Azerbaijan buys medium-range missiles

The range of fire medium-range missiles is about 3000 km.

 

Azerbaijan has gained the medium range ballistic missiles EXTRA of Israeli production (130 km) and long-range missiles (2,000 km) made in Pakistan.

 It has to be noted that in order not to disturb the balance of power, Russia does not sell long-range ballistic missiles to Armenia and Azerbaijan. At the same time, Russia has installed operational-tactical missile complexes "Iskander" with nuclear warheads on a military base in Armenia near the Turkish border.

The ballistic missiles with a range 1000-5500 km can be fitted with a nuclear warhead.

The missiles of Israel Military Industries (IMI) have the caliber of 306 mm, a length of 3.97 m, a launch weight of 450 kg and a 125 kg weight of warhead.

Pakistani missile "Shaheen-1" is capable of hitting targets at a distance of 750 km, "Hatf-4" is an improved version of the "Shaheen-1" missile with a longer range. The exact range of "Shaheen-1A" advanced missile called the "Hatf-4" is not officialy reported, although the range of fire medium-range missiles is about 3000 km.

Why sea-based nuclear weapons won't stabilise the Indo-Pacific

China, India and possibly Pakistan intend to deploy nuclear weapons at sea. Ultimately, such deployments may well have a stabilising effect — that is, they may reduce the risk of full-scale war and nuclear use. Sea-based nuclear weapons might, for instance, fit well with 'no-first-use' doctrines.

 They might also encourage reduced investment in more destabilising forces such as weapons fired from fixed sites, which are vulnerable and thus suited to a 'first strike'. And after all, sea-based nuclear weapons were widely seen as stabilising during the Cold War. 

 

However, we should beware of applying simple retrospective visions of the US-Soviet balance to the Asian strategic scene. There are various reasons to doubt that deployment of sea-based nuclear weapons in Indo-Pacific Asia will be stabilising. 

 

First, to state the obvious, there are three independent centres of nuclear power in Asia: China, India and Pakistan. And that is before counting the US and Russia, as well as North Korea, which one day could also want to base some of its weapons at sea. This fundamental element of the Asian nuclear scene will remain regardless of where weapons are based.

 

Second, although wanting the permanent presence of nuclear weapons at sea as a second-strike capability to guarantee their survival is arguably a stabilising factor, that may not be the driving motivation of all three countries. There seems to be strong interest in China and India, at least, in the symbolic value of strategic submarines, including for parochial or bureaucratic reasons. In addition, these two countries may prefer to avoid deploying nuclear-armed sea-launched ballistic missiles, in order to maximise political control over the weapons. It should also be added, regarding China, that the choice of a secure SSBN base on Hainan island, where berths are largely immune to a first strike, puts less pressure on Beijing to adopt a practice of continuous at-sea deterrence. 

 

Third, deployment of nuclear weapons at sea in Indo-Pacific Asia does not only mean strategic missiles based on submarines.

 

It may include cruise missiles on vulnerable surface platforms. It will also probably include theatre systems designed to target naval forces, notably by Pakistan. This would not be a stabilising factor if command-and-control dilemmas for such systems are resolved in a way that dilutes the ability of national authorities to maintain the highest degree of political control over the weapons at all times. It should be remembered that probably the closest call for the use of nuclear weapons since 1945 concerned naval theatre weapons: it was in Cuba in October 1962.

 

Fourth, Indo-Pacific waters lend themselves less easily to the deployment of non-detectable submarines than was the case for the Cold War confrontation, when the Atlantic and the Pacific oceans offered more opportunities. This is especially true since India and Pakistan are likely to field only medium-range systems for some time, forcing their submarines to operate relatively close to the adversary's shores. It is also worth mentioning that unlikely accidents can happen, as was the case in 2009 when British and French SSBNs collided, and it took them a while to realise what had happened.

 

More generally, the transition period towards the deployment of operational SSBNs by China, India and Pakistan is likely to be long, tortuous and dangerous, for technical and budgetary reasons. What happens if one (or two) of the three countries manages to have a secure sea-based second-strike capability well before the others? 

 

Simply put, it is impossible to argue that the deployment of sea-based nuclear weapons in Indo-Pacific Asia will be inherently stabilising.

The dangers of SSBN proliferation in Indo-Pacific Asia

It has become commonplace to lament the arms races underway in Indo-Pacific Asia.

 

China's military modernisation over the last two decades has helped provoke heightened political tensions and growing concern in capitals from Tokyo to New Delhi to Washington and Moscow.

 

North Korea's continued pursuit of nuclear weapons and missile delivery systems keeps tensions in Northeast Asia high. The Indian subcontinent is home to two nuclear powers that have fought four wars over the last 65 years. Many countries in the Asian littoral have undertaken serious rearmament programs, and across the region strategists see a proliferation of missiles of all types — anti-access systems, aerospace capabilities and naval platforms, among others

. 

Regional nuclear modernisation programs, especially the development of submarines (nuclear powered or conventional) armed with nuclear weapons, are of special concern.

 

China and India are committed to producing more nuclear-capable delivery systems and weapons with greater range, accuracy and features that make them more lethal and thus more threatening to potential adversaries. Meanwhile Pakistan is pursuing its own program to acquire more capable submarines from China. While no one is arguing, as yet, that Pakistan intends to acquire ballistic missile submarines, some analysts hint that nuclear-tipped cruise missiles are a real possibility. Given Pakistan's record on nuclear proliferation over the past decades, such fears appear real. 

 

With the possible exception of America, powers external to the Indo-Pacific (Russia, for example) are also pursuing strategic modernisation. Russia, lest anyone forget, is an Indo-Pacific nuclear power by virtue of its Pacific Fleet, complete with its latest model SSBNs (in the American lexicon: Ship, Submersible, Ballistic, Nuclear), the Borei class, armed with Bulava missiles. Even the US is investing in the research and development preliminary to building a replacement for the Ohio-class submarines that currently constitute the sea-based leg of the American nuclear triad. American strategic modernisation is not a driver in the region's strategic dynamics, but insofar as the US is executing an Asian 'pivot', American military capabilities, nuclear and conventional, remain important. 

 

This short post will not attempt a net assessment of regional or bilateral rivalries. A full analysis would need to look more closely at all dimensions of military power as well as the impact of American forces in the region. But a simple scan of the table above allows one small observation for a region that may soon be in the grips of a full-blown nuclear arms race. The prospects for stable, long-term peace (meaning greater strategic stability, the reduction of crisis instability, and fewer opportunities for accidents, chance and misperception to lead to conflict) depend, in part, on taking steps sooner rather than later to rein in potentially destabilising developments. At present, regional SSBN programs are not so advanced, and the numbers of platforms and weapons are not so large, that steps cannot avert a widening arms race. 

 

Growing numbers of submarines with nuclear-armed ballistic missiles may preserve second-strike capabilities for their possessors (and thus, debatably, contribute to strategic stability). But in the increasingly crowded seas of  Indo-Pacific Asia, greater numbers also lead to more opportunities for accidents, chance and misperception.

 

Submarine accidents are not unknown: the national tragedy of a lost boat and its crew might quickly become a regional or even global crisis if reactors or nuclear weapons have problems. Submarine operations in cramped seas also raise the possibility that one side or another will encounter the other in a crisis, with unpredictable results. Slowly maturing command and control (C2 ) and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) technologies still have a ways to go (look how long it took in US and the Soviet Union to develop their systems).

 

Furthermore, few speak of the challenge of ensuring the political and professional reliability of crews (while the mature nuclear powers rarely focus today on crew reliability, such concerns were quite real in the not-so-distant past). Nor are SSBNs and ballistic missiles in the Indo-Pacific the only aspect of undersea warfare and nuclear weapons that should trouble us: surface fleets, mine warfare, anti-submarine warfare and so forth increase the danger of incidents at sea, and they could raise the potential for a nuclear crisis. Knowledgeable analysts are concerned that the next stage of the Indo-Pacific naval arms race will involve still more submarines with nuclear sea-launched cruise missiles. 

Three 'nots'

If regional actors (not just the states currently pursuing SSBNs but other concerned parties) are to act to avert further arms racing and stabilise the emerging undersea deterrent, they must recognise the situation for what it is. A nuclear arms race at sea is:

• Not simply a local or regional issue.
• Not simply a military issue.
• And not simply a navy or maritime issue.

A nuclear arms race at sea is a global problem with far-reaching implications for proliferation, conventional arms modernisation, and the possibility of arms control. The mere existence of such systems makes it more likely that the so-called nuclear taboo might finally be broken. An undersea nuclear race is deeply political because it affects the geopolitical rivalry among great and regional powers, not to mention alliance structures and patterns of regional governance.

 

For all regional military forces, such a nuclear arms race at sea is not simply the business of navies: SSBNs affect joint and combined operations in ways big and small, and blur important distinctions between conventional and nuclear systems. It is worrisome that despite some recent developments there has been, in general, asymmetric progress in developing weapons systems versus the C2, ISR, training/readiness, and nuclear doctrine necessary to deploy sea-based deterrent systems safely and reliably. 

 

Although prudence on the part of India, China and other regional powers may alleviate these concerns, it may not be sufficient for those interested in regional stability. In the end, although it is not fashionable to advocate for arms control much less naval arms control, strategists and policy makers should remember the words of Schelling and Halperin: 'the essential feature of arms control is the recognition of the common interest, of the possibility of reciprocation and cooperation even between potential enemies with respect to their militaries.' And, in the words of Robert Jervis, which seem especially prescient with regard to naval nuclear arms racing in the Indo-Pacific, 'because the security dilemma and crisis instability can exacerbate if not create conflicts, potential enemies will have an interest in developing arms control arrangements.'

India-Pakistan: Taliban Plead For Mercy

The Pakistani Taliban have called for a ceasefire to halt daily air strikes that have (since February 19 ^th ) caused them several hundred casualties and the loss of many buildings and lots of vehicles, equipment and weapons. Over a hundred Taliban have been killed by the F-16s and helicopter gunships employed. The army recently revealed that over a hundred soldiers had been killed in the tribal territories since September 2013. The government is going through the motions of recognizing this Taliban ceasefire but are not allowed (by the media and the military) to ignore the fact that the Taliban have always broken ceasefires and peace agreements. In the seven years of Taliban insurrection the Islamic terrorists have only agreed to ceasefires or peace deals when faced with major military operations. There are currently nearly 200,000 troops in the Pakistani tribal territories, and over 40,000 surrounding North Waziristan. This is an area of 4,700 square kilometers, with 365,000 people that is the only sanctuary Islamic terrorist groups like the Taliban and Haqqani Network have in the tribal territories. North Waziristan has been surrounded since late 2009, but until recently Pakistani generals refused to go in and shut down this terrorist refuge. Politicians have been under growing pressure from the West, especially the United States to do something about the continued terror attacks by what the Pakistanis call "bad Taliban". These are mostly Pakistani Taliban who wants to establish a religious dictatorship in Pakistan and some of them have been increasingly active attacking other Pakistanis. This has caused a shift in public opinion against the Taliban, although there is still a lot of support for Islamic terrorists who only attack India, Afghanistan or Western nations.

 

The Afghan Taliban, who wants to establish a similar government in Afghanistan are considered "good Taliban" along with the minority of Pakistani Taliban who don't want to overthrow the government. In the last four years, the Pakistani Taliban have also caused over a thousand of casualties among pro-government tribesmen throughout the tribal territories. It's no secret that the army hires tribesmen and puts them in dangerous situations to minimize army casualties. The army cannot afford to lose the support of the loyal tribes up there. All this has put pressure on the army to eliminate the refuge the killers can flee to in North Waziristan.  Several times, because of the demands of Pakistani and American politicians, the Pakistani generals have said they will consider advancing into North Waziristan. But it hasn't happened yet. Despite that, in the last week the generals have openly talked about actually going in on the ground and eliminating the North Waziristan Islamic terrorist sanctuary. The Pakistani military has explicitly declared that it would not attack its longtime and loyal terrorist allies (especially Haqqani Network) in North Waziristan or anywhere else in the tribal territories or any other terrorists who do not attack targets inside Pakistan. The air force has only been bombing Taliban targets and those of other Islamic terrorist groups openly making terrorist attacks inside Pakistan.

  

The basic problem here is that the Taliban is a coalition where the factions cooperate when each feels like it and the more extreme groups oppose any talks or peace deals with the government. In short, the head of the Pakistani Taliban does not control an entire organization in the same way the commander of an army does. The government and Taliban began the current peace negotiations on February 6^th. Although both sides agreed that the talks would not be about changing the constitution, one of the Taliban negotiators announced on the 7^th that there could be no peace unless the nation accepted a religious dictatorship and the imposition of strict Islamic law. This was the extremist faction problem once more. For the rest of February there were more Taliban terrorist attacks by the extremist factions. The Taliban refused to try and discipline these factions and the government refused to recognize these divisions and just hold the violent factions responsible. In part this was because the more extreme factions do not seek a lot of publicity and know that their best defense is to remain within the larger Taliban organization. The government is thus forced to go after Taliban factions only suspected of anti-government activity as well as those who openly declared their intentions. The Taliban refuse to discipline their uncontrollable factions. That is largely the result of tribal and local politics. If the Taliban factions fight each other they risk starting blood feuds and upsetting many tribal alliances. All politics is local, especially in the tribal territories.  

 

In Pakistan growing threats from China to cut off and withdraw investments if security for these operations is not improved has led to assigning soldiers to provide security for the largest Chinese companies.

 

In eastern India the campaign against the Maoist rebels grinds on. There is little that is considered newsworthy in these operations. It’s largely patrols, intelligence collecting and analysis. There are occasional clashes and arrests. Over the last few years the Maoists have been losing ground, and personnel. Desertions are becoming more of a problem as is organized resistance from rural populations who rarely resisted before.

  

In the Pakistani tribal territories (40 kilometers northwest of Peshawar) gunmen fired on a convoy of trucks carrying NATO supplies and killed two drivers. This comes a week after a court declared that a local political party was breaking the law and had to halt its blockade of this road to trucks carrying NATO supplies. This blockade led to lots of locals losing their jobs and that was not popular at all.

 

March 3, 2014: In the Pakistani capital (Islamabad) six or more Islamic terrorists attacked a court complex, detonating two suicide bombs and killing 11 people, including one judge. Pakistan ordered more security for courts as these have become a popular target for Islamic terrorists.

  

In Indian Kashmir police and soldiers, acting on a tip, found an Islamic terrorist hideout in a forest. Seized were an AK-47, 58 rounds of ammo and 18 grenades in addition to cold weather clothing and equipment. Elsewhere in Kashmir gunmen shot dead two policemen outside a court complex.

  

March 2, 2014:  Pakistan declared a suspension of air strikes against Taliban targets in the tribal territories, but not before an attack on a Taliban faction (in the Khyber area) took credit for yesterday’s attack on a polio vaccination team.

  

March 1, 2014: The Pakistani Taliban declared a month-long ceasefire. That did not stop one Taliban faction from continuing its attacks against polio vaccination efforts by ambushing (with a roadside bomb and gunfire) two vehicles carrying vaccination personnel and killing twelve people, eleven of them policemen.

  

In Pakistan a senior army general announced (without providing much detail) that five Iranian border guards who were kidnapped inside Iran and moved into Pakistan on February 7^th had been released. The Iranians were held just across the border in Pakistan (Baluchistan). There are Baluchi tribes on both sides of the border. The religious dictatorship in Iran is hostile to Sunnis and the Iranian Baluchis do not like this at all. The Iranian Baluchi rebels have become bolder and more successful in their attacks on Iranian security forces. Iran has responded by executing more captured Baluchi rebels and that has resulted in even more Baluchi violence. Iran demanded that the Pakistani government find the five Iranian border guards. Iran threatened to send its own troops into Pakistan to free the captive border guards if Pakistan did not act. Elsewhere in Baluchistan police raided a village near the Iranian border and freed 11 foreigners (eight Iranians, two Tunisians and one Yemeni) being held captive by a drug smuggling gang.

 

February 28, 2014: A coalition of major Sunni and Shia Islamic scholars declared today “Anti-Taliban” day. That was a courageous act as any Islamic cleric who openly condemns the Taliban is liable to be put on the hit list of the many Taliban death squads that operate throughout Pakistan, especially in the tribal territories and Karachi (the largest city in Pakistan.) The Pakistani government said that no ground operations were planned in the tribal territories although as a precaution army units in the tribal territories were on a high degree of alert and were readying themselves for Islamic terrorist attacks. That would include counterattacks if necessary.

  

In the Pakistani tribal territories (Khyber) an Islamic terrorist leader and two subordinates were killed at a checkpoint where the three were challenged and opened fire.

  

February 27, 2014: In Indian Kashmir a soldier went berserk at his base, killed five other soldiers and then himself. 

  

February 26, 2014: Pakistan revealed that the American CIA refused to use its UAVs to carry out intelligence missions for help in planning Pakistani air strikes against the Taliban. The Americans say this is because they have found that they cannot trust their counterparts in the Pakistani intelligence agencies. Pakistan has its own growing force of UAVs. These are less capable (than the American Predators and Reapers) but can get the job done and are locally made. Pakistan has received Chinese UAVs and these apparently influenced the design of the locally made ones that entered service in late 2013.

  

February 25, 2014: In Indian Kashmir troops clashed with a group of Islamic terrorists and killed six of them. Documents on the men revealed that all were Pakistanis belonging to a Pakistani Islamic terrorist group long involved with terrorism inside India.

  

In the Pakistani tribal territories (Peshawar) a suicide bomber attacked outside the Iranian consulate, killing himself and two security guards. 

  

February 24, 2014:  In the Pakistani tribal territories (North Waziristan) unidentified gunmen shot dead a senior Taliban commander. The dead man was a proponent of a negotiated peace and it appears he was murdered by one of the radical factions that are violently opposed to any peace deal that does not involve establishing a religious dictatorship in Pakistan.

  

Saudi Arabia is trying to persuade Pakistan to supply Pakistani made anti-aircraft and anti-tank missiles for delivery to the Syrian rebels. The only problem with this is that Pakistan would be blamed for any civilian aircraft brought down by the missiles.

  

India and China agreed to be nice to each other. This includes holding joint military drills this year so their military forces could learn how to work together in disaster relief or peace keeping missions. All this feel-good stuff was a win for India because China is reducing its military and diplomatic pressure on India to surrender Indian territory China has claims on. The basic problem is that India and China have never agreed on where their mutual border is. Because of that the border is called the LAC (Line of Actual Control) and is also known as the MacCartney-MacDonald Line. It has, since the 19^th century, been the unofficial border between India and China and gives rise to a lot of disputes over who owns what. Most of this is about Chinese claims on territory India currently controls. The LAC is 4,057 kilometers long and borders the Indian States of Ladakh, Kashmir, Uttarakhand, Himachal, and Arunachal. On the Chinese side it is mostly Tibet. China has become less vocal about its claims on Indian territory recently but has not abandoned these assertions. Cooling down these tensions is a big relief to India, which has a defense budget one third that of China’s.

 

February 23, 2014: The Pakistani Taliban told the government that a peace deal was not possible unless it was agreed that the country would be run according to Islamic law. This would quickly lead to a religious dictatorship which only a minority of Pakistanis support.

  

Although Bangladesh has much less of an Islamic terrorism problem than India and Pakistan, there is still some Islamic terrorism there. This was seen today when a prison van carrying three convicted Islamic terrorists was ambushed. One of the police escorts was killed and the attackers wounded three others. The three prisoners were freed and made a getaway with their liberators.  Two of the escapees had been convicted of terrorism and sentenced to death. One of these men was found the next day and shot to death when he refused to surrender. 

  

February 22, 2014: In the Pakistani tribal territories (Kohat) a bomb went off in a bus terminal killing 14 people. Since most of the victims were Shia this was believed to be another attack by Sunni Islamic terrorists. 

  

February 18, 2014: In the Pakistani tribal territories at least two soldiers have been killed in the last two days by Islamic terrorist attacks.

Bangladesh, Pakistan set to get Chinese submarines

China has also signed an agreement with Pakistan to sell two Type 035G Ming-class diesel-electric submarines to Bangladesh China will provide submarines to Bangladesh and Pakistan, Times of India reported on Saturday. India's submarine crisis comes just around the time China has begun arming two other neighbors, Bangladesh and Pakistan, with submarines. China has also introduced new nuclear submarines that have caused a flutter in Washington, the report said. Jane's weekly quoting a senior Pakistani official says China is set to sell up to six submarines to Pakistan by end of 2014.

 

China has also signed an agreement with Pakistan to sell two Type 035G Ming-class diesel-electric submarines to Bangladesh, reports from Dhaka said recently. The New Age newspaper said the deal was valued $206 million. China has promised to deliver the submarines to Bangladesh Navy by 2019.

 

 "Technical details are almost done. The present discussions are mainly about the financing details," a senior Pakistan official told Jane's. The journal said a second Pakistani government official confirmed that "the contract is at an advanced stage and discussions won't linger on for too long. Realistically, we should have a deal by end 2014." Islamabad is expected to buy China's S20 or Yuan-class diesel-electric submarine (SSK). At present, the Pakistani Navy operates five French submarines; three Agosta 90B (Khalid-class) submarines purchased in the 1990s and two ageing Agosta 70 (Hashmat-class) boats dating from the late 1970s. Pakistan's ambitious defence planners are also pushing China for selling submarine-launched nuclear ballistic missiles. But western diplomats say China may be reluctant to hand over such sophisticated equipment fearing harsh reactions from Washington.

 

Another of India's neighbours, Myanmar is using Chinese experts to train its submarine personnel. It also sent a contingent of navy personnel for submarine warfare training in Pakistan in mid-2013.

 

Myanmar has announced plans to build its own fleet of submarines, and is expected to look towards Russia for supplies.

The War Against Kidnapping In Karachi

Police in Pakistan have been ordered to prevent kidnapping from becoming a major industry in Karachi, the largest city. That has been difficult because Karachi has a major problem with all sorts of crime. In the last few years there have been over 3,500 terrorism deaths in Sind province. Over 95 percent of these deaths took place in Karachi, the largest city (containing 40 percent of the provincial population) in Sind. Karachi is Pakistan's largest city, with 14 million people (eight percent of the nation's population) and producer of a quarter of the GDP. What happens in Karachi is important for the rest of Pakistan. The terrorism deaths and kidnapping are related because while many of the dead were killed by hired (or at least rewarded) killers, the kidnappings are mainly for raising money, often used to carry out more attacks.

 

Last year there were 3,386 reported kidnappings in Pakistan, compared to 2,954 in 2011. So far this year kidnappings are down about 30 percent and that is largely because the police became more aggressive in promptly finding and going after the kidnappers. This is especially the case in Karachi where so far this year police have killed 30 kidnappers and rescued 14 victims. Many more kidnappers were arrested and information from the living, and dead, kidnappers makes it clear that there is heavy terrorist involvement in most kidnappings. The urban kidnappers are often part of larger gangs based in the tribal territories (both the Pushtun in the northwest and the Baluchi in the southwest.) The tribal areas have long been the source of most kidnappers, and their victims, in Pakistan. While these gangs initially believed Karachi was a gold mine for kidnappers, the police have in the last year made it a very dangerous place for them. As a result fewer kidnappers are moving to Karachi. The ransom money may not be as abundant outside Karachi, but getting to the payday is a lot safer.

 

In Karachi most of these terrorism, including many kidnappings, is about politics, even if Islamic terrorists were often the perpetrators. Karachi is a prime example of why a major source of terrorism in the world is the widespread custom of political parties maintaining armed auxiliaries to intimidate their opponents and anyone who might vote for their foes. Often these armed supporters are a local criminal gang, which is more interested in cash than politics. Governments sometimes come to their senses and try to shut down these gangs. This is difficult to do. It’s especially difficult in Karachi.

 

Since Pakistan was founded in 1947, there has been violence between the natives (Sindis, from the surrounding Sind province) and new groups from India (Mohajirs, Indian Moslems forced to flee the religious violence that accompanied the division of British India into Pakistan and India in 1947) and Pushtuns, Baluchis, and other minorities from the Pakistani tribal territories.

 

Politics is often a contact sport in Pakistan and it's become common for political parties to ally themselves with criminal gangs to win elections. The gangster chiefs sometimes seek to enter politics themselves or demand more favors from their patrons than the parties can justify. The gangsters are also, well, gangsters and have unsavory reputations, despite the occasional Robin Hood type gesture. Political parties and their gang associates often part company for political, financial, or personal reasons. Most of this mayhem is concentrated in Karachi and increasingly the actual killers or kidnappers are Pushtun tribesmen hired for that purpose. During election season kidnapping is often used to persuade a group to change their vote. 

 

The Pushtuns are the most numerous tribal minority in Karachi but are divided by religious and tribal differences. There had long been small numbers of Pushtuns in Karachi but in 1947 hundreds of thousands of Mohajirs showed up. That led to a sharp growth in the economy and that led to more Pushtuns arriving. Enterprising young Pushtuns fled the poor, and violent, tribal lands for a better life in Sind, and often it was these enterprising Mohajir refugees from India that provided jobs and other opportunities. The Pushtuns also found themselves shunned and feared in Karachi because of their alien tribal ways. Meanwhile the wealthier and better educated Mohajirs were soon competing with the Sindis for control of the great city. The Pushtuns and other tribesmen produced a lot of criminal gangs and a poor underclass. On top of this there was also religious violence between various Moslem groups (especially Sunni and Shia) as well as between Moslems and non-Moslems (usually Christians and Hindus).

 

What makes this such an incomprehensible and volatile mess is that each group has a different idea of what winning is. Most of these groups see political power as useful and attach themselves to one political party or another. But political power is a means to an end. The old Sind clans in Karachi want to maintain the power they have held for centuries and have nowhere to go but down. The Mohajirs have hurt the Sind clans economically and politically. But for sheer body count the Pushtun groups (both political, criminal, and religious) have been the most dangerous. The Pushtuns are pushing for respect and more economic and political power. The Sindis and Mohajirs are reluctant to give it up to the Pushtuns. The religious radical groups (including the Taliban and al Qaeda) want a regional religious dictatorship. This puts them at odds with the Sindi and Mohajirs political parties but often in alliances with the Pushtuns (but not the Baluchi).

 

In the last three years the violence has gotten much worse. Massive police efforts reduced the violence for a while but the political and terrorist gangs kept at it. Police were ordered to "shoot on sight" any of the armed men responsible for turning many Karachi neighborhoods into combat zones.

 While the violence is mainly driven by political parties seeking to establish control over parts of the city, Islamic radicals are heavily involved. The Taliban has established a presence among the two million Pushtuns in the city. Many of those killed have been Pushtuns, partly because the locals are hostile to Pushtun groups gaining more power and partly because many Pushtun groups are fighting each other and most of the best hired guns are Pushtuns. The kidnapping victims tend to be the wealthier Sindi and Mohajirs.  But a lot of the violence is the result of the Taliban trying to prevent the police from stopping the Pushtun radicals establishing safe havens in Karachi. The wealthier Sindis and Mohajirs just want law and order so that commerce (and life in general) can continue uninterrupted. Some of that commerce is illegal, like gun running and drug smuggling. The Pushtun gangs control a lot of this but getting stuff in and out of the country often requires cooperation from Sindi and Mohajirs officials and gangsters.

 

Karachi is one the wealthiest parts of Pakistan, but the city itself is an explosive mélange of hostile groups. Add to that party politics and a disdain for rules and laws and you get a very ugly situation. It’s not just the deaths, but the kidnappings, robbery, and extortion that gangs carry out when they are not killing for their cause. The chaos seems endless and unstoppable.

Pakistan Prepares For What Is Not Coming

Pakistan recently responded to the Indian “cold start” military doctrine by announcing reforms that get reserve units into action faster and moves active duty units to the border fast enough to counter the rapidly approaching “cold start” Indian battle groups. This new Pakistani doctrine comes after four years of preparation, training and studies.

 

A major problem with this new Pakistani doctrine is that India has never really implemented their cold start doctrine. Although first proposed in 2004, and occasionally discussed since then, the Indian military was never reorganized (into smaller battle groups) to ensure that units closest to the border were ready to join others nearby and rapidly move into Pakistan. The basic idea was to advance 50-75 kilometers into Pakistan and thus establish a better bargaining position when international pressure forced both countries to cease hostilities and talk things over. This new doctrine took advantage of the known slowness of the Pakistani Army in mobilizing for war and moving troops to the border. The new Pakistani reforms are supposed to deal with that. But, like the Indian non-implementation of cold start, the Pakistani response is likely to be just as illusionary. 

 

Meanwhile, Pakistan announced an unexpected and more realistic change in military doctrine last year. The generals officially recognized that internal Islamic terrorist groups are the main threat, not an Indian invasion. This change caused many Islamic conservatives in Pakistan to call for “true Moslems” in the military to rise up and oppose this disturbing policy change. For over thirty years the Pakistani military leadership has supported Islamic radicalism and many Pakistanis are not willing to let go. 

 

Pakistani army units on the Kashmir frontier have, for years, made attacks on Indian troops. These attacks were denied by the Pakistani government but tolerated by the Pakistani military high command because they were part of a two decade old terrorism campaign in Indian Kashmir. The Pakistani army still tolerates this kind of terrorism from Pakistan based terrorists but officially opposes Islamic terrorists who attack Pakistani targets. Allowing more attacks on Indian troops in Kashmir is one way to placate the many pro-terrorism officers and troops in the army.

 

Both countries still devote a large portion of their military budgets preparing for a land war that neither is interested in fighting. India gains little from invading Pakistan, which is a chaotic failed state that would cost more than India would like to spend to occupy and rehabilitate. Moreover, for the past decade both nations have had the ability to use nuclear weapons on each other. That has forced military leadership to frame every doctrine with the caveat; “as long as there is no nuclear escalation.” Any invasion, no matter how limited, would risk use of nukes by the losing side. Once the nukes fly, both sides lose, big time.

Continuing IED Attacks Draw Attention to Pakistan's MRAP Shortage

An IED attack on a paramilitary convoy in Peshawar on Sunday has once again drawn attention to Pakistan’s lack of suitable vehicles to combat what will likely remain terrorists’ favored mode of attack.

The Associated Press of Pakistan quoted an official saying the IED was composed of mortar rounds and improvised explosives weighing some 40 kilograms hidden in a car parked by the roadside and detonated once the convoy drew close.

However, nearby women and children appeared to make up the majority of the 14 dead and approximately 20 injured.

Nevertheless, it has highlighted the continuing threat from such devices, and the lack of suitable MRAP vehicles in sufficient number for the security services.

The threat was further underlined today by the death of four soldiers in and IED attack near Miranshah in Northern Waziristan in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas bordering Afghanistan.

With the drawdown of ISAF forces in neighboring Afghanistan, Pakistan has been mentioned in media reports as being in line to receive some surplus US equipment.

The equipment does not include MRAP vehicles, many of which are reported to be scrapped in Afghanistan.

When contacted for clarification on what surplus equipment Pakistan may receive, the US Embassy here in Islamabad could not provide details.

A spokesperson for the Embassy said, “Military gear that has been determined to be excess defense articles will not be brought back with US forces from Afghanistan as they redeploy elsewhere. The United States intends to offer this equipment to Afghanistan and other partners, but no final determinations have been made yet.”

The spokesperson further stated, “It is premature to speculate on what may be provided and to whom.”

Neither Pakistan’s Ministry of Defence, nor the military’s Inter Service Public Relations (ISPR) media branch replied to requests for clarification, or indeed confirmation that surplus MRAP vehicles were offered to Pakistan, but declined.

Pakistan’s indigenous MRAP vehicle, the Burraq, manufactured by the state-owned Heavy Industries Taxila AFV builder, also appears nowhere in sight despite Defense News being told in March it was only a matter of months from finally being unveiled.

Former Australian defense attaché to Islamabad, Brian Cloughley, said there could be a good reason for such an offer being declined.

“Of course it would be attractive to acquire such vehicles” he said, “but the associated problems are probably too great to make this practicable.”

While highlighting that MRAP vehicles are becoming increasingly important in global conflicts, Cloughley says, “costs and practicalities have to be considered.

“First of all, the vehicles are enormously expensive. Pakistan simply couldn’t afford a state-of-the-art MRAP vehicle. But even if they were donated by the US on grounds that they were surplus stock [and even then, Congress might not give approval], the operating and maintenance costs would be enormous,” he said.

With Pakistan beset with crippling economic woes, keeping finances tight is a major concern for the military, but operational costs, especially against the Taliban, are already prohibitively expensive.

“It is all too often forgotten that Pakistan is finding it extremely difficult to meet the day-to-day costs of military operations in the Tribal Areas, where so many thousands of its soldiers have died in the conflict that erupted after Afghanistan went critical,” says Cloughley.

“The expense of running ordinary resupply vehicles, alone, is extremely high. Factor in a brand-new type of vehicle, with requirement for training, and staggering running and maintenance costs, and it’s a very big problem indeed,” he adds.

If the door on surplus US counter-IED equipment has closed, the two day visit of UK Prime Minister David Cameron over the weekend may offer something of an alternative.

A joint statement issued during the visit said, “The UK will work in partnership with Pakistan providing expertise in support of Pakistan’s developing strategy on counter terrorism. The UK will provide more equipment to tackle the scourge of improvised explosive devices and support Pakistan in improving the security of its infrastructure, including sharing the UK’s expertise in safeguarding sporting events.”

However, the details of this offer are not known, and despite requests no clarification was forthcoming from the UK’s High Commission here in Islamabad, with a spokesperson referring Defense News back to the joint statement.

It appears to be part of or a follow-on from similar efforts announced in April 2011 as part of the Anglo-Pakistani Strategic Dialogue.

At the time, a spokesman at the High Commission said Britain welcomed “Pakistan’s efforts to develop a national counter-IED strategy aimed at combating this phenomenon using a holistic, interagency approach.”

Britain was to help establish “a ‘center of excellence’ that will train and equip front-line law enforcement and security forces to deal with IED threats whenever and wherever they occur.”

British help would also extend to dealing with the aftermath of IED attacks, specifically “training experts to make sure that forensic evidence can be recovered from IEDs,” in order to strengthen the legal cases against terrorist suspects and those suspected of manufacturing and using IEDs.

This latter aspect was not thought to be a specific strong point of Pakistan’s security and law enforcement bodies at the time.

India-Pakistan - Making Treason Stick

In Pakistan the civilian government has decided to prosecute former military dictator and army chief general Pervez Musharraf for treason (various crimes committed during and after his 1990 government takeover). This is a first in Pakistan and it is feared that many other senior commanders will be dragged into the process and prosecuted as well (for working with Musharraf). This is a major threat to the military, where prosecution by civilian courts and obedience to elected governments was, until recently unheard of. That is changing, but there remains the risk of the generals taking over, or trying to, once more.

 

China and India will hold border negotiations in China starting tomorrow. India continues to have problems with Chinese troops crossing the unofficial border both nations share. The negotiations mean to adjust the Tibet border (which a temporarily independent Tibet adjusted in India’s favor in 1914) to please both nations. There are many disputed portions along the 4,000 kilometer long frontier, most of them involving Chinese claims on territory India has occupied for a long time. 

 

Just across the Pakistani border in Afghanistan Afghan troops and Afghan Taliban have been attacking bases used by Pakistani Taliban. The Afghan security forces and the Taliban gunmen are not cooperating but they are both going after the Pakistani Taliban. This is apparently part of a deal the Afghan Taliban agreed to recently with the Pakistani Army for joint attacks on the Pakistani Taliban. The Afghan Taliban depends on a sanctuary it has in and around Quetta, the largest city in Baluchistan (southwest Pakistan). Quetta is safe because Pakistan will not let American UAVs to operate there. Quetta is where the Afghan Taliban leadership has been sheltered since 2002 and is right across the Afghan border from the Taliban heartland in Kandahar and Helmand provinces. Since the Afghan Taliban has not made (or sponsored) terrorist attacks inside Pakistan, there has been an unofficial truce with the Pakistani government. For over a year now the Pakistani military has been trying to persuade the Afghan Taliban to help deal with anti-Pakistan Islamic terrorists in Pakistan. 

 Most of these attacks are carried out by factions belonging to the Pakistani Taliban. The Afghan Taliban were persuaded to help as long as they only had to attack the Pakistani Taliban inside Afghanistan. There was another reason for this as well. Pakistan assisted the Afghan Taliban in getting permission to open up an official office in the Persian Gulf state of Qatar recently. Pakistan has also persuaded some Islamic terror groups that operate mainly against India to join in attacking the Pakistani Taliban. In return for that Pakistan has increased its assistance in financing terrorist training camps near the Indian border and using Pakistani troops to fire on Indian border guards in order to help the Islamic terrorists get across the border into India. 

 

These deals with the Afghan Taliban and Islamic terrorists who concentrate in India make it clear that for Pakistan the main enemy is India and that the Taliban (of whatever flavor) are simply another weapon in their arsenal. Thus there is growing cooperation between Afghanistan and India because the Afghans see Pakistan as their most dangerous foe. The Taliban were created by Pakistan to gain a greater degree of control over Afghanistan and the Afghans will never forgive Pakistan for that.  

In southwest Pakistan (Quetta, the provincial capital of Baluchistan) a suicide bomber and a nearby civilian were killed at a bus stop when the explosive vest the bomber was carrying (not wearing) went off. This was apparently not intended and terrorists was either on his way to use the vest himself or delivering it to someone who would. 

 

June 26, 2013: Bangladesh has agreed to participate in a Chinese project that would build a highway from southwestern China (Kunmin) through Burma and Bangladesh to eastern India (West Bengal). This is an outgrowth of an earlier Chinese effort to rebuild the World War II "Stillwell (or Ledo) Road", from northeast India into Burma. That road was originally, in 1942, built to replace the "Burma Road" that got Allied military aid to Chinese troops fighting the Japanese. But Japan captured Burma in 1942, and cut that connection. The new Burma Road was to bypass India, and just go from China into Burma. India was not happy about being left out and now everyone seems onboard for this project. The new road will be of great benefit for all areas it passes through as it will make trade, and travel, with China cheaper and more convenient. Previously India was concerned about the military implications, but now trade looms larger than potential Chinese invasion. Pakistan is trying to interest China in building a similar road, and railroad, to Pakistani ports. So far China has not been interested, probably because the Pakistan route goes through more difficult (and expensive to build in) terrain and the security situation in Pakistan is much less stable than in Indian, Burma and Bangladesh. China is particularly angry about how three of its citizens were recently murdered at a mountain climbing base camp in northern Pakistan. 

 

In Kashmir Pakistani troops opened fire across the LOC (Line of Control, the unofficial border separating Indian and Pakistani portions of Kashmir) despite a cease fire arranged after the similar attacks yesterday. Inside Indian Kashmir Islamic terrorists murdered a local pro-Indian politician.

In Karachi (Pakistan) Islamic terrorists attempted to kill a senior judge with a roadside bomb. The judge escaped injury but nine others in his convoy, or nearby civilians, were killed

 

June 25, 2013: In Kashmir Pakistani troops opened fire across the Line of Control from several of their border posts. Indian troops returned fire and it soon became apparent that this was another attempt by Pakistani troops to create a diversion while Islamic terrorists (four of them this time) sneaked into Indian Kashmir. While the ceasefire between Pakistan and India has greatly reduced the violence along the border, there is still shooting. The Indian troops usually fire back and Pakistan will often try to create an issue out of that, claiming that the Indians started it all. 

 

In Pakistan's tribal territories ( Khyber ) a suicide bomber attacked a funeral killing 29 people. One of the victims (believed to be the main target) was a recently elected member of parliament. There were over 800 people at the funeral service. 

 

Indian and American military commanders met in Hawaii to discuss how the two countries could cooperate to deal with growing Chinese military power and aggression in waters off China and the Indian Ocean. 

 

In eastern India (Bihar) about twenty Maoists dressed in police uniforms attacked the home of a bank executive and killed two people. The Maoists are generally hostile to banks and accuse them of exploiting the poor. 

 

June 24, 2013: In Indian Kashmir two Islamic terrorists ambushed an army convoy killing eight soldiers and wounding 19. This was the most damaging such attack in a long time. So far this year thirty Indian soldiers have been killed in Kashmir as Pakistan has increased its efforts to sneak Islamic terrorists into the area. The terrorists are housed and trained in camps across the LOC in Pakistan. The violence had been declining in the last decade as Indian security measures became more effective and Pakistan finally agreed to talk peace. But pro-terrorism commanders in the Pakistani military and intelligence agencies (ISI) appear to have gained more influence of late and the Islamic terrorists have become more active. This is seen as a Pakistani tactic to encourage more Islamic terror groups to make peace with Pakistan and halt their attacks inside Pakistan. These terrorists are angry at Pakistani cooperation with Western (especially American) antiterrorism efforts. 

Some of the local Islamic radicals also want Pakistan run by a religious dictatorship, not a democracy. That only appeals to a minority of Pakistanis, but this is a radicalized minority that accepts the use of terror to achieve their goals.  The Pakistani government hopes to isolate these radicals by offering other radicals most assistance in getting into India and making attacks there. This is all unofficial, of course, as Pakistan has never admitted that it is sponsoring Islamic terrorism, especially groups operating against India. This stances has been the source of growing embarrassment as more and more evidence piles up proving Pakistani involvement. 

 

June 23, 2013: In southwest Pakistan (Baluchistan) the army launched another major search operation against tribal rebels. Locals complained that the troops were firing indiscriminately at unarmed people. This is a common complaint during such operations. 

 

In eastern India (Jharkhand) police arrested a local Maoist commander, one of his followers and captured weapons and a large quantity of bomb making equipment. 

 

June 22, 2013: In northern Pakistan fifteen Taliban, disguised as local tribal paramilitary police (the Gilgit Scouts), hiked two days up to a complex of base camps for foreign mountain climbers and killed nine of them (including American, Chinese, Lithuanian, Nepali, Slovakian, Ukrainian victims) along with a Pakistani cook. Many potential victims managed to flee. Northern Pakistan contains some of the highest, and most difficult to climb, mountains in the world. The area had always been quiet and safe and the government encouraged the development of tourism. Foreign climbers were particularly attracted to the remote area and their visits have become a major part of the local economy. For a while at least, that is all gone. Even Pakistani tourists are cancelling. Many non-climbers, especially Pakistanis, came to the area for its cooler weather in Summer and reputation for safety from terrorism and crime. After this recent attack the government managed to get all the other foreign climbers off the mountains and back to safety. Soldiers and police are searching the area for the attackers, who will have a hard time evading detection. Satellite phones got word of the attack out quickly and the site of the crime had few escape routes. For now, and the next few years, the economic damage is done and the locals will suffer a sharp decline in living standards until tourists return. That can take a few years, or longer if the Taliban continue operating in this area. A Taliban faction took credit for the attack and said it was revenge for a fatal UAV attack against one of their leaders last month. 

 

June 19, 2013: In Pakistan's tribal territories (outside Peshawar) Islamic terrorists ambushed an army convoy and killed six soldiers. Some of the attackers were killed or wounded but they all got away before army reinforcements arrived. 

 

June 16, 2013: In northeastern Pakistan (Swabi) two more volunteer health workers were killed by Islamic terrorists because the victims were immunizing children against polio. The Islamic terrorists consider these immunization efforts un-Islamic. 

 

June 15, 2013: In southwest Pakistan (Baluchistan) 23 people were killed (including 14 female college students) by two terrorist attacks in the Quetta (the provincial capital). A faction of the Pakistani Taliban claimed responsibility. This group usually attacks local Shia, but in this case they managed to mainly kill local Sunnis. The Taliban agree with al Qaeda that women should not be educated and that Shia are heretics who must die.

China to Build Two Missile Corvettes for Bangladesh

The Government of Bangladesh has signed a contract with the Chinese Wuchan Shipyard, for the construction and delivery of two 64 meter corvettes, similar to, but slightly larger than the Azmat class fast missile boats supplied earlier this year to Pakistan. The first vessel will be completed in 2013. Each of the boats will have a displacement of 648 tons and a top speed of 28 knots. Based on the Houjian-class (Type 037/2) missile craft in service with the People’s Liberation Army Navy, the vessel is designed to carry eight C-802A anti-ship missiles, two 25 mm guns and two 12.7 mm machine guns

Gunmen kill two NATO drivers in Pakistan, officials say

Gunmen on Thursday opened fire on NATO supply trucks passing through northwest Pakistan near the Afghan border, killing two drivers, local officials said.

The first driver was killed in the Jamrud area of Khyber, one of seven districts that make up Pakistan's semi-autonomous tribal belt where Taliban and Islamist militants are active.

“Two gunmen on a motorcycle fired at a NATO truck and killed its driver,” local official Asmatullah Wazir told AFP.

In a separate attack, gunmen opened fire on another NATO supply truck in a suburb of Peshawar, killing its driver, senior police official Muhammad Faysal Murad told AFP.

“The truck was empty and had returned from Afghanistan after delivering supplies,” Murad said.

There was no immediate claim of responsibility for the killings.

Pakistan is a key transit route for the NATO mission in landlocked Afghanistan, from where it is driven to the border from the Arabian Sea port of Karachi.

Incoming prime minister Nawaz Sharif, who claimed victory in last week's general election, has promised Pakistan's “full support” as the United States withdraws most of its combat troops from Afghanistan by the end of next year.

From November 2011 to July 2012, Pakistan shut its Afghan border to overland NATO traffic after botched US air raids that killed 24 Pakistani troops.

Pakistan and the United States have signed a deal allowing NATO convoys to travel into Afghanistan until the end of 2015.

India-Pakistan; Terrorists Win A Big Election

China recently released an unclassified analysis of the Indian military situation. This is a first for China, which has, in the last decade, increasingly come into conflict with India over where the Tibetan border should be and whose fleet should be dominant in the Indian Ocean. The last time China and India fought was in 1962, when China won a brief battle to decide a dispute over where the Tibetan border really should be. All has been quiet since then, mainly because of Cold War politics (Russia and China began feuding and India became a Russian client while still maintaining ties with the West). After 1991, with the Soviet Union gone, Russia and China became the best of pals (despite dormant Chinese claims on Russian territory) while India drew closer to the West and remained the largest customer for Russian weapons. The big change has been the huge growth in the Chinese economy, which is now the second largest in the world. China spends three times as much as India does on defense. Chinese leaders are not elected (the country is still a communist police state) and have used nationalism (rebuilding the old Chinese empire) to maintain power. This means adjusting the Tibet border (which a temporarily independent Tibet adjusted in India’s favor in 1914) and moving the rapidly growing Chinese fleet into the Indian Ocean (to safeguard vital Chinese trade routes). Despite all this, the Chinese analysis still sees Pakistan as India’s major military threat, despite India officially shifting its effort to confront China in the last few years. Pakistan has attacked India several times in the last half century and lost every time. The Pakistani military is poorly equipped and really only good for fighting Pakistanis. It’s not very good at that either and India has decided the Chinese are more of a threat. The new Chinese study is apparently an effort to make the Pakistanis feel better, if only because Pakistan is a major customer for Chinese weapons.

In southwest Pakistan (Baluchistan) a terrorist truck bomb was used against a police station, killing five policemen. 

 

May 11, 2013: National elections were held in Pakistan, despite Islamic terrorists and tribal rebels trying to halt the process. Over a thousand casualties (including at least 200 dead) were suffered by candidates, voting officials and civilians in the last month. There’s always some of that, but it was worse this time because each new government is expected to do something about Islamic terrorism and tribal unrest and they don’t. 

 

Nawaz Sharif and his party (the Moslem League) won the election. This returns Sharif to power after being ousted by the military in 1999. Five years ago Nawaz Sharif, who tried to remove Pervez Musharraf as head of the armed forces in 1999, and was himself removed by the army in turn, tried to return Pakistan (from exile) and overthrow Musharraf. He was arrested at the airport. Many of Sharifs followers had earlier been rounded up. Sharif had earlier agreed to stay out of the country for ten years (until 2010). This was partly to avoid going to prison for corruption. Sharif eventually got in and established himself and his party as a viable contender. 

 

While Musharraf was disliked for being a dictator, the political parties don't offer much of an alternative. The Islamic parties fear they are losing support, because of the continuing Taliban and al Qaeda violence. Musharraf had ordered elections when he saw rising popular anger against him and the military. He lost power in the 2008 elections. He has since been arrested for corruption and abuse of power. Musharraf is unlikely to make a comeback. Nawaz Sharif, on the other hand, belongs to a powerful family from Punjab and has temporarily made the corruption charges go away. The wealthy feudal families dominate the economy, politics and the military in Pakistan and less than a hundred of these clans control about half the economy. They are very powerful and determined to keep things that way.

 

The corruption is still there but Sharif, who got his start working for military dictator Muhammad Zia who ruled from 1977 until his death in 1988). Zia was notable for establishing Islamic terrorism and Islamic radicalism as official state policy, along with being the longest lasting military dictator in Pakistani history. In effect, Zia is most responsible for the mess Pakistan is currently in but is considered a national hero because he was in charge during the 1980s as billions in American and Saudi money poured in to sustain Afghan refugees from the war with Russia in neighboring Afghanistan. Those refugees supplied tribal warriors who kept fighting the Russians until the Russians tired of the enterprise and left in 1989. Pakistanis officers and officials stole lots of that money and infected the refugees with Islamic radicalism, which led to Pakistan creating the Taliban in the 1990s. With that as a background, Nawaz Sharif now has to deal with the growing threat (to Pakistan) of Islamic radicalism and the Pakistani military (to depose him once more). The corruption in the economy and politics makes it difficult to rule Pakistan but there is the hopes that Nawaz Sharif might get it right the second time around. That’s no guarantee of success, especially since Sharif and his clan still wallow in corruption, but in Pakistan hope is often the only thing you’ve got. 

 

Sharif’s party did surprisingly well, gaining 46 percent of the seats in parliament. Sharif has said nice things about Islamic radicalism and advocates yet another attempt to make peace with the Pakistani Taliban (which has been at war with Pakistan for most of the last decade). With all that Sharif says he wants to maintain good relations with the United States while reducing Pakistani efforts against Islamic terrorism. That is something that is unpopular with America, India and China. Many Pakistanis see the Islamic radicals not as potential saviors but as another bunch of criminals plundering the country. It is a fact that the Taliban often steal and have made a lot of money extorting ransoms and protection money from the military. The Islamic terrorist assassins know where officers and their families live and have powerful branches in major cities (especially Karachi). While many Taliban are intent on turning Pakistan into a religious dictatorship, many others have tasted the good life all this extortion cash can bring. This terror campaign has caused the military to back off on its efforts to shut down the Islamic terror groups (mainly the Taliban) at war with Pakistan. Can Sharif turn this around? Probably not, but the hope is that he can. In one sense hope has been fulfilled because this election marks the first time in Pakistani history that one elected government has followed another without being interrupted by a period of military dictatorship. 

 

May 10, 2013: A long time British reporter (Declan Walsh) in Pakistan (who has worked for major British and American newspapers) was expelled. This was apparently the military expressing its displeasure at his stories revealing how the military tried to blame some of its air strikes on American UAV operations. Walsh was lucky, for his Pakistani counterparts are often murdered for saying things the military does not want said. 

 

May 9, 2013: In northeast India (Assam) police arrested a senior Maoist leader (Anukul Chandra). Police are not sure if Chandra (and two less senior Maoist leaders arrested in the area last month) are simply trying to escape the increasingly effective anti-Maoist campaign in eastern India, or are in the northeast to help with the Maoist effort to expand their operations into the tribal territories of the northeast. There, tribal separatists have been fighting the government for decades but in the last few years most of them have made peace. 

 

May 7, 2013: For the first time since the Taliban declared war on polio vaccination a year ago, there has been a case of polio in the tribal territories. It occurred in North Waziristan, an unofficial (but very real) sanctuary for Islamic terrorists where resistance to vaccination has been most effective. Polio can only exist in a human host and one case means there will be others.

 

In Bangladesh two days of violence by Islamic religious (madrassa) students, demanding the imposition of Islamic law led to 28 deaths, most of them Islamic radicals. Islamic radicalism is growing in popularity in Bangladesh but is still very much a minority activity. Incidents like this, and the mess Islamic radicals have made in Pakistan, make it difficult for Islamic radicals to expand their base of popular support.  

 

May 6, 2013: More gunfire on the Afghan border although this time Pakistan insists the Afghan’s fired first. Last week an Afghan policeman was killed in a similar incident. This violence is all about an ongoing dispute about exactly where the international border is. Recently Pakistan built some new border posts forward of previous ones but still, according to Pakistan, on Pakistani territory. This has led to shooting between Afghan and Pakistani border guards. There’s also a tribal rivalry element to all this. Most of the Afghan-Pakistani border is occupied by Pushtun tribes. This frontier, still called the “Durand Line” (an impromptu invention of British colonial authorities) was always considered artificial by locals, because the line often went right through Pushtun tribal territories. However, the Afghans are more inclined to accept the Durand Line, and fight to maintain it. The Pakistanis believe absolute control of the border is impossible, and their attempts to stop illegal crossings cause additional trouble (as tribesmen do not like excessive attention at border crossing posts). This recent violence is also linked to years of anger over Afghan Taliban and other terrorists hiding out in Pakistan and Islamic terrorists (fighting the Pakistani government) hiding out in Afghanistan. This has led to regular Pakistani shelling of suspected terrorist camps in Afghanistan, which often kills innocent (or semi-innocent) Afghan civilians. The Afghans protest and the Pakistanis refuse to halt the shelling and rocket fire or even admit that they are doing it.

 

May 5, 2013: Indian and Chinese officers met to resolve yet another border dispute and a bit of Chinese aggression. China agreed to withdraw its intruding troops while India agreed to remove some border posts that had annoyed the Chinese. Both nations declared victory, but the Chinese got more out of the deal. It was all about twenty or so Chinese troops who have been camped out 19 kilometers inside Indian Kashmir since April 15^th. China said their troops were not inside India, something India disputed. Neither country seemed eager to escalate this, or resolve it. China said it would withdraw if India would abandon an observation post in the mountains that overlooked Chinese positions. The Indian outpost was in Indian territory but the Chinese don’t like being watched. The Indians refused and pointed out that there had been three other Chinese incursions recently, but these troops did not linger. India sees all this as the Chinese way of applying pressure on India to withdraw from territory claimed by India. Once more, this tactic worked.

 

Heavy fighting continues in the Pakistani tribal territories (near the Khyber Pass). The most recent battles today left 16 Islamic terrorists and two soldiers dead in the Tirah Valley. This time troops overran a major camp and captured a lot of weapons, ammo and equipment. Pakistani troops have spent six weeks fighting Taliban gunmen there. The army has been using regular troops as well as SSG commandos and pro-government tribesmen. So far nearly 150 terrorists have been killed along with about 40 soldiers and tribal allies. The army has been trying to clear the Taliban from this border area since 2009, but have been unable to keep the Taliban from returning. When pressed hard enough, the Taliban retreat across the border into camps and villages in Afghanistan. They are sometimes attacked there, but because the Pakistani Taliban are not attacking anyone in Afghanistan, the local security forces concentrate on those who do (mainly the Afghan Taliban and the Haqqani Network, which is based in North Waziristan, an official terrorist sanctuary the Pakistani government refuses to shut down.)

Pakistan - Troops being deployed in Balochistan’s poll sensitive areas

Over one thousand troops of Pakistan Army started moving to the poll sensitive areas from Quetta Cantonment here on Monday. The army convoy moved after Chief of Army Staff General Ashfaq Kayani approved the proposal regarding deployment of army personnel at polling stations before May 11 during the Corps Commanders Conference. The troops left for the areas including Mastung, Khuzdar, Washuk, Kharan, Turbat, Panjgur, Gwadar, Dera Bugti, Kohlu and Noshki.  Their  movement would continue for two days. In view of security threats, federal and provincial governments had requested army to deploy their force at polling sensitive stations, so that election could  be held in a peaceful manner.The Balochistan government has made a strategy to hold free elections making three categories ahead of May 11. In sensitive areas, ballot papers and other electioneering staff would be transported through military helicopters and aircraft. 

“Besides police and Balochistan Constabulary men, some 17,000 personnel of army including Frontier Corps, and paramilitary force would be  deployed in volatile districts of the province,” Home Secretary Balochistan Akbar Hussain Durrani told media.    

In the face of threats by the banned organizations, Government Teachers Association (GTA) Balochistan chapter had already refused to perform duties at polling stations in eleven sensitive areas. However, the Home Secretary Balochistan had warned them, saying action against government employees reluctant to perform duties at polling station would be taken.

Pakistan - Army officers protest humiliating treatment to Pervez Musharraf

A group of Pakistani military officers protested against the "humiliating treatment" meted out to ex-army chief Pervez Musharraf, who has been arrested over the 2007 emergency and the assassination of former premier Benazir Bhutto. 

A delegation of 75 officers from the Command and Staff College in Quetta expressed their concerns over the treatment of Musharraf and the perceived humiliation of the military during a meeting with members of a committee of the Senate or upper house of parliament. 

The delegation led by Col Saqib Ali Cheema met Mushahid Hussain Sayed, chairman of the Senate Standing Committee on Defence, at Parliament House yesterday. 

"The military officers were of the opinion that under the Constitution, the armed forces could not be criticised," a source was quoted as saying by the Dawn newspaper. 

The military officers expressed concern at what they described as the "ridiculing of the army as an institution", The News daily reported. 

Musharraf, 69, was arrested last week after the Islamabad High Court revoked his bail over the detention of more than 60 judges during the 2007 emergency. 

He was subsequently arrested by the Federal Investigation Agency over the assassination of Bhutto.

Musharraf is currently being held at his farmhouse, which has been declared a "sub-jail". 

The former military ruler's legal woes have multiplied since he returned to Pakistan last month after nearly four years in self-exile. 

He is also facing charges over the killing of Baloch leader Akbar Bugti in a 2006 military operation and several lawyers have petitioned the Supreme Court to put him on trial for treason for imposing emergency rule. 

Over the past few days, several retired generals, including former army chief Mirza Aslam Beg, have expressed concern at the treatment of Musharraf, who was also been barred from running for next month's general election. 

During the interaction with the military officers, Mushahid Hussain Sayed agreed with their views and reportedly said: "We are all proud of the professionalism of our armed forces and in the Constitution. The judiciary and armed forces are national institutions which should not be subject to any kind of criticism". 

He said the military officers had asked him if there was anything in the Constitution that allowed anyone to humiliate any institution. 

He said no constitutional provision allows any institution or person to humiliate any other institution.

He said the way the situation was being run was "highly regrettable and the red line should not be crossed" as the situation could reach a "point of no return". 

"Pakistan today is a vibrant democracy and there are multiple power centres playing an effective role in strengthening democracy and democratic traditions in the country," Sayed said during the meeting.

The military officers asked questions about the civilian vision of civil-military relations and the national defence strategy. 

They also raised questions about the reasons for the lack of legislation on tackling terrorism.

India-Pakistan - Jail For The Generals

Indian and Chinese officers are still discussing why twenty or so Chinese troops have been camped out ten kilometers inside Indian Kashmir since the 15 ^th . China says their troops are not inside India, something India disputes. Neither country seems eager to escalate this, or resolve it.

 

Indian communist (Maoist) rebels, reeling from several years of growing pressure by special police battalions, are seeking alliances with separatist rebels in the northeast. The only thing the Maoists and the separatists have in common is hostility towards the Indian government. But both groups are losing ground to government forces and need whatever help they can get. 

 

While the Pakistani Army is losing it power to act without consulting the civilian government it does not appear that this will change the long-term Pakistani military’s cooperation with and sponsorship of Islamic terrorist groups. Too many Pakistani voters still back Islamic radicalism as a cure for the corruption and bad government in Pakistan. The U.S. has made it clear that as long as Pakistan supports Islamic terrorists (a violation of international law) the U.S. will keep operating its armed UAVs over Pakistan to hunt down Islamic terrorists. This is also a violation of international law but the alternative is to allow the terrorists in their sanctuaries to plan and carry out attacks against Western targets. That is unacceptable in a democracy. When given a choice, most people will vote to defend themselves. 

 

The Pakistani tolerance of Islamic terrorists has also made it dangerous for democracy in the tribal territories. Candidates for the May 11 parliamentary elections in the tribal territories have to take extraordinary security precautions as they campaign in rural areas. The Pakistani Taliban has been quite openly making war on the ruling parties in the tribal territories, seeking to make it possible for pro-Taliban politicians to be elected. At least one female candidate has withdrawn because of death threats. While the Taliban consider democracy un-Islamic, they believe having their own men elected will pave the way for the desired religious dictatorship. 

 

Decades of support for Islamic radicalism and terrorism has hurt the popularity of the Pakistani military. The generals ignored this trend for a long time but that is no longer possible. Civilian leaders are less willing to tolerate whatever the military does and the courts have become dangerously hostile. This is a major change for Pakistan, especially since the military leadership appears divided over what to do. The big question is when, or if, the army can be made to stop supporting Islamic terrorists and its constant attacks on Indian border posts and border patrols. The Pakistani military denies responsibility for this violence, despite the obvious evidence about what it really happening.

In southern (Karachi) and central (Kabirwala) Pakistan female health workers administering polio vaccine to children were assaulted and beaten by Islamic terrorists who oppose Western medicine. In Karachi shots were fired. The Islamic militants have apparently decided to stop trying to kill the health workers as that brought on too much police attention and bad publicity. 

 

Pakistani factory owners are complaining that the growing electricity shortages will cost the country billions of dollars’ worth of lost export sales. As the hours the electricity is turned off (load shedding) increases factories simply cannot produce the products they have overseas orders for. For decades government corruption has impeded the construction and operation of new power plants and despite predictions that these shortages would grow worse nothing was done. 

 

April 22, 2013:  In Pakistan the courts ordered the government to release a list of journalists who received some two million dollars in payments over the last two years. This was not widely reported in the media, for obvious reasons. It’s been an open secret for a long time that journalists, and favorable coverage, could be bought in Pakistan and the government was often buying. Not all journalists are for sale, but many, if not most are and few care to have details of their relationships in this area made public. Technically the government payments were for “legitimate expenses” but the reality was that reporters were expected to produce pro-government stories to justify their expense money. Government officials tried to defy the court order by providing an incomplete list, which included the names of some journalists who never got any money. 

 

April 21, 2013: In the Pakistani tribal territories (North Waziristan) a roadside bomb killed four soldiers.

 

April 20, 2013: In the Pakistani tribal territories (Bajaur) a suicide bomber was halted at the entrance to a hospital, where she detonated her explosives and killed four people. What was unusual was that the bomber was an elderly woman, who may have been coerced into carrying a remotely controlled explosive vest. 

 

April 19, 2013: In Pakistan former head of the military (and military dictator from 1999-2008) Pervez Musharraf submitted to house arrest. Musharraf had returned from exile recently to run for president (“to save the country”) but misjudged the degree of popular hatred for his years of military rule. This is the first time such a senior military officer has been arrested. While there is still a pro-Musharraf faction in the military, that faction was not powerful enough to protect Musharraf from arrest. The courts have also barred Musharraf from running for president and want to prosecute him for various illegal acts while he was military dictator. 

 

April 17, 2013: In the Pakistani tribal territories (South Waziristan) an American UAV fired two missiles at a terrorist compound and killed at least five of the terrorists there.

April 16, 2013: In the Pakistani tribal territories (Peshawar) a suicide bomber killed 19 people at a political rally. 

 

April 15, 2013: In Indian Kashmir a platoon (20-30) of Chinese troops crossed the disputed border with India and set up camp ten kilometers into Indian territory. This was in the mountains at an altitude of 5,500 meters (17,000 feet). This camp was soon discovered by an Indian patrol, which did not confront the Chines but called for reinforcements, which camped nearby and called for diplomats to talk to their Chinese counterparts to clear up the situation. In this age of GPS you can’t blame this sort of thing on getting lost.

 

In eastern India (Chhattisgarh state) police raided a Maoist rebel camp and killed nine of them. The police had received a tip about the location of the Maoist camp in this rural area.