Counter - Terrorism ----- Russia Learns To Kill With Kindness

Over the last decade Russia and the United States have been cooperating more closely in dealing with Islamic terrorism. While a lot of this is about exchanging information on wanted terrorists and what they are up to, there has also been some detailed discussions about counter-terror techniques. While some Russian techniques are illegal in the West (more extreme forms of torture and taking relatives of terror suspects’ hostage) the Russians have found some Western methods useful. In particular the Russians have adopted the U.S. practice of offering large rewards for not just for the most senior terrorists, but for a lot of lower ranking ones as well. The Russians were impressed at the large number of terrorists the Americans captured or killed this way. The Russians also learned, and adopted, other American ideas that made the reward program so effective. This included adopting the American Witness Protection Program (“Witsec”). The U.S. began this program in 1970 to encourage witnesses against organized crime (which had a reputation for killing witnesses) to testify in court.

 

The Russians were impressed at how effective Witsec has been in protecting those within the program and the U.S. provided the Russians with assistance in putting together a Russian version. This included the addition of a few embellishments, like greater use of plastic surgery and putting some people in the program outside Russia. Once word of the Russian Witsec got around, more people were willing to risk talking about Islamic terrorists for the reward money.

 

Meanwhile the American program continues to provide useful tips on where bad guys are. Informants are quietly paid and sometimes moved, with their families, to a safer place where they can spend the reward money without fear of terrorist assassins seeking vengeance. The U.S. often uses the tips to kill terrorists via missile armed UAVs. While capturing these fellows alive is preferred, that is often not practical if they are deep in bandit country. While you can launch a large commando operation, there are not sufficient resources for a lot of these raids and with each one there’s the risk of losing some of your commandos or support troops (like helicopter crews.) So the unexpected missile is the only alternative to nothing at all. 

  

While the media likes to make much of terrorists with multimillion dollar rewards on their heads, most of the terrorists captured or killed because of much smaller rewards, often less than $100,000 and rarely more than a few hundred thousand dollars. There are a dozens of terrorists with multimillion dollar rewards attached, but these are the best protected and well hidden people. Often these senior bad guys are eventually located via several less-costly underlings who are identified via smaller rewards. This is especially the case if these underlings can be captured and interrogated.

  

Year by year more Pakistanis and Afghans are taking advantage of the reward program, and living to spend the money. That's a big change, and it has made the Taliban leadership, on both sides of the border, very uneasy. The U.S. has given Pakistan's main intelligence agency; ISI (Inter Service Intelligence agency), tens of millions dollars for rewards, since September 11, 2001. The U.S. money was paid as rewards for the capture or killing of wanted Islamic terrorists. The live ones were turned over to the United States. Pakistan says it captured over 800 of these terrorists, but the actual number is believed to be greater. The U.S. did not look closely at exactly who got the reward money.

 

Osama bin Laden had a $25 million price on his head since late 2001 (before that it was $5 million). Did anyone collect all or part of that reward? Because of the way Witsec works, that will be a secret for a long time. With that much money at stake, many people wondered why someone had not ratted him out by sooner. The main reason was that large cash rewards usually, but do not always, work.

 

Getting someone to drop a dime (make a phone call) to turn someone in for a reward only works if there are phones available and faith in the ability of those paying the reward to ensure the recipients will live to spend it.

 

It was back in 1984 that the United States began offering rewards of one to seven million dollars for information leading to the capture of terrorists, and lesser amounts to those who provided evidence against a terrorist or provided good information about a planned terrorist act. The informer, and his family, were also offered removal to a safe place (including the United States).

 

By September 11, 2001, five major terrorists had been captured because of this program. Over $6 million was been paid out to in over 20 cases. Some 42 percent of the informants requested security protection and another 42 percent sought relocation for themselves and family members to another country or region to avoid of retaliation.

 

Since then, the number of high value people captured via this program has more than tripled and the amount of money paid out has increased even more. However, one problem with the reward program is that it does not pay attention to the realities of international terrorism. Most major terrorists, like Osama bin Laden, are well protected and hidden. Sure, there are people who know where they are, and can get in contact with people around the bad guy. But an operation to nab one of these men requires a getting the message out to those who have the information, and providing informants with a realistic way to call in, and then collect.

 

Getting the word out is not as easy as it sounds. The FBI has undertaken several advertising campaigns in Pakistan, using matchbook covers, posters and other media to remind people in the tribal territories that rewards of up to twenty-five million dollars are being offered for prominent al Qaeda members. In addition to the cash rewards, "relocation (to another country, for the tipster and immediate family) is available". At least half a dozen al Qaeda big shots have been caught this way, and rewards paid.

  

Collecting the reward is difficult. The wanted men are surrounded by bodyguards and aides. They hide out in neighborhoods or villages full of people who share their beliefs. There are also cultural problems. Most of the al Qaeda big shots who have not yet been captured or killed are known to be (or believed to be) taking refuge among pro-Taliban Pushtun tribes along the Afghan border. The people there are generally poor, illiterate and not very well informed. Many have never seen anyone outside their village or valley. Most of the people with modern gadgets (like cell phones) are working for the terrorists. The people with some education and wealth, like local tribal leaders, have to worry about their large families. Anyone who turns in someone carrying a huge reward would be marked for murder if they suddenly displayed signs of wealth.

 

The fact is, there are lots of spies in the tribal areas. Selling information to outsiders has long been a recognized (if not entirely approved) way for a poor tribesman to make some money, or earn some valuable favors. But getting stuff out is difficult for these people, who have little privacy in their lives, and are constantly under the control of family and tribal elders. You can't just walk out, either.

 

Wandering through the territory of another tribe or clan (as in the next valley over), can get you killed. Strangers are seen as enemies, and treated accordingly. Cell phones changed that over the last decade and the Islamic terrorists tried, unsuccessfully, to keep the cell phone service out of remote tribal areas in Pakistan and Afghanistan.

  

Meanwhile, U.S. troops have learned to forget about the big payoffs, and concentrate on the small ones. As U.S. Army Special Forces operators have long known (and constantly teach the regular army troops they work with), little favors (that won't be noticed by the Taliban enforcers) get you little bits of information. These bits add up and some have led to nailing whales (guys with big prices on their heads). One of the more popular favors in the backcountry is medical care. Out there, not much is to be had. For this reason, the two medics in each Special Forces Alpha Detachment ("A-Team") have been taught to treat common maladies encountered in poor, isolated, areas. An astute diagnoses, and prompt application of some antibiotics can save the life of someone dear to the heart of somebody else with information you need. Sometimes the troops will bring a surgeon in, to perform a lifesaving (or life altering) procedure. This yields much good will, and loosens tongues.

 

The big thing about medical care is that it's not as visible as a pile of cash (which usually results in something flashy being bought, and dangerous queries from the local Taliban), but means a lot more than mere things. Pakistani or Afghan doctors don't like travelling to the tribal territories. Too dangerous. Those who can afford medical care, travel to a town or city that has it. But the U.S. and NATO soldiers have access to drugs and medical care wherever they are. Sharing it is often more valuable, or at least more practical, than a $25 million reward.

 

The Russians have adapted many of these techniques to their own situation. Some of these ideas are not new to Russia. Offering favors or scarce resources to people in return for cooperation has long been used in Russia, especially by the Soviet era secret police. But since the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991 a free market economy has made a lot of economic goodies and opportunities freely available. So the Russian police are open to new ideas from the West.

Making Terrorism Pay

Islamic terrorists cannot operate without supplies. They need weapons, ammo, vehicles, communications, and all manner of other supplies to operate and survive. While terrorist groups will accept contributions of goods, they prefer cash. Thus the most successful terrorist groups are the ones who can get their hands on the most cash. For a long time one of the easiest ways to obtain a lot of cash was to kidnap a Westerner (or anyone from a wealthy family) and hold them for ransom. This only works if the potential victims make themselves available to grab. In countries where law and order are weak, those worth kidnapping tend to take good care of their personal security. Western tourists or workers in Moslem countries used to be good targets, but all it took was a few kidnappings to halt the tourism and put tight security on Westerners who had to be there. Finally, many Western countries enacted “no ransom” policies. While not always enforced, this made it more difficult, sometimes impossible, to get a lot of money for Western hostages.

 

There were all manner of other criminal acts terrorists could, and still do, use to obtain cash. But these all entail the risk of getting killed or captured and the locals come to consider the Islamic radicals just another bunch of bandits, and this hurts recruiting and grassroots support. When desperate, Islamic terrorists will take from whoever they can find in order to survive. But if this means angering the people they depend on for new recruits and popular support, going the bandit route is usually a sign that the group is on its last legs. 

  

The most reliable source of funds is Islamic charities and foreign charities in general. The charity route sometimes involves deception, but often the donors know exactly where their money is going and approve of how it is used. Much of the charitable contributions come from private donations, NGOs, madrasas (Islamic religious schools), and businesses throughout South Asia, the Middle East, and Europe. Most of it tends to come from Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, where many terrorist groups have considerable support not only among local and expatriate Moslems but also patronage of the royal families and other higher ups in both these countries. This allows some terror groups to solicit quite openly. Often in the country where the terrorists are operating they can raise cash from local businessmen, industry leaders, farmers, and others willing to donate freely. These donations are collected throughout the year, sometimes in the name of religion and often, openly, for jihad. 

  

Fund raisers will often issue receipts for donations. To placate Western nations trying to shut down Islamic terrorists the fundraisers often operate through front companies or Islamic charities and are registered as such with the local government. Donations are particularly heavy during the Hajj (the last month of the Moslem calendar when pilgrimages to Mecca are undertaken) and Ramadan (the 9th month of the Moslem calendar, when observant Moslems fast and pray a lot). The Islamic calendar is lunar, meaning it follows the phases of the moon and thus these dates move relative to the fixed calendar used in most of the world. People are much more likely to give during these two months.

  

Over the last decade Saudi Arabia and other Gulf Arab states have been under increasing Western pressure to crack down on this terrorist fundraising. Saudi Arabia, in particular, has cracked down since 2003 (when al Qaeda began making attacks there), after denying that there was a big problem with wealthy, and generous, Islamic conservatives in the kingdom. In the United States several Islamic charities have been successfully prosecuted since September 11, 2001, for sending money to terrorists.

  

Terrorist organization prefer to set up support organizations in Europe and North America, as they can safely stash their families and key operatives there by having them all claim asylum. This, until recently, was something these nations were often quick to offer and were quite tolerant of terrorist activity. But these nations, especially the ones that were subjected to terrorist attacks since 2001, are much less accommodating these days. 

  

The terrorists constantly adapt. Decades of efforts to curb their fund raising have had an impact. It is much harder for terrorists to raise cash now, but they still do so. This has increased the importance of terrorists who specialize in fundraising. These men (and some women) develop lists of known donors, or potential ones, and assign other specialists to travel around and personally visit these donors. By way of introduction these visitors are authenticated by smartphone videos from some prominent cleric or terrorist leader, often in the presence of the visitor, saying that this man is authorized to collect funds for the cause. If a donation is forthcoming this brings into play another specialist who knows how to get the money safely from the donor to the terrorists. Meanwhile, yet another new fundraising specialist has come into play: the media advisor. Terrorists have learned that working the media (Western and in Moslem countries) is crucial for getting attention for specific terrorist groups in need of money. The media advisor recommends what types of attacks to make and what kind of press releases to put out afterward in order to get favorable attention from specific donors or groups of donors. The media advisors keep track of attitudes in countries or expatriate populations that are likely donors to identify individuals or organizations the fund raisers can approach and what types of terrorist actions will make such visits the most lucrative. 

  

Every terrorist organization has specific needs and donor communities most likely to give. Terrorist groups that survive and thrive are the ones that are most successful at raising cash. Western counter-terror operations now concentrate on all these fundraising specialists. These fellows are wanted alive, because of all the valuable things they know. But failing that, a Hellfire missile in their SUV will work too.

Counter-Terrorism ----- Algeria, The Other Threat Grows

The January raid on a natural gas facility in southern Algeria (near the Tunisian border) that got 70 people killed (including all the Islamic terrorist attackers) has resulted in much tighter security around the facility and all others. The foreign firms are satisfied with the new security arrangements and are allowing their citizens to return to work at the plant. Without the foreigners, full production has not been resumed and a lot of other technical work had to be postponed.

 

Oil and natural gas account for 95 percent of exports and the foreign currency needed to buy imports. Most food is imported and over the last three decades the economy has stagnated because of corruption and continued belief in centralized control. If the current leadership (who have been in power since France left in the 1960s) wants to prevent another rebellion they have to fix the economy. But as long as the leaders refuse to allow foreign investment and local entrepreneurs to operate freely economic revival is not happening. Official unemployment is 10 percent but that includes a lot of marginal jobs provided by the government. For men under 30, the government admits there is a much higher unemployment rate (over 20 percent), and these are the people who would start and sustain another revolution. Few of these young men are attracted to Islamic terrorism any more, but most want some economic and social changes and so far all the government offers are admissions that there is a problem but no real solutions. Meanwhile, oil income is shrinking because current oil and gas fields are running dry and government investment restrictions and inept management hamper efforts to find new fields. The population increases and those who do not flee the country become angrier and more impatient.

  

The government believes that 4 diplomats taken captive by Islamic terrorists in Mali in April 2012 are still alive. But there is no direct contact with the captors and trying to free the 4 is difficult. The government does not want to pay ransom, so as not to encourage more such attacks.

  

October 11, 2013: Across the border in Tunisia, soldiers raided a house near the Kasserine Pass where a terrorist leader and some followers were reported (by a local informant) to be. After an hour long gun battle the Islamic terrorists escaped, leaving behind a phone and some ammo. Tunisian border police and soldiers have spent over 4 months hunting for up to 50 Islamic terrorists who are operating near the Kasserine Pass and Mount Chaambi in the Atlas Mountains just across the border.

 

Tunisian security personnel are searching a hundred square kilometers of sparsely populated forests and mountains without much success. This is the first time Tunisia has had to deal with armed Islamic terrorists since 2007. These armed men have been active in the area since January. Some of these terrorists fled Mali earlier this year and others are from Algeria.

 

October 10, 2013: Algerian security forces on the southern borders with Mali and Libya killed 8 Islamic terrorists and captured weapons, documents, and vehicles. Unlike the operations in the Atlas Mountains up north, the border patrols have been more successful at killing and capturing Islamic terrorists.

  

Parliament is introducing stricter laws against terrorism and smuggling. The smugglers often work for Islamic terrorists, getting weapons and personnel in and out of the country. The new laws will make it easier to go after the smugglers. 

  

October 3, 2013: West of the capital a roadside bomb went off, wounding 3 civilians. In the southern oasis town of Ghardaia, violence between Arab and Berber residents over water and religion led to 4 arrests and 6 policemen wounded while breaking up riots.

  

October 2, 2013: Tunisian police arrested 4 Islamic terrorists near the Algerian border. In the last 3 days police have arrested 31 actual (armed) or suspected Islamic terrorists in Tunisia. While several dozen armed Islamic terrorists are operating in the Atlas Mountains near the Algerian border, there are hundreds more throughout the country trying to organize an uprising that would establish a religious dictatorship. Most Tunisians want nothing to do with this.

 

October 1, 2013: Last month army personnel cleared over 4,800 mines along the eastern and western borders. Many of these mines date back to the 1960s.

Counter-Terrorism ----- Fatal Contradictions

Al Qaeda leader Ayman al Zawahiri recently released an audio message, via the Internet, in which he blamed moderate Moslems for preventing more conservative or radical Moslems from taking control in the wake of the Arab Spring uprisings in 2011. This is a remarkable statement because in the past al Qaeda and other Islamic radical groups called on moderate Moslems to join them in overthrowing oppressive governments and share power once that was done. But Zawahiri correctly noted that whenever that happened the Islamic radicals pushed the more moderate Moslems aside and tried to establish an Islamic (religious) dictatorship. This failed because the moderates were more numerous and unwilling to submit to another dictatorship. At least that’s what happened in Tunisia and Egypt. In Iraq and Afghanistan the Islamic radicals never got to share power because in both those places the radicals revealed themselves as violent thugs early on.

 

Al Qaeda and Zawahiri accuse the moderate Moslems as being bad Moslems for their opposition to using Islamic law (sharia) to govern secular and religious affairs. During the 7^th century, when Islam was founded, the intent was that sharia would apply to all aspects of life for Moslems. But those who had to actually govern found that this did not work in practice, in part because there was no (and still is not) supreme authority to interpret sharia law. Thus the rulers and the clergy were feuding over the true meaning of sharia from the beginning. Naturally, the guys with the weapons won these arguments. This is how al Qaeda justifies the use of weapons and terror to establish the true religious dictatorship they believe Islamic law requires. Unfortunately, even among Islamic fundamentalists there is still no agreement on how to interpret sharia, which is why Islamic radical groups often fight each other. This tendency to drift into constant feuding and violence has been a problem with militant Islamic conservatives for over a thousand years. While modern technology makes this Islamic terrorism more widespread and lethal, the built-in self-destruction of Islamic radicalism remains and most Moslems realize it.

U.S. builds up military bases in Italy for African ops

Three P-3C Orion aircraft belonging to the Tridents of Patrol Squadron Two Six (VP-26) stand ready on a rain soaked airfield on board Naval Air Station Sigonella. in Sigonella, Sicily on Jan. 15, 2006. The U.S. Marines are being moved to the Naval Air Station at Sigonella on Sicily, which will eventually have a force of 1,000 Marines with its main focus Libya, 100 miles across the Med.

 

The U.S. deployment of 200 Marines to a naval base in Sicily for possible operations in Libya, a short hop across the Mediterranean, underlines how the Americans have been building a network of bases in Italy as launch pads for military interventions in Africa and the Mideast.

 

The signs are that 20 years after the American military's first, and costly, encounter with Muslim militants in Mogadishu, Somalia, U.S. operations in Africa are growing as the Islamist threat expands.

 

Another key factor is U.S. President Barack Obama's switch in his counter-terror strategy from drone strikes against al-Qaida to pinpoint raids by small Special Forces teams, as seen in Somalia and Libya Oct. 5.

These were triggered by Islamist violence in both countries, including the Sept. 21 seizure of the Westgate shopping mall inl Nairobi, capital of Kenya, by fighters of Somalia's al-Qaida affiliate, al-Shabaab, that left at least 67 people dead.

 

The U.S. SEAL Team 6 seaborne raid on the Somali coastal town of Barawe to capture al-Shabaab mastermind Abdulkadir Mohamed Abdulkadir,a Kenyan of Somalia origin, ran into heavier than expected resistance and had to be aborted.

 

But the U.S. Army's Delta Force had more success in its raid on Tripoli when they grabbed longtime al-Qaida fugitive Nazih Abdul-Hamed al-Ruqai, aka Abu Anas al-Libi, indicted by a U.S. court in 2000 for the August 1988 bombings of U.S. embassies in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, that killed 224 people.

 

These raids reflect a U.S. move away from the kind of risk-averse operations the Americans have been mounting with missile-firing drones to on-the-ground raids against high-value targets.

 

The abhorrence of risk stemmed largely from of the psychological fallout over the October 1993 operation in Mogadishu to capture Somali warlord Mohamed Farah Aidid that went badly wrong and led to the downing of two U.S. helicopters and the deaths of 18 Rangers and Special Forces troopers.

U.S. President Barack Obama's visit to Africa in June-July was widely seen as evidence of the White House's broader foreign policy objectives which have included an expansion of U.S. military operations across Africa.

 

Many of these involve small-scale "secret wars" against Islamists, mainly linked to al-Qaida and often carried out under the aegis of the U.S. Africa Command established in 2007.

 

"Both the number and complexity of U.S. military operations in Africa will continue to grow in the medium term," observed Oxford Analytica.

 

"Given the relatively high impact contribution they make to Washington's strategic goals, such military operations will also increasingly encroach on domains traditionally associated with development and diplomacy.

 

"However, they will also increasingly commit the United States to an 'intervention-led' foreign policy in Africa."

 

Although Africom and the U.S. Joint Special Operations Command claim they have a small footprint in Africa, over the last year or so they've been increasingly active in building up a U.S. military presence -- and especially reach -- across the continent.

       

The United States has only one official base in Africa, the counter-terrorism facility at Camp Lemonnier, a former French Foreign Legion base in Djibouti, East Africa, where Special Forces, strike jets and armed unmanned aerial vehicles are based.

 

But small units are deployed across Africa. Meantime, the Americans have established a network of bases in Italy, involving a significant manpower shift southward from the old Cold War bastion of Germany.

 

The Marines moved to Italy from Spain this month are the vanguard of a larger force dubbed Special Purpose Marine Air-Ground Task Force-Crisis Response.

 

It was established after the Sept. 11, 2012, attack on the U.S. consulate in Benghazi, Libya, in which U.S. Ambassador Christopher Stevens and three other Americans were killed.

 

According to U.S. security specialist David Vine, the Pentagon has spent around $2 billion -- and that's just construction costs -- "shifting its European center of gravity south from Germany" and transforming Italy "into a launching pad for future wars in Africa, the Middle East and beyond."

The U.S. Marines are being moved to the Naval Air Station at Sigonella on Sicily, which will eventually have a force of 1,000 Marines with its main focus Libya, 100 miles across the Med.

 

Vines estimates there are now 13,000 U.S. troops in Italy at Sigonella and some 50 other facilities like Vicenza, a former Italian air force base near Venice, with the 173rd Infantry Brigade Combat Team (Airborne), a rapid response force.

Reports: Jordan Air Force Captain Deserts, Joins Al-Nusra

A Jordanian air force captain has deserted to join the al-Qaeda affiliated al-Nusra Front fighting in Syria, a family member and a Salafist leader said on Monday.

"Ahmad Atallah Shbeib al-Majali, born in 1984, took a leave from his job last Wednesday and travelled to Turkey on Friday and from there he went to Syria to join the rebels," the family member told AFP on condition of anonymity, adding that he was promoted two weeks ago.

The anonymous Salafist leader said that "the captain from the Southern city of Karak has been in touch with members of Nusra and has decided to join them. There are eight people fighting with Nusra from his area."

Jordanian Salafists have reported upto 500 Jordanians are fighting in Syria.

Syria has been experiencing unrest since March 2011 with organized attacks by well-armed gangs against the Syrian police, border guards, statesmen, army and the civilians being reported across the country.

Thousands of people have been killed since terrorist and armed groups turned protest rallies into armed clashes.

The government blames outlaws, saboteurs, and armed terrorist groups for the deaths, stressing that the unrest is being orchestrated from abroad.

In October 2011, calm was almost restored in most parts of the Arab state after President Assad started a reform initiative in the country, but Israel, the US and its Arab allies brought the country into chaos through every possible means. Tel Aviv, Washington and some Arab capitals have been staging various plots in the hope of increasing unrests in Syria.

The US daily, Washington Post, reported in May, 2012 that the Syrian rebels and terrorist groups battling Assad's government have started receiving significantly more and better weapons, a crime paid for by the Persian Gulf Arab states and coordinated by the United States.

The newspaper, quoting opposition activists and US and foreign officials, reported that Obama administration officials emphasized the administration has expanded contacts with opposition military forces to provide the Persian Gulf nations with assessments of rebel credibility and command-and-control infrastructure.

According to the report, material is being stockpiled in Damascus, in Idlib near the Turkish border and in Zabadani on the Lebanese border.

Opposition activists who used to say the rebels were running out of ammunition said last May that the flow of weapons - most bought on the black market in neighboring countries or from elements of the Syrian military in the past - has significantly increased after a decision by Saudi Arabia, Qatar and other Persian Gulf states to provide millions of dollars in funding each month.

Powerful missiles from Qatar sent to Syrian rebels

As an intermittent supply of arms to the Syrian opposition gathered momentum last year, the Obama administration repeatedly implored its Arab allies to keep one type of powerful weapon out of the rebels’ hands: heat-seeking shoulder-fired missiles.

The missiles, US officials warned, could one day be used by terrorist groups, some of them affiliated with Al Qaeda, to shoot down civilian aircraft.

But one country ignored this admonition: Qatar, the tiny, oil-and-gas-rich emirate that has made itself indispensable to rebel forces battling calcified Arab governments and that has been shipping arms to the Syrian rebels fighting President Bashar Assad’s government since 2011.

According to four US and Middle Eastern officials with knowledge of intelligence reports on the weapons, Qatar has since the beginning of the year used a shadowy arms network to move at least two shipments of shoulder-fired missiles, one of them a batch of Chinese-made FN-6s, to Syrian rebels who have used them against Assad’s air force. 

Deployment of the missiles comes at a time when US officials expect that President Obama’s decision to begin a limited effort to arm the Syrian rebels might be interpreted by Qatar, along with other Arab countries supporting the rebels, as a green light to drastically expand arms shipments.

Qatar’s aggressive effort to bolster the embattled Syrian opposition is the latest brash move by a country that has been using its wealth to elbow its way to the forefront of Middle Eastern statecraft, confounding both its allies in the region and in the West. 

The strategy is expected to continue even though Qatar’s longtime leader, Sheik Hamad bin Khalifa Al Thani, stepped down last week, allowing his 33-year-old son to succeed him.

“They punch immensely above their weight,” one senior Western diplomat said of the Qataris. “They keep everyone off balance by not being in anyone’s pocket.”

Obama in April warned Hamad about the dangers of arming Islamic radicals in Syria, although most US officials have been wary of applying too much pressure on the Qatari government. “Syria is their backyard, and they have their own interests they are pursing,” said one administration official.

Qatari officials did not respond to requests for comment.

The United States has little leverage over Qatar on the Syria issue, because it needs the Qataris’ help on other fronts. Qatar is poised to host peace talks between US and Afghan officials and the Taliban. The US forward base in Qatar gives the US military a command post in the heart of a strategically vital but volatile region.

Qatar’s ability to be an active player in a global gray market for arms was enhanced by the C-17 military transport planes it bought from Boeing in 2008.

In Obama’s meeting with Hamad at the White House on April 23, he warned the Qatari leader that the weapons were making their way to radical groups like Jabhat al-Nusra, also known as the Nusra Front, an Al Qaeda-affiliated group that the United States has designated as a terrorist group.

Yemen - Death Squads Gone Wild

The government believes al Qaeda is increasing its use of assassinations and kidnappings to help rebuild. The killings, usually of police or intelligence officials, are meant to discourage the security forces from coming after al Qaeda members, especially those known to be hiding out in certain villages up in the hills (and protected by local tribesmen). The kidnappings are necessary to raise money to provide “gifts” to the tribesmen who are risking their lives to protect the terrorists. Many southern tribes still want to form a separate nation in the south and believe al Qaeda can help with that. Al Qaeda is currently playing down its ultimate goal of establishing a religious dictatorship that would rule all of Arabia and strictly control the lives of all its subjects. Meanwhile, the many captured terrorists and documents indicate that three al Qaeda men were involved with the attack in Libya last September that killed the U.S. ambassador and three other Americans. The intel from Yemen apparently also revealed details of many other al Qaeda operations outside Yemen.

 

As desperate as Yemen is for foreign aid, delivering it is made much more difficult because of the local custom of kidnapping foreigners to use as a bargaining chip with the government. The dispute is usually over the government arresting a tribesman for a crime and his kin insisting they are in the right, the government is not, and any measures are justified to right this slight. This “tribe above all” attitude is common in many parts of the world and is reinforced in places like Yemen, where what passes for government is very corrupt. But these attitudes make it very difficult to do business in Yemen, be it aid programs or simply tourism. It’s another reason why Yemen is so poor and unpleasant a place to live. 

 

May 16, 2013: Three kidnapped Red Cross workers (two foreigners and one local) were freed after negotiations with the tribe that held them. Red Cross has 200 staff in Yemen, a quarter of them foreigners. Threats to stop aid shipments often persuade tribal elders to get involved and get aid workers freed. 

 

May 15, 2013: Near the southern port city of Aden, secessionist tribesmen clashed with police, leaving two dead and three wounded. 

 

May 13, 2013: Near the southern port city of Aden, armed tribesmen kidnapped three Red Cross aid workers in an attempt to get a fellow tribesman freed from jail (where he has been held on murder charges for a year).

One of the air force’s elderly Russian ground attack jets (an Su-22) crashed near the capital. The pilot died, mainly because the aircraft exploded in the air before crashing. Su-22s are useful for ground attack but they are elderly aircraft, difficult to maintain, and unreliable. Since they are cheap and Yemen is broke, the Yemeni air force has about 30 of them. 

 

May 12, 2013: Police raided a house in the southern port city of Aden and found four al Qaeda terrorists. There was resistance and one of the terrorists was killed before the other three surrendered. The police found weapons and documents indicating the four were planning attacks in the area.

Outside the capital police found a roadside bomb and disabled it. 

 

May 10, 2013: Tribesmen kidnapped a Turkish man some 300 kilometers east of the capital. This was to pressure the police to release several vehicles they had seized. 

 

May 9, 2013: In the south al Qaeda assassins killed a policeman near his home, using a silenced pistol. The dead policeman belonged to a special security unit. 

 

May 8, 2013: Al Qaeda released three captives (a Finn and two Austrians) after a million dollar ransom was paid. The government has been trying to free these three for months. Back in February the military believed it had located the three and launched a major operation to rescue them. That failed and the weeks of fighting left more than a hundred dead. Al Qaeda put up some major resistance but reduced their ransom demands from $50 million to $4 million. The Finnish government was willing to pay, but the Austrians were not. The U.S. and Britain have always refused to pay ransom to terrorists, knowing that this just encouraged more kidnappings and made possible more terrorist activity. More and more European nations are joining the “no ransom” camp but are doing so in the face of continuing popular willingness to pay. These kidnapping victims become major local news stories and that puts pressure on politicians to pay, no matter what the consequences. Al Qaeda says it paid $150,000 (to the tribal kidnappers) for the three captives (taken in December) and would kill them if the rescue force got too close. Hundreds of al Qaeda and pro-terrorist tribesmen joined the fight to stop the rescue effort. The Yemenis got tired of the losses (including at least 30 dead among the rescuers) and urged that some ransom payment be made. The three captives were taken from an Arab language school, of which there are several in Yemen and these depend on foreign students to survive. The tribes don’t care about anyone else and many tribesmen are willing to die to preserve their right to kidnap foreigners. The matter was finally settled when Omani negotiators got everyone to agree to a million dollar ransom and end the bloodshed. This was a rather tainted victory for the terrorists and the tribes, given the high death toll and other losses. This apparently persuaded the Austrians (who are very much in the “no-ransom” camp these days) to go along. 

 

In the south (Shabwa province) an al Qaeda death squad killed three senior air force officers near an airbase. 

 

May 7, 2013: In the south two Egyptians were kidnapped by tribesmen trying to get one of their kinsmen freed from prison (where he has been for several years, after being convicted of murder). 

 

May 4, 2013: North of the capital rival tribesmen fought, leaving four dead and six wounded. 

 

May 3, 2013: The army has a mutiny on its hands, as soldiers of the 3^rd brigade, stationed in the north, have gone vigilante in an effort to find and kill tribesmen believed responsible for killing four soldiers last month. The soldiers got upset at what they considered inadequate government response to those deaths. 

 

May 2, 2013: In the southern city of Taiz, police attempted to arrest the crew of a recently arrived ship that was carrying 20,000 illegal weapons (believed to be from Turkey) and ammunition. The ship was taken but all the smugglers got away except for the captain of the ship. Some of the smugglers were picked up in the next few days. This was the fourth illegal Turkish arms shipment to be seized in the last six months.

Mali - The Saudi Connection

In the three months since French led forces drove Islamic terrorists out of the cities of northern Mali, life has been hard up there. That’s because these cities depended a lot on tourism, which disappeared a year ago when the Islamic radicals and Tuareg rebels showed up. The tourists have not returned and the lost income has over a third of the population in the cities dependent on charity or foreign aid to survive. Hunger is common and many refugees in neighboring countries have not returned because of the poor economic conditions. 

The Malian army is concentrating troops near the northeastern town of Kidal, which is controlled by the MNLA rebels. The MNLA means (in French) “Liberation Army of Azawad” and the Mali government is upset that MNLA men control most of the rural (and very thinly populated) areas in the north. The only large town the MNLA controls is Kidal and the Mali troops are threatening to take it back by force. It’s unlikely the Mali soldiers and police could handle the MNLA gunmen, so the concentration of security forces near Kidal is seen more as a bargaining tactic than as a real threat to the MNLA. Negotiations with the MNLA have not gone well as the rebels are insisting on an autonomy agreement and the French and African peacekeepers have been unwilling to shut down the MNLA for the Mali government. The Mali Army is seen as more of a threat to an elected Mali government than to the Tuareg rebels. 

MNLA rebels torment the Mali troops with things like approving documents (like passes) with rubber stamps that say “State of Azawad”. That is the Tuareg term for their homeland in northern Mali and at the moment its capital is Kidal. The MNLA refuses to disarm but is willing to negotiate their role in the north. After invading in January France tolerated the MNLA as long as the rebels cooperated and did not fight the Mali army or government officials. Several hundred Tuareg Malian soldiers work directly for the French as scouts and translators. These men help the French determine which Tuareg rebels can be trusted and which are Islamic terrorists (usually members of MUJAO or Ansar Dine.)

The Tuareg rebels still want autonomy (self-rule) and the black African majority (90 percent of the population) in the south does not want to allow it. But the Mali Army, dominated by black Africans, is still a corrupt bunch of ill-trained poorly equipped and ineptly led gunmen who tend to serve whoever pays them. This army is still incapable of defeating the MNLA and so far has been unable to persuade the peacekeepers to do it for them.  The MNLA expects the July elections (the 7th for the president the 21st for parliament) to bring another group of corrupt southerners to power. 

French troops continue to search for and attack Islamic terrorist groups in the north. French intelligence has identified dozens of camps and equipment storage sites al Qaeda constructed in the north during the last year and, in the far northern mountains near the Algerian border, over the last decade. France is using its warplanes and smart bombs to attack these bases and supply dumps. 

Sending in ground troops is a less attractive option because of the al Qaeda use of landmines and the possibility of ambush by nearby terrorists. The French troops can go in on foot, but there are more targets to be hit than there are infantry to hit all of them. It takes time and manpower to clear the mines.

Islamic terrorists who have fled Mali are showing up in nearby countries. Tunisia recently revealed that a group of fifty armed Islamic terrorists have been operating in the Atlas Mountains (the coastal mountain range that runs from Morocco to Tunisia) for the last six months and that at least a quarter of them were veterans of the recent fighting in Mali. Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) had members from all over North Africa, but mostly from Algeria and while defeated in Mali it was not destroyed there. Hundreds of experienced Islamic terrorists have scattered and are reorganizing via email, cell phones and hand-carried documents. Recruiting has taken a hit, as the operations in Mali this year showed once more that Islamic radicals cannot stand up to professional soldiers and their “Islamic” governing methods tend to turn the population against them. This caused over a thousand AQIM members to desert, while nearly 500 were killed in the Mali fighting. Hundreds of local Islamic terrorists (Tuaregs and black Africans from countries in the region) have stayed in northern Mali and are carrying out a terrorism campaign. There are a few larger groups of these Islamic terrorists still wandering around the far north but they are being hunted by French aircraft and hit with smart bombs. Some of these Islamic terrorists have renounced their alliance with al Qaeda and are trying to evade attack by just being another group of Tuareg separatists. 

One aspect of the Islamic terrorism in the north has not run for cover. That is the Wahhabi Moslems created over the last two decades by Saudi Arabian missionaries and money. Since the 1980s nearly a hundred billion dollars of Saudi money (from the government and private donations) has been used to send thousands of Wahhabi missionaries to (mostly Moslem) foreign countries and recruit new adherents to this conservative and intolerant form of Islam. The money went to build mosques and madrassas (religious schools) and pay Islamic conservative clergy and teachers to convert more people to the Wahhabi way of thinking. 

Al Qaeda started as an organization of Wahhabi militants and Wahhabi believers still form the core of most Islamic terror organizations. The Saudis deny that they are subsidizing Islamic terrorism, but the Wahhabis preach hatred of non-Moslems and violence against those who do not accept the Wahhabi way. These Islamic radical missionaries have been active in Mali for over a decade and although less than ten percent of Mali Moslems adhere to Wahhabi beliefs, they are among the most active Moslems and did not get upset when, a year ago, Islamic terrorists in the north began destroying the holy places of the majority Sufi Moslems up there. Wahhabis were busy in the south as well as the north and police has recently discovered and arrested southerners who had formed terrorist cells as a result of their Wahhabi beliefs. 

May 10, 2013: Five suicide bombers died in two attacks on peacekeepers. One bomber attacked a Niger Army camp 300 kilometers east of Gao. That one consisted of the bomber driving a car through the camp entrance checkpoint and being shot at by guards and other troops. The bomber was shot dead before he could detonate his explosives. The second attack was to the west, near Timbuktu, against a Mali Army camp. The four bombers died and two soldiers were wounded. These five bombers were recruited, trained and sent out by MOJWA (Movement for Oneness and Jihad in West Africa) which is largely composed of black African Islamic radicals and led by Mauritanians. 

MOJWA is unique among Islamic terrorist groups because its leadership is black African. 

Mauritanian security forces have made it very difficult for MOJWA to operate in Mauritania and that’s why so many MOJWA members moved to Mali in the last year. Many are still there and not looking forward to the arrival of Mauritanian troops as peacekeepers.

May 7, 2013: AQIM released a video on the Internet in which Moslems worldwide were urged to attack French people and property wherever they could. AQIM has been calling for this sort of thing since French led forces drove them out of northern Mali last January. There have been a few attacks, but not much damage. In response, France has increased its efforts to hunt down Islamic militants in France. 

Troops from Mali and Burkina Faso entered the village of Ber (50 kilometers northeast of Timbuktu). MNLA rebels had withdrawn from Ber to avoid a fight with the Burkina Faso peacekeepers. There had been fighting in Ber between Arab and Tuareg residents, which attracted the attention of the peacekeepers. 

May 6, 2013: In neighboring Niger a Nigerian Air Force Alpha jet crashed as it was returning from a reconnaissance patrol over northern Mali. The two man crew of the Alpha jet died, so it will take more time to find out what exactly happened. Ground fire is unlikely as the jet was in Niger air space when it went down. Nigeria sent two of its light bombers (Alpha jets) to Niger last January as part of its contribution to the Mali peacekeeping force. Nigeria has used these jets in peacekeeping missions before, for scouting and attacking ground targets with machine-guns and bombs. 

May 5, 2013: Morocco announced that it arrested members of two local Islamic terrorist cells and found that both groups had been in touch with Islamic terrorists in Mali. 

May 4, 2013: In Gao a suicide bomber on a motorbike attacked a Mali Army patrol, killing himself and five soldiers. Elsewhere in Gao three Islamic terrorists in a car opened fire on Mali soldiers, killing two of them. Return fire killed all three of the Islamic terrorists. 

April 28, 2013: Another French soldier was killed in northern Mali, this time by a roadside bomb. This makes six French soldiers lost in the last four months. There are about 4,500 French troops in Mali, about half of them in the far north pursuing the remnants of the Islamic terror groups that controlled the north for over six months.

Algeria - Why Terrorists Hate This Place

More ethnic violence has broken out in the south (Ghardaia, 600 kilometers south of the capital) where at least a dozen were injured in street fighting between Arabs and Berbers. There was also a religious element to the hostility as the local Berbers belong to a Shia sect. Algerians Arabs tend to be Sunni and Sunni conservatives consider Shia heretics. An increasing number of Berbers are also converting to Christianity, as a protest against the continued persecution of Berbers. This further infuriates the Sunnis. The government says that only 11,000 (out of 34 million) Algerians are Christian. But Christian religious leaders say the number is 30,000 and growing fast, especially among Berbers. The government fears these Berber Christians and Berbers in general. The Berbers, a people related to the ancient Egyptians, were the original occupants of Algeria. Arab armies conquered the country over a thousand years ago, but, unlike other Arab conquests, most Berbers did not adopt Arab language and customs. Today, about a third of Algerians are Berbers, and speak the Berber language, Tamazight. There has always been tension between Berbers and Arabs, and now Berbers are demanding that their language be made one of Algeria's official languages. The Arab dominated government refuses to consider this.

 

In the Atlas Mountains just across the Tunisian border police and soldiers have been searching for about fifty Islamic terrorists who are operating near the Kasserine Pass. Tunisian security personnel are searching a hundred square kilometers of sparsely populated forests and mountains without much success. Algerian border security in that area has been increased in case the terrorists try to flee into Algeria. This is the first time Tunisia has had to deal with armed Islamic terrorists since 2007. These armed men have been active in the area for at least six months. Some of these terrorists recently fled Mali and others are from Algeria. These were joined by a smaller group (a dozen or so) of Tunisian Islamic terrorists who had apparently not been active until joined by all these new men and a few local recruits. Eleven of the 32 terrorists killed nearby in an attack on an Algerian natural gas field in January, were Tunisian, which provided a hint that there were a lot more Islamic terrorists in Tunisia than the government wanted to admit.

 

The defeat of al Qaeda in Mali has sent hundreds of experienced Islamic terrorists looking for a new refuge. Algeria, because of its large and experienced counter-terrorism forces, is not seen as a suitable destination. Tunisia and Libya, on the other hand, are. Many of these Mali refugees have also gone to Europe, despite the large and alert counter-terrorism forces there. 

 

May 5, 2013: Police attacked several hundred young people demonstrating outside parliament and demanding economic reforms that would create more jobs. Several demonstrators were arrested and dozens injured. The unemployment rate of those under 35 is over 20 percent and many who are employed don’t get paid much. The government has created a lot of pointless and low-paid government jobs that just make those getting them more eager for a real job. More jobs are not being created because of decades of government corruption and rules that discourage entrepreneurs and new businesses that would threaten those run by friends of the government. Despite this discontent, no one has been able to get large scale and persistent demonstrations going. This is partly because the police have been able to detect and disrupt attempts to organize larger protests. This is largely due to the internal intelligence services, which became larger and more effective during the anti-terrorism campaign of the 1990s and did not “demobilize” after the terrorists were defeated a decade ago. So when the Arab Spring came along two years ago, the Algerian government was ready (which similar governments in neighboring Tunisia and Libya were not). 

 

May 2, 2013: In the south (Chlef province) police arrested a man wearing an explosive belt and prevented a suicide bomber attack. The arrested man was recruited by al Qaeda. 

 

April 28, 2013: An air force patrol spotted four vehicles carrying armed men crossing the Libyan border. Soldiers were sent to intercept and the resulting gun battle left five Islamic terrorists and three soldiers dead. Another ten terrorists fled into the desert and troops pursued them. This was the largest clash with Islamic terrorists since the terrorist raid on a natural gas field near the border in January.

Three local defense force volunteers were killed 70 kilometers east of the capital. The attackers were believed to be Islamic terrorists, which the 94,000 local defense force volunteers watch out for. First organized in 1994, the defense volunteers were a key element in defeating the Islamic terrorist uprising of the 1990s. 

 

April 27, 2013: President Bouteflika suffered a mild stroke while visiting France. The 77 year old Bouteflika is one of the 1950s revolutionaries who led the battle for independence. He has been president since 1999 and has continued the post-revolution of rigged elections and corruption. This is what the Islamic radicals rebelled against in the 1990s. That uprising was defeated mainly because the Islamic radicals seemed even worse than the corrupt “old revolutionaries.” Most Algerians are still unhappy with their government but not willing to suffer through another revolution, not yet. 

 

April 25, 2013:  Two local security volunteers were wounded by a roadside bomb 510 kilometers east of the capital.

Yemen - Al Qaeda Dies Hard

The American UAV campaign against al Qaeda in Yemen is crippling the terrorist organization there. The UAVs are a much more effective way to find and attack terrorists hiding out in rural areas among pro-terrorist tribesmen. Going in with ground troops is much bloodier, especially in terms of civilian casualties. The UAVs and more powerful intelligence collection and analysis software make it possible to find the terrorists quickly and accurately. Terrorists have been unsuccessful at defending against these UAV tactics. The best defense al Qaeda has going for it is media ignorance of how the UAV tactics work which has led to some special interest groups pressuring media and politicians to outlaw the use of UAVs like this because they interpret it as a war crime. This requires ignoring the deadlier alternatives and most editors and politicians realize this and don’t bite. But some, out of ignorance or the need for some media attention, go for it.

 

There were 53 of these UAV attacks in Yemen last year, compared to 18 the year before. The increase last year was mainly in response to a major al Qaeda offensive that sought to take over most of the towns in the south. This exposed a lot more al Qaeda men to detection and UAV missile attack. The al Qaeda offensive was defeated and the surviving terrorists scattered back to their rural hideouts. While some al Qaeda men have fled to other terrorist battle zones (Somalia, Pakistan, Africa) or sought refuge in Europe, hundreds have stayed in Yemen. Most of these are from Yemen or other countries in the Arabian Peninsula. They feel they have nowhere to go and are prepared to go down fighting. Most Yemenis are willing to accommodate them. 

 

So far this year over 30,000 Africans have been smuggled across the Gulf of Aden and entered Yemen. Last year at least 107,000 Africans arrived that way. This was a record, the last one being in 2011 (103,000). Drought in northeast Africa, and chronic poverty and lack of economic opportunity has driven more people to leave and the Yemeni and Somali smugglers have been very busy. There are believed to be more smugglers now because many who had switched to piracy are back because the counter-piracy effort has made piracy much less profitable. Most of the people smuggled into Yemen want to keep moving to find work in the wealthy Arab Gulf states, Israel or Europe. In the last seven years about half a million Africans have made the journey and Yemeni refugee camps hold about 200,000 of these foreigners who did not move on for one reason or another. The main reason these Africans remain in Yemen is because of the growing efforts by Saudi and Yemeni border guards to prevent smugglers from getting the illegal migrants across the border. While some seek work in Saudi Arabia, many keep going for Israel or Europe. 

 

April 30, 2013:  A pipeline near the Red Sea was bombed again, halting flow of oil and much needed income for the government. Normally Yemen produces 270,000 barrels of oil a day and most of it is exported (accounting, with natural gas, 90 percent of export income). The 320 kilometer long pipeline extends from oil fields in Marib province to the Red Sea export terminal. Such attacks cost the government a billion dollars in lost revenue last year. Tribesmen loyal to deposed president Saleh were blamed. The army has been going after the tribal factions believed responsible and the last attack was on April 8^th. 

 

In the south (Shabwa province) soldiers discovered and disarmed a bomb placed next to a natural gas pipeline. The gas goes to a liquid natural gas facility on the coast where it is exported. 

 

April 29, 2013: In the east (Marib province) tribesmen loyal to deposed president Saleh  damaged the long distance power lines and blacked out most of the province. 

 

April 28, 2013: In the southeast (Hadramout province) an al Qaeda death squad killed another military intelligence officer. This campaign against intelligence personnel has been going on for over a year because al Qaeda sees the Yemeni intelligence efforts as a major source of information on where al Qaeda personnel are. This, they believe, enables the American UAVs to strike.

April 27, 2013: Outside the capital al Qaeda gunmen attacked a checkpoint killing five soldiers while losing two of their own. Elsewhere in the south (Aden) over 100,000 separatist tribesmen commemorated the 1994 civil war in which the southern tribes tried to split the country in two. The south failed that time but wants a rematch. 

 

April 21, 2013: East of the capital an American UAV fired missiles at a group of al Qaeda men, killing two and wounding three. This is the third such attack in the last week. Al Qaeda retaliated by attacking a checkpoint, killing two soldiers while losing one of their own. 

 

April 20, 2013: In the south (Abyan province) rival tribesmen clashed leaving two pro-government and three anti-government tribesmen dead. Elsewhere in the south (Mukalla) an al Qaeda death squad killed another military intelligence officer.

 

April 18, 2013: In a symbolic move, anti-Saleh demonstrators who had been camped out in the capital for two years took down their tents and left, thus marking an end to the Arab Spring uprising in Yemen. It isn’t really over, as the new government is nearly as corrupt and ineffective as the decades old Saleh rule they replaced. The Yemen Arab Spring demonstrations began in February 2011 and by the end of the year Saleh agreed to go. But then separatist tribes in the south, in conjunction with their al Qaeda allies, tried to take control of the south and establish a separate country. Most of last year was spent putting down that rebellion. 

 

April 17, 2013: In the south (Thamar province) Yemeni warplanes attacked a group of al Qaeda and killed five of them. Outside the capital a U.S. UAV missile attack killed a wanted al Qaeda leader and four of his followers. In the south, tribal elders are trying to negotiate with local al Qaeda bands to get the terrorists to stop attacking repair crews trying to restore electrical power to villages where members of the tribe live.

Five soldiers gunned down in Iraq

Gunmen killed five army intelligence soldiers in two attacks west of Baghdad while others shot dead five anti-Qaeda militiamen north of the Iraqi capital on Saturday, police and doctors said.

One group of soldiers were driving near the site of a long-running anti-government protest in the former insurgent stronghold of Ramadi when they were stopped by gunmen.

They shot one of the gunmen, wounding him, and clashes broke out in which four of the soldiers were killed and another wounded, a police lieutenant colonel and a doctor said.

Gunmen also killed one soldier and wounded another in a similar incident involving a second vehicle in the same area, the same sources said.

And gunmen killed five Sahwa anti-Qaeda militiamen in an attack, on a checkpoint south of Tikrit, which lies north of the Iraqi capital, a second police lieutenant colonel and a doctor said.

Authorities announced a curfew in the whole province of Anbar.

They also gave the protest organisers in Ramadi, the provincial capital, a 24-hours deadline to hand over the gunmen responsible for killing the soldiers or face a “firm response,” said Major General Mardhi Mishhin Al Mahalawi, the army’s Anbar operations chief.

Members of Muslim Sunni minority have been rallying for the past four months in several Iraqi cities to protest what they describe as unfair treatment by Maliki’s government.

Tensions spiked earlier this week when fighting broke out in the northern town of Hawija during a security crackdown on a protest encampment.

That provoked a series of clashes nationwide that left more than 170 people dead over the past five days.

The victims in Tikrit were government-allied anti-Qaeda militia of Sunni fighters from the Sahwa, those who joined forces with US troops to fight Al Qaeda during the Iraq war.

The head of the Sahwa threatened war on militants if they do not turn over those who have killed Iraqi soldiers, state television reported on Saturday.

If those responsible are not handed over, “the Sahwa will take the requested procedures and do what it did in 2006,” Sheikh Wissam Al Hardan was quoted as saying.

In 2006, Sahwa militiamen fought pitched battles against Sunni militants, helping turn the tide of the Iraq war.

The attack on the army intelligence soldiers drew a quick response from Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri Al Maliki, whose Shiite-led government has been the target of rising Sunni anger over perceived mistreatment.

Maliki vowed his government would not keep silent after the killing of the soldiers.

“I call upon the peaceful protesters to expel the criminals targeting military and police,” Maliki said in a statement posted on his official website. Maliki pointed a finger at the civil war in neighbouring Syria for the return of sectarian strife to Iraq.

Sectarian strife “came back to Iraq, because it began in another place in this region,” Maliki said in televised remarks.

“Sectarianism is evil, and the wind of sectarianism does not need a licence to cross from a country to another, because if it begins in a place, it will move to another place,” Maliki said.

“Strife is knocking on the doors of everyone, and no one will survive if it enters, because there is a wind behind it, and money, and plans,” he added, two days after warning of the danger of a return to “sectarian civil war.”

Iraqi officials have repeatedly claimed that insurgent groups, such as Al Qaeda in Iraq and supporters of former Iraqi leader Saddam regime have infiltrated Sunni demonstrations.

Militants kill Yemen colonel and 5 troops

Suspected Al Qaeda militants killed a Yemeni colonel near his house on Saturday. Gunmen opened fire from a motorbike, killing Colonel Ahmed Abdulrazzaq, intelligence head in Yemen’s Hadramawt Province, outside his home in Mukalla on the Arabian Sea.

Militants also shot dead five Yemeni soldiers in an attack on Saturday on a checkpoint southeast of Sanaa, an official said, while two assailants were reportedly killed.

The attack targeted an army checkpoint in the district of Rada, where the interior ministry said late on Friday it mounted security measures following intelligence about possible attacks by Al Qaeda militants.

Five soldiers were killed and several others were wounded in the attack, the local government official told AFP.

A gunfight was still ongoing on Saturday afternoon, and some gunmen were also killed, he added.

The Sep.net news website, which is linked to the Yemeni defence ministry, said two gunmen perished in the exchange of gunfire.

Al Qaeda loyalists seized large swathes of the south and east in 2011, taking advantage of a decline in central government control during an 11-month uprising that forced veteran president Ali Abdullah Saleh from power in 2012.

Government troops have since recaptured much of the territory with support from US drone strikes but the jihadists retain bases in the desert east.

Around 60 military and security officials have been assassinated in southern and eastern Yemen in the past two years after an Islamist insurgency sprang up.

Gunmen kill 10 Iraq security forces members

Gunmen killed five army intelligence soldiers in two attacks west of Baghdad while others shot dead five anti-Qaeda militiamen north of the Iraqi capital on Saturday, police and doctors said.

One group of soldiers were driving near the site of a long-running anti-government protest when they were stopped by gunmen. They shot one of the gunmen, wounding him, and clashes broke out in which four of the soldiers were killed and another wounded, a police lieutenant colonel and a doctor said.

Gunmen also killed one soldier and wounded another in a similar incident involving a second vehicle in the same area, the same sources said.

And gunmen killed five Sahwa anti-Qaeda militiamen in an attack, on a checkpoint south of Tikrit, which lies north of the Iraqi capital, a second police lieutenant colonel and a doctor said.

The incidents come amid a wave of violence that began on Tuesday when security forces moved in against anti-government protesters near the Sunni Arab northern town of Hawijah, sparking clashes that left 53 people dead.

Subsequent unrest, much but not all of it apparently linked to the Hawijah clashes, killed dozens more people and brought the death toll to over 200 by Saturday.

French defense minister visits northern Mali

France's defense minister reaffirmed Friday that his country will keep 1,000 of its troops in Mali to fight radical Islamic militants even after the arrival later this year of more than 12,000 United Nations peacekeepers.

In a visit to the volatile northeastern city of Gao, Defense Minister Jean-Yves Le Drian addressed reporters a day after the U.N. Security Council authorized the deployment of the peacekeeping force.

"From now on we are in the post-war phase. The U.N. resolution adopted yesterday will allow for the arrival of a force to stabilize the country," he told reporters. "But France will keep about 1,000 soldiers to carry on with military operations."

Some Malians are already questioning how successful the United Nations peacekeeping mission to their country will be given its limited mandate and the volatile mix of armed groups across the north.

The U.N. force is tasked with helping to restore peace after a French-led military operation was launched in January to dislodge radical Islamic fighters who had seized control of the country's vast north.

However, the U.N. peacekeepers will not be authorized to launch offensive military operations or chase terrorists in the desert, which French forces will continue to do, although France is aiming to downscale its presence in its former colony by year-end.

Daouda Sangare, an entrepreneur in Bamako, questioned how much the peacekeepers would do to protect civilians because of their limited mandate. Other U.N. peacekeepers in Africa have been accused of failing to protect local populations from attack, he said.

 

"The U.N. forces will only be coming to collect their salaries," he said. "We have seen the example in Congo, where the M23 rebels entered Goma and the U.N.'s blue helmets were there in the city and did not protect the population. There were deaths and injuries."

On July 1 the U.N. peacekeepers are supposed to take over from a 6,000-member African-led mission now in Mali, although the deployment date is subject to change depending on security conditions.

The transformation into a U.N.-led mission will be a positive step because it will have considerable financial backing, said Ousmane Diarra, a Bamako-based politician.

"Until now, the African forces that have been in Mali have been financed by their countries," he said. "That was a worry for us because it was not clear that the African countries could continue to finance their military mission in Mali."

Mali fell into turmoil after a March 2012 coup created a security vacuum that allowed secular Tuareg rebels to take over the country's north as a new homeland. Months later, the rebels were kicked out by Islamic jihadists who carried out public executions, amputations and whippings.

When the Islamists started moving into government-controlled areas in the south, France launched a military offensive on Jan. 11 to oust them. The fighters, many linked to al-Qaida, fled the major towns in the north but many went into hiding in the desert and continue to carry out attacks including suicide bombings.

"We know it's going to be a fairly volatile environment and there will certainly be some attacks against peacekeepers where they will have to defend themselves," U.N. peacekeeping chief Herve Ladsous told reporters on Thursday.

France is gradually reducing its presence in Mali — currently just under 4,000 troops — and French officials said they expect to have roughly 1,000 there by year-end. Some 750 of those will be devoted to fighting the insurgent groups, officials said.

The U.N. force will also operate alongside a European Union mission that is providing military training to the ill-equipped Malian army, which was left in disarray by the March 2012 coup.

Algeria - Al Qaeda Under Heavy Attack

The government continues to remain one move ahead of the kind of rebellion that hit other similarly corrupt governments during the “Arab Spring”. Enough of the most corrupt and inept members of the government are being dumped, along with some economic progress, to keep angry mobs off the streets. People are still angry because there is still a lot of corruption and lost economic opportunities around for all to see. In Algeria the Arab Spring at least served to provide some needed motivation to fix the mess decades of bad government created. Algerians are hoping to have a bloodless revolution, largely because they do not want a repeat of the bloody war with Islamic radicals in the 1990s. To that end, even senior people in the government are helping out by turning on the most corrupt and inept members of the leadership and even going public with details of the massive thefts of oil income over the years. European firms that have long done business with the Algerian company are going public with details and this helps persuade their Algerian counterparts to admit what everyone in Algeria already suspects. While these European revelations are largely the result of European efforts to clean up their own corruption, it helps reformers in foreign countries like Algeria. 

France has not yet been able to get DNA proof that the man Chadian troops killed in northern Mali on March 2^nd was Mokhtar Belmokhtar (the planner of the January natural gas facility attack in southern Algeria that got 37 workers killed). Al Qaeda says Belmokhtar is still alive but offer no proof. The supreme leader of al Qaeda in North Africa (Abdel Malek Droukdel) is believed to still be hiding out in northern Algeria and he would be the one to appoint a successor to Belmokhtar. There has been no such announcement yet. Meanwhile, the destruction of so many al Qaeda bases in Mali, and the death of hundreds of hard-core Islamic terrorists there, have demoralized Islamic radicals throughout North Africa. At the same time all counter-terrorism forces in the region are trying to take advantage of all this by seeking out Islamic terrorists fleeing Mali. 

Seizures of illegal drugs (hashish, cocaine, and heroin) tripled last year (from 53 tons 2011 to 157 tons). This is an indication of growing affluence in Algeria, but the hashish and cocaine are coming from the south mainly for export to Europe. This smuggling is a primary source of income for al Qaeda and other Islamic radical groups, and the seizures are an indication of its success and the extent of Algerian efforts to stop it. 

March 2, 2013: In Mali Chadian and French troops found and destroyed a major al Qaeda camp near the Algerian border. Among the dead were two Algerians (Abdel Hamid Abu Zeid and Mokhtar Belmokhtar) who were high ranking al Qaeda leaders. 

February 24, 2013: The Tiguentourine natural gas facility in the south resumed limited production. The plant had been closed since the January terrorist attack that left 37 workers dead. Heroic efforts by key members of the security and operational staff prevented the plant from being heavily damaged. This was done by shutting down the gas flow early on, something the terrorists could not figure out how to reverse with all the key technical staff dead, fled, or silent. 

February 22, 2013: Two raids in the north left a dozen al Qaeda men dead. More importantly 13 weapons and many documents were seized. 

February 20, 2013: The U.S. has put its diplomatic personnel in Algeria on high alert because intelligence indicated there is a high risk of a terrorist operation against them. At the same time Algeria announced increased security around oil and gas facilities. 

February 18, 2013: Acting on a tip from locals, troops in the south found the base of seven Islamic terrorists from Mali. Four of the terrorists were killed but three got away, apparently headed for Mali.

Mali – A Legend dies, or does he?

France will keep its troops in Mali a month later than planned, with withdrawal beginning in April. France is still not sure which senior Mali leaders were killed recently, because definitive identification of these senior but definitely dead men has proved difficult to confirm. In the last two weeks days France rapidly moved troops into the Adrar des Ifoghas mountains near the Algerian border, where France already knew of al Qaeda had bases. French warplanes have been bombing these bases as more recon aircraft and UAVs are available to confirm al Qaeda targets. 

France and its African allies (especially the desert experienced Chadians) are making an effort to kill or capture as many veteran al Qaeda men before they can scatter to more distant sanctuaries. To this end the recent arrival of American UAVs and electronic intelligence collecting aircraft have proved crucial in detecting and tracking Islamic terrorists who attempt to leave the mountains and head for Libya, Algeria or more distant points. France would prefer to capture as many of these terrorists as possible, but second best is killing them and searching the bodies. French aircraft have to do the killing because the American UAVs are unarmed. The American aircraft have apparently provided target information for at least sixty of the French air strikes in the last few weeks. France is also seeking to rescue seven French civilians believes held captive in the Adrar des Ifoghas. So far the French force of 4,000 in Mali has lost four troops killed during eight weeks of fighting. There are 1,200 French and 800 Chadian troops in the mountains near the Algerian border and dozens of al Qaeda safe houses and weapons and ammo storage sites have been captured or destroyed from the air. 

An African peacekeeping force of about 5,000 troops is occupying the cities and large towns in northern Mali and fighting with al Qaeda men who did not make it to the mountains or across the border.  The destruction of so many al Qaeda bases in Mali, and the death of hundreds of hard-core Islamic terrorists there have demoralized Islamic radicals throughout North Africa. At the same time all counter-terrorism forces in the region are trying to take advantage of all this by seeking out Islamic terrorists fleeing Mali. 

In the end it may be that driving al Qaeda out of Mali was easy while dealing with the rebellious Malian Army proved to be much more difficult. At the moment the Mali Army has about 10,000 people on the payroll and about 6,000 of these are soldiers while the rest are support personnel. The army has always been more of a political than a military force. Jobs in the military are much sought after and those who get them are expected to bring the support of their family for whoever runs the military. Until last year it was senior politicians who controlled the military. Then a coup by junior officers, seeking better weapons and equipment for the army displaced the political control. 

Politicians are notoriously corrupt in Mali but the new army leadership, calling for clean government, has now become a force to contend with in Mali politics. To the foreign nations that supply much of the government budget (via foreign aid) the coup is not acceptable. The foreigners want the elections back, even though the elections were rigged by the corrupt politicians that the younger officers despise. Unfortunately, these officers are not immune to the endemic corruption and are turning into the kind of men they seek to replace. It’s a messy situation that mixes rebellious troops with corrupt politicians. While the EU (European Union) training force (220 military trainers and another to train civilian officials) is planning to train and equip four battalions (about have the troops in the Mali Army) to a higher standards, forcing out the officers who support the coup will be a lot more difficult. The training program begins on April 2^nd. 

March 6, 2013:  A French soldier was killed a hundred kilometers north of Gao in northern Mail while accompanying a force of one hundred Chadian troops that encountered some al Qaeda men. Four Chadians and an unknown number of terrorists were wounded. In the last few days over a hundred al Qaeda men have been killed or wounded. These men were part of a larger force (of several hundred al Qaeda) that were either trapped in Gao or entered from Niger, which is just across the Niger River. 

In the northern mountains 2,000 French and Chadian troops killed at least 15 Islamic terrorists in several clashes today. This fighting took place in the Ametetai valley, where over a hundred Islamic terrorists had taken refuge. The valley has water, as do many other valleys in these mountains near the Algerian border. The locals want no part of this fighting, but will provide information with the right incentives (cash will often work, as it worked for al Qaeda, which operated their lucrative and drug smuggling operations from bases in these mountains). 

March 3, 2013: Over the last three days more than fifty Islamic terrorists were killed during several clashes in northern Mali. Ten Chadian and one French soldier were also killed. Dozens of vehicles and large quantities of weapons and documents were captured. All this took place between Gao and the Adrar des Ifoghas Mountains near the Algerian border.

 

March 1, 2013: The Chadian government went public with the news that Chadian troops in northern Mali had killed two al Qaeda leaders on February 22^nd. 

Mali announced that presidential elections will be held in July. It’s still unclear if the army leadership will obey whoever is elected. 

February 28, 2013: France has spent $131 million for its Mali operations so far and some French officials want to keep French troops there until July. Other French leaders want to get the troops out beginning in March. Apparently a compromise on the withdrawal date is in the works. 

February 26, 2013: In the northern city of Kidal a suicide car bomber killed six armed Tuaregs manning a check point. The Tuareg rebel militias split with al Qaeda over eight months ago and shifted their allegiance to the French when French troops showed up in northern Mali. Kidal is the nearest city to the Adrar des Ifoghas Mountains. 

February 22, 2013: Chadian troops in northern Mali believed they killed Mokhtar Belmokhtar (the planner of the January natural gas facility attack in southern Algeria that got 37 workers killed) and Abdelhamid Abou Zeid (leader of the other al Qaeda group that was long based in these mountains. 

Al Qaeda later said Belmokhtar was still alive but offered no proof. The loss of Belmokhtar would be a major blow to al Qaeda morale as Belmokhtar had a reputation for always escaping the many efforts to kill or capture him. When a legend dies, it is always demoralizing for the followers. The supreme leader of al Qaeda in North Africa (Abdel Malek Droukdel) is believed to be still hiding out in northern Algeria and he would be the one to appoint a successor to Belmokhtar, who was number two or three in the North African al Qaeda organization. There has been no such announcement yet. 

The battle that got the two al Qaeda leaders cost the lives of 13 Chadian troops and over 40 other Islamic terrorists. 

The U.S. announced that it had set up a UAV and intelligence base in nearby Niger. About a hundred American troops were there to maintain several Reaper UAVs. 

February 21, 2013: Two suicide car bombers attempted to attack a French camp outside the northern town of Tessalit. In addition to the bombers, three others were killed.