Counter - Terrorism ----- Russia Learns To Kill With Kindness

Over the last decade Russia and the United States have been cooperating more closely in dealing with Islamic terrorism. While a lot of this is about exchanging information on wanted terrorists and what they are up to, there has also been some detailed discussions about counter-terror techniques. While some Russian techniques are illegal in the West (more extreme forms of torture and taking relatives of terror suspects’ hostage) the Russians have found some Western methods useful. In particular the Russians have adopted the U.S. practice of offering large rewards for not just for the most senior terrorists, but for a lot of lower ranking ones as well. The Russians were impressed at the large number of terrorists the Americans captured or killed this way. The Russians also learned, and adopted, other American ideas that made the reward program so effective. This included adopting the American Witness Protection Program (“Witsec”). The U.S. began this program in 1970 to encourage witnesses against organized crime (which had a reputation for killing witnesses) to testify in court.

 

The Russians were impressed at how effective Witsec has been in protecting those within the program and the U.S. provided the Russians with assistance in putting together a Russian version. This included the addition of a few embellishments, like greater use of plastic surgery and putting some people in the program outside Russia. Once word of the Russian Witsec got around, more people were willing to risk talking about Islamic terrorists for the reward money.

 

Meanwhile the American program continues to provide useful tips on where bad guys are. Informants are quietly paid and sometimes moved, with their families, to a safer place where they can spend the reward money without fear of terrorist assassins seeking vengeance. The U.S. often uses the tips to kill terrorists via missile armed UAVs. While capturing these fellows alive is preferred, that is often not practical if they are deep in bandit country. While you can launch a large commando operation, there are not sufficient resources for a lot of these raids and with each one there’s the risk of losing some of your commandos or support troops (like helicopter crews.) So the unexpected missile is the only alternative to nothing at all. 

  

While the media likes to make much of terrorists with multimillion dollar rewards on their heads, most of the terrorists captured or killed because of much smaller rewards, often less than $100,000 and rarely more than a few hundred thousand dollars. There are a dozens of terrorists with multimillion dollar rewards attached, but these are the best protected and well hidden people. Often these senior bad guys are eventually located via several less-costly underlings who are identified via smaller rewards. This is especially the case if these underlings can be captured and interrogated.

  

Year by year more Pakistanis and Afghans are taking advantage of the reward program, and living to spend the money. That's a big change, and it has made the Taliban leadership, on both sides of the border, very uneasy. The U.S. has given Pakistan's main intelligence agency; ISI (Inter Service Intelligence agency), tens of millions dollars for rewards, since September 11, 2001. The U.S. money was paid as rewards for the capture or killing of wanted Islamic terrorists. The live ones were turned over to the United States. Pakistan says it captured over 800 of these terrorists, but the actual number is believed to be greater. The U.S. did not look closely at exactly who got the reward money.

 

Osama bin Laden had a $25 million price on his head since late 2001 (before that it was $5 million). Did anyone collect all or part of that reward? Because of the way Witsec works, that will be a secret for a long time. With that much money at stake, many people wondered why someone had not ratted him out by sooner. The main reason was that large cash rewards usually, but do not always, work.

 

Getting someone to drop a dime (make a phone call) to turn someone in for a reward only works if there are phones available and faith in the ability of those paying the reward to ensure the recipients will live to spend it.

 

It was back in 1984 that the United States began offering rewards of one to seven million dollars for information leading to the capture of terrorists, and lesser amounts to those who provided evidence against a terrorist or provided good information about a planned terrorist act. The informer, and his family, were also offered removal to a safe place (including the United States).

 

By September 11, 2001, five major terrorists had been captured because of this program. Over $6 million was been paid out to in over 20 cases. Some 42 percent of the informants requested security protection and another 42 percent sought relocation for themselves and family members to another country or region to avoid of retaliation.

 

Since then, the number of high value people captured via this program has more than tripled and the amount of money paid out has increased even more. However, one problem with the reward program is that it does not pay attention to the realities of international terrorism. Most major terrorists, like Osama bin Laden, are well protected and hidden. Sure, there are people who know where they are, and can get in contact with people around the bad guy. But an operation to nab one of these men requires a getting the message out to those who have the information, and providing informants with a realistic way to call in, and then collect.

 

Getting the word out is not as easy as it sounds. The FBI has undertaken several advertising campaigns in Pakistan, using matchbook covers, posters and other media to remind people in the tribal territories that rewards of up to twenty-five million dollars are being offered for prominent al Qaeda members. In addition to the cash rewards, "relocation (to another country, for the tipster and immediate family) is available". At least half a dozen al Qaeda big shots have been caught this way, and rewards paid.

  

Collecting the reward is difficult. The wanted men are surrounded by bodyguards and aides. They hide out in neighborhoods or villages full of people who share their beliefs. There are also cultural problems. Most of the al Qaeda big shots who have not yet been captured or killed are known to be (or believed to be) taking refuge among pro-Taliban Pushtun tribes along the Afghan border. The people there are generally poor, illiterate and not very well informed. Many have never seen anyone outside their village or valley. Most of the people with modern gadgets (like cell phones) are working for the terrorists. The people with some education and wealth, like local tribal leaders, have to worry about their large families. Anyone who turns in someone carrying a huge reward would be marked for murder if they suddenly displayed signs of wealth.

 

The fact is, there are lots of spies in the tribal areas. Selling information to outsiders has long been a recognized (if not entirely approved) way for a poor tribesman to make some money, or earn some valuable favors. But getting stuff out is difficult for these people, who have little privacy in their lives, and are constantly under the control of family and tribal elders. You can't just walk out, either.

 

Wandering through the territory of another tribe or clan (as in the next valley over), can get you killed. Strangers are seen as enemies, and treated accordingly. Cell phones changed that over the last decade and the Islamic terrorists tried, unsuccessfully, to keep the cell phone service out of remote tribal areas in Pakistan and Afghanistan.

  

Meanwhile, U.S. troops have learned to forget about the big payoffs, and concentrate on the small ones. As U.S. Army Special Forces operators have long known (and constantly teach the regular army troops they work with), little favors (that won't be noticed by the Taliban enforcers) get you little bits of information. These bits add up and some have led to nailing whales (guys with big prices on their heads). One of the more popular favors in the backcountry is medical care. Out there, not much is to be had. For this reason, the two medics in each Special Forces Alpha Detachment ("A-Team") have been taught to treat common maladies encountered in poor, isolated, areas. An astute diagnoses, and prompt application of some antibiotics can save the life of someone dear to the heart of somebody else with information you need. Sometimes the troops will bring a surgeon in, to perform a lifesaving (or life altering) procedure. This yields much good will, and loosens tongues.

 

The big thing about medical care is that it's not as visible as a pile of cash (which usually results in something flashy being bought, and dangerous queries from the local Taliban), but means a lot more than mere things. Pakistani or Afghan doctors don't like travelling to the tribal territories. Too dangerous. Those who can afford medical care, travel to a town or city that has it. But the U.S. and NATO soldiers have access to drugs and medical care wherever they are. Sharing it is often more valuable, or at least more practical, than a $25 million reward.

 

The Russians have adapted many of these techniques to their own situation. Some of these ideas are not new to Russia. Offering favors or scarce resources to people in return for cooperation has long been used in Russia, especially by the Soviet era secret police. But since the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991 a free market economy has made a lot of economic goodies and opportunities freely available. So the Russian police are open to new ideas from the West.

Entrapment

The U.S. recently arrested Abdella Ahmad Tounisi (an American citizen of Arab ancestry) for trying to leave the United States and join al Qaeda. The United States and most other Western nations with large Moslem populations have gotten much better at spotting and stopping their Moslem citizens (or emigrants) who try and travel to other countries (like Pakistan or Syria) and join Islamic terrorist groups. Over a thousand young men (and a few young women) have managed to do that over the last two decades. Even many of the families of these terrorist recruits were in the dark and the growing number of complaints by parents to the government eventually revealed the extent of the problem.

Tounisi was caught because of an FBI website set up to attract Americans seeking to join terrorist groups. In the past most of the recruiting was done by terrorist sympathizers and fund raisers in local mosques. This has become more dangerous as more American Moslems are tipping off the FBI about such recruiters and mosques known for or suspected of such recruiting activities are under greater surveillance. So more of the recruiting has moved online and the FBI realized that most of these web sites kept their operator’s name secret, so the FBI began setting up some of its own to identify and grab wannabe terrorists before they got a chance to hurt anyone.

 

Tounisi was a fortuitous catch because he was good friends with Adel Daoud who was arrested a year ago after he tried to set off a bomb in Chicago for the cause of Islamic radicalism. Daoud is awaiting trial because the FBI made sure the bomb was a dud. The FBI also discovered that Tounisi was a fellow Islamic terror fan and friend of Daoud and would have been arrested with Daoud but withdrew from the plot because he suspected it was an FBI trap. While the FBI knew that Tounisi was a fan of Islamic terrorism, until he tried to go off to Syria to join an al Qaeda affiliate he had not done anything he could be indicted for. 

 

The FBI is sometimes accused (usually by the terrorism suspects attorney, family or fans) of entrapment. But judges and juries have not agreed with that. If you send emails or ask to meet with FBI agents posing as terrorism facilitators, you are getting caught before you can kill someone, not entrapped. Despite all these honey pot (terrorism intermediaries who are actually working for law enforcement) cases, and the publicity they get, people still fall for these bogus opportunities to commit mass murder.

Counter Terrorism - Arab Spring And The Major Fail

After two years the Arab Spring revolution has developed a bitter aftertaste. Unemployment is up and corruption is still around in countries where the rebels succeeded. The incompetent and abusive police forces are still on the job in those nations. While the government has changed, the families that control most of the economy are still around. This concentration of economic power in a few families is common in many countries, particularly in the Arab world. The problem with the Arab Spring is that the focus was the anger was too narrow, concentrating on the current dictators and not the fundamental problems that allowed all those dictators to flourish in the first place.

 

Islamic radicalism has been a part of Islam since the beginning but has never been able to sustain control over governments. That’s in large part because Moslems are divided over whether it is better to be ruled by a religious dictatorship and according to Islamic law (interpreted by religious scholars who act as a final appeals court) or by some other system. Islamic radicals consider the alternatives (secular dictatorship, monarchy and democracy) un-Islamic. Many Arab countries had tried secular dictatorship (usually accompanied by socialism) after World War II. This turned out to be a major failure and most of the Arab Spring governments overthrown were secular dictatorships. Monarchies have been more successful as they have been the oldest and most successful form of government in the region. Democracy has had a hard time in the Middle East because it requires a civil society (people willing to work honestly for the common good) and the pervasive corruption in the region made that very difficult. The religious dictatorship has never worked, also done in by the corruption and tribalism but it has survived as an impossible idea. 

 

The big change has been the tolerant attitude towards Islamic radicalism by the new Arab Spring governments. A major reason for the renewed vigor of Islamic terror organizations in the last year is because the Egyptian, Libyan, Syrian, and Tunisian jails were emptied of political prisoners after the rebels replaced the dictators. The freed prisoners included thousands of Islamic radicals, many of them Islamic terrorists who have gone back to the business of being very bad. 

 

Even the Islamic conservatives, who tended to stay out of jail by toning down their religious and social prejudices, have become a problem. Mobs of Islamic conservative men have been attacking women’s schools and any establishment that serves alcohol (even if mainly to tourists). Women who don’t dress very conservatively are confronted and sometimes beaten. These Islamic conservative groups want Islamic law imposed on everyone and are not waiting for laws to be passed. Anyone who opposes this vigilantism is accused of being hostile to Islam and attacked even more vigorously. 

 

Most of the Islamic terrorists let out of prison were those who had experience, especially management skills. In the last decade the U.S. and Israel have put thousands of skilled Islamic terrorists out of action (dead or imprisoned). Arab dictatorships were particularly effective at finding and killing to imprisoning Islamic radicals and have been doing this vigorously since the 1990s. All this led to a steady decline in the number of Islamic terrorist attacks over the last decade. But with so many jailed Islamic terrorists freed, the mayhem is on the increase again.

 

Already, police in Arab countries are seeking to arrest some of those freed radicals for crimes committed since they got out, or for general bad behavior over a long period of time. Despite that experience, countries still undergoing Arab Spring rebellions (like Syria) are under pressure to let Islamic radicals out of prison once the dictatorship is overthrown. In part this is because many Islamic radical groups are taking part in the fighting and expect to get something more than a “thank you” for their efforts. Indeed, Syrian rebels are concerned about the Islamic radicals attempting to install a religious dictatorship after the current secular Assad dictatorship is overthrown. Whatever the case, Islamic radicals expect a new government to let imprisoned Islamic terrorists to go free. 

Even if the new government wants to keep Islamic terrorists and criminals imprisoned, the chaos that accompanies a revolution often leads to many jail breaks. Moreover, many of the non-terrorist criminals and political prisoners are recruited into Islamic radical groups while in prison. Western and Arab intelligence agencies are identifying more and more of these former prisoners in terrorist hot sports like Pakistan, Yemen, Mali, and Libya, including those who were not originally jailed for Islamic terrorism.

Counter-Terrorism - How The Culture Clash Works

Despite over a year of civil war inside their southern neighbor Yemen, most Saudis are confident that they have suppressed al Qaeda terrorist activities in their own kingdom. This can be seen from the fact the most wanted lists (issued by national and provincial police) mainly features drug dealers, gangsters and non-religious bad men in general. Most of the Islamic terrorists have been arrested, surrendered or gone to fight in Yemen, Syria or other foreign lands in need of Saudi Holy Warriors. What really bothers many Saudis is why, with all the affluence in their kingdom there are so many educated young men, from good families, who go off to join Islamic terrorist groups. The answer has a lot to do with what opportunities Saudi society offers its young men, and what is done (or, rather, not done) to help them prepare for the future.

The official unemployment rate in Saudi Arabia is 11 percent, but many of those men are unemployed by choice and the unofficial rate is over 20 percent. Saudi Arabia, like most Arab states, has a very different labor force than is found in the West. There are several reasons for this.

Arabs tend to have a very high opinion of themselves, and most jobs available, even to poorly educated young men, do not satisfy. Thus most Saudis prefer a government job, where the work is easy, the pay is good, the title is flattering, and life is boring. In the non-government sector of the economy, 90 percent of the Saudi jobs are taken by foreigners. These foreigners comprise 27 percent of the Saudi population, mostly to staff all the non-government jobs. This means most young Saudi men have few challenges. One might say that many of them are desperate for some test of their worth, and a job in the competitive civilian economy does not do it. These jobs are considered boring and, well, not worthy of a descendent of the mighty Bedouin tribes that have long controlled the area. Being a terrorist, even if it means a quick death as a suicide bomber, is considered a preferable alternative to helping run the civilian economy. The Saudi government knows that it is essential that Saudis actually run the economy. But they must force businesses to hire less efficient and more troublesome Saudi employees. Foreigners work harder, for less and cause fewer problems. Currently 30 percent of employees (in commercial enterprises) must be Saudis, and that percentage will keep going up. On the plus side this is causing more demand for employers to be allowed to hire Saudi women, who also work harder and are less inclined to give the boss a hard time.

The Saudi employment situation is not unique. The UAE (United Arab Emirates) has foreigners occupying 99 percent of the non-government jobs. The unemployment rate is 23 percent, but only a tenth of those are actually looking for a job. A survey indicated that most of the unemployed are idle by choice. Kuwait is more entrepreneurial, with only 80 percent of the non-government jobs taken by foreigners. The other Gulf Arab states (which have less oil) have a similar situation.

Many Saudis are aware of the problem, especially those who have studied in the West, or spent some time there. As a result, there are some very competent Saudi doctors, scientists and bankers. But this minority knows they are up against an ancient and well entrenched culture that does not seek out innovation and excellence as it is done in the West. The more insightful Saudis seek ways to work around these problems. For example, the royal family established the National Guard in the 1930s, as a private, tribal army, that is now almost as large as the regular army and considered more dependable and effective than the regulars. That's because the National Guard troops follow traditional rules of military leadership, and have a personal relationship with the king. Only men from tribes that are known to be loyal to the Saud family may join, and they are expected to make their family and tribe proud. Saddam Hussein and other Arab leaders formed similar organizations. Saddam had his Republican Guard. Despots the world over tend to have a guard force recruited more for blood ties and loyalty, than for anything else.

The regular forces (army, navy and air force) are just government jobs, run by another government bureaucracy. There are lower standards because there are none of the family or tribal ties that can demand better. Only in the West do most people give the same devotion and respect to non-family/tribal institutions. Thus family run businesses in the Middle East are the model for a highly effective business. In the West, the most effective businesses are corporations where nepotism (family ties) are discouraged, if not outright forbidden.

It comes down to a different cultural attitude towards taking responsibility for your actions. It's human nature to avoid failure, or taking responsibility for a mistake. Thus we have the concept of "saving face." One reason the West has made such economic, cultural, military and social progress in the last five hundred years is because they developed a habit of holding people responsible for their actions and giving out the rewards based on achievement. In the West, this sort of thing is taken for granted, even if it is not always practiced.

But in much of the rest of the world, especially the Arab world, things are different. Most Arab countries are a patchwork of different tribes and groups, and Arab leaders survive by playing one group off against another. Loyalty is to one's group, not the nation. Most countries are dominated by a single group that is usually a minority, as in Bedouins in Jordan, Alawites in Syria, Sunnis in Iraq (formerly) and Nejdis in Saudi Arabia. The result of all this means that officers and officials are assigned not by merit but by loyalty and tribal affiliation.

Then there are the Islamic schools, which are so popular in Moslem countries, which favor rote memorization, especially of scripture. Most Islamic scholars are hostile to the concept of interpreting the Koran (considered the word of God as given to His prophet Mohammed). This has resulted in looking down on Western troops that will look something up that they don't know. Arabs prefer to fake it, and pretend it's all in their head. Improvisation and innovation is generally discouraged. Arab armies go by the book. Western armies rewrite the book and thus usually win.

All of this makes it difficult to develop a real NCO corps. Officers and enlisted troops are treated like two different social castes and there is no effort to bridge the gap using career NCOs. Enlisted personnel are treated harshly. Training accidents that would end the careers of US officers are commonplace in Arab armies, and nobody cares.

Arab officers often do not trust each other. While an American infantry officer can be reasonably confident that the artillery officers will conduct their bombardment on time and on target, Arab infantry officers seriously doubt that their artillery will do its job on time or on target. This is a fatal attitude in combat.

Arab military leaders consider it acceptable to lie to subordinates and allies in order to further their personal agenda. This had catastrophic consequences during all of the Arab-Israeli wars and continues to make peace difficult between Israelis and Palestinians. When called out on this behavior, Arabs will assert that they were "misunderstood."

American officers and NCOs are only too happy to impart their wisdom and skill to others (teaching is the ultimate expression of prestige), but Arab officers try to keep any technical information and manuals secret. To Arabs, the value and prestige of an individual is based not on what he can teach, but on what he knows that no one else knows.

While Western officers thrive on competition among themselves, Arab officers avoid this as the loser would be humiliated. Better for everyone to fail together than for competition to be allowed, even if it eventually benefits everyone.

Western troops are taught leadership and technology; Arabs are taught only technology. Leadership is given little attention as officers are assumed to know this by virtue of their social status as officers.

In Arab bureaucracies, initiative is considered a dangerous trait. So subordinates prefer to fail rather than make an independent decision. Battles are micromanaged by senior generals, who prefer to suffer defeat rather than lose control of their subordinates. Even worse, an Arab officer will not tell an ally why he cannot make the decision (or even that he cannot make it), leaving Western officers angry and frustrated because the Arabs won't make a decision. The Arab officers simply will not admit that they do not have that authority.

This lack of initiative makes it difficult for Arab armies to maintain modern weapons. Complex modern technology requires on the spot maintenance, and that means delegating authority, information, and tools. Arab organizations avoid doing this and prefer to use easier to control central repair shops (which makes the timely maintenance of equipment difficult). If you can afford it, as the Saudis can, you hire lots of foreign maintenance experts to keep equipment operational. All this is taken for granted inside Saudi Arabia, but looks quite strange to Westerners who encounter it for the first time.

While these cultural differences make it more difficult to run a modern, technological society, they do make it easier to form terrorist organizations and carry out lots of attacks. Thus many Arabs are not eager to study engineering or science in college (religion is the preferred major in Saudi Arabia), they are more inclined to die in the cause of creating a worldwide Islamic dictatorship