Yemen - Al Qaeda Dies Hard

The American UAV campaign against al Qaeda in Yemen is crippling the terrorist organization there. The UAVs are a much more effective way to find and attack terrorists hiding out in rural areas among pro-terrorist tribesmen. Going in with ground troops is much bloodier, especially in terms of civilian casualties. The UAVs and more powerful intelligence collection and analysis software make it possible to find the terrorists quickly and accurately. Terrorists have been unsuccessful at defending against these UAV tactics. The best defense al Qaeda has going for it is media ignorance of how the UAV tactics work which has led to some special interest groups pressuring media and politicians to outlaw the use of UAVs like this because they interpret it as a war crime. This requires ignoring the deadlier alternatives and most editors and politicians realize this and don’t bite. But some, out of ignorance or the need for some media attention, go for it.

 

There were 53 of these UAV attacks in Yemen last year, compared to 18 the year before. The increase last year was mainly in response to a major al Qaeda offensive that sought to take over most of the towns in the south. This exposed a lot more al Qaeda men to detection and UAV missile attack. The al Qaeda offensive was defeated and the surviving terrorists scattered back to their rural hideouts. While some al Qaeda men have fled to other terrorist battle zones (Somalia, Pakistan, Africa) or sought refuge in Europe, hundreds have stayed in Yemen. Most of these are from Yemen or other countries in the Arabian Peninsula. They feel they have nowhere to go and are prepared to go down fighting. Most Yemenis are willing to accommodate them. 

 

So far this year over 30,000 Africans have been smuggled across the Gulf of Aden and entered Yemen. Last year at least 107,000 Africans arrived that way. This was a record, the last one being in 2011 (103,000). Drought in northeast Africa, and chronic poverty and lack of economic opportunity has driven more people to leave and the Yemeni and Somali smugglers have been very busy. There are believed to be more smugglers now because many who had switched to piracy are back because the counter-piracy effort has made piracy much less profitable. Most of the people smuggled into Yemen want to keep moving to find work in the wealthy Arab Gulf states, Israel or Europe. In the last seven years about half a million Africans have made the journey and Yemeni refugee camps hold about 200,000 of these foreigners who did not move on for one reason or another. The main reason these Africans remain in Yemen is because of the growing efforts by Saudi and Yemeni border guards to prevent smugglers from getting the illegal migrants across the border. While some seek work in Saudi Arabia, many keep going for Israel or Europe. 

 

April 30, 2013:  A pipeline near the Red Sea was bombed again, halting flow of oil and much needed income for the government. Normally Yemen produces 270,000 barrels of oil a day and most of it is exported (accounting, with natural gas, 90 percent of export income). The 320 kilometer long pipeline extends from oil fields in Marib province to the Red Sea export terminal. Such attacks cost the government a billion dollars in lost revenue last year. Tribesmen loyal to deposed president Saleh were blamed. The army has been going after the tribal factions believed responsible and the last attack was on April 8^th. 

 

In the south (Shabwa province) soldiers discovered and disarmed a bomb placed next to a natural gas pipeline. The gas goes to a liquid natural gas facility on the coast where it is exported. 

 

April 29, 2013: In the east (Marib province) tribesmen loyal to deposed president Saleh  damaged the long distance power lines and blacked out most of the province. 

 

April 28, 2013: In the southeast (Hadramout province) an al Qaeda death squad killed another military intelligence officer. This campaign against intelligence personnel has been going on for over a year because al Qaeda sees the Yemeni intelligence efforts as a major source of information on where al Qaeda personnel are. This, they believe, enables the American UAVs to strike.

April 27, 2013: Outside the capital al Qaeda gunmen attacked a checkpoint killing five soldiers while losing two of their own. Elsewhere in the south (Aden) over 100,000 separatist tribesmen commemorated the 1994 civil war in which the southern tribes tried to split the country in two. The south failed that time but wants a rematch. 

 

April 21, 2013: East of the capital an American UAV fired missiles at a group of al Qaeda men, killing two and wounding three. This is the third such attack in the last week. Al Qaeda retaliated by attacking a checkpoint, killing two soldiers while losing one of their own. 

 

April 20, 2013: In the south (Abyan province) rival tribesmen clashed leaving two pro-government and three anti-government tribesmen dead. Elsewhere in the south (Mukalla) an al Qaeda death squad killed another military intelligence officer.

 

April 18, 2013: In a symbolic move, anti-Saleh demonstrators who had been camped out in the capital for two years took down their tents and left, thus marking an end to the Arab Spring uprising in Yemen. It isn’t really over, as the new government is nearly as corrupt and ineffective as the decades old Saleh rule they replaced. The Yemen Arab Spring demonstrations began in February 2011 and by the end of the year Saleh agreed to go. But then separatist tribes in the south, in conjunction with their al Qaeda allies, tried to take control of the south and establish a separate country. Most of last year was spent putting down that rebellion. 

 

April 17, 2013: In the south (Thamar province) Yemeni warplanes attacked a group of al Qaeda and killed five of them. Outside the capital a U.S. UAV missile attack killed a wanted al Qaeda leader and four of his followers. In the south, tribal elders are trying to negotiate with local al Qaeda bands to get the terrorists to stop attacking repair crews trying to restore electrical power to villages where members of the tribe live.

Mali - Forward to the Past

The cause of the rebellion in northern Mali (corrupt southern officials running the north in a corrupt and inept fashion) has not been dealt with. The Tuareg rebels still want autonomy (self-rule) and the black African majority (90 percent of the population) in the south does not want to allow it. But the Mali Army, dominated by black Africans, is still a corrupt bunch of ill-trained poorly equipped and ineptly led gunmen who tend to serve whoever pays them. This army is still incapable of defeating the MNLA (Tuareg rebels) and not sure if they can persuade the peacekeepers to do it for them.  The MNLA expects the July elections (the 7 ^th for the president the 21 ^st for parliament) to bring another group of corrupt southerners to power.

 

Fixing the corruption in the Mali government and military is seen as the solution to the problems with the Tuareg north. But that corruption, fueled by tribal ties and tradition, has proved extremely difficult to eliminate or even just tone down. One thing there is no shortage of in Mali is challenges.

Speaking of corruption, the decision by Chad to withdraw its 2,250 troops from Mali was, as many expected, just a negotiating ploy. Chad leaders want more money and no criticism if a lot of it disappears into their pockets. 

 

In Europe, Africa and the Middle East police are detecting, and increasingly arresting, Islamic terrorists who have fled Mali. Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) had members from all over North Africa, but mostly from Algeria and while defeated in Mali it was not destroyed there. 

Hundreds of experienced Islamic terrorists have scattered and are reorganizing via email, cell phones and hand-carried documents. Recruiting has taken a hit, as the operations in Mali this year showed once more that Islamic radicals cannot stand up to professional soldiers and their governing methods tend to turn the population against them. This caused over a thousand AQIM members to desert, while nearly 500 were killed in the Mali fighting. Hundreds of local Islamic terrorists (Tuaregs and black Africans from countries in the region) have stayed in northern Mali and are carrying out a terrorism campaign. There are a few larger groups of these Islamic terrorists still wandering around the far north but they are being hunted by French aircraft and hit with smart bombs. Some of these Islamic terrorists have renounced their alliance with al Qaeda and are trying to evade attack by just being another group of Tuareg separatists. 

 

French troops continue to search for and attack Islamic terrorist groups in the north. French intelligence has identified dozens of camps and equipment storage sites al Qaeda constructed in the north during the last year and, in the far northern mountains near the Algerian border, over the last decade. France is using its warplanes and smart bombs to attack these bases and supply dumps. 

Sending in ground troops is a less attractive option because of the al Qaeda use of landmines and the possibility of ambush by nearby terrorists. The French troops can go in on foot, but there are more targets to be hit than there are infantry to hit all of them. It takes time and manpower to clear the mines. 

 

April 25, 2013:  The UN approved a Mali peacekeeping force of 12,600 soldiers and police. Most of the troops would be from Africa and include the 6,000 African peacekeepers already in Mali and at least a thousand French troops. 

 

April 24, 2013: The MNLA means (in French) “Liberation Army of Azawad” and the Mali government is upset that MNLA men control most of the rural (and very thinly populated) areas in the north. These rebels like to approve documents (like passes) with rubber stamps that say “State of Azawad”. That is the Tuareg term for their homeland in northern Mali. MNLA refuses to disarm but is willing to negotiate their role in the north. After invading in January France tolerated the MNLA as long as the rebels cooperated and did not fight the Mali army or government officials. Several hundred Tuareg Malian soldiers work directly for the French as scouts and translators. These men help the French determine which Tuareg rebels can be trusted and which are Islamic terrorists (usually members of MUJAO or Ansar Dine.) 

 

April 23, 2013: The French transferred responsibility for security to a battalion (650 troops) of peacekeepers from Burkina Faso. 

 

April 22, 2013:  France officially agreed to keep 2,000 troops in Mali through July and at least a thousand by the end of the year. 

 

April 21, 2013: MNLA (Tuareg rebels) took control of Ber, a town of 9,000 some 50 kilometers east of Timbuktu. The town had been taken over by an Islamic radical group that had arrived to protect Arabs living there. The Tuareg and Arabs are ethnically similar and sometimes unite against the black Africans who live in the north. But after months of harsh rule by Islamic terrorists, even the Tuareg are hostile to “Arabs” and locals will still try and drive them out. The only defenders of the local Arabs (who have often been there for generations) are the remaining Islamic radicals or the French troops. Local leaders in Ber called on the MNLA for help in keeping the peace. 

 

April 18, 2013: Mauritania has agreed to send 1,800 peacekeepers to Mali. Mauritanian troops are particularly valuable because they have years of experience chasing down Islamic terrorists and bandits in the desert. Mauritania borders Mali and sees this peacekeeping duty as self-defense. One of the groups Mauritanian troops will be fighting is MOJWA (Movement for Oneness and Jihad in West Africa, largely composed of black African Islamic radicals and led by Mauritanians). MOJWA is unique among Islamic terrorist groups because its leadership is black African. Mauritanian security forces have made it very difficult for MOJWA to operate in Mauritania and that’s why so many MOJWA members moved to Mali in the last year. Many are still there and not looking forward to the arrival of Mauritanian troops.

 

April 16, 2013: Algerian soldiers and police continue to intercept arms smugglers from Libya trying to get to northern Mali. It’s unclear if these weapons were headed for the Islamic terrorists still operating their or tribesmen. Both are regular customers for weapons dealers.

Counter Terrorism - Arab Spring And The Major Fail

After two years the Arab Spring revolution has developed a bitter aftertaste. Unemployment is up and corruption is still around in countries where the rebels succeeded. The incompetent and abusive police forces are still on the job in those nations. While the government has changed, the families that control most of the economy are still around. This concentration of economic power in a few families is common in many countries, particularly in the Arab world. The problem with the Arab Spring is that the focus was the anger was too narrow, concentrating on the current dictators and not the fundamental problems that allowed all those dictators to flourish in the first place.

 

Islamic radicalism has been a part of Islam since the beginning but has never been able to sustain control over governments. That’s in large part because Moslems are divided over whether it is better to be ruled by a religious dictatorship and according to Islamic law (interpreted by religious scholars who act as a final appeals court) or by some other system. Islamic radicals consider the alternatives (secular dictatorship, monarchy and democracy) un-Islamic. Many Arab countries had tried secular dictatorship (usually accompanied by socialism) after World War II. This turned out to be a major failure and most of the Arab Spring governments overthrown were secular dictatorships. Monarchies have been more successful as they have been the oldest and most successful form of government in the region. Democracy has had a hard time in the Middle East because it requires a civil society (people willing to work honestly for the common good) and the pervasive corruption in the region made that very difficult. The religious dictatorship has never worked, also done in by the corruption and tribalism but it has survived as an impossible idea. 

 

The big change has been the tolerant attitude towards Islamic radicalism by the new Arab Spring governments. A major reason for the renewed vigor of Islamic terror organizations in the last year is because the Egyptian, Libyan, Syrian, and Tunisian jails were emptied of political prisoners after the rebels replaced the dictators. The freed prisoners included thousands of Islamic radicals, many of them Islamic terrorists who have gone back to the business of being very bad. 

 

Even the Islamic conservatives, who tended to stay out of jail by toning down their religious and social prejudices, have become a problem. Mobs of Islamic conservative men have been attacking women’s schools and any establishment that serves alcohol (even if mainly to tourists). Women who don’t dress very conservatively are confronted and sometimes beaten. These Islamic conservative groups want Islamic law imposed on everyone and are not waiting for laws to be passed. Anyone who opposes this vigilantism is accused of being hostile to Islam and attacked even more vigorously. 

 

Most of the Islamic terrorists let out of prison were those who had experience, especially management skills. In the last decade the U.S. and Israel have put thousands of skilled Islamic terrorists out of action (dead or imprisoned). Arab dictatorships were particularly effective at finding and killing to imprisoning Islamic radicals and have been doing this vigorously since the 1990s. All this led to a steady decline in the number of Islamic terrorist attacks over the last decade. But with so many jailed Islamic terrorists freed, the mayhem is on the increase again.

 

Already, police in Arab countries are seeking to arrest some of those freed radicals for crimes committed since they got out, or for general bad behavior over a long period of time. Despite that experience, countries still undergoing Arab Spring rebellions (like Syria) are under pressure to let Islamic radicals out of prison once the dictatorship is overthrown. In part this is because many Islamic radical groups are taking part in the fighting and expect to get something more than a “thank you” for their efforts. Indeed, Syrian rebels are concerned about the Islamic radicals attempting to install a religious dictatorship after the current secular Assad dictatorship is overthrown. Whatever the case, Islamic radicals expect a new government to let imprisoned Islamic terrorists to go free. 

Even if the new government wants to keep Islamic terrorists and criminals imprisoned, the chaos that accompanies a revolution often leads to many jail breaks. Moreover, many of the non-terrorist criminals and political prisoners are recruited into Islamic radical groups while in prison. Western and Arab intelligence agencies are identifying more and more of these former prisoners in terrorist hot sports like Pakistan, Yemen, Mali, and Libya, including those who were not originally jailed for Islamic terrorism.