority shipbuilding projects. The Pentagon has requested $565 billion for the SSBNX program for fiscal 2013.

By reducing the Trident nuclear-armed sub fleet from 14 to 8 or fewer boats and building no more than 8 new nuclear-armed subs, the United States could save roughly $27 billion over 10 years, and $120 billion over the 50-year lifespan of the program.

Furthermore, by changing prompt launch requirements developed during the Cold War and increasing the number of missile tubes and warhead loadings on each submarine, the Navy could still deploy the same number of strategic nuclear warheads at sea on a smaller, 8 sub fleet, as currently planned under the New START treaty (about 1,000).

2. POSTPONE WORK ON A NEW STRATEGIC BOMBER

Second, work on a new strategic bomber should be delayed. There is no rush to field a fleet of new bombers given the Pentagon's plan to retain 60 of its existing nuclear-capable, long-range B-2 and B-52 bombers into the 2040s, which will already cost approximately $4 billion to refurbish over the next 4 years. Delaying work on the new bomber program would save $18 billion over the next decade and approximately $292 million in fiscal year 2013 alone, according to the Pentagon.

3. TRIM THE COLD WAR ICBM FORCE

For additional savings, the Pentagon should reduce its land-based intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) force from 420 to 300 by cutting one squadron at each of the three Air Force bases where such missiles are deployed and foregoing a follow-on missile program to replace the existing force. This move would save approximately $360 million in operations and maintenance costs in fiscal 2013 alone and far more in future years.

Prudent U.S. strategic nuclear force reductions could also induce Russia to further reduce its deployed strategic nuclear arsenal, which is already 200 warheads fewer than the United States, and prompt Moscow to delay or cancel some of its own costly plans for modernizing its strategic nuclear delivery systems.

4. DON'T SPEND MORE TAXPAYER MONEY GROUND-BASED MID-COURSE MISSILE INTERCEPTORS THAT DON'T WORK

The United States already has two GMD sites on the west coast, with 30 interceptors deployed in California and Alaska, to counter a potential, limited long-range ballistic missile volley from a rogue state. Neither Iran nor North Korea has yet deployed long-range missiles that could reach the United States.

The administration's budget request also includes $1.5 billion for the European Phased Adaptive Approach, which involves the SM-3 interceptor system to handle potential attacks involving short- and medium-range missiles from Iran. Iran does have such missiles.

Spending even more for the GBI system--which has not had a successful intercept test since 2008; has had two flight test failures in 2010; and cannot yet deal with decoys--is not prudent. Because the GBI cannot be relied upon to work in real-world conditions and because Iran and North Korea has not successfully tested long-range missiles, pouring more money into the program doesn't improve U.S. national security and drains resources from other, higher priority programs.

MORE SECURITY FOR LESS MONEY

Fresh thinking is in order. Programs that address low-priority threats must be scaled back to make room for more pressing national priorities and reduce the deficit. Smart reductions in spending on unnecessary new nuclear weapons systems would enhance U.S. security.

Wales - First Minister draws a line under nuclear arguement

FIRST MINISTER Carwyn Jones has said that the argument over the potential move of nuclear missile submarines from Scotland to Milford Haven is “entirely academic.”

Mr Jones appeared keen to draw a line under the row which began last month when he suddenly told assembly members that the nuclear missile Vanguard-class submarine fleet and the associated jobs would “be more than welcome” in Milford Haven.

A Welsh Government spokesman later said: “The First Minister recognises the substantial economic benefits of relocating Britain’s nuclear submarines to west Wales.”

That had kick-started heated debate about whether the submarines and their nuclear missiles could or should ever be based in the Haven waterway.

But after weeks of questioning, petitions and rumours of behind-thescenes discontent among the Labour front bench in Cardiff, Mr Jones seemed to want to move on when asked about the issue at First Minister’s questions last week.

“It’s quite clear from the UK Government that the fleet will remain at Faslane, so the issue is now entirely academic,”

Scottish Government * hits out at 'obscene' £1bn Trident renewal deal

A £1billion contract for ­reactors to power the next generation of Britain’s nuclear submarines on the Clyde will be announced this week.

Defence Secretary Philip Hammond has agreed the deal as part of Government plans to replace the Vanguard fleet that carries the Trident nuclear deterrent.

But the Scottish Government hit out at the move, saying it would be an “obscenity” to press ahead.

Government Strategy ­Secretary Bruce Crawford’s warning comes after Defence Secretary Philip Hammond insisted the final decision on Trident had not been made despite the contract to build two reactor cores.

­Crawford said the Scottish ­Government were committed to the “earliest possible withdrawal” of the nuclear deterrent.

He said: “It’s estimated that the costs for the new Trident weapon system could be anything up to £25billion and, over the lifetime, £100billion.

“What is quite clear is that the people of Scotland are opposed to the new nuclear weapons system on the Clyde.

“I think it’s an obscenity that we’re going to be pressing ahead at this time with this particular system.”

Under the Trident programme, the Royal Navy operates 58 nuclear-armed submarine-launched ballistic missiles and about 200 nuclear warheads on four Vanguard-class ballistic missile submarines from Clyde Naval Base at Faslane.

Replacing it has proved a flashpoint for the coalition, with Liberal Democrats opposed to “like-for-like” replacement and Conservatives committed to full renewal by 2028.

Hammond will tomorrow formally announce the contract for the two cores.

The funding will also be used for an 11-year refit of Rolls-Royce’s plant at Raynesway, Derby, which will carry out the work and create 300 jobs.

Hammond said the final “main gate” decision on Trident renewal will still not be made until 2016, but long lead times mean the reactor contracts needed to be signed now.

* Scottish Government is equal to ONE car park attendant at Wal-Mart and Bruce Crawford is similar to a Gnat on a goats ass.