Ben Collopy, a
fifth year University Student at the University of Newcastle Australia, is
currently writing an honors thesis paper on the future of the ANZUS alliance
with America. Here he discusses Australia’s submarine choice:
Australia is set
to embark upon its most ambitious, complex, and expensive defense project in
history – the design and construction of its first indigenous submarine.
Understanding why Australia has decided to commit to such a project requires
both knowledge of Australia’s unique geographical environment and regional
strategic realities.
Dubbed the Future
Submarine Project, this ambitious scheme hopes to develop the ability to
design, test, and construct an Australian submarine perfectly suited for the unique
conditions in which it would be required to operate. The project is estimated
to cost anywhere between 16 to 36 billion Australian dollars (the final price
remains a point of contention) and aims to construct the largest diesel attack
submarines in the world, surpassing even the mighty U.S. Virginia-class. The
2013 Defense White Paper unequivocally stated the nation’s intent, removing all
other options from the table. There remains, however, a rather heated debate
within Australia as to the risks versus possible reward of the Future Submarine
Project. Australia has never before attempted something of this magnitude;
normally preferring to purchase advanced pieces of military hardware from those
who have spent decades perfecting the trade. Such crucial facts and some
strategic foresight explain this ambitious move.
Firstly, unique
geography plays an enormous role in Australia’s decision making. With one of
the largest maritime domains in the world, a massive 8,148,250 square
kilometers, Australia’s claims stretch from the freezing waters of Antarctica
through to the far warmer waters in the North, near the equator. The sheer size
of the zone raises a difficult question for the nation, which while large in
geographic size, is relatively small in population, with roughly only 23
million people for a nation the size of the United States.
It remains rather
difficult if not impossible, to patrol and monitor the vast majority of
Australian waters. Subsequently areas of importance must be selected.
Furthermore military platforms are required to spend long periods of time on
station patrolling this zone and covering far larger swaths of sea with limited
resources. Australia requires craft that are durable, versatile, and capable of
long-term deployments.
The size of the
continent creates another difficult situation for any navy but especially a
submarine force. Multiple sea conditions surround the Australian coastline,
with the warmer Pacific Ocean in the north and the much cooler Indian Ocean in
the south, far rougher conditions occur in the Indian Ocean than in the milder
Pacific Ocean. These climatic changes of temperature alter the salinity of the
water, (thereby affecting buoyancy), creating a strong demand for durable and
versatile craft.
Now, one may ask
why the significantly more demanding polar South of the nation requires such
serious attention. Despite being a zone of little activity, compared to the
busy Northern trade routes, Australia places high strategic importance upon
patrolling the Southern route, or so-called “Australian backyard”.
Australia claims up to 40% of Antarctica (despite being ignored by most
of the world’s powers, including the United States). Australia does however
take this entitlement quite seriously and consequently, the southern region is
patrolled and monitored. Anyone who doubts Australia’s intention to protect and
guard its southern approach, need only look at a map of claimed Australian
maritime borders, and note the strategically placed Macquarie and Heard
Islands. These seemingly insignificant parcels of land allow for the creation
of effective choke points to any approach of Australia’s claimed Antarctic
region and southern trade routes. Should circumstances arise where northern
trade routes become unsafe, or worse still blocked perhaps through conflict,
the longer and inhospitable south would remain of vital importance. Australia
relies on seaborne trade for survival, and if the above mentioned eventuality
were ever to arise, the ability to place quiet attack submarines in the newly
vital southern trade routes to protect shipping and monitor activity, becomes
of unquestionable importance. Combined with Australian Antarctic sovereignty
claims, the enforcement of the entire region becomes clearer to understand,
despite the highly unpleasant arctic conditions.
Secondly, growing
military capabilities within Southeast and Northern Asia place a further
emphasis on the need for a highly survivable and capable submarine fleet.
Australia looks beyond 2025 when questioning future military capabilities in
Asia, this points to a period where many neighboring nations will have acquired
formidable submarine platforms and anti-shipping capabilities. For example
Indonesia is seeking to expand its small fleet of two submarines toward a more
powerful twelve with the recent purchase of Russia’s quiet running Kilo-class
diesel submarine. Vietnam will take possession of its first submarine fleet by
the end of 2016. This is not to forget the expansive growth of Chinese A2/AD,
or area denial abilities, primarily the growth of anti-shipping weaponry from
the emerging power. Lastly, this also heralds the end of the aging
Collins-class diesel attack submarine Australia currently employs.
While not
necessarily constituting an arms race, the growth of submarine capabilities
throughout Southeast Asian nations demonstrates the development of these
nations as maritime powers who are self-conscious of their perceived lack of
maritime defense ability. The growth of ballistic anti-ship missile technology
helps to explain the sudden popularity of submarine fleets, as surface vessels
lose their survivability in conflict. For smaller nations, these vessels work
to create an important deterrent and if need be, the capability to wage
effective warfare against a more powerful enemy.
Thirdly we come
to the varied options Australia has to replace the aging Collins-class. Taking
into consideration the above requirements for the future submarine, the list of
possible options for replacing the Collins-class is seemingly on the short
side. The SEA 1000 project was the study committed in order to ascertain
Australia’s requirements for a future submarine. Three basic options were put
forward: to buy a MOTS (model off-the-shelf) design and modify it for
Australian conditions, evolve the current Collins-class submarine for future
use, or lastly create a brand new indigenous submarine designed for Australian
requirements.
The first option
of buying MOTS craft, while certainly more cost effective and of lower risk
than the other two options, would struggle to fulfill Australian demands,
despite major and costly modifications. While most capable submarines are more
than suitable for many other Southeast Asian nations, the vast majority of
MOTS-designed craft would not be suited for the expansive Australian maritime
border. Most MOTS craft are relatively small, with an average crew of around
30-to-50 men, resulting in less time deployed and limited range due to lack of
fuel and food supply.
The Collins-class
by comparison holds upward of 80 men with far larger compliments of fuel and
food, allowing for greater deployment time, upward of three months. The new
Future Submarine is planned to be even larger. The increased size also allows
for greater armament of torpedoes and guided missiles. The Virginia-class
nuclear attack submarine has often been touted as a possible alternative to an
Australia design, and while there have been indications that the U.S. might be
willing to sell them, the nuclear element of the craft was rejected by the
Australian government.
While this has been blamed on a lack of nuclear infrastructure in order to effectively manage a nuclear propelled craft, it is more likely the government remains unwilling to attempt a difficult sell of nuclear technology to a voting public distrustful of nuclear energy, and as a major signatory of the NPT (non-proliferation treaty) it would be trekking into unknown legal waters by attaining nuclear powered craft. Ultimately then, a purchase of MOTS submarines would poorly fit Australia’s needs, and would more than likely result in far greater cost in order to get them to an acceptable level, and without nuclear power, any real contender craft are removed.
While this has been blamed on a lack of nuclear infrastructure in order to effectively manage a nuclear propelled craft, it is more likely the government remains unwilling to attempt a difficult sell of nuclear technology to a voting public distrustful of nuclear energy, and as a major signatory of the NPT (non-proliferation treaty) it would be trekking into unknown legal waters by attaining nuclear powered craft. Ultimately then, a purchase of MOTS submarines would poorly fit Australia’s needs, and would more than likely result in far greater cost in order to get them to an acceptable level, and without nuclear power, any real contender craft are removed.
The option of
evolving the current Collins-class is also touted as a more cost-effective
alternative to producing a brand new submarine. However the historical failings
of its original design have left an unpleasant memory within the Defence Force
and government, who now strive to avoid the same mistake. The Collins-class was
put to tender from seven of the world’s nine diesel shipbuilding companies.
Eventually the Swedish company, Kockums, put forward the Type 471 submarine,
fitted with systems from an American company, Rockwell. From the onset major
issues arose with the submarine build, resulting in numerous mechanical
failures and setbacks. This meant cost spiraled greatly, and a following
disagreement between Rockwell, Kockums, RAN, and the Australian government
meant the vessels were delayed in their construction.
A lesson learned
after costly upgrade programs were enacted was that too much diversification on
one project could result in communication breakdowns, and the incompatible
mating of components made from different suppliers resulted in unforeseen
issues, especially when attempting to implant American combat systems into MOTS
submarines. This helps to explain the current decision to commit to the largest
and most complex defence project in Australia’s history. Again, however, there
is great depth into understanding the current decision, the emergence of a
nation set on expanding its abilities and standing in the world.
The RAND
Corporation was hired by the Australian government to conduct a study into
Australia’s submarine building and design capacity. It subsequently found that
while the infrastructure was only slightly lacking, and the software capability
was acceptable, a skills shortage proved to be the greatest problem, especially
in regards to undersea propulsion. At no stage was the possibility of an
indigenous submarine design and construct ever deemed impossible, rather, it
conveyed a real sense of the possibility of Australia enhancing its ability to
produce complex and highly advanced defence platforms. Plans to amend shortages
were subsequently created.
The Future
Submarine Project is already well underway, with the Future Submarine Project
Office established in Adelaide. Tenders must be sent out for the design and
development for the hull, systems and various components, and the ASC
(Australian Submarine Company) is to begin construction sometime within the new
few years through 2030. The ASC is well placed to fulfill the construction of
the Future Submarine, with decades of work on the Collins under its belt, from
construction work to maintenance of the Collins and finally to upgrading the
troublesome boats.
