Efficiency of Russian weapons was proved by fight against terrorism, for example, in Syria, Russian President Vladimir Putin said on Wednesday, adding that the analysis of practical use of defense technologies would improve the quality of military equipment.
MOSCOW (Sputnik) – The president added that Russian military equipment was used for humanitarian purposes – for example to demine the liberated cities of Aleppo and Palmyra and to neutralize terrorists’ chemical weapons. Putin pointed at the efficiency of mobile medical complexes and other Russian military products.
"The capabilities of Russian weapons, their reliability and efficiency are seen in the fight against terrorism in Syria, counteracting terrorism in the entire Middle East region. Using aircraft and air defense systems in the real combat situation provides air and engineer staff, air defense crews as well as developers of Russian military production with absolutely priceless experience. I want to thank them for their active work and prompt reaction to the remarks emerging during the use of military vehicles," Putin said at the session of the Commission for Military Technology Cooperation.
Putin also called for analyzing the usage of military technologies and improving methods of military training.
"Such an approach will also promote the development of ties in the system of military technology cooperation, increasing the quality of the country’s military products," he added.
Russia launched its military operation in Syria on September 30, 2015, at the request of the Syrian government.
NB - It should be noted that what Russia calls Efficiency and targeted bombing is commonly referred to by Civilised Nations as Carpet Bombing!
The Russian military says Ilya Gorbunov, 19, died when a tank he was driving rolled off a bridge. His sister says that a soldier from her brother's unit said Ilya died after being locked in a tank and suffocating.
At 10 a.m. on February 17, Russian draftee Arkady B. jumped out of a third-story window of his barracks outside Moscow. Doctors say it was a miracle that he survived, with multiple compression fractures, a concussion, and other injuries. They are optimistic that Arkady, who asked not to be identified for this article, will walk again after a few months of rehabilitation.
"They were squeezing money out of me," Arkady told RFE/RL. "They wanted 110,000 rubles ($1,860). Supposedly some things went missing -- a tent, some shoes, some sort of spare parts. They found a naïve idiot and pressured me hard."
Arkady's mother, Natasha, told RFE/RL that he had repeatedly reported widespread extortion in his unit to his division psychologist, but no action was taken.
"He called home several times and complained about the extortion," Natasha said. "He called on the 10th, 11th, and 12th of February, saying that if he didn't come up with 110,000 rubles, they would either put him in prison or force him to sign up for a stint as a volunteer soldier. He couldn't take the pressure, so he jumped out a window."
Arkady's story is hardly unique. Although the Russian government does not release statistics on crime in the military, reports of suicides and suspicious deaths in the armed forces are depressingly common. According to government figures, cases of extortion overall more than doubled between 2015 and 2016, and rights activists say cases inside the military are also on the rise.
"Violence and extortion haven't gone anywhere in the military," Sergei Krivenko, head of the Citizen And The Army NGO and a member of Russia's Human Rights Council, said. "But the form of these things has changed. Hazing as a day-to-day form of control by senior soldiers over recruits has been superseded by a system where violence is determined on ethnic grounds or by region of origin. The point of the violence now is not maintaining some sort of discipline but the extraction of money."
Denis Khamidullin, 19, died on March 7 at his military unit outside Yekaterinburg. The military provided no details on his death, which was ruled a suicide. His family says he regularly asked for money.
Though the Russian Defense Ministry remains silent on such incidents, Citizen And The Army's most recent semiannual report, covering the second half of 2016, provides glimpses into the closed world of the Russian military.
-- On July 28, a soldier died when he fell from a barracks window in the Kaliningrad region. The incident is under investigation.
-- On the night of August 4-5, a soldier in the Novosibirsk region was found dead from hanging, a suspected suicide.
-- On August 8, the body of an 18-year-old soldier was found in a St. Petersburg cemetery about 10 kilometers away from his unit. The case is under investigation.
-- On September 26, a soldier was found hanged near Bryansk. His mother reportedly received an SMS from him four days earlier asking for money. His body was reportedly bruised, with two broken ribs.
-- On October 17, the body of a soldier was discovered in Amur Oblast. He had been shot dead and, officially, the incident was ruled a suicide.
-- On November 19, a 26-year-old lieutenant was stabbed to death in Volgograd by a soldier over a "conflict about money."
-- On December 27, an 18-year-old soldier was found hanged in a shower near Dzherzhinsk. The incident was ruled a suicide, although the body was scratched and bruised.
Activists estimate there are 200 to 300 such suspicious incidents in the Russian military each year.
Many of these cases are connected with extortion, Krivenko said.
"Extortion within military units has been on the rise in recent times," he said. "Many connections between soldiers have literally turned into money relationships: 'If you don't want a particular duty, pay. If you want to make a phone call home, pay.' And it must be understood that these crimes are, as a rule, unreported. Many soldiers are afraid to complain, thinking it will only make things worse. Very often, information about extortion only comes out during the investigation of other crimes."
After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the military fell on hard times, with massive reductions and spending cuts, as well as a sharp loss of social prestige. Hazing, or dedovshchina, was rampant, often with fatal results. Under Russian President Vladimir Putin, the military's budget has been sharply increased. The state has prioritized upgrading the military's equipment and the creation of volunteer, contract-based units.
Hazing, in its pure form, has been on the decline, but extortion has become "the norm" in the military, says Veronika Marchenko, an activist with the NGO Mother's Rights.
"The vast majority of these crimes go unreported and taking a case to court is extremely hard," Marchenko said. "The soldiers are afraid to complain, preferring just to pay in the hope that they will then be left to serve out their term in peace. But then their parents get their sons back in a zinc coffin. And when we investigate these cases, either we learn that either the soldier was driven to take his own life or it was a murder that was covered up to look like a suicide. Very often, the root of these tragedies is extortion as draftees are squeezed for money."
In many cases, the ultimate culprits are officers, extorting money from soldiers either for their own benefit or to purchase things for their unit. Aleksandr Gorbachyov, a lawyer with the Committee of Soldiers' Mothers in St. Petersburg, told RFE/RL that officers often use collective discipline among soldiers to pressure recalcitrant recruits.
"The soldiers, as a rule, pay, of course," Gorbachyov said. "There are those who don't pay, but they have problems with their units because resistance is collectively punished -- for instance, by denial of permission to call home or by depriving them of sleep."
On February 6, 19-year-old Ilya Gorbunov died at his military unit outside of Moscow after just three months of service. According to military officials, Gorbunov died from injuries suffered when a tank he was driving rolled off a bridge. The incident aroused suspicion because no other soldiers were reported injured, although the T-80 tank should have a crew of three. In addition, Gorbunov's sister said her brother had no driving license or experience.
Ilya Gorbunov had repeatedly contacted his family by SMS, seeking money
Maria Gorbunova told RFE/RL that her brother had contacted her repeatedly in the days before his death asking for money.
"First, he called and asked if we could quickly sell his share in our apartment," she said. "An officer supposedly lost 58,000 rubles and, Ilya said, they were making the four soldierswho were on duty at the time pay the money back. He said he had to give his portion immediately."
Gorbunova said Ilya told her that he was beaten regularly along with another soldier who reportedly suffocated to death in a storage closet in January.
"Another SMS from Ilya was asking for money that he needed to pay for a notebook computer that disappeared from his unit," Gorbunova said. "We immediately sent him 18,500 rubles. But that money didn't save him in the end."
She says a soldier from her brother's unit told her Ilya had been severely beaten by three other soldiers and locked in a tank. When they went to let him out three hours later, he was dead.
"Ilya is the third soldier to die in that unit since the beginning of the year," Gorbunova said.
On March 7, 19-year-old Denis Khamidullin died at his military unit outside Yekaterinburg with only two months left to serve. Officially, his death was ruled a suicide, although the military provided no details.
His family says he regularly asked for money. In November, he sought 5,000 rubles and in February, 2,000 rubles more.
"He spoke to his sister several times in January and February," Khamidullin's mother, Dina Khamidullina told RFE/RL."'I have such problems, if you only knew,' he told her. But she hid that from me."
"We spoke to him for the last time on March 7," she said. "We were cut off, but I didn't bother calling back. I figured I'd talk to him again. But there was no 'again.'"
The Kaliningrad Oblast is a federal subject of Russia. Situated on the Baltic Coast, it is surrounded by Poland and Lithuania, two NATO members.
Formerly known as Könisberg, Kaliningrad was annexed by the Soviet Union on April 7, 1946. With more than 963,000 people, Kaliningrad is one of Russia’s best-performing regional economies.
Its geographical location is ideal for an early warning system to monitor NATO movements.
Kaliningrad’s Geopolitical Situation
Surrounded by Poland and Lithuania, the Kaliningrad Oblast has no direct ground links back to Russia’s mainland. Kaliningrad is also the only Russian Baltic Sea Port that enables the Baltic Fleet to operate in the region on a year-round basis.
The Kaliningrad Oblast is a federal subject of Russia. Situated on the Baltic Coast, it is surrounded by Poland and Lithuania, two NATO members.
Formerly known as Könisberg, Kaliningrad was annexed by the Soviet Union on April 7, 1946. With more than 963,000 people, Kaliningrad is one of Russia’s best-performing regional economies.
Its geographical location is ideal for an early warning system to monitor NATO movements.
Due to the proximity of almost every European NATO member, Kaliningrad is ideal to have an early warning system: the Voronezh radar.
However, Kaliningrad is not ideal to mobilize troops for offensive operations due to its geographical position. The logistical issues would be far too great for Russia to even consider deploying an offensive force to the region.
The Baltic Fleet’s Marines are able to launch seaborne operations, but it would be very unlikely due to its small size.
Nevertheless, the adjacency of NATO members makes it ideal for defensive purposes and provide Russia with a strong foothold in the Baltic Sea.
The presence of the Baltic Fleet is also one of the main reasons behind the strategic importance of Kaliningrad. According to the Ministry of Defence of the Russian Federation: “The main tasks of the Baltic Fleet are as follows:
• to protect economic zone and production regions, suppression of illegal production activities; • to ensure safety of navigation; • to fulfil foreign policy acts of the Government in economically important regions of the World Ocean (visits, ships business visits, joint exercises, peacekeeping missions, etc.)”
Kaliningrad remains one of the most vital regions for Russia’s defence against NATO. The military installations in Kaliningrad would most likely be NATO’s first targets if there was a total war against Russia.
The destruction of the Voronezh radar station would greatly weakened Russia’s ability to counter NATO attacks thus making it a target of choice.
Voronezh Radar In Kaliningrad
Based at the former Dnuyavka air base, the Pionersky Radar Station operates a Voronezh radar system. The radar was built in Kaliningrad to counter NATO’s missile defence systems and enable Russia to keep their nuclear weapons operational.
NATO is putting a lot of emphasis on this missile system to deter the launches of intercontinental ballistic missiles by Russia’s Strategic Nuclear Forces against their members.
The radar was deemed operational in 2014 and can cover more than 6,000 km, enough to keep Europe and part of the Atlantic Ocean under permanent surveillance. The Voronezh-DM can also simultaneously track more than 500 objects.
Due to its vulnerability, the radar site is most likely guarded by anti-aircraft systems such as the S-300 and the S-400 Triumf.
Anti-Aircraft In Kaliningrad
Surrounded by NATO countries, the Kaliningrad military installations need a solid anti-aircraft capability.
With NATO aircraft able to quickly reach the Kaliningrad military installations and ports, Russia has no choice but to deploy many anti-aircraft surface-to-air (SAM) missiles.
Russian S-300 and S-400 long-range surface-to-air missile systems are the weapons of choice to counter enemy aircraft. Capable of reaching 400 km with a 40N6 missile, both missile systems can be quickly deployed—under 5 minutes—and engage incoming enemy aircraft.
It is vital for Russia to keep the S-300 and S-400 long-range surface-to-air missile systems operational to protect the Voronezh radar installation in Pionersky. Due to its mobility, both systems can also be deployed anywhere in the Kaliningrad Oblast to counter enemy aircraft.
Russian Armed Forces In Kaliningrad
The Russian Armed Forces have different types of units deployed all over the Kaliningrad Oblast. Due to its strategic importance, Russia keeps a strong permanent military presence in the Oblast to give them a capable defensive force.
Troops stationed in Kaliningrad are under the command of the Western Military District. According to Wikipedia, the Ground and Coastal Forces of the Baltic Fleet is mainly comprised of:
HQ: Kaliningrad
7th Independent Guards Motorized Rifle Regiment (Kaliningrad) (formerly known as the 1st Guards Motor Rifle Division)
22nd Independent Air Defence Regiment. Not clear which missiles this regiment is equipped with. However it was announced in 2011 that two divisions (batteries) of new S-400 Ground-to-Air Missile systems will join the Baltic Fleet.[24]
73rd Independent Bridge Battalion.
254th Independent Radio Battalion (electronic intelligence gathering)
Other small units
The ground troops are mainly conducting defensive operations. However, the 336th Independent Guards Marine Brigade can be deployed to conduct seaborne operations. The 71st Order of the Red Star Landing Ship Brigade provide the Marines with landing ships and two air-cushioned landing crafts.
In fact, the 336th could launch offensive operations against Copenhagen, Denmark’s capital. However, this is very unlikely and would start a total war between NATO and Russia.
The Russian Baltic Fleet is permanently headquartered in Kaliningrad. In 2015, 3 submarines and 55 warships are under the Baltic Fleet’s command. The main naval port is Baltiysk and a second port is also in Kronstadt, located in the Gulf of Finland.
The Baltic Fleet’s Kilo-class submarines are known to lurk around Latvia’s territorial waters. However, the Russian submarines stay in the international waters, which is perfectly legal.
The 128th Surface ship Brigade is the largest formation of the Baltic Fleet. Composed of anti-submarine and anti-surface warfare warships, the 128th is the first line of defence of the Russian Navy against NATO warships.
The Future Of Kaliningrad
Russia is slowly deploying new Iskander missiles to Kaliningrad. The Iskander missile is a tactical weapon and can be launched up to 500 km. It could be employed as a pre-emptive strike weapon to disrupt enemy forces on the borders of Kaliningrad.
The Baltic Fleet will most likely receive new ships in the near future, especially to conduct littoral operations. Having said that, the Baltic Fleet is one of the most important fleets of the Russian Navy due to its geographical location.
As for ground troops, I think an additional motorized rifle brigade could be deployed to Kaliningrad to provide a quick reaction force in case of a NATO attack.
Tensions between Russia and NATO are quickly escalating and we’re on the verge of a new Cold War. Nevertheless, a total war between Russia and NATO is highly unlikely. Russia will continue to mass troops on their borders and launch aerial reconnaissance mission around NATO airspaces.
Although more large-scale drills will be conducted to test the Russian Armed Forces readiness, Russia will also focus on keeping its fleets fully operational. The Russian Navy, especially the Baltic Fleet, is vital for them to gain more influence on the world stage and having a strong presence in their waterways.
As for Kaliningrad, I believe Russia will fortify the region while pouring money to further stimulate the thriving regional economy.
Russia’s Defense Ministry And Vladimir Putin Responsible for MH17 Crash
On February 24, 2016 Bellingcat has released its new report on the Russian anti-aircraft missile brigade that, as Bellingcat analysts assume, provided and possibly operated the Buk that downed MH17 on June 17, 2014.
From June 23 to 25, 2014, Russia’s 53rd Anti-Aircraft Missile Brigade transported several Buk-M1 anti-aircraft missile systems to areas near the Russia-Ukraine border. It is possible to trace the 53rd Brigade’s journey from its base in Kursk, Russia to near the Russia-Ukraine border. One of the Buks from the convoy was quite similar to the Buk seen in Donetsk, Ukraine on the day of the tragedy.
According to the report, the 53rd Anti-Aircraft Missile Brigade has transferred the Buk-M1 to the militants. Besides, it is most likely that Buk operators belonged to the brigade as well.
The third section of the report, “Soldiers of the 53rd Anti-Aircraft Missile Brigade,” details the soldiers within the 53rd Brigade and the information provided by their public postings on social media. The soldiers of the 2nd Battalion provided a wealth of information, including photographs and written notes, describing their time on the Russia-Ukraine border in June and July, 2014. More extensive details are provided regarding the soldiers who were normally responsible for the Buk missile launcher numbered 222, which was replaced by Buk 3×2, which we believe downed MH17.
The final and most important section, “Commanders of the 53rd Anti-Aircraft Missile Brigade,” provides extensive information regarding the leadership structure of the brigade and battalion that provided and possibly operated the likely murder weapon in the downing of MH17.
“We provide partially anonymized information regarding 14 officers of the 2nd Battalion of the 53rd Brigade, including the commanders of the Buk unit vehicles within the battalion. Sergey Borisovich Muchkaev, the commander of the 53rd Anti-Aircraft Missile Brigade, is closely detailed, along with his superiors, including Aleksey Zolotov of the Air Defense of the 20th Guards Army and Andrey Kokhanov of the Air Defense of the Western Military District”, analysts report.
According to the report, the responsibility for the downing of MH17 from a weapon provided and possibly operated by the Russian military lies with the Ministry of Defense and the Supreme Commander of the Russian Armed Forces, President Vladimir Putin.
As previously reported, on February 24 Bellingcat was supposed to release report on Russia’s 53rd Anti-Aircraft Missile Brigade, which, Bellingcat believes, is responsible for providing the Buk-M1 system that downed MH17.
Although attention is naturally focused on the role of Russia’s conventional forces in the Ukraine conflict , we should not overlook the modernization of the country’s nuclear forces. The last few years has seen Moscow make great progress in stabilizing Russia’s decaying nuclear arsenal. The Russian government considers its nuclear weapons as its best tool of defense, deterrence, and global influence– essential for protecting Russia against external aggression and for preserving its great power status.
Despite recent improvements in Russia’s conventional forces and Russian mastery of the art of non-kinetic hybrid warfare techniques, Moscow continues to invest enormous sums in reviving its nuclear capabilities, which suffered financial and other problems following the end of the Cold War. Nonetheless, Russia’s nuclear buildup will continue to face major challenges in coming years and present risks to other countries.
Systems
In determining their nuclear arsenal, Russian policy makers employ an expansive force-sizing principle, in which Russian nuclear forces must be able to counter the combined arsenal of all other nuclear weapons states . Due to this demanding mission and the weight of the Soviet legacy, the structure and composition of Russia’s current nuclear forces strongly resemble the force that it inherited at the end of the Cold War. Russia continues to maintain a strategic triad of land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), strategic submarines (SSBN) with long-range sea-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), and long-range bombers equipped with short-range nuclear-armed missiles and gravity bombs. Many of these have multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicles (MIRVs) for carrying more than one warhead as well as decoys and other penetration aids. Russia has also retained many smaller tactical nuclear weapons that it inherited from the Soviet period and is developing its own strategic defenses even as it criticizes U.S. missile defenses as destabilizing.
The ICBMs of Russia’s Strategic Missile Forces (SMF) have historically represented the mainstay of the country’s strategic deterrent. Russia’s more than three hundred ICBMs can carry approximately 1,000 warheads. Since Russia’s operational ICBMs are on average 30-40 years old, many have reached the end of their service lives and are being decommissioned. Moscow is currently in the process of retiring all of its Soviet-era ICBMs (the SS-18, the SS-19, and the single warhead SS-25) and replacing them with systems built and increasingly designed in the years following the Cold War, such as the Topol-M (SS-27) and the multi-warhead RS-24 Yars. At present, the SMF fleet is split roughly equally between the two generations, but in another decade all of Russia’s strategic missiles will be post-Soviet. Russia is expected to begin production soon of a new 100-ton ICBM, known as Sarmat, to replace the SS-18. Like the SS-18, the Sarmat will be a heavy ICBM using liquid fuel, based in hardened fixed silos, and capable of carrying ten MIRVs.
The future of Russia’s sea-based nuclear deterrent rests with the fourth-generation Project Mk 955 Borey- class nuclear-powered SSBN and its new RSM-56 Bulava SLBM, a combination designed as the foundation of Russia’s maritime nuclear triad through at least the 2040s. The first two Borey-class SSBNs, the Yuri Dolgoruky and the Aleksandr Nevsky, joined the fleet last year. However, their entry, and those of the other six planned Bereys, has been repeatedly delayed due to problems with the Bulava missile. About half of the missile’s 19 test launches have failed, sometimes spectacularly. After an overhaul of the missile’s production process in 2009, the flight test program had a pair of successful launches in 2010–2011, leading to a decision to put it into serial production. However, the Bulava failed its 20th flight test in September 2013, reawakening doubts about the system’s reliability and delaying the entry of further Borey-class submarines into the fleet. Russia now plans to resume testing of the Bulava missile in late 2014. The new Borey strategic submarines are desperately needed to replace the current fleet of three Project 667BDR Kalmar (NATO: Delta III ) and six Project 667BDRM Delfin (NATO: Delta IV ) strategic submarines. The Navy is preparing to decommission the Delta IIIs, while modernizing the Delta IVs, to extend their service lives for another 10-15 years.
Russia’s strategic bomber fleet remains the weakest leg of its offensive strategic triad. It consists almost exclusively of Soviet-manufactured platforms capable of launching long-range air-launched cruise missiles (ALCMs) armed with nuclear warheads. The Long-range Aviation Command has 55 turboprop Tu-95MS (NATO-designated “Bear”) heavy bombers built in the 1950s and 11 swing-wing supersonic jet Tu-160 “Blackjack” bombers, nicknamed “White Swans” by their pilots. The Blackjacks are being modernized to extend their service lives. For example, they are receiving NK-32 engines, which will last longer than their original engines. The upgrades will also enable the planes to use gravity bombs as well as conventionally armed cruise missiles. The Russian government also plans to build a new strategic bomber before the end of this decade. This new bomber, codenamed PAK DA, will likely carry a new long-range nuclear-armed cruise missile, the Kh-102, which is currently under development. Like its U.S. counterparts, the future bomber will probably also have the capacity to conduct non-nuclear strikes with several types of conventional weapons.
Challenges
Although Russia has more than enough nuclear warheads and constituent components, it has nevertheless encountered problems deploying adequate numbers of strategic delivery platforms. Since the breakup of the Soviet Union, Russian defense enterprises have manufactured considerably fewer strategic ballistic missiles than required to replace the country’s aging land- and sea-based strategic deterrents. As a result, the mass decommissioning of Soviet-era ICBMs (with as many as ten warheads each) and their replacement by only a small number of single-warhead ICBMs, has resulted in a precipitous decline in the relative contribution of Russia’s land-based missiles to the offensive strategic triad, at least measured in terms of warheads.
One way Russia is trying to compensate for the diminished size of its ICBM fleet is to improve the other two legs of its strategic nuclear triad. In particular, the Russian government has devoted vast resources to revitalizing the sea-based leg of its nuclear deterrent, lavishing attention on the Borey-Bulava combination. For political and military leaders who have traditionally relied on land-based ICBMs for most of their country’s strategic nuclear warheads, however, Russia’s growing dependence on its more vulnerable submarines and bombers must arouse a certain degree of anxiety.
Moscow is trying to counter this trend by increasing the number of warheads it places on each remaining ICBM. The plans to rebuild the land-based ICBM fleet by deploying more MIRV-ed systems should help limit the speed with which the number of warheads on Russia’s ICBMs fall, but at the cost of crisis stability. Placing more warheads on a fewer number of strategic systems increases the incentives for its adversaries to strike first in any crisis with the objective of destroying Russia’s limited number of MIRV-ed systems before they have launched and released their individual warheads, which exponentially increases the number of targets the defender needs to destroy. Russia also has a strong incentive to launch its MIRV-ed missiles in a crisis rather than risk losing such a concentrated target of warheads to a U.S. first strike.
To cut costs and facilitate maintenance and training, the Russian military is seeking to reduce the types of delivery systems it has in each leg of the offensive triad. Instead of half a dozen ICBMs and SLBMs, the military is developing and producing a pair of each delivery systems. But the decision to reduce the variety of nuclear delivery platforms in service has already created crises whenever one type has experienced production (e.g., the Topol-M) or development (e.g., the Bulava) problems. The reduction in the types of nuclear warheads creates comparable risks from the failure of a particular warhead design.
Russia’s smaller number of ICBMs would also make it easier for a strategic defense system to target and destroy them. Russian missile designers have tried to make their systems less vulnerable to BMD systems by making their launchers mobile (so that their launch location and flight path is less predictable); having the missiles cut or drop their engines as soon as possible to reduce their infrared signature; giving missiles auxiliary engines or using maneuverable warheads, which are much harder to intercept than those flying a simple ballistic trajectory; applying stealth coatings to warheads that reduce their heat and electromagnetic signature to sensors; and making the decoys’ flight path in outer space closely resemble those of their warheads. Nevertheless, the capabilities, efficacy, and availability of these new technologies and tactics remain uncertain.
Through its enormous spending to modernize Russia’s nuclear forces, the Putin administration looks likely to stabilize the size of the force in coming years as well as replace its Soviet-era weapons systems. Nevertheless, the weakening Russian economy and the government’s plans to spend more on conventional forces by, for example, buying more expensive precision-guided munitions for the army and air force, could further reduce the resources available for modernizing Russia’s nuclear arsenal. The Russian government appears prepared to rebalance its funding in coming years and devote more resources on conventional forces and other priorities. The Kremlin is reluctant to cut social spending in such a volatile political situation, even to boost defense spending, and now needs to devote enormous funds to integrating Crimea into the Russian Federation. The sanctions the Western governments imposed on Russia for its aggression in Ukraine are hurting its overall growth prospects and could disrupt Moscow’s nuclear modernization since factories in Ukraine were key components of the Soviet military-industrial complex.
Russia announced plans Tuesday to bolster its navy with more advanced weapons in response to NATO's vow to halt the Kremlin's push into Ukraine and feared expansion into eastern Europe.
Defence Minister Sergei Shoigu told a general security meeting that he expected to hear a detailed report from Russia's navy commander about how this could be achieved efficiently over the coming six years.
"These proposals must ensure that our forces are reequipped with modern weapons and military equipment," Russian news agencies quoted Shoigu as saying.
The new strategy "must also improve the operational readiness of Russian naval forces in locations posing the greatest strategic threat," said Shoigu.
"I will not hide that this in large part is linked to events of recent months," he said in reference to the pro-Russian insurgency convulsing eastern Ukraine.
NATO and the United States have both stepped up air defences of former Soviet satellites that are growing increasingly wary of Russia's military ambitions and see President Vladimir Putin as a fast-emerging threat.
US President Barack Obama unveiled a $1 billion security plan for eastern Europe during a June visit to Poland that is aimed at helping countries on Russia's western periphery build more modern armies.
And outgoing NATO chief Anders Fogh Rasmussen expressed concern last week that Putin's ambitions went "beyond Ukraine" and now covered a Russian-speaking region of ex-Soviet Moldova and two separatist parts of the small Caucasus nation of Georgia -- both now closely allied with the European Union.
Russian news reports did not immediately outline what proposal Shoigu and the navy command had in mind.
The Defence Academy of the United Kingdom -- the official post-graduate school for the British military's higher command -- said Russia's current plan through 2020 that Shoigu wants to update is focused on the development of nuclear-powered submarines and aircraft carriers.
France has irritated the United States by pushing through plans to deliver two Mistral-class helicopter carriers that Russia wants to station in Ukraine's seized Crimea peninsula and near a string of disputed islands claimed by Japan.
- 'Major problems with readiness'-
Russia has only one functioning aircraft carrier that was first commissioned in the Soviet era and has been lacking the money and know-how to develop a more modern class.
The 10 active carriers available to the United States have posed one of the biggest obstacles to Putin's hopes of countering Washington's global domination with a new alliance between the Kremlin and nations such as China.
Putin promised ahead of his 2012 third-term election to nearly double Russia's military spending over the coming decade to 23 trillion rubles ($635 billion, 475 billion euros).
But Russia's current economic downturn has seriously threatened those plans.
The defence ministry's attempts in the past two years to procure new weapons from its huge network of defence production facilities were hampered by the discovery that plants simply lacked the technology to churn out modern weapons in any significant quantity.
The Defence Academy of the United Kingdom notes that Russia's "industrial base... remains a significant area of concern".
"The Russian navy continues to have major problems with readiness and the quality of both personnel and equipment."
Shoigu said that Russia's recent attempts to improve procurement by awarding contracts to outside companies had also failed to live up to expectations.
"Outsourcing did not become the universal method of ensuring the Russian army's needs," Shoigu told the security meeting.
"We therefore must reform the existing system of providing for the armed forces."
More than 400 Russian servicemen are taking part in the coastal artillery exercises of the Russian Baltic Fleet in Kaliningrad Region, which involve over 60 units of combat equipment, the fleet’s press service reported Monday.
“The purpose of the exercises is to improve the crews’ combat skills, the artillery units’ teamwork abilities, and the commanders’ practical skills in organizing offensive and defensive operations. Crew members will go through all stages of combat training, from individual prep work to joint tasks,” the press service said in a message.
The servicemen participating in the artillery exercises are to complete over 100 training tasks by the end of September. Artillery crews are to operate equipment that includes Giatsint field guns, Grad multiple rocket launcher systems, and self-propelled mobile artillery weapons such as the 2S9 Nona mortar and the 2S1 Gvozdika howitzer. Special attention is to be paid to the training of junior commanders. About 70 percent of the servicemen involved in the Baltic Fleet artillery exercises joined the Russian military as part of the spring 2014 conscription group.
The Baltic Fleet’s main base is in the city of Baltiysk, located in Kaliningrad Region, Russia’s Baltic exclave. The fleet, which is of high strategic importance to Russia, includes a division of surface ships, a brigade of diesel-powered submarines, auxiliary vessels, naval aviation, coastal troops, combat service support and special support units
Refitting Soviet-era warships, fielding new aircraft and tanks and seeking new overseas bases, the Russian military — which now has troops on alert amidst a crisis in Ukraine — is more potent than the force that briefly fought Georgia six years ago.
Moscow is seriously investing in building its clout. Since 2008, it has raised military spending by almost a third and drastically reformed both the armed forces and defense industry to tackle post-Cold War decay.
But Russian forces remain much weaker than at their Soviet peak and face huge problems ranging from corruption to a long-term shortage of recruits, not to mention the risk of insurgency if they set foot in Ukraine.
Moscow denies any direct link between the surprise military drills announced Wednesday and Ukraine, where largely pro-Western demonstrators ousted President Viktor Yanukovych, an ally of Russian leader Vladimir Putin, last weekend.
Nevertheless, the decision to put 150,000 troops on high alert along with jet fighters on Russia’s Western borders — where Ukraine lies — raised memories of Putin’s invasion of Georgia. Moscow’s expressions of concern for the safety of Russian citizens in Ukraine have also used similar language to statements that preceded the Georgian campaign.
In that five-day war, Russian troops evicted their Georgian counterparts from the disputed regions of South Ossetia and Abkhazia. But the outdated forces suffered losses at the hands of the sometimes more technically advanced, Western-equipped Georgians, prompting soul-searching and criticism in Moscow.
According to some accounts, three of the four Russian aircraft lost were downed by their own side.
The International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) in London estimates defense spending rose 31 percent between 2008 and 2013 to $68.2 billion. Russia is now firmly established as the world’s third-largest military spender, behind the U.S. and China, and the chaos under former President Boris Yeltsin, who stood down in 1999 to make way for Putin, is a thing of the past.
“There is a sense in the broader U.S. political discussion that Russia is still the basket case military of the Yeltsin era, but that is wrong,” said Elbridge Colby, a former Pentagon official and now fellow at the Center for a New American Security. “(It) is not the Red Army of the 1970s, but it has made considerable strides.”
While Russian officials say Moscow will not intervene in Ukraine, many Western analysts are skeptical about their assertions that the exercises are not linked to the crisis in the former Soviet republic. Russia’s saber-rattling, they say, is another sign of its military confidence.
“There is certainly an element of intimidation to it,” said Dmitry Gorenburg, Russia specialist at the U.S. government-funded Center for Naval Analyses. “They have put a great deal of effort into military reforms since Georgia, and some of it has worked. They probably do have a greater ability to intervene in Ukraine than they did then — it’s not that big a step up.”
While any actual invasion could initially succeed, he said Moscow might struggle in the face of a resultant insurgency. A more limited operation in majority Russian-speaking Crimea — already home to Russia’s Black Sea Fleet — could prove more achievable but is also seen as unlikely for now.
Russia says it is ready to work with the West on resolving the crisis but the interests of all Ukrainians must be taken into account. It accuses the new leaders in Kiev of violating a Western-backed peace deal and ignoring the interests of Russian-speakers.
The war games, scheduled to last from Friday until next week, are not the first of their kind. In September, the Zapad-13 exercise in Belarus saw 10,000 Russian troops deployed along the border with the Baltic states, former Soviet republics that now belong to the European Union. Another surprise exercise last July in Russia’s east involved 160,000 troops and was seen as a reminder that Moscow also remains nervous about its border with China.
Both exercises involved a level of activity that Russian forces would have been incapable of even five years ago, analysts say.
Russia is also asserting itself on the world stage. While its ability to send the army much beyond former Soviet borders seems limited, its warships have increased operations in the Arctic, Pacific, Baltic and Atlantic while returning to a near-permanent presence in the Indian Ocean and Mediterranean for the first time in years. Russian long-range bombers are again periodically probing NATO airspace.
On Wednesday, Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu said Moscow is planning to expand its presence outside its borders with new military bases in a number of countries.
How viable these plans might be is unclear.
Since Georgia, Russia has abolished its cumbersome structure of undermanned divisions designed to fight on massive European fronts, replacing them with much more flexible smaller brigades and reducing the size of its officer corps by a third.
Its armaments industry was reorganized into a small number of largely state-owned firms, while Moscow promised that by 2020, 70 percent of its military equipment will be modernized. It has also partnered French manufacturers in building helicopter carriers, other European firms on ground vehicles and Israeli specialists on unmanned drones.
According to IISS, Russia now operates one aircraft carrier, five cruisers, 18 destroyers, nine frigates and 82 coastal warships as well as 64 submarines — 11 carrying ballistic missiles. Its air force is believed to have about 1,400 combat-capable aircraft.
IISS estimates Russia has 845,000 military personnel, with a largely theoretical reserve of 2 million with recent military service.
How much further the military will grow is also unclear. Corruption remains a serious problem. Demographics are also not going Russia’s way.
Still, “Moscow’s armed forces have already accomplished the organizational transition from mass mobilization army to modern combat force,” the German Institute for International and Security Affairs said in a January report. “Greater military muscle flexing must be expected.”
Russia’s
Navy is expected to receive 40 new warships and auxiliary vessels in 2014, a
high-ranking official said Friday.
In addition to surface ships of various classes, the navy
will also commission the third Borey-class nuclear powered ballistic missile
submarine, the Vladimir Monomakh, and a Varshavyanka-class diesel electric
submarine, Rear Admiral Viktor Bursuk, a deputy commander of the Russian navy,
said.
Bursuk, who oversees weapons procurement for the navy, said
that Russia
will continue the repair and overhaul of the Admiral Nakhimov nuclear-powered
missile cruiser and three nuclear-powered attack submarines this year.
The Kirov-class cruiser, known as the Kalinin
until 1992, was commissioned in 1989 and mothballed in 1999. It has since been
docked for upgrades at the Sevmash shipyard in the northern Russian city of Severodvinsk,
on the White Sea.
The Admiral Nakhimov is expected to rejoin the Russian navy
in 2018 with the most advanced weapons systems for its vessel type, the Sevmash
shipyard said in June last year.
Auxiliary ships to be commissioned by the end of 2014
include the Igor Belousov, an advanced search-and-rescue ship designed to boost
the navy’s ability to rescue submarines and ships in distress, Bursuk said.
The lead vessel in a new class of patrol ships was laid down in
a ceremony at Russia’s Zelenodolsky
shipyard Wednesday, the builder said in a statement.
The Vasily Bykov will be the first diesel-powered Project 22160
patrol ship and is planned to feature a helicopter landing pad on its aft deck,
according to the Severnoye Design Bureau, the vessel's designer.
The 1,300-ton ship will have a range of 6,000 nautical miles and
be armed with a single 57mm cannon, heavy machine guns, air defense systems and
optional missile launchers.
“This ship is a vessel of a new generation, built according to
modular principles,” Cpt. of the First Rank Igor Dygalo said.
Dygalo explained that owing to its modular design the ship could
be re-tasked in short order to perform a range of duties.
The new class is intended for economic zone patrol,
search-and-rescue operations, anti-piracy and anti-smuggling activities,
environmental monitoring, as well as coastal defense and escort service,
according to the shipyard’s statement.
A navy spokesperson said that six ships of the class are
expected to be built by 2019.
A new advanced fighter jet prototype has been delivered to
the Russian Air Force for testing, the manufacturer said Friday.
The first T-50 “stealth” fighter had been delivered to a
military airfield in Russia’s
southern Astrakhan region for test
flights, the Sukhoi company said in a statement.
The chief air force commander, Lt. Gen. Viktor Bondarev,
said in December that combat squadrons could expect deliveries of the
production version, known by its Russian acronym PAK-FA for future tactical
fighter aircraft, in 2016 at the latest.
The PAK-FA is slated to replace the country’s aging fleet of
Soviet-era fighter jets.
The Sukhoi T-50 is a fifth-generation fighter jet and
features a stealth profile with internal weapons bays for air and ground-attack
weapons, thrust-vectoring engines for high-acceleration turns and an ability
known as supercruise to fly supersonic without the use of a fuel-guzzling
afterburner.
An export version, called the fifth-generation fighter
aircraft (FGFA), is also under development in a joint project with India
for that country’s air force.
Experts consider the plane comparable to the only
fifth-generation fighter currently in operation worldwide, the American F-22
Raptor, which entered service in 2005.
The Moscow-based Sukhoi has been conducting its own test
flights of several of the aircraft since 2010, including in-flight refueling
and high-agility maneuvers. The company said in October that these had produced
favorable results.
Striking changes have started taking place in Russia’s Armed
Forces after Sergei Shoigu took over as defense minister. For example,
last week the military posted what had until then been top-secret data
online, specifically the nation’s Army and Navy development and building
plans until 2020.
Truth be told, this didn’t happen overnight, but had been preceded by
a discussion of those plans at a Board meeting of the Defense Ministry.
The meeting reviewed the results of a surprise inspection of the air forces' combat readiness that took place at the end of May,
the recruitment of professional servicemen for the Army and Navy, and,
most importantly, a draft of the Defense Ministry’s plan for carrying
out presidential decrees concerning the improvement of military service.
Curiously, those plans had been posted on the Defense Ministry’s
website before the Board had a chance to discuss and approve them.
According to the Defense Ministry’s press and information department
head, Major General Igor Konashenkov, all comments on those plans will
be immediately posted on the website without modification and forwarded
to the commanders to whom they are addressed.
Naturally, Armed Forces development plans will always have classified
sections that nobody is going to post online. However, according to
military experts, more than enough non-classified data has already been
disclosed.
For example, anyone interested could learn how and when contract
crews will be recruited for submarines and surface vessels. The plan
sets a December 2013 deadline for this goal.
Paratrooper battalions should also be fully staffed with contract
soldiers by the end of this year.
Sergeant positions must be 75% filled
by the end of this year and 100% filled by the end of next year.
Technical specialists (drivers, mechanics, operators of the most
technologically sophisticated systems and weapons) must all be recruited
by the end of 2017.
The number of contract servicemen to be recruited by 2020 has been
scheduled on a year-by-year basis. They are to number 241,400 by the end
of 2013 and 295,000 in 2014. A total of 425,000 professionals are
expected to serve in private and junior commander positions by 2020.
General Valery Gerasimov, chief
of the General Staff of Russia’s Armed Forces, told the Board meeting
that this year’s plan was to recruit professional soldiers for five
brigades, including four motorized infantry and one paratrooper assault
brigades, one regiment, 14 special-purpose detachments, 27 paratrooper
battalions, and seven marine battalions.
You also can find some interesting data on combat equipment and arms
supplied to the Armed Forces in the web. For example, 47% of all
submarines listed in the State Armament Program until 2020 are to be
delivered this year.
Military analysts will understand what and how many submarines are
covered by this percentage given that two Borey-class Project 955
strategic submarine cruisers carrying 16 strategic Bulava missiles are
to be delivered this year in addition to one Yasen-class Project 885
multi-purpose nuclear-powered submarine, while two diesel-electric
Amur-class Project 636 submarines are scheduled for delivery next year.
The same kind of analysis could be applied to the percentage of
surface vessels scheduled for delivery to the Navy, fighters and
frontline bombers to the Air Force, or the Iskander-M theater missile systems,
tanks, self-propelled artillery systems, multiple rocket launchers, and
other armored equipment intended for the Ground Forces.
As a matter of fact, General Gerasimov made the task even easier as
he revealed a "military secret." He said the troops would be receiving
between 70 and 100 aircraft per year, more than 120 helicopters, eight
or nine surface vessels and submarines, and up to 600 units of new
armored equipment.
Those plans also include deliveries of the most advanced and
experimental equipment and arms, repairs and upgrades of all military
hardware, the construction and reconstruction of training centers,
ranges, residential quarters, and many other things.
According to Gerasimov, the mass delivery of experimental arms would
begin in 2016. Before that, development will be completed on the new
Armata tank and the Kurganets IFV and APC in 2015, the T-50 Prospective
Airborne Complex of Frontline Aviation, the S-500 anti-aircraft missile
system and a corvette in 2016, and a new-generation destroyer in 2018.
The question is why did the generals put their plans online?
The answer is multifaceted. On the one hand, Presidential Decree No.
603 dated May 7, 2012 mandates such openness. On the other hand, the
disclosure of Armed Forces development and building plans could become a
stage on the path towards the emergence of a civil society in Russia
and progress towards public control over the Army and Navy. Now that Sergei Shoigu has become defense minister, such control seems to be within reach.
The Russian ministry of defense (MoD) has awarded United Aircraft (UAC) a firm order for 15 Antonov An-148 twinjets, according to UAC
president Mikhail Pogosian, speaking at the Paris Air Show. The
contract is worth Rouble 18 billion ($550 million). The delivery
schedule calls for one aircraft this year, eight in 2014-2015 and six in
2016-2017. The Russian government has previously expressed a need for
130 jetliners for various government agencies. This requirement includes
59 An-148s, according to minister for industry and trade
Denis Manturov.
The MoD order is highly profitable for aircraft maker VASO, a UAC
factory in Voronezh, with some 25 percent margin over the manufacturing
expenses. This contract, along with another for six Il-96-300s for VIP transport, is meant to help the plant establish cost-effective production. VASO
lost Rouble 1.2 billion ($36.5 million) in the past year, despite a
rise in revenues to Rouble 8.8 billion ($268 million). Last year the
factory delivered only one An-148-100EA to the Russian government’s special air detachment (a second is due by year-end) and one An-148-100EM to the Ministry for Emergencies (a second is due this summer), along with three An-148-100Es to Ilyushin Finance (IFC), which subsequently placed them with the airline Angara.
Speaking to AIN at Paris, Alexander Roubtsov, general manager at IFC,
said the MoD order “will help gear-up type production at the Voronezh
plants, from which commercial buyers will only benefit.” The military
order will enable VASO to invest in advanced manufacturing methods and equipment, and to master lean, resource-saving technologies. IFC
holds orders for 34 An-148s, and another commercial buyer, Savings
Bank, has ordered 10. Thus far, 11 aircraft have been delivered, split
between the two.
Eighteen An-148s are currently in service (plus two extended-fuselage
An-158s), counting both Russian- and Ukraine-built examples, and to
date they have carried two million passengers, according to Antonov. The
design house is shaping the An-148-300MP
maritime patrol version with 10-hour loitering capability and armed with
anti-ship missiles, unguided rockets, depth charges and 23-mm cannon
pods. This version is aimed at Russian and Ukrainian MoDs and is also on
offer to India. In addition, Antonov is developing the An-178, a
ramp-equipped airlifter based on the An-148 and able to carry a
16-metric-ton payload 3,800 km. At the Paris Air Show, Antonov president
and general designer Dmytro Kiva said the first prototype is under
construction for an anticipated maiden flight next year.
The Russian military has denied
media reports that personnel had been withdrawn from its naval
maintenance and supply facility in Syria, Russian news agencies
reported.
The daily Vedomosti on Wednesday cited an
unidentified source saying that neither servicemen nor civilian Defence
Ministry personnel were currently stationed at the naval facility in the
Syrian port of Tartous.
But the Defence Ministry press service said
the modestly sized and equipped facility had long since been manned by
civilians and that they had not been withdrawn.
"These personnel continue to work in the
usual regimen. And there is no talk of evacuating them," state-run news
agency RIA quoted the Defence Ministry's press service as saying in a
statement.
The ministry press service told Reuters it could not immediately provide the statement.
The Tartous facility is a foothold in
Syria, where 100,000 people have been killed in a civil conflict, and
Russia's only military base outside the former Soviet Union.
Russian warships occasionally call there for supplies and minor repairs.
Russia has shielded Syrian President Bashar
al-Assad during the conflict, supplying what it says are purely
defensive weapons and blocking Western-backed U.N. Security Council
resolutions meant to pressure him to end the bloodshed.
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