North Korea Building Missile Submarine

U.S. intelligence agencies believe North Korea is building a submarine capable of launching ballistic missiles, potentially increasing the threat posed by the nuclear-armed rogue state.

 

A missile launch tube on a North Korean submarine was observed recently by U.S. intelligence agencies and is raising new concerns about the missile and nuclear threat from the communist regime in Pyongyang, according to two defense officials familiar with reports of the development.

 

Pentagon spokesman Lt. Col. Jeffrey Pool declined to comment on the North Korean missile submarine program. “We do not comment on intelligence matters, but we do urge North Korea to become more transparent in their defense sector in order to reduce tensions in the region,” he said in a statement.

 

Details of the missile submarine remain closely held within the government.

 

Disclosure of the missile submarine work followed a recent report from North Korea showing photographs of dictator Kim Jong Un riding in the conning tower of a rusty North Korean submarine at sea.

 

Military analysts expressed surprise at the intelligence on the missile submarine program and speculated the submarine could be a modification of one of North Korea’s Russian or Chinese design Romeo-class diesel submarines.

 

A second possibility is that the new missile submarine is a copy or modification of a Soviet-era Golf-class missile-firing submarine purchased by Pyongyang—ostensibly for scrap metal—in the mid-1990s.

 

North Korea’s current submarine force includes around 70 submarines. Most of the vessels are older diesel submarines, including 22 Romeo-class or Chinese design Type-031 subs—the type of submarine Kim was photographed on in June.

 

The majority of the North’s submarines, more than two dozen, are small, Sango-class mini-submarines used for covert commando operations to infiltrate South Korea during a conflict. The North Koreans also have four 1940s-design Whiskey-class submarines from Russia.

 

North Korea’s use of submarine warfare was evident as recently as 2010, when it carried out a torpedo attack on South Korea’s Choenan costal warship, killing 46 sailors. A North Korean mini-submarine is suspected in that attack. North Korea denied it was behind the strike.

 

Additionally, U.S. intelligence agencies believe North Korea already has submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs). The North covertly obtained several SS-N-6 SLBMs from Russia. The missile has been adapted into North Korea’s new intermediate-range missiles.

 

Until the recent discovery of the modified submarine, there were no intelligence signs North Korea is interested in developing its own submarine-launched missiles.

 

Pyongyang is one of the largest producers and exporters of ballistic missiles in the world, and makes several types of short-range Scuds, medium-range Nodongs, Musudan intermediate range missiles, and long-range Taepodongs.

 

Its missile arsenal is estimated to include between 600 and 1,000 missiles.

 

If the modified submarine is based on the Golf, it is likely the technology or actual missile tubes were derived from the decommissioned submarines obtained in the mid-1990s.

 

The authoritative Jane’s’ Fighting Ships revealed in May 1994 that North Korea purchased 40 decommissioned submarines from Russia, including several Golf-class and Romeo-class submarines.

 

Former British Navy Capt. Richard Sharpe, stated in the foreword to the 1994 publication that the Golf submarine sale raised concerns about their missile capabilities. It is “possible that the missile tubes may be adaptable for other weapons,” including ballistic missiles, he stated.

 

Rick Fisher, a military analyst, said he suspects one of the Golf-class submarines obtained by the North Koreans included one or more SS-N-6 missiles in its launch tubes as part of the deal.

 

North Korea then may have used the past 20 years to reverse-engineer a version of the Golf, which was designed to carry up to three ballistic missiles, Fisher said.

 

“In North Korean service, a Golf-size ballistic missile-carrying submarine could potentially carry two Musudan-size liquid-fueled missiles or a larger number of long-range cruise missiles,” he said.

 

If the missile submarine development is confirmed, it would mean North Korea could use one of its submarine missiles to attack Anchorage from waters near Russia’s Sakhalin Island. Another potential target for the North Korean missile submarine could be U.S. forces on Okinawa, Philippines, or Guam from the Yellow Sea. The missile could have a range of between 1,500 and 2,500 miles.

 

Eric Wertheim, an analyst at the U.S. Naval Institute, said he is skeptical North Korea could develop missile firing submarines, either indigenously or by copying or refurbishing a Golf.

 

“There are very many hurdles that would need to be overcome for North Korea to develop an SLBM and turn a diesel submarine into an operational platform able to launch guided SLBMs,” Wertheim said in an email.

 

“If not a Golf class, launch of SLBMs would probably require another large class of submarine and most recent North Korean submarine production seems to have focused on smaller subs or less than 1,000 tons,” he added.

 

A former intelligence analyst also said North Korea’s refurbishing of the Golf subs would be very difficult, and that the North Koreans would need satellite navigation for the missile.

 

South Korea press reports, however, have indicated recently that China is sharing its Beidou satellite navigation technology with North Korea.

 

A 2009 State Department cable made public by Wikileaks revealed that North Korea developed a new land-mobile intermediate-range missile based on the SS-N-6 SLBM.

 

The missile was deployed on Russia’s Golf submarines, indicating that the Golf missile tubes could be used or copied for the new North Korean missile submarine or as launch tubes on a converted submarine.

 

A modified SS-N-6 engine was used to build what is now called North Korea’s road-mobile Musudan missiles.

 

“Development of the Musudan with this more advanced propulsion technology allows North Korea to build even longer-range missiles—or shorter range missiles with greater payload capacity—than would be possible using Scud-type technology,” the cable on North Korean missile development stated.

 

A second 2011 cable revealed that North Korea shared the SS-N-6 missile technology with Iran for use in its Safir missile. The cable said “the second-stage of the Safir utilizes steering engines that are almost certainly derived from the Soviet-era SS-N-6 (Soviet designation: R-27 or RSM- 25) submarine-launched ballistic missile.”

 

“U.S. information was clear that Iran purchased these [missiles] from North Korea and that its technology was far more advanced than SCUD technology,” a third cable from 2007 said.

That cable quoted Russian officials, in talks with U.S. officials, denying any SS-N-6 missiles were sold to North Korea, claiming all were destroyed as part of the 1987 Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces treaty, which the State Department recently said was violated by Moscow through development of a new cruise missile.

 

Additionally, the Russians in 2007 said North Korea and Iran could not master the technology of the SS-N-6. “The Russians argued that the technology was customized for underwater use; and that the missile would not work without the water pressure at specific depths,” the cable said.

 

Fisher said another possible source for North Korea’s submarine-launched missile program is China, which has produced a version of the Golf known as the Type-031 and which was used until 2013 as an SLBM test platform.

 

“Given China’s habit of assisting North Korea to obtain earlier generation strategic weapons, the chances are greater that China would have aided North Korea’s rebuilding of the scrap Soviet Golf class submarines,” Fisher said. “Chinese assistance would have been crucial for North Korea to rebuild the pressure hull, missile tubes and to equip the sub with modern command and control systems.”

 

Fisher noted covert Chinese missile assistance in the past to North Korea’s KN-08 long-range missile, specifically the transfer of Chinese-made transporter-erector launchers.

 

“The emergence of a North Korean ballistic missile carrying submarine raises many questions for U.S. strategy and force levels in Asia,” Fisher said. “Should it now be considered a great error for the Obama administration to have retired and dismantled U.S. nuclear-armed cruise missiles for U.S. submarines in 2010?”

 

A missile-firing North Korean submarine also will require increased U.S. and Japanese anti-submarine warfare forces, he said. “Both will have to consider an additional number of submarines to check North Korea,” Fisher said.

 

Another concern is that North Korea will share or export missile-firing submarines in the future to Iran. North Korea cooperated with Iran on submarine training in the past.

PLA's JL-2 SLBM set to enter service in near future

The JL-2, China's second-generation submarine-launched ballistic missile, is set to enter service. China may develop its next generation with a range of at least 12,000 km in order to reach North America from the South China Sea, reports our Chinese-language sister paper Want Daily.
 

The PLA Navy's nuclear-powered Type 094 submarine was spotted patrolling with the missile, which has a range of around 8,000 km and can carry multiple warheads, at the beginning of this year. The Chinese military ended its decade-long research, development and trials for the missile at the end of 2012 and has been preparing to introduce it to its arsenal. State broadcaster CCTV recently aired a documentary on the missile's development process with video clips of its firing tests.
 

Photos posted by military enthusiasts show three Type 094 submarines, capable of launching the JL-2, in Sanya, Hainan province. A fourth of the class of submarine is said to be under construction.
 

The missile's range still falls short of China's ideal target range however since the Type 094 submarines need a missile with a range over 12,000 km to strike North America from South China Sea. The Trident missiles that US Navy launched from submarines in June this year have a maximum range of 11,000 km and can carry 11 warheads.

Why sea-based nuclear weapons won't stabilise the Indo-Pacific

China, India and possibly Pakistan intend to deploy nuclear weapons at sea. Ultimately, such deployments may well have a stabilising effect — that is, they may reduce the risk of full-scale war and nuclear use. Sea-based nuclear weapons might, for instance, fit well with 'no-first-use' doctrines.

 They might also encourage reduced investment in more destabilising forces such as weapons fired from fixed sites, which are vulnerable and thus suited to a 'first strike'. And after all, sea-based nuclear weapons were widely seen as stabilising during the Cold War. 

 

However, we should beware of applying simple retrospective visions of the US-Soviet balance to the Asian strategic scene. There are various reasons to doubt that deployment of sea-based nuclear weapons in Indo-Pacific Asia will be stabilising. 

 

First, to state the obvious, there are three independent centres of nuclear power in Asia: China, India and Pakistan. And that is before counting the US and Russia, as well as North Korea, which one day could also want to base some of its weapons at sea. This fundamental element of the Asian nuclear scene will remain regardless of where weapons are based.

 

Second, although wanting the permanent presence of nuclear weapons at sea as a second-strike capability to guarantee their survival is arguably a stabilising factor, that may not be the driving motivation of all three countries. There seems to be strong interest in China and India, at least, in the symbolic value of strategic submarines, including for parochial or bureaucratic reasons. In addition, these two countries may prefer to avoid deploying nuclear-armed sea-launched ballistic missiles, in order to maximise political control over the weapons. It should also be added, regarding China, that the choice of a secure SSBN base on Hainan island, where berths are largely immune to a first strike, puts less pressure on Beijing to adopt a practice of continuous at-sea deterrence. 

 

Third, deployment of nuclear weapons at sea in Indo-Pacific Asia does not only mean strategic missiles based on submarines.

 

It may include cruise missiles on vulnerable surface platforms. It will also probably include theatre systems designed to target naval forces, notably by Pakistan. This would not be a stabilising factor if command-and-control dilemmas for such systems are resolved in a way that dilutes the ability of national authorities to maintain the highest degree of political control over the weapons at all times. It should be remembered that probably the closest call for the use of nuclear weapons since 1945 concerned naval theatre weapons: it was in Cuba in October 1962.

 

Fourth, Indo-Pacific waters lend themselves less easily to the deployment of non-detectable submarines than was the case for the Cold War confrontation, when the Atlantic and the Pacific oceans offered more opportunities. This is especially true since India and Pakistan are likely to field only medium-range systems for some time, forcing their submarines to operate relatively close to the adversary's shores. It is also worth mentioning that unlikely accidents can happen, as was the case in 2009 when British and French SSBNs collided, and it took them a while to realise what had happened.

 

More generally, the transition period towards the deployment of operational SSBNs by China, India and Pakistan is likely to be long, tortuous and dangerous, for technical and budgetary reasons. What happens if one (or two) of the three countries manages to have a secure sea-based second-strike capability well before the others? 

 

Simply put, it is impossible to argue that the deployment of sea-based nuclear weapons in Indo-Pacific Asia will be inherently stabilising.

Report: 'New' Russian nuclear programs alarm neighbors

Russia is expanding and modernizing its nuclear arsenal, raising questions from surrounding nations about what Moscow and President Vladimir Putin are up to, according to a new report from the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists.

 

In the March/April issue provided to Secrets, the report reveals that the former Soviet capital is working on new missiles, nuclear submarines and bombers capable of carrying heavy nuclear-tipped bombs and missiles.

 

“Since our last Russian Notebook in early 2013, Russia has taken several important steps in modernizing its strategic and nonstrategic nuclear forces. These include continued development and deployment of new intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), construction of ballistic missile submarines, development of a new strategic bomber, and deployment of tactical ballistic and cruise missiles and fighter-bombers,” said the authors.

 

“While much of this development continues well-known programs that have been under way for many years, other developments are new. Combined, the steps contribute to growing concern in other countries about Russian intentions and help justify nuclear modernization programs and political opposition to reductions in other nuclear weapon states,” they added.

When added to Russia's surprising moves over the last week in Ukraine, the information revealed in the new nuclear report raises the stakes in the diplomatic standoff between Putin and President Obama.

 

On the nuclear side, the authors also said that Russia has some 3,500 warheads slated for dismantlement under an international deal, but still intact.

 

“Russia had a military stockpile of approximately 4,300 nuclear warheads, of which roughly 1,600 strategic warheads were deployed on missiles and at bomber bases.

 

Another 700 strategic warheads are in storage along with roughly 2,000 nonstrategic warheads. A large number — perhaps 3,500 — of retired but still largely intact warheads await dismantlement,” said the report.

 

The report also raised a new issue: Russia has not dismantled the nonnuclear weapons it promised to. “Despite Russia’s declaration in 1991 and 1992 that it would eliminate all ground-launched nonstrategic nuclear warheads, it has not done so. We estimate that approximately 170 warheads are assigned to SS-21 Scarab (Tochka) and SS-26 Stone (Iskander) short-range ballistic missiles. The SS-26 will replace the SS-21 completely over the next decade, eventually arming 10 tactical missile brigades,” said the Bulletin.

Russian Defense Radar, Missiles Worry U.S. Officials

 Russia deploying new missile defense radar while seeking curbs on U.S. defenses

Russia’s military has completed work on a new missile defense radar in southern Russia that has some U.S. military officials worried Moscow is building up offensive and defensive strategic forces in destabilizing combination.

The large radar station near Armavir, located near the Black Sea and designed to detect missiles launched from Europe and Iran, is nearly complete, said U.S. officials.

The radar deployment comes as Russia is seeking legal restrictions on U.S. and NATO missile defenses in Europe that are designed to protect the continent and the United States from long-range Iranian missiles.

“The [radar] station is in the final stage of preparations for entering combat duty,” Russian Aerospace Defense Forces commander Col. Gen. Oleg Ostapenko told RIA Novosti news agency June 19. “We are planning to almost wrap up the work on the station approximately by the end of the year.”

A U.S. military official said the Armavir radar station, along with a major buildup of missile defenses and new short- and medium-range missiles, poses a strategic threat to the United States and NATO allies.

“The Russians are upset with U.S. missile defenses in Europe and here they are building a network of missile tracking facilities,” the official said.

Disclosure of the new radar also comes as President Barack Obama is seeking further cuts in U.S. strategic offensive arsenals with Russia following his announcement last month in Berlin that he would cut nuclear warhead stockpiles by one-third, to around 1,000 warheads.

Obama said last year during an open-microphone exchange with then-Russian President Dmitri Medvedev that he would have “more flexibility” in talks on missile defenses with Russia after his reelection.

A U.S. official involved in strategic nuclear issues said the Obama administration wants to resolve all missile defense issues with the Russians, including legal restrictions, in order to begin a new round of strategic offensive arms talks.

When Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel announced in March the United States was canceling the fourth phase of its missile defenses in Europe to assuage Moscow’s fears, the Russian government did not back down. The fourth and last phase of the program would have included interceptors that could stop missiles from hitting U.S. territory. The three earlier phases are targeted on missiles aimed solely at Europe.

The Russian Foreign Ministry issued a statement shortly after the March announcement criticizing the Pentagon for continuing “to maintain a course toward strengthening its system of global missile defense and raising its effectiveness.”

The statement said the Russians were continuing to demand “legally binding guarantees” that U.S. defense were targeted at Russian missiles.

By contrast, the Obama administration has made no mention of Russia’s missile defense and strategic nuclear arms buildup. It also has not sought limits on Russian missile defenses in talks with Russian officials.

Russian President Vladimir Putin suggested in a speech June 19 that Moscow’s current offensive and defensive strategic buildup is aimed at countering similar U.S. developments.

“There has been increasing talk among military analysts about the theoretical possibility of a first, disarming, disabling strike, even against nuclear powers,” Putin said. “This is something that we also need to take into account in our plans for developing the armed forces.”

Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov was quoted in March in the Russian media as saying “we are not experiencing any euphoria” over the cancelation of the fourth phase. Ryabkov also voiced opposition to the announced plans by the Pentagon to add 14 new long-range interceptors to bases in Alaska and California, which he called a substantial growth in U.S. missile defenses.

In a related strategic missile development, U.S. officials said Russia’s military restricted publication of photographs of the controversial Yars-M missile.

The Yars missile, also called the RS-24, was tested last month as an intermediate-range missile that U.S. intelligence officials believe violated Moscow’s commitment to the 1987 Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces (INF) treaty.

According to the officials, one site of the Yars was not allowed to be photographed by Russian news photographers.

However, one photo of the new missile’s prohibited view was published last year.

U.S. officials and private missile specialists said the excessive secrecy surrounding the Yars has contributed to concerns that the missile violates the INF treaty.

Russia has said the Yars does not violate INF because Russian officials claim its range is 3,400 miles—above the range for a missile to be considered intermediate-range.

However, during a flight test of the Yars on June 6 the missile traveled from a launch center at Kapustin Yar and landed at an impact range at Sary-Shagan, about 2,000 kilometers, or 1,242 miles away. The distance would make the missile an INF-covered weapon.

An intelligence official told the Washington Free Beacon that U.S. intelligence agencies believe the Yars is an intermediate-range missile disguised by the Russians as an ICBM to avoid being accused of violating the INF treaty.

A State Department annual report on arms compliance that was due to Congress on April 15 will address the issue, a department spokeswoman said.

Stefan Forss, a former missile specialist with the government of Finland’s Foreign Ministry, said he agrees the Russians appear to be breaking the INF treaty.

Forss said the June 6 test of the Yars to less than intercontinental ballistic missile range is a clear sign the system is an intermediate-range missile.

“If there are no further tests to intercontinental ranges—we should, however, prepare for some maskirovka [deception] tests in this regard—the matter is settled,” Forss, an adjunct professor at Finland’s National Defense University said in an email. “Yars M will take care of the upper end of the INF range spectrum and Iskander-M of the lower end.”

The Iskander is Russia’s new short-range, nuclear-capable missile.

Forss said a recent statement by Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov that any future strategic arms accords must include other states beyond the United States and Russia was significant.

“It effectively buries any hopes of further reductions,” he said.

For the Europeans, according to Forss, strategic nuclear arms cuts are less important than tactical nuclear cuts since Russia currently has an overwhelming advantage in tactical nuclear weapons.

“The reason why Russia now opposes bilateral talks with the USA is plain and clear,” Forss said. “Russia doesn’t want any lower START ceilings for the reason that it needs them for the new ‘ICBM’ that for all practical reasons is a non-strategic IRBM.”

Forss said Moscow’s strategy likely would be to first build up INF capabilities and then withdraw from the treaty.

The Armavir radar is one of four advanced missile defense radars being built by Russia in recent years that are being rushed into service by 2020. Each of the radar can track up to 500 objects simultaneously.

The radars are protected by Russian S-400 air defense and anti-missile interceptors.

Two of the stations, called Voronezh-M, already are deployed near St. Petersburg and in Siberia in the Irkutsk region.

The fourth radar is located in the Baltic enclave of Kaliningrad, where Moscow in the past has said it would deploy advanced Iskander short-range nuclear-capable missiles in response to European missile defenses.

The Voronezh radars can track objects up to 3,700 miles away and are considered more technically advanced than earlier Soviet-era missile defense radar.

According to Novosti, the Armavir station can track missiles from France and Spain in the west as well as areas of North Africa and through Iran, Afghanistan, and parts of India and Pakistan.

Voronezh radars also are planned for Pechora in Russia’s Komi Republic and near the Siberian cities of Barnaul and Yeniseisk.

Russia announced late last year that the Baltic missile defense radar is being built by 2014 to counter what Russia said is “the perceived threat from a joint U.S.-NATO missile defense system in Europe,” Novosti stated.

The new missile defense radar are part of a major buildup of Russian defenses against missiles first disclosed by the Free Beacon on May 16.

Other elements of the strategic missile defense modernization program include new and modernized anti-missile interceptors, such as the advanced S-500 missile defense system and advanced S-400 and S-300 defenses.

Moscow also is upgrading SH-08 nuclear-tipped anti-missile interceptors around Moscow.

Additionally, other new missile defenses being fielded are Russian SA-20 and SA-21 surface-to-air missiles, and a new advanced system called the SA-X-23, an advanced version of the S-300.

US Officials Say Russia Violating Missile Treaty – Report

US intelligence officials believe Russia is violating a Soviet-era arms-control treaty with the United States by building a new medium-range missile banned under the agreement, a conservative US website reported.

US intelligence officials believe the missile, which the Russian Defense Ministry describes as a new intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM), is actually a medium-range missile that puts Russia in violation of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF) concluded between the United States and the Soviet Union in 1987, the Washington Free Beacon reported.

“The intelligence community believes it’s an intermediate-range missile that [the Russians] have classified as an ICBM because it would violate the INF treaty,” the conservative website cited one official as saying.

The Russian Defense Ministry announced earlier this month that it successfully tested a prototype of a new solid-fuel ICBM that is expected to replace the Topol-M and Yars missiles in the future.

The missile was fired from a mobile launcher at the Kapustin Yar testing range in the Astrakhan region and hit its designated target at the Sary Shagan testing range in Kazakhstan, the ministry said.

US intelligence officials said that according to internal assessments, the new missile that Russia tested earlier this month was an INF missile with a range of less than 3,418 miles (5,500 kilometers), the Free Beacon reported.

Victor Yesin, consultant to Russia’s chief of the general staff, told the website that the missile “is a Topol class ICBM, is not covered by the INF Treaty as its range is over 5,500 kilometers,” the website reported.

“Russia officially informed the US about that in August 2011,” Yesin, a former commander of Russia’s strategic forces, was quoted by the Free Beacon as saying.

The website noted an April 12 letter that two US Congressmen wrote to President Barack Obama in which they expressed concerns over “a massive Russian violation and circumvention of an arms control obligation to the United States of great significance to this nation and its NATO allies.”

The Republican authors, Rep. Howard “Buck” McKeon and Rep. Mike Rogers, did not specify the alleged violation in question but told Obama that Senate Intelligence Committee members had previously expressed their concern about “clear examples of Russia’s noncompliance with its arms control obligations.”

The Soviet Union and the United States signed the INF Treaty on December 8, 1987. The agreement came into force in June 1988 and does not have a specific duration.

The INF treaty banned nuclear and conventional ground-launched ballistic and cruise missiles with ranges of 300 to 3,400 miles (500 to 5,500 kilometers). By the treaty's deadline of June 1, 1991, a total of 2,692 such weapons had been destroyed, 846 by the US and 1,846 by the Soviet Union.

North Korea tried to sell 3,500KM range missiles – arms trader

North Korea offered 3,500km intermediate range ballistic missiles to UK arms dealer Michael Ranger, information detailed in a new UN report has revealed for the first time.

Representatives from the North Korean front company Hesong Trading Corporation allegedly offered Mr. Ranger modern and vintage small arms and light weapons, GPS jammers, multiple launch rocket systems, and “extraordinarily,” ballistic missiles with a range of up to 3,500 km.

“The price per unit was in excess of US$ 100 million for those intermediate-range ballistic missiles and would be sold not less than three at a time, mixed as one long-range and two medium-range missiles or one medium-range and two long-range missiles”, testimony provided by Mr. Ranger to the UN explained.

Although North Korea has a long history of selling short-range SCUD-type ballistic missiles to governments in the Middle East, to date there have been no reports of “medium” and “long-range” missile-types being offered to foreign clients.

“DISTURBING” REVELATIONS

While no explicit link is made in the report, the range of the missiles offered to Mr. Ranger coincides very closely with North Korea’s only known intermediate-range missile, the Musudan, says Mark Fitzpatrick, Director of the Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Programme at the International Institute for Strategic Studies.

“3,500km is the range sometimes mentioned for the Musudan.  They don’t have any other missiles in that medium-range category,” Fitzpatrick told NK News by email.

North Korea first showcased the Musudan to the outside world at an October 2010 military parade covered by international media. But despite the strident parade and subsequent spike in reporting on the missile type, the Musudan is not known to have ever been flight-tested.

“It’s very disturbing that North Korea is seeking to sell such systems, though the fact that they have never been tested in North Korea should make any would-be buyers wary,” Mr. Fitzpatrick further explained to NK News.

The Korean People’s Army was suspected of putting two Musudans into “launch-ready” status during tensions with South Korea and the U.S. earlier this year.

However, those launches never took place, leading some analysts to question whether the Musudan is real or not. That Mr. Ranger was offered the Musudan is therefore a noteworthy development.

SALES TECHNIQUE?

Although Mr. Ranger’s claims shed new light on how North Korean officials might be marketing the DPRK’s latest missile capabilities to foreign clients, experts suggest that his allegations should be taken with a pinch of salt.

“Regarding the price, number and specifications of intermediate-range ballistic missiles claimed to have been on offer to Mr Ranger- there appears to be no means of verifying his claims,” Lawrence Dermody, an arms researcher at the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute told NK News.

“However, it’s certainly possible that Hesong representatives had an interest in exaggerating technology on offer to establish relationships with potential buys or secure related contracts.”

Another analyst familiar with the UN report, who wished to remain anonymous, echoed Mr. Dermody’s suspicions: ”It is possible that this was the DPRK flying a kite to observe Mr Ranger’s reaction.”

INTERNATIONAL SHIPPING CONUNDRUM

Even if Musudan missiles really were for sale, tightened international sanctions and intensified monitoring of cargo into and out of the DPRK would have made it extremely difficult for someone like Mr. Ranger to guarantee deliveries to would-be-clients.

“It is not clear how the DPRK would ship such missiles if indeed they sold them. Given their bulk, however, they would probably use maritime rather than air routes,” an analyst familiar with sanctions told NK News.

But after the high-profile turnaround of the Kang Nam 1, a North Korean vessel suspected to have been transporting missile parts to Myanmar in 2009, increased scrutiny over DPRK sea-lanes suggest that UN sanctions may be adding serious hurdles to North Korea’s capacity to sell advanced weapons systems.

Faced with an increasingly tight sanctions regime, the latest UN report says that North Korea has few direct connections with mainstream shipping companies and has to “charter feeder vessels to carry cargo to regional hubs in neighboring countries”.

Doing so is not cheap and the principal reason why a sale of between 70 and 100 man-portable air defense systems from North Korea to Azerbaijan, orchestrated by UK national Mr. Ranger, fell apart.

“The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea looks carefully at the bottom line and rejects orders for small quantities because of higher per-unit manufacturing and/or transport costs”, the UN report explains.

When Mr. Ranger’s client requested a sample of 10 man-portable air defense systems to be tested in Azerbaijan before committing to the full purchase, North Korea insisted that testing must take place on DPRK territory. But because of the risks involved in shipping even small cargoes, it simply wasn’t cost-effective for Pyongyang to export such a small cache and risk interception.

ONGOING EXPORTS?

Despite a tightening sanctions regime and steadily increasing number of arms-related interceptions being revealed the latest UN report, experts warn that sanctioned North Korean weapons exports could still be continuing under the radar.

Nevertheless, Martin Uden, coordinator of the UN Panel of Experts, told NK News: ”While there are gaps in implementation and arms exports are doubtless continuing, it’s clear that the DPRK is having to go to extreme lengths to circumvent UN sanctions, making it more and more difficult, expensive and time-consuming to pursue this illegal trade.”

But an analyst familiar with sanctions said of the repeated references to Dalian based entities in the latest UN report, ”It is clear that the Chinese port [of Dalian] has continued to be deeply involved in the DPRK’s illicit activities during the period covered by the report.”…

Capability of Russia’s Ballistic Missile Submarine Force Questioned

The Federation of American Scientists (FAS) recently obtained information from the U.S. Navy suggesting that, though Russia is undergoing a much-publicized push to modernize its ballistic missile submarine force, the actual patrol rate amongst vessels in service remains extremely low. 

Figures suggest that the entire fleet of nine operational nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines (SSBN) made just five deterrent patrols in all of 2012, according to the organization.

FAS analysts noted that this was likely not sufficient to sustain a constant deterrent presence, and the overall tempo of patrols has continued to decline since the end of the Cold War, when the SSBN fleet reached a record of 102 patrols in 1984.

There was a slight resurgence 2008 with ten patrols (up from 3 in 2007), but these again declined, despite Russian pronouncements that they were ready to maintain a constant at-sea deterrent. The overall number of patrols also suggests that there are long periods in which boats go without extended deployments, meaning SSBN crews lack hands-on training, according to FAS.

Russian Navy planners are currently working to replace the currently in-service Soviet-era Delta III and IVs with Borei-class vessels, which are expected to be fully operational by the mid-to-late 2020s.

Morale - Missile Men Lose Their Mojo

The U.S. Air Force recently had still more serious problems with the troops who handle, and operate, its nuclear weapons. This time 17 officers were relieved from ICBM launch duty. This suspension is only supposed to last for two months or so, assuming that training and attitude problems can be fixed. There is some doubt that these problems can be fixed.

 

These 17 officers are among the ones who actually launch ICBMs. Two of them are in charge of ten silos, each containing an ICBM. The two officers monitor the readiness of those missiles and, if they receive orders, both have to agree to launch their missiles. Each pair of launch officers is in a separate underground bunker and five of these bunkers are in the same area, each with ten nearby ICBM silos. Each pair of launch officers can, if need be, take over control of another launch control team’s missiles if that launch team’s bunker is destroyed or put out of action. 

 

The 17 launch control officers were suspended because a surprise inspection revealed that they did not know all the details of their jobs they were supposed to know. There was apparently a breakdown in training and leadership in their squadron (which controls 50 silos) and wing (which controls three squadrons). Air force leaderships also believes that there is still an attitude problem among those who maintain and operate the ICBMs. 

 

Problems with training, leadership and attitude among troops who handle and operate nuclear weapons were first noted in the 1990s, after the Cold War ended. The problems have been getting more and more attention in the last decade. Back in 2009 it became obvious that the situation was getting worse. That’s because twice that year the air force had to relieve the commander of a combat wing. One was a B-52 bomber wing while the other was a Minuteman ICBM wing.  In the case of the ICBM wing two other senior officers were also relieved (one of them the guy in charge of the Wing Maintenance Squadron.) In both cases, the reason was "loss of confidence in his ability to command". That's milspeak for "too many little things have gone wrong and you are making your bosses nervous."

 

In the case of the dismissed missile Wing commander there had been two accidents with the large trailers that move the missiles. A vehicle accident is normally not grounds for removing a Wing commander but in this case it was just one of many problems. Two missile wings also failed their Nuclear Safety Inspection. There were also incidents of misconduct by members of the Wing that lost its commander. Too many problems and the commander becomes a problem.

 

In 2009 many nuclear weapons units were having problems with the two week long Nuclear Safety Inspections that take place every 18 months. Because of the embarrassing problems with nuclear weapons security over the previous three years, these inspections had become stricter. Scary inspections have become fashionable again, and commanders who don't get with the program are headed for early retirement.

 

These inspections are not unique or a surprise. All of the Missile Wings have been based where they are for over four decades. The word comes down the chain of command about what is expected, and if anyone screws up, officers (or, more rarely, NCOs) are relieved and careers are ruined. Heads did not roll in 2009 just for specific inspection failures. The word from on-high was that the units handling nuclear weapons had to be over-the-top fanatic about nuclear safety and security. This was a switch from then current practices. By 2009 the attitude was that if there is a pattern of failure, the commander gets relieved and life goes on. But this alone was not fixing the problems. 

 

This persistent problem resulted in the return of the old SAC (Strategic Air Command) attitude. This is one of those rare cases where it is recognized that the Good Old Days were better, or in this case, meaner, tougher, more effective and safer. In 2009 that led to the establishment of the Global Strike Command (GSC). This outfit would, as SAC once did, control all air force nuclear weapons and delivery systems (ICBMs and heavy bombers.) This came sixteen years of trying to do without SAC.

In 1992 SAC, which had control of air force nuclear bombers and missiles since 1946, was disbanded and the ICBMs, and their crews, were transferred to the new Space Command. SAC had long been the butt of many jokes, for being uptight and fanatical about security, discipline and the myriad details for handling nukes. Everyone tolerated this because, after all, SAC had charge of all those nukes, heavy bombers and ICBMs. When Space Command took over, they eased up on the tight discipline and strictness about procedure that had been the hallmark of SAC for decades. The old timers complained, but many of the young troops liked the new, looser, attitudes.

 

Officers operating the ICBMs were no longer career "missileers", but Space Command people. Time that used to be spent on studying nuclear weapons security and missile maintenance issues, was now devoted to subjects of more concern to Space Command (satellites and communications, for example). Standards fell, efficiency slipped. Then in 2005, the missile crews lost their Missile Badge, and had it replaced with a generic Space Command badge. 

 

Then, in 2007, there was much angst when it was discovered that six nuclear cruise missiles had accidentally been mounted on a B-52 and flown halfway across the country. How could this happen? The old timers knew. While many of these older officers and NCOs were pleased when SAC went away early in their careers, they knew that it was that act, and the subsequent "loosening up", that led to the lax attitudes that put those six nukes on that B-52. All this was part of a major, post-Cold War reorganization of the USAF. It was the beginning of the end of a decades old tradition of handling nuclear weapons safely and securely.

 

In 2008, the air force brass reinstated the Missile Badge, for any missile crew member who belonged to a missile crew that was certified CMR (passed some strenuous inspections to be declared Combat Mission Ready). The badge had been used for decades, until 2005, when it was withdrawn and replaced by the generic "Space Wings" of the USAF Space Command, which took control of the ICBMs in 1993. SAC, it turns out, has been coming back quietly for quite some time, both for the bomber units, as well as the missile ones. 

 

But as the recent failures indicate, not everyone has gotten with the program. Among the new SAC people there were many who were still “Space Command” at heart. This is attributed to the fact that with the end of the Cold War in 1991 the strategic nuclear weapons were no longer as crucial as they had been since the late 1940s. For decades the United States and Russia (as the Soviet Union) each had thousands of nuclear armed ballistic missiles (and a few hundred bombers) aimed at each other. That got the attention of people in SAC and encouraged everyone to concentrate. After 1991, the incentive was no longer there and it is still not there. But when you are handling nukes, the old SAC fanaticism is still the best way to go.

Growing Threat To US As Enemies Acquiring More Ballistic Missiles, Senate Told

Senior U.S. defense officials underscored the importance of ballistic missile defense modernization efforts requested in the fiscal 2014 budget proposal citing disturbing trends in Iran, North Korea, Syria and elsewhere around the globe. 

"The threat continues to grow as our potential adversaries are acquiring a greater number of ballistic missiles, increasing their range and making them more complex, survivable, reliable and accurate," Navy Vice Adm. J.D. Syring, Director of the Missile Defense Agency, told the Senate Armed Services Committee during a testimony on Thursday.

"The missile defense mission is becoming more challenging as potential adversaries incorporate [ballistic missile defense] countermeasures," he reported. 

Syring said the Missile Defense Agency "is engaged either bilaterally or multilaterally with nearly two dozen countries and international organizations," including NATO and the Gulf Cooperation Council. He reported "good progress in our work with our international partners."

The budget requests $9.2 billion in fiscal 2014 and $45.7 billion over future years to develop and deploy missile defense capabilities.

Madelyn Creedon, Assistant Secretary of Defense for global strategic affairs, told the panel that these capabilities would both protect the U.S. homeland and strengthen regional missile defenses.

The administration remains committed to developing proven and cost-effective missile defense capabilities through the phased advance approach to regional missile defense, Creedon noted in her written statement.

"This approach puts emphasis on a flexible military toolkit with forces that are mobile and scalable. They underwrite deterrence in peacetime, but can be surged in crisis to meet defense requirements," she said.

Creeden reported on progress on three policy priorities: sustaining a strong homeland defense, strengthening regional missile defense and fostering increased international cooperation and participation.

She emphasized the importance of continually improving the Ground-based Midcourse Defense system in place to protect the U.S. homeland against potential limited intercontinental ballistic missile attacks.

The budget request, she said, supports this effort as well as enhancement of ground-based interceptors and deployment improved sensors, she said. The proposal also includes funding to implement regional missile defense approaches that Creedon said would be tailored to the unique deterrence and defense requirements of Europe, the Middle East and the Asia-Pacific regions.

While promoting these efforts, the United States is striving to build stronger relationships with allies and partners to cooperatively address the ballistic missile threat, and to help build partner capacity to do so, she said.

The fiscal 2014 budget request reflects DoD's goals of retaining the flexibility to adjust and to enhance its defenses as the threat and technologies evolve, Creedon said.

"Our most vital security commitments - the defense of the United States and the protection of our allies and partners and our forces around the world - demand nothing less," she added.

Russian SSBN Fleet: Modernizing But Not Sailing Much

The Russian ballistic missile submarine fleet is being modernized but conducting so few deterrent patrols that each submarine crew cannot be certain to get out of port even once a year.

During 2012, according to data obtained from U.S. Naval Intelligence under the Freedom of Information Act, the entire Russian fleet of nine ballistic missile submarines only sailed on five deterrent patrols.

The patrol level is barely enough to maintain one missile submarine on patrol at any given time.

The ballistic missile submarine force is in the middle of an important modernization. Over the next decade or so, all remaining Soviet-era ballistic missile submarines and their two types of sea-launched ballistic missiles will be replaced with a new submarine armed with a new missile (see also our latest Nuclear Notebook on Russian nuclear forces).

The new fleet will carry more nuclear warheads than the one it replaces, however, because the Russian military is trying to maintain parity with the larger U.S. nuclear arsenal.

Sluggish Deterrent Patrols

The operational tempo of the Russian SSBN fleet – measured in the number of deterrent patrol conducted each year – has declined significantly – actually plummeted – since the end of the Cold War.

At their peak in 1984 – the year after the Russian military became convinced that the NATO exercise Able Archer was in fact disguised preparations for a nuclear first strike against the Soviet Union, Russian SSBNs carried out 102 patrols. Under Mikhail Gorbachev, operations quickly declined in the second half of the 1980s. But even as the Warsaw Pact collapsed and the Berlin Wall fell in 1989, the fleet was able to muster a slight comeback in 1990.

As the Cold War officially ended in 1990, the Soviet Union dissolved and Russia descended into financial recession, the SSBN force increasingly stayed in port until in 2002, when no deterrent patrols were conducted all.

Since then, the performance has been a mixed bag. After a slight whiff of new life with 10 patrols in 2008 (up from 3 in 2007), the number of SSBN patrols has declined again to around five in 2012.

The recent decline contrasts with the Russian Navy’s declaration last year that it would resume continuous deterrent patrols from mid-2012. Assuming the five patrols occurred throughout the year and not just in the last six months, the fleet would have had a hard time maintaining a continuous at-sea presence with only five patrols. Theoretically, it could be done if each patrol lasted an average of 73 days. That is how long a U.S. SSBN deploys on a good day. But Russian SSBNs are thought to do shorter patrols, probably 40-60 days each, in which case most of the five patrols would have had to occur between July and December to maintain continuous patrol from mid-2012.

Even if the navy were able to squeeze a more or less continuous at-sea presence out of the five patrols, it would at best have consisted of a single SSBN – not much for a fleet of nine submarines or demonstrating a convincing secure retaliatory capability.

Perhaps more significantly, the five deterrent patrols conducted in 2012 are not enough for each SSBN in the fleet to be able to conduct even one patrol a year. The five patrols by nine SSBNs indicate that only five or less submarines are active. That means that submarine crews do not get much hands-on training in how to operate the SSBNs so they actually have a chance to survive and provide a secure retaliatory strike capability in a crisis. Crews probably compensate for this by practicing alert operations at pier-side at their bases.

Unlike U.S. SSBNs, which can patrol essentially with impunity in the open oceans, Russian deterrent patrols are thought to take place in “strategic bastions” relatively close to Russia where the SSBNs can be protected by the Russian navy against the U.S. and British attack submarines that probably occasionally monitor their potential targets.

The Russian navy remembers all too well the 1980s when the aggressive U.S. Maritime Strategy envisioned using attack submarines to hunt down and destroy Soviet SSBNs early on in a conflict, a highly controversial strategy [see here and here] that could likely have triggered escalation to strategic nuclear war. Hunting Russian SSBNs is no longer a primary mission for U.S. attack submarines, but it is probably still part of the mission package and one that Russian planners cannot afford to ignore. As a result, Russian SSBNs probably continue to patrol in the areas used in the late-1980s and early-1990s (see map) to provide maximum protection.

Force Structure
Russia currently operates 10 ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs), of which three Delta IIIs based in the Pacific are outdated and six Delta IVs based in the Barents Sea have recently been refurbished to serve for another decade or so. The 10^th SSBN added in January 2013 is the first of a new type of Borei-class SSBNs that are scheduled to replace all Deltas by the mid/late-2020s.

The first Borei-class (Project 955) SSBN, Yuri Dolgoruki, entered service after more than 15 years of design and construction, marking the first time in 25 years that the Russian Navy had commissioned a new SSBN. A second Borei has been launched and a third is under construction. Russia has announced plans to build a total of eight Boreis. Each Borei is equipped with 16 SS-N-32 (Bulava) SLBMs, a missile that Russia has declared can carry up to six warheads.

The fourth and subsequent Borei-class SSBNs will be of an improved design, known as Borei-II or Project 955A). Russian news media is full of rumors that the improved Boreis will be equipped with 20 SLBMs instead of 16 on each of the first three boats. Some Russian officials dispute that, saying all Boreis will be equipped with 16 missiles.

This force structure plan has implications for Russia’s nuclear posture and strategic priorities. The replacement of the Delta SSBNs with eight Borei SSBNs will reduce the size of the Russian SSBN fleet and the number of SLBMs, but result in a 23-percent increase in the number of sea-based warheads because the SS-N-32 carries more warheads than the SS-N-18 and SS-N-23 SLBMs it replaces.

In other words, Russia will be placing more eggs in fewer baskets at sea, which increases the importance of each SSBN – something strategists say is bad for crisis stability.

Conclusions and Implications

The Russian SSBN force is in the middle of a transition from Soviet-era weapons to a smaller but more warhead-heavy fleet of new submarines.

This means that the SSBN fleet will carry a growing portion of Russia’s strategic missile warheads – up from about a third today to nearly half by the mid-2020s.

The trend of increased warhead loading on sea-launched ballistic missiles is similar to the development on land where reduction of the Russian ICBM force will result in a greater portion of the remaining force being equipped with multiple warheads.

This is perhaps the most dominant trend of Russia’s nuclear forces today: fewer launchers but each carrying more warheads. Not that Russia will have more total nuclear warheads than before (their arsenal is declining), but that military planners have fallen for the temptation to place more nuclear eggs in each basket.

They appear to do so to compensate againt the larger U.S. nuclear missile force and its significant reserve of additional warheads. But it would be helpful if the Russian government would declare how many Borei-class SSBNs it plans to build in total and limit the number of missiles on each to 16.

The Russian modernization is motivating Cold Warriors in the U.S. Congress to argue that the United States should not reduce but modernize its nuclear forces. They are wrong for many reasons, not least because the two postures are very different.

The U.S. SSBN fleet is more modern with another 15 service years left in it, and it carries many more missiles that are much more reliable with more warheads. The U.S. could in fact easily reduce its SSBN fleet to ten boats, perhaps fewer.

Moreover, in contrast with U.S. SSBN operations, where each operational submarine conducts an average of 2-3 patrols each year, Russian SSBN crews do not get a lot of operational training with an average of less than one patrol per submarine per year.

Rather than opposing further reductions, U.S. lawmakers should support limitations on the growing asymmetry between U.S. and Russian strategic nuclear forces – an asymmetry that is significantly in the U.S. advantage – to help limit further concentration of nuclear warheads on Russia’s declining numbers of strategic missiles. That would actually help the national security interests of all.

Pentagon: North Korea nears nuclear missile that could hit U.S. mainland

North Korea's progress in developing nuclear weapons that could reach the United States depends on continued missile and nuclear tests, a Pentagon report said.

The annual report to Congress, presented Thursday, provided an overview of North Korea's military threat and discussed the reclusive country's progress toward developing a nuclear missile, CNN reported Friday.

The report didn't indicate how long defense officials believed it would take North Korea to develop a fully operational nuclear missile capable of reaching the U.S. mainland.

The report characterized North Korea's ballistic missile program as "ambitious" and said "the pace of its progress will depend, in part, on how many resources it can dedicate to these efforts and how often it conducts tests."

The report said that the type of long-range rocket North Korea launched in December to put a satellite in orbit "could reach parts of the United States if configured as an intercontinental ballistic missile [ICBM] capable of carrying a nuclear payload."

The report added, however, that "a space launch does not test a re-entry vehicle [RV], without which North Korea cannot deliver a weapon to target from an ICBM."

The launch and the April 2012 display of an untested but road-mobile ICBM draws attention to "the threat to regional stability and U.S. national security posed by North Korea," the report said.

The report's authors said they didn't expect North Korean leader Kim Jong Un to stray much from the strategy shaped by his father, Kim Jong Il, who died in December 2011.

That approach, the report said, includes "coercive diplomacy to compel acceptance of its diplomatic, economic and security interests; development of strategic military capabilities to deter external attack," and challenges to South Korea and the U.S.-South Korean alliance.

The rocket launch in December and underground nuclear test in February prompted international condemnation and tougher U.N. sanctions. North Korea, in response, stepped up its provocative rhetoric and acts, including threatening a pre-emptive strike against South Korea and the United States.

Pentagon Weighs Refurbishing or Replacing Ballistic Missiles

The U.S. Defense Department is weighing the feasibility of extending the service life of the nation’s aging Minuteman 3 intercontinental ballistic missiles versus replacing them in coming decades with brand new nuclear-armed ballistic missiles.

The 450 Minuteman 3s are expected to last through 2030, but might be retained longer if they can be further refurbished, senior Pentagon officials said at a Senate hearing on Wednesday. The weapons were first deployed in 1970 and sit on alert in underground silos at three different bases in Montana, North Dakota and Wyoming.

The Air Force, which fields and maintains the missiles, is “very carefully analyzing exactly how the current system is degrading, so that they have a much better understanding of how they might extend the life of this [ICBM], if that is the alternative that’s chosen,” Madelyn Creedon, assistant Defense secretary for global affairs, told the Senate Armed Services Strategic Forces Subcommittee in testimony alongside other civilian and military leaders.

The analysis, which is to begin in July after some “bureaucratic delays,” will conclude late next year, said Lt. Gen. James Kowalski, who heads Air Force Global Strike Command. The assessment will examine whether to undertake a “program to further extend the life of the Minuteman 3 or to develop a follow-on ICBM,” Creedon elaborated in her written testimony.

Many details about the various modernization options and their projected costs -- first examined in an initial Capabilities Based Assessment finalized last October -- remain classified. However, officials say key factors under study include whether to place any new ICBMs in fixed launch silos or make them mobile on trucks or other vehicles; which warhead to mate with the delivery vehicles; and how to modernize these systems most affordably.

Whether the country’s future ICBM -- dubbed the “Ground-Based Strategic Deterrent -- is an updated Minuteman or a totally new design, it appears the missile will share quite a bit of hardware in common with the Navy’s future ballistic missile for basing aboard submarines, Defense officials say.

Which option ultimately is selected, according to experts, might come down to a question that many automobile owners would find familiar: Does it make more sense to save upfront investment by continuing to operate an old design with swapped-out parts and upgrades, or to invest instead in a new system with more up-to-date design efficiencies that could be easier to maintain in the long run?

Another question facing the Minuteman 3’s overseers and custodians is whether the missiles, even after some recent renovations, could actually function through 2030. At the hearing, Senator Deb Fischer (R-Neb.) asked if the Minuteman might age out sooner unless near-term steps are taken to extend its service life.

“I am confident we can get the missile, as it is, to 2030 with the programs that we have in place, or the programs that we don’t have funded yet but plan to pursue in the next couple years,” responded Kowalski, whose command is based in Louisiana.

For example, he said, there is some question about whether the casings around the missile propellant might degrade early, a possibility that could lead to leaks or malfunctions. If the existing propulsion unit lasts an estimated 30 years, no refurbishment would be needed until 2025 or later, he said. However, less longevity in the technology could demand earlier intervention.

Of the Minuteman’s three rocket stages, the third motor is attracting most concern. However, there is no indication to date of any degradation of the materials with which it is made -- not even any “adverse trends” -- which has led many officials to conclude that the already overhauled propulsion system might even last a half-decade or more beyond an estimated 30-year lifespan, one issue expert said.

The expert asked not to be named in discussing the sensitive issue of how long a nuclear-armed system might remain viable.

The Minuteman 3 missile guidance system also could require a service-life extension between now and 2030, Kowalski said.

This, too, is a question under internal debate, according to the issue expert. The Air Force estimate is that the current guidance system -- which helps direct a warhead to its target -- will function for another 17 years. However, some have raised questions about whether existing electronics might fail earlier and should be traded out for updated replacements, this source said.

Kowalski noted in written testimony that the overall service life initially anticipated for the Minuteman 3 was just 10 years, but the missile has since “proven its value in deterrence well beyond the platform’s intended lifespan."

The Air Force is studying how any near-term maintenance for the deployed Minuteman 3s, if needed, would relate to the missile’s eventual replacement, the commander said at the hearing.

“All of the things that we plan to invest in the Minuteman 3 are specific subsystems that we intend to dovetail into the ground-based strategic deterrent, the follow-on [ICBM],” said the three-star general, adding that the Pentagon intends to ensure “we are not paying for the same thing twice.”

Some have suggested the United States might safely eliminate the ICBM leg of the nation’s nuclear triad, and rely instead on a combination of dual-capable, nuclear-conventional bomber aircraft and ballistic missiles aboard highly survivable submarines at sea.

However, Kowalski suggested that as the capability to field atomic arms and ballistic missiles proliferates around the globe, Washington’s ICBM arsenal remains a crucial bulwark against possible nuclear blackmail or coercion threats.

“There are 450 hardened launch facilities in the heartland of this country,” he said. “And if we did not have those, we’d need to think through what that scenario looks like in 15 or 20 years.”

Creedon was asked about a recent Obama administration decision to avoid further escalating tensions with North Korea by rescheduling a Minuteman 3 test launch from Vandenberg Air Force Base, Calif., which had been slated for last week.

“We decided it was wise to postpone for a while the last launch because of the situation on the Korean Peninsula,” she said. “It was a situation that we just wanted to deal with in a way that we didn’t increase the provocation cycle” in the region, she said.

Plans are now for the next Minuteman 3 test flight to occur between May 21 and 23, which would effectively resume the normal launch schedule where it left off, Creedon said.

Russia to Start State Tests of New Ballistic Missile in 2014

MOSCOW, April 5 (RIA Novosti) – The state tests of a new solid-fuel intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) will begin in 2014, a former Russian military commander said.

Russia announced the development of a new ICBM to replace the existing Topol-M and Yars missiles in 2012. If the tests are successful, it could be commissioned as early as in 2015.

“The state tests of the missile have been scheduled for 2014,” Col. Gen. Viktor Yesin (Ret.), who served as chief of staff of the Russian Strategic Missile Forces (SMF) in 1991-93, told RIA Novosti on Thursday.

The general added that the preliminary tests of the missile were underway, but refused to provide details on its performance characteristics.

According to open sources, the SMF currently operates at least 58 silo-based SS-18 Satan ballistic missiles, 160 road-mobile Topol (SS-25 Sickle) missile systems, 50 silo-based and 18 road-mobile Topol-M (SS-27 Sickle B) systems, and 18 RS-24 Yars systems.

Two missile divisions have been fully rearmed with Topol-M and Yars systems, while the rearmament of three more divisions will start later this year, according to SMF.

The SMF will also deploy in the near future a new automated battle management system (ASBU), which will allow rapid retargeting of ICBMs.

Russia to Deploy New ICBM in 2014

Russia will deploy its newest medium-weight solid-fuel intercontinental ballistic missile in 2014, a military source told RIA Novosti on Wednesday.

Previously, Strategic Missile Forces (RSVN) commander Sergei Karakayev said Russia would deploy such a weapon only in 2015.

"According to the latest information, it will be accepted into service in 2014; the new weapon is part of a response program to the United States ballistic missile defense program," the source said, without naming the new system.

The Strategic Missile Forces test-fired a prototype of the new weapon in October from the Kapustin Yar test range, he said. "This was a test launch as part of combined state trials," he said, adding the weapon will be formally accepted only after completion of those trials.

The new weapon will be primarily based on mobile launchers, he said. "So far there has been no decision on whether to base them in silos," he added.

The missile will have intercontinental range, or more than 3,500 miles (5,500 kilometers), he said.