‘Fast-track frigates to save jobs’

A PLAN to save Australia’s ship building industry by bringing forward construction of eight potent new frigates for the Royal Australian Navy is being considered by the Abbott government. 

              

This option to bridge the so-called “valley of death” for shipbuilding would mean constructing sections of some of the new frigates when the hulls of the three air warfare destroyers (AWDs) are completed. That would mean the 7000-tonne frigates would use the same hulls as the destroyers so that they could be built with the existing equipment and the same workforce.

 

The sections, or “blocks” can be built in different shipyards and then welded together.

 

This option will be discussed in a speech to be made by Defence Minister David Johnston to key defence industry figures in Canberra today.

 

The valley of death is the tag given to the point when current defence contracts run out with the completion of the AWDs and two giant landing ships. Companies say they will have to sack thousands of skilled workers unless more ships are ordered.

 

That follow’s last night’s warning by Royal Australian Air Force chief Geoff Brown that the world was entering a period of political and economic instability “which will shape a potentially volatile and dangerous security environment, especially in our region”.

 

“Of particular concern to Australia is the rising tension in the South China Sea where our vital interests are directly engaged,” Air Marshal Brown told The Australian Strategic Policy Institute.

 

He said air power was the most agile and responsive military instrument available to government.

The use of air power by the US to save refugees trapped on Iraq’s Mount Sinjar had demonstrated how decisive it could be.

 

Senator Johnston will tell the industry representatives today the AWD project is running 21 months late and more than $360 million over budget.

 

He stresses the option of building the frigates in Australia ­depends on the shipbuilding industry demonstrating that it can complete the destroyers without further cost overruns or delays.

 

“This is to ensure everything is in place to allow a continued naval shipbuilding industry in Australia,” he will tell the Australian Business Defence Industry Group.

 

“All we are asking is that industry demonstrates it can meet an acceptable benchmark for cost and productivity.

 

“Part of the work on the future frigate program is to examine whether we can commit to the construction of some early blocks to ensure there is no break in production overall.”

 

Senator Johnston says no decision has been made on the design of the navy’s new submarines but work is progressing well on ­options. The government has ­already provided $78m for preliminary work on the new frigates.

 

The new class was set out in the Rudd government’s 2009 defence white paper which intended they’d be operational by the mid-2020s.

 

The ships were to carry cruise missiles and they were likely to be equipped with a system able to ­destroy ballistic missiles.

 

Co-operation on such a system was announced in Sydney last week at the annual AUSMIN talks between Australia’s foreign affairs and defence ministers and their US counterparts.

Fire On Board Royal Australian Navy Submarine

Thursday afternoon, February 27th 2014, HMAS Waller, one of the Royal Australian Navy’s submarines, experienced a fire whilst on the surface off the West Australian coast. Emergency response actions were taken to extinguish the fire.

There were no causalities. As a precaution four members of the ship’s crew who were involved in the response to the fire have been landed for observation.

HMAS Waller had recently completed a scheduled maintenance period and was at sea as part of her return to operations. A full investigation into the incident will be held.  At this stage no further details are available.

Understanding Australia’s Submarine Choice

Ben Collopy, a fifth year University Student at the University of Newcastle Australia, is currently writing an honors thesis paper on the future of the ANZUS alliance with America. Here he discusses Australia’s submarine choice:

Australia is set to embark upon its most ambitious, complex, and expensive defense project in history – the design and construction of its first indigenous submarine. Understanding why Australia has decided to commit to such a project requires both knowledge of Australia’s unique geographical environment and regional strategic realities.

 

 Dubbed the Future Submarine Project, this ambitious scheme hopes to develop the ability to design, test, and construct an Australian submarine perfectly suited for the unique conditions in which it would be required to operate. The project is estimated to cost anywhere between 16 to 36 billion Australian dollars (the final price remains a point of contention) and aims to construct the largest diesel attack submarines in the world, surpassing even the mighty U.S. Virginia-class. The 2013 Defense White Paper unequivocally stated the nation’s intent, removing all other options from the table. There remains, however, a rather heated debate within Australia as to the risks versus possible reward of the Future Submarine Project. Australia has never before attempted something of this magnitude; normally preferring to purchase advanced pieces of military hardware from those who have spent decades perfecting the trade. Such crucial facts and some strategic foresight explain this ambitious move.

 

Firstly, unique geography plays an enormous role in Australia’s decision making. With one of the largest maritime domains in the world, a massive 8,148,250 square kilometers, Australia’s claims stretch from the freezing waters of Antarctica through to the far warmer waters in the North, near the equator. The sheer size of the zone raises a difficult question for the nation, which while large in geographic size, is relatively small in population, with roughly only 23 million people for a nation the size of the United States.

 

It remains rather difficult if not impossible, to patrol and monitor the vast majority of Australian waters. Subsequently areas of importance must be selected. Furthermore military platforms are required to spend long periods of time on station patrolling this zone and covering far larger swaths of sea with limited resources. Australia requires craft that are durable, versatile, and capable of long-term deployments.
 

The size of the continent creates another difficult situation for any navy but especially a submarine force. Multiple sea conditions surround the Australian coastline, with the warmer Pacific Ocean in the north and the much cooler Indian Ocean in the south, far rougher conditions occur in the Indian Ocean than in the milder Pacific Ocean. These climatic changes of temperature alter the salinity of the water, (thereby affecting buoyancy), creating a strong demand for durable and versatile craft.
 

Now, one may ask why the significantly more demanding polar South of the nation requires such serious attention. Despite being a zone of little activity, compared to the busy Northern trade routes, Australia places high strategic importance upon patrolling the Southern route, or so-called “Australian backyard”.  Australia claims up to 40% of Antarctica (despite being ignored by most of the world’s powers, including the United States). Australia does however take this entitlement quite seriously and consequently, the southern region is patrolled and monitored. Anyone who doubts Australia’s intention to protect and guard its southern approach, need only look at a map of claimed Australian maritime borders, and note the strategically placed Macquarie and Heard Islands. These seemingly insignificant parcels of land allow for the creation of effective choke points to any approach of Australia’s claimed Antarctic region and southern trade routes. Should circumstances arise where northern trade routes become unsafe, or worse still blocked perhaps through conflict, the longer and inhospitable south would remain of vital importance. Australia relies on seaborne trade for survival, and if the above mentioned eventuality were ever to arise, the ability to place quiet attack submarines in the newly vital southern trade routes to protect shipping and monitor activity, becomes of unquestionable importance. Combined with Australian Antarctic sovereignty claims, the enforcement of the entire region becomes clearer to understand, despite the highly unpleasant arctic conditions.

 

 

Secondly, growing military capabilities within Southeast and Northern Asia place a further emphasis on the need for a highly survivable and capable submarine fleet. Australia looks beyond 2025 when questioning future military capabilities in Asia, this points to a period where many neighboring nations will have acquired formidable submarine platforms and anti-shipping capabilities. For example Indonesia is seeking to expand its small fleet of two submarines toward a more powerful twelve with the recent purchase of Russia’s quiet running Kilo-class diesel submarine. Vietnam will take possession of its first submarine fleet by the end of 2016. This is not to forget the expansive growth of Chinese A2/AD, or area denial abilities, primarily the growth of anti-shipping weaponry from the emerging power. Lastly, this also heralds the end of the aging Collins-class diesel attack submarine Australia currently employs.
 

While not necessarily constituting an arms race, the growth of submarine capabilities throughout Southeast Asian nations demonstrates the development of these nations as maritime powers who are self-conscious of their perceived lack of maritime defense ability. The growth of ballistic anti-ship missile technology helps to explain the sudden popularity of submarine fleets, as surface vessels lose their survivability in conflict. For smaller nations, these vessels work to create an important deterrent and if need be, the capability to wage effective warfare against a more powerful enemy.
 

 As for Australia, while it certainly doesn’t consider the growth of neighboring military capabilities a risk to its survival, it understands how maritime abilities developed by its neighbors can help secure Southeast Asia and those ever important trade routes. However, it also realizes that the growth of military capabilities erodes Australia’s traditional military edge over its immediate possible rivals. Seemingly then, the desire to have one of the most capable and deadly submarine fleets in the region remains critically important to Australia, which considers much of Southeast Asia of vital strategic importance. Any Asian history buffs should look to the 1951 Radford Collins agreement to get a sense of the zone (large portions of the Indian and Pacific Oceans) Australia has considered under its immediate strategic concern, and perhaps what it still does.
 

Thirdly we come to the varied options Australia has to replace the aging Collins-class. Taking into consideration the above requirements for the future submarine, the list of possible options for replacing the Collins-class is seemingly on the short side. The SEA 1000 project was the study committed in order to ascertain Australia’s requirements for a future submarine. Three basic options were put forward: to buy a MOTS (model off-the-shelf) design and modify it for Australian conditions, evolve the current Collins-class submarine for future use, or lastly create a brand new indigenous submarine designed for Australian requirements.
 

The first option of buying MOTS craft, while certainly more cost effective and of lower risk than the other two options, would struggle to fulfill Australian demands, despite major and costly modifications. While most capable submarines are more than suitable for many other Southeast Asian nations, the vast majority of MOTS-designed craft would not be suited for the expansive Australian maritime border. Most MOTS craft are relatively small, with an average crew of around 30-to-50 men, resulting in less time deployed and limited range due to lack of fuel and food supply.
 

The Collins-class by comparison holds upward of 80 men with far larger compliments of fuel and food, allowing for greater deployment time, upward of three months. The new Future Submarine is planned to be even larger. The increased size also allows for greater armament of torpedoes and guided missiles. The Virginia-class nuclear attack submarine has often been touted as a possible alternative to an Australia design, and while there have been indications that the U.S. might be willing to sell them, the nuclear element of the craft was rejected by the Australian government.


While this has been blamed on a lack of nuclear infrastructure in order to effectively manage a nuclear propelled craft, it is more likely the government remains unwilling to attempt a difficult sell of nuclear technology to a voting public distrustful of nuclear energy, and as a major signatory of the NPT (non-proliferation treaty) it would be trekking into unknown legal waters by attaining nuclear powered craft. Ultimately then, a purchase of MOTS submarines would poorly fit Australia’s needs, and would more than likely result in far greater cost in order to get them to an acceptable level, and without nuclear power, any real contender craft are removed.
 

The option of evolving the current Collins-class is also touted as a more cost-effective alternative to producing a brand new submarine. However the historical failings of its original design have left an unpleasant memory within the Defence Force and government, who now strive to avoid the same mistake. The Collins-class was put to tender from seven of the world’s nine diesel shipbuilding companies. Eventually the Swedish company, Kockums, put forward the Type 471 submarine, fitted with systems from an American company, Rockwell. From the onset major issues arose with the submarine build, resulting in numerous mechanical failures and setbacks. This meant cost spiraled greatly, and a following disagreement between Rockwell, Kockums, RAN, and the Australian government meant the vessels were delayed in their construction.
 

A lesson learned after costly upgrade programs were enacted was that too much diversification on one project could result in communication breakdowns, and the incompatible mating of components made from different suppliers resulted in unforeseen issues, especially when attempting to implant American combat systems into MOTS submarines. This helps to explain the current decision to commit to the largest and most complex defence project in Australia’s history. Again, however, there is great depth into understanding the current decision, the emergence of a nation set on expanding its abilities and standing in the world.
 

The RAND Corporation was hired by the Australian government to conduct a study into Australia’s submarine building and design capacity. It subsequently found that while the infrastructure was only slightly lacking, and the software capability was acceptable, a skills shortage proved to be the greatest problem, especially in regards to undersea propulsion. At no stage was the possibility of an indigenous submarine design and construct ever deemed impossible, rather, it conveyed a real sense of the possibility of Australia enhancing its ability to produce complex and highly advanced defence platforms. Plans to amend shortages were subsequently created.
 

The Future Submarine Project is already well underway, with the Future Submarine Project Office established in Adelaide. Tenders must be sent out for the design and development for the hull, systems and various components, and the ASC (Australian Submarine Company) is to begin construction sometime within the new few years through 2030. The ASC is well placed to fulfill the construction of the Future Submarine, with decades of work on the Collins under its belt, from construction work to maintenance of the Collins and finally to upgrading the troublesome boats.
 

 As for a nuclear option, it remains unlikely. While nuclear powered submarines would be the best possible option for Australia, as argued here, a lack of political will is likely to hamstring any attempts. The current conservative government however, is perhaps more pragmatic and positive towards the possibility and with a new Defence White Paper due the end of 2014, there remains hope. Australia is keenly self-aware of its unique strategic position in the world, and has striven since World War II to develop capabilities that allow for a self-reliant defence ability of the massive island nation. Despite a riskier option, the rewards offers far greater justifiable benefits in development of an indigenous Australian submarine, allowing the country to reach a new level of self-reliance and confidence, and take a strategic leap forward in the world in an uncertain and ever-changing world.

 

New subs to be much bigger than Collins

Australia's next submarine will be much bigger than the existing Collins boats but the likely cost won't be known for years, a senior defence official says. 

 

David Gould, general manager for submarines in the Defence Materiel Organisation (DMO), said he couldn't estimate the cost of a vessel not yet designed and could not endorse estimates of $36-40 billion in some studies.

Under the 2009 and 2013 Defence White Papers, Australia is looking to replace the six Collins submarines with 12 new vessels of greater range, longer endurance and expanded capabilities.

This is set to be Australia's largest ever defence procurement.

Mr Gould said the new boats would have to be larger than the 3500-tonnes Collins.

"It will be in my opinion larger, much larger. That's the work we are doing at the moment," he told an Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI) national security lunch.

The 2013 White Paper reduced the acquisition options from four to two, ruling out the cheapest options of an existing overseas design or an existing model with some Australia-specific systems.

That leaves either an evolution of the Collins or an all-new design.

Mr Gould said Australia had reached agreement with the government of Sweden on intellectual property rights to allow a start on concept designs for an evolved Collins.

That work would be undertaken by German shipbuilder TKMS, now the parent of Swedish firm Kockums, the original Collins designer.

Mr Gould said TKMS would have to correct known defects with Collins and propose improvements.

"But we will not allow them to increase the diameter of the pressure hull - to do so would clearly cross the threshold of a new design," he said.

Mr Gould said two concept designs should have been completed in two years and a decision made on the propulsion system for the first two or three boats.

There would be a much better handle on costs of design and construction.

"But we will not have contract quality costs for a build by any stretch of the imagination at that point," he said.

Australia - Minister for Defence Materiel – Sale of decommissioned Ships Manoora and Kanimbla

Minister for Defence Materiel Dr Mike Kelly AM MP today announced the disposal by sale of the Royal Australian Navy’s (RAN) decommissioned ships HMAS Manoora and HMAS Kanimbla.

Dr Kelly said the Navy vessels would be recycled by purchaser Southern Recycling LLC in the United States in a manner commensurate to the environmental standards the Commonwealth expected of such disposal activities by 2014.

“In June 2012, the Department of Defence released a Request for Tender offering the two former Australian naval vessels for sale for recycling to domestic and international markets,” Dr Kelly said.

The disposal of these vessels required US Government consent in accordance with US International Traffic in Arms Regulations, which has now been achieved.

Contract negotiations with the preferred purchaser were completed in early May 2013 and the disposal contract was signed on 20 May 2013. The contract details regarding cost are ‘Commercial in Confidence’. The ships were withdrawn from service in 2011. 

“The disposal of Manoora and Kanimbla by sale has been completed in less than two years from the date the vessels were withdrawn from service, providing the best and most competitive net disposal cost to the Commonwealth,” Dr Kelly said.

The ships were formally decommissioned with ceremonies in 2012. Memorabilia from the ships has been transferred to the Naval Heritage Collection Headquarters and the main repository at Spectacle Island, which are both located in Sydney.

HMAS Tobruk and HMAS Choules now continue to provide Navy’s core amphibious capability together with Australian Defence Vessel Ocean Shield, until Australia’s First Landing Helicopter Dock (LHD) HMAS Canberra is commissioned in 2014.

HMAS Choules recently completed a successful period of ‘Shakedown’ training in far north Queensland which included flying operations with a Royal Australian Navy Multi-Role Helicopter (MRH90) and is currently taking part in a joint Navy and Army amphibious exercise called Exercise SEA LION from 10–24 June 2013.

Media contacts:
Minister Kelly’s office: Robbie Rynehart (02) 6277 7730 or 0459 810 654
Defence Media Operations (02) 6127 1999

Australia’s Submarine Folly

Over the last several years there has been an ongoing debate over the replacement of Australia's conventional powered Collins-class submarines. Some defense analysts have argued that a nuclear submarine purchase or leased from the United States, the UK, or France would make the most sense as opposed to the limitations a conventional diesel submarine.

It seems, at least for now, the debate has been settled, with homegrown diesel subs winning the day.

On Friday, Australia released its Defense White Paper 2013. The document lays out the future agenda and goals for Australia's military. The document seems to have crushed the idea of nuclear propelled Australian submarines:

"Due to the strategic value and importance of Australia’s submarine capability, the Government remains committed to replacing the existing Collins Class fleet with an expanded fleet of 12 conventional submarines that will meet Australia’s future strategic requirements. The future submarines will be assembled in South Australia. The Government has ruled out consideration of a nuclear powered submarine capability to replace the Collins Class fleet."

The report also seemingly commits to an indigenously built vessel:

"The Government has directed further work on a new Submarine Propulsion Energy Support and Integration Facility in Australia. This land-based facility will substantially reduce risk in the Future Submarine Program by providing the capability to research, integrate, assemble and test the propulsion, energy and drive train systems in all stages of the Future Submarine’s design, build and through-life sustainment."

"The Government has also taken the important decision to suspend further investigation of the two Future Submarine options based on military-off-the-shelf designs in favor of focusing resources on progressing an ‘evolved Collins’ and new design options that are likely to best meet Australia’s future strategic and capability requirements." 

There are some compelling arguments for sure when it comes to the direction of Australia's future submarine force. Homegrown conventional diesel submarines obviously would power Australia's defense industry for decades to come, creating or retaining jobs while developing greater domestic submarine building capabilities and technical knowhow. Modern diesel electric submarines, powered by air-independent propulsion, are near silent and tough to track by any modern navy. Armed with modern anti-ship missiles, they are certainly a force to be reckoned with on the high-seas.

Despite the benefits to Australia's defense industry and military capabilities of a domestic conventional submarine, one must look back to Canberra's last submarine project, the Collins-class — certainly not a smooth experience. In an interview The Diplomat conducted last year with Australian defense expert Ross Babbage, he explained some of the challenges of the last domestically built submarine:

"Overall, the Collins Class program demonstrated that Australia does have the industrial and other skills to design, build and then operate a very advanced diesel-electric submarine, provided that it receives extensive assistance from a range of friendly countries. When fully operational, these boats have periodically performed extremely well on exercises.

However, there were many problems with the Collins program including flaws in the contract and contract management, inadequate contingency allowances, design weaknesses, skill shortages and some major production and support difficulties. The result was that the boats arrived late, they were over-budget, they have experienced continuing reliability problems and these factors have compounded the challenges of building experienced submarine crews and a strong cohort of support personnel for the force.

Hence, while the Collins program hasn’t been the unmitigated disaster that’s so frequently described in the press, it isn’t the sort of experience that should be repeated given the rather more demanding requirements that Australia now has for its next-generation submarines." 

Considering the cost and needs of Australia's military for the next several decades, leasing an American, British or French nuclear submarine would surely have been a better option.

In particular, American nuclear powered Virginia-class subs are some of the most state of the art and well praised in defense circles and would be an excellent choice for Australia. As Babbage noted last May, "(The Virginia class boats), in particular, are well sorted and reliable, they have low risk, they have known costs, they never need to be refueled and they could be acquired with associated training programs and system upgrade pathways."

In the end, domestic considerations like job creation and economic matters may have ruled the day when it comes to Australia's future submarine choice. With Julia Gillard trailing in the polls, it certainly would have been an unpopular choice to hand billions in defense contracts to any foreign supplier at a time when the government is running a budget deficit. However tough the challenge would have been for Gillard, let's hope Australia also weighed the ultimate consideration: getting the most capable submarine to defend the nation for the best cost.

Spanish navy ships head Down Under

Australia has finalised a deal for the Spanish navy tanker and supply ship SPS Cantabria to spend much of next year working with the Australian navy.

 The Cantabria will deploy to Australia from mid-February to November, a period which covers part of the cyclone season when the Australian navy is short of support ships because of the problems with HMAS Choules.

Defence Minister Stephen Smith said the Cantabria deployment was a unique opportunity for both navies and would strengthen the relationship between Spain and Australia.

"I am very pleased that the project arrangement for this innovative activity has been signed," he said in a statement.

"It is a very sensible sharing of resources with positive training and capabilities for both the armada and for the RAN (Royal Australian Navy)."

The 19,500-tonne Cantabria was launched in 2008 and is capable of supplying fuel, food, stores and ammunition to ships while at sea.

This will be the Cantabria's longest deployment and will allow the Spanish Armada to trial the ship's full range of capabilities, including the operating and maintenance cycle.

Defence Materiel Minister Jason Clare said many of the Cantabria's systems were similar to what would be on board Australia's new landing helicopter dock (LHD) ships and air warfare destroyers (AWDs), both of which are based on Spanish designs.

"This arrangement will provide an opportunity for RAN personnel to train and familiarise themselves with Cantabria before they go on to crew the LHD and AWD," he said.

During the deployment, the Cantabria will provide support to the RAN during domestic and international training and exercises.

The deployment will culminate with the Cantabria's participation in the Australian International Fleet Review in October 2013.

Australia - Navy techical sailors lured by mine cash

A Shortage of technical sailors, blamed on the resources boom, has forced the navy to tie up two frontline warships indefinitely while its remaining 10 frigates lost 459 days in just six months this year due to "unscheduled" repairs and maintenance.

The navy describes the temporary withdrawal from service of the WA-based frigate HMAS Arunta and the Sydney-based HMAS Stuart as "extended readiness" and it blames the mining boom's high wages for cornering the market in highly qualified technicians.

Navy chief Vice Admiral Ray Griggs said it would take the senior service until 2018 or 2020 to recover from the shortage depending on what happened in the resource sector.

He said the impact of the loss of two frigates would be minimal because three of the ships would be out of service receiving an anti-ship missile upgrade.

"We still have a problem with technical sailors and retaining technical sailors," Admiral Griggs said.

"It is going to be a long-term thing to recover from."

Defence said the navy had been working on a number of initiatives to stabilise the technical workforce. This has included targeted retention bonuses, re-structuring of the fleet support units, industry outplacement programs and a focus on retention.

HMAS Anzac was out of service for about 35 days for "unscheduled maintenance", HMAS Sydney lost 28 days and HMAS Darwin 27 days.

"Sydney's scheduled docking maintenance availability was extended beyond the planned date due to a defect in the ship's main propulsion system identified during the scheduled maintenance period," a navy spokesman said. "During Darwin's scheduled maintenance period additional work was required to repair defects in the ship's gas turbine engine exhaust uptake system."

The navy said it has worked very hard during the past 14 months to better manage the competing demands of operational availability and maintenance requirements. Availability has also been a major challenge for the 14-vessel Armidale class patrol boat fleet during the first six months of this year when it lost 215 days due to unscheduled repairs and maintenance.

In addition to the well publicised gas leak and hull cracking problems, the navy has also highlighted issues with stern tube bearings and cooling, rigid hull inflatable boats and their davits and main engine fuel pumps.

"Despite reduced availability, the Armidale force has met all required operational tasking," the navy said.

HD hull in Australian waters

The hull of the first of the navy's two new large amphibious landing ships is in Australian waters and will reach Melbourne in a week.

The LHD01 hull has been transported from Spain to Australia by a Heavy Lift Ship, Blue Marlin.

The LHD hull will be unloaded and moved by tug to the BAE Systems Williamstown Shipyard for consolidation of the superstructure and other critical fitout work.

BAE Systems Director Maritime, Bill Saltzer said preparation works were complete and the Australian team are ready to start work on the next phase of the construction, as soon as it arrives.

“In the last few months, works have proceeded at a rapid pace as we prepare for the arrival of the first hull,” Saltzer said.

“Most recently as part of the preparation for the arrival, one of the largest permanently-based cranes in Australia has been assembled on Nelson Pier.”

Saltzer said the total mass of the crane and the counterweight is in excess of 800 tonnes.

He went on to say that the combined mass of the crane, support steelwork and the load during the first lift of the LHD blocks would be in excess of 1500 tonnes.

The first section of superstructure to be lifted weighed approximately 300 tonnes and would be lifted to a height of approximately 25 meters.

It then needed to be placed in exactly the right position for it to be joined to the deck of the LHD.

The LHD is expected to be introduced into Royal Australian Navy service in 2014.

First Keel Laying for Royal Australian Navy Hobart Class Destroyer

September 6, 2012 marked the start of the consolidation phase of the Royal Australian Navy Air Warfare Destroyer (AWD) project with the laying of the first keel at Techport Australia in Adelaide.

AWD Alliance CEO Rod Equid said the first keel laying is a significant milestone in the AWD project as it marks the start of the next phase in the delivery of three world-class warships to the Royal Australian Navy.

“It’s an exciting time with work on the AWD project progressing well. From today we will see steady progress on consolidation of the first ship with its hull due for completion on the hardstand within 15 months.”

“BAE Systems has delivered all seven blocks to AWD Shipbuilder ASC in Adelaide for Ship 1. Forgacs is expected to deliver seven blocks for Ship 1 before the end of the year.”

“Block fabrication work is now underway on all three ships at ASC Shipyard in Adelaide, Forgacs shipyards in Newcastle, BAE Systems shipyard in Melbourne and Navantia’s shipyard in Spain.”

                         

“I welcome today’s announcement by the Ministers to re-baseline the AWD program which will extend the keel-to-keel interval to 18 months between each ship,” Mr Equid said.

“The initiative was taken in consultation with industry and is good news for our workforce, for the future shipbuilding industry and for our industry partners.

“This will be welcomed news for the 2500 people directly working on this project throughout Australia. Extending the keel-to-keel intervals will reduce risk and create savings by improving productivity and stabilising the workforce demand over time.

“The initiative will contribute to long-term stability of the national shipbuilding sector and assist in preserving the skills and capability within the sector in the lead up to planned future naval programs.”

“It will also allow the project to capitalise on the knowledge learned during the construction phase of the first ship and apply that knowledge to the subsequent ships.”

Australia - New destroyers to arrive even later

Australia's next-generation air warfare destroyers (AWDs) will arrive later than planned, with the first delivered in March 2016 rather than late 2014.

Defence companies welcomed the rescheduling of the AWD construction program but the opposition says the government is trying to sugarcoat delays caused by defence budget cuts.

Defence Minister Stephen Smith admitted it would help the budget bottom line.

"We are going through a tough fiscal period so moving some $100 million to the right has a benefit so far as the forward estimate years are concerned," he told reporters in Adelaide.

The first of the AWDs, HMAS Hobart, will arrive in March 2016, HMAS Brisbane in September 2017 and HMAS Sydney in March 2019.

In 2007, when the Spanish Navantia F-100 was declared the winning ship design, the former coalition government said the three vessels would be delivered from late 2014 to mid-2017.

Mr Smith revealed the "re-baselining" of the AWD construction schedule at ASC following a ceremony for laying of the keel of Hobart.

The move flows from ongoing defence industry problems in building a skilled workforce for major shipbuilding projects amid stiff competition from the resources sector.

Mr Smith said AWD construction started years after the final ANZAC frigate was completed in 2004, a gap which led to a massive reduction in skills needed to build the AWD.

He said the new schedule would increase the period of work for the AWD Alliance consortium and its partners.

"Extending the AWD ship building program will help avoid a decline in naval shipbuilding skills before the commencement of Australia's largest and most complex naval project, the future submarine," Mr Smith said.

The $8 billion program is Australia's largest defence project and will give the navy three modern warships, equipped with advanced radars and weapons systems and able to defend against air and missile attacks.

Each ship comprises 31 200-tonne hull blocks constructed in Europe and at three yards in Australia. Blocks will be assembled at the ASC facility.

The project ran into problems in 2011 when BAE Systems acknowledged its facility at Williamstown, Melbourne, was hard pressed to perform both AWD work and on the navy's two new large landing ships.

Much of that work was reallocated, with Forgacs in Newcastle gaining a larger share.

Forgacs executive director Tony Lobb wholeheartedly supported the extended AWD schedule.

"Forgacs can now retain its skilled marine engineering workforce of 1200 people, skills vital in supplying our nation with warship capability for a secure future," he said in a statement.

Opposition defence spokesman David Johnston said Mr Smith was attempting to sugarcoat delays by pretending Labor was doing some sort of favour to the defence industry, rather than admitting it was about damaging cuts to defence spending.

It was another desperate attempt to preserve Treasurer Wayne Swan's budget surplus, Mr Johnston said.

"After attempting to spin it to be all about jobs in South Australia he was forced to admit it is really about preserving the government's surplus and this is not the way to devise a national security strategy," he said in a statement.