Showing posts with label Russian aggression. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Russian aggression. Show all posts

Tuesday, 21 March 2017

15:27 21.03.2017 NATO, Ukraine discussing reforms in Ukrainian security and defense sectors, partnership enhancing

A meeting of the Defense Policy and Planning Committee (DPPC) with participation of Ukraine in the format of the NATO Defense Planning Process (NDPP) was held at NATO Headquarters on Tuesday, the Ukrainian Mission to the Alliance reports.
The event was attended by a delegation of representatives of government bodies of Ukraine participating in the NDPP, headed by Deputy Director of the Department for Military Policy, Strategic Planning and International Cooperation of the Ukrainian Defense Ministry, Colonel Oleksandr Buniak, a message released on the website of the Defense Ministry of Ukraine on Tuesday, says.
"During the meeting, the parties discussed the draft Evaluation of Ukraine's participation in the NDPP, which contains information on the main issues of defense and security policy, the state and prospects for the development of the security and defense sector, the financial and economic aspects, participation in peacekeeping operations on the implementation of the partnership goals chosen by our state," the message says.
The mission of Ukraine also informs that taking into account the relevance of the gender factor in the activities of defense and security institutions of Ukraine, as well as the implementation of the provisions of the UN Security Council resolution No. 1325 on women, peace and security, the parties agreed to include new goal of partnership - gender perspectives in the package of partnership goals for Ukraine for the current stage of NDPP.
The participants of the meeting noted the importance of practical implementation of certain partnership objectives, including strengthening democratic civil control over the Ukrainian Armed Forces and other military formations, transparency and accountability in the activities of the security and defense sectors, and the implementation of NATO standards. The sides also confirmed the readiness of the member states to contribute fully to the implementation of the tasks of reforming the defense and security spheres of the Ukrainian state.
The NDPP is a key mechanism developed by the Alliance to assist partner countries in achieving the compatibility of certain forces with the military forces of the armed forces of NATO member countries for joint participation in crisis management operations, as well as in the implementation of security and defense sector reform in accordance with Euro-Atlantic standards.

Ukraine Media Centre

Russia's military aggression against Ukraine 21/03

Russia's military aggression against Ukraine 21/03

  1. 1. Vilyen Pidgornyy – MOD Spokesperson RUSSIA’S MILITARY AGGRESSION AGAINST UKRAINE (weekly update)
  2. 2. Day-by-day review of cease-fire violations against UAF (March 13 – 19) 0 20 40 60 80 100 120 Cease-fire violations Heavy arms
  3. 3. Number of cease-fire violations by the Russia-backed militants Luhansk sector Donetsk sector Mariupol sector 122 257 239
  4. 4. Enemy drone activity 9 episodes
  5. 5. Russia’s supplies to militants • 24 railroad tank cars with fuel • 8 trucks with ammunition • 62nd “humanitarian convoy” consisting of 40 trucks carrying over 500 tons of unidentified cargo
  6. 6. Enemy losses 11 militants – killed 27 militants – wounded
  7. 7. Combat casualties of Ukrainian Forces 7 – KIA 40 – WIA
  8. 8. Civilian casualties Injured during enemy shellings 1 teenager in Valuiske 1 woman in Luhanske 2 women and 1 man in Avdiivka
  9. 9. Civil buildings and infrastructure damages • 29 residential buildings across the front line in the Donetsk & Mariupol sectors • 3 non-residential building in Avdiivka & Krasnohorivka • a kindergarten in Avdiivka • a humanitarian supplies distribution center in Zaitseve • power line in Hnutove • railway track sections in the frontline area in the Donetsk sector

yiv, March 21, 2017 Most intense hostilities take place at Krymske, Novoaydar district and in Avdiivka and its outskirts – Defense Ministry


Kyiv, March 21, 2017.
Overall, the number of ceasefire violations ranged between 50 on Sunday, March 19, and 112 on Friday, March 17.
The situation on the frontline did not change significantly. “Most active hostilities, during the previous week, took place at Krymske, Novoaydar district, in Avdiivka and its outskirts and in the south of the Mariupol sector”, stated Vilyen Pidgornyy, Ministry of Defense spokesperson during a press briefing at Ukraine Crisis Media Center. The share of enemy indirect fire episodes last week remained unchanged in comparison with the preceding week and amounted to 44%. In contrast, incidents of enemy sniper fire decreased in actual numbers and reached 12, comparing to 22 over the foregoing week.
Luhansk sector
Last week Russia-backed militants engaged Ukrainian Armed Forces in the sector with mortars and cannon artillery. The enemy remains consistent while choosing their target areas week after week: Krymske, Popasna area and Troitske regularly came under enemy fire of low and medium intensity. “However, on March 16 there was an unexpected development in Lobacheve. At 20:30 pro-Russia proxies opened fire with 82 mm mortars that resulted in casualties on the part of Ukrainian defenders. That day, militants treacherously used 122 mm artillery during nighttime against Troitske and Novozvanivka. The same day, the enemy fire wounded a teenager in Valuiske village of Stanytsia Luhanska district”, Mr. Pidgornyy said. On March 13, Russia-equipped militants used mortars  at Krymske three times, having fired more than 210 rounds. On March 14, the enemy has paused mortar attacks in the daytime just so that their sniper groups could advance to the front line and open direct fire against Novozvanivka, Novooleksandrivka and Zhovte. On March 18, Krymske was attacked with heavy weapons five times. Enemy artillery crews fired more than 150 mortar bombs and rounds of different caliber during one artillery and four mortar attacks. Additionally, the enemy opened tank fire. Last week, the daily number of cease-fire violations by the enemy in the sector ranged between 12 (on March 16) and 25 (on March 18).
Donetsk sector
Positions of Ukrainian Armed Forces in this sector were targeted with most intense enemy fire. Russia-backed militants opened short but multiple mortar and artillery fire along the whole front line, being most active in Avdiivka area. The militants engaged Ukrainian positions day and night. In the evening of March 15, the enemy artillery crews opened a severe artillery fire at our rear positions in Klishchiivka, south of Bakhmut, having fired nearly 80 rounds over an hour and a half. Similar to the previous week the enemy opened tank fire in Avdiivka and adjacent areas and used infantry fighting vehicles in Luhanske, Verhniotoretske and Zaitseve. Last week, the daily fire activity of the enemy ranged between 31 (on March 18) and 52 cease-fire violations (on March 17).
Mariupol sector 
Traditionally, the majority of cease-fire violations took place in the Pavlopil – Shyrokyne area of the front line. However, last week the militants several times used heavy weapons in the northern part of the sector, namely in Krasnohorivka, Maryinka, Berezove and Novotroitske. In the morning of March 13, the enemy sniper groups advanced to the front line. In the afternoon, the enemy artillery crews opened indirect fire at Pavlopil. In the early morning of March 14, enemy tank engaged our positions in Maryinka and fired nearly 20 shells in ten minutes. On March 16, the enemy launched a two-hour-long combined attack on Novotroitske, having fired the total of 50 artillery rounds and mortar bombs. “March 17 was marked by the highest intensity of enemy fire.  The enemy artillery opened fire at Krasnohorivka, Maryinka, Hnutove, Vodiane, Lebedynske and Shyrokyne. On March 18, Russia-trained militants used artillery at Vodiane having fired nearly 50 rounds”, added Mr Vilyen Pidgornyy. Last week, the number of cease-fire violations by the enemy ranged between 29 (on March 18) and 46 (on March 17).
According to Mr. Pidgornyy, compared with the foregoing week, the intensity of UAVs use by the militants decreased from almost three a day to the total of 9 episodes of hostile drones flights during the whole last week in the ATO area. The enemy conducted aerial reconnaissance both in the tactical rear of the Ukrainian Armed Forces and at the very front line near Avdiivka, at Svitlodarsk and Krymske village.
Russia delivered fuel to the occupied territories of Ukraine in 24 railroad tank cars. On Saturday, March 18, eight trucks carrying ammunition for militants crossed the Ukrainian-Russian border near Dmytrivka village, Donetsk region. Besides, on Thursday, March 16, the sixty-second so-called “humanitarian convoy” from Russia delivered unidentified cargo for the needs of militants through Izvaryne and Uspenka checkpoints that are not controlled by the Ukrainian government. Ukrainian military intelligence confirmed the “convoy” consisted of 40 trucks carrying over 500 tons of cargo.  
Casualties
Last week, 7 Ukrainian servicemen were killed in action. Forty soldiers were wounded in action, including  the National Guard of Ukraine officer.
Five civilians were wounded in enemy shellings in the conflict area last week. “This includes one teenager in Valuiske, Luhansk sector, a woman in Luhanske, two women and a man in Avdiivka, Donetsk sector. One of the wounded women in Avdiivka was a volunteer. All wounded civilians received medical assistance in a timely manner”, MOD spokesperson stated.
Damage to civilian infrastructure
Twenty-nine residential buildings were damaged in the indirect fire conducted by the Russian proxies in the Donetsk and Mariupol sectors. Most of them are in Avdiivka. Three non-residential buildings were damaged by the enemy shelling in Avdiivka and Krasnohorivka. Mortar and artillery rounds directly hit a kindergarten in Avdiivka, humanitarian supplies distribution hub in Zaitseve, power line in Hnutove, and railway track sections in the frontline area in the Donetsk sector.

Defense Ministry: Ukrainian Armed Forces defeat two subversive reconnaissance groups near Vodiane, militants employ heavy artillery and MLRS

Vodiane in the Mariupol sector was the main flashpoint of the conflict area yesterday, reported Colonel Oleksandr Motuzyanyk, Ministry of Defense of Ukraine spokesman on ATO-related issues, during a press briefing at Ukraine Crisis Media Center. In the morning, two subversive reconnaissance groups of up to 20 militants each attacked Ukrainian positions. Ukrainian troops successfully defeated the attack. “To retaliate, occupants opened massive fire from mortars, cannons and ‘Grad’ multiple rocket launcher systems, firing over 50 mortar rounds, eighty 122 mm and 152 mm shells, and 65 ‘Grad’ missiles. Security cameras recorded one of the ‘Grad’ salvos directly hitting Vodiane,” elaborated Col. Motuzyanyk. Enemy losses in the firefight are assessed at 5-8 people killed and 13-16 wounded.
Militants used mortars, cannons and tanks in cease-fire violations in Talakivka, Lebedynske and Shyrokyne, and employed mortars in Marinka and Krasnohorivka.  The enemy conducted two sniper and two artillery attacks in Novotroitske, firing over 50 rounds at our positions, mostly between 20:00 and 21:00.
In the Donetsk sector militants performed 17 ceasefire violations, using heavy weapons seven times. Most attacks occurred near Luhanske and on Kamianka – Avdiivka – Butovka coal mine frontline sector. “Russia-backed militants were active in the afternoon, employed mortars, tanks, and other armor as well as snipers. In addition, the enemy twice violated the ceasefire in Novoluhanske,” elaborated Col.  Motuzyanyk. Horlivka and the Donetsk airport area were relatively peaceful.
Fifteen enemy ceasefire violations were recorded in the Luhansk sector, with over 70% of attacks taking place in the Popasna district. Russia-backed militants shelled Troitske with 10 mortar rounds. Moreover, the truce was violated in Stanytsia Luhanska, Triokhizbenka and Krymske.  “Enemy shelling damaged Slovianoserbsk – Triokhizbenka power line and cut off the power supply 1400 consumers in Triokhizbenka, Orikhovo-Donetske and Kalaus. Repair works are in progress,” said Col. Motuzyanyk.
According to Chief Intelligence Directorate of the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine, militants of so-called “7th brigade” of Russian occupational troops set up engineer obstacles at the Svitlodarsk area using PMN-2 antipersonnel mines on March 16.  “This mine type is notoriously known as “Black Widow”, and is prohibited under the Ottawa convention. Ukraine signed and ratified this document, yet Russia has not,” said the spokesman.

Sunday, 19 March 2017

4 NATO warships arrive in Black Sea Port of Odessa, Ukraine, to stay until April 20

Four NATO warships have entered the Port of Odessa, according to the Ukrainian Navy. The ships will remain until April 20, as NATO and Ukrainian marines engage in military competitions and peer learning.

According to the statement from the Ukrainian Navy, the ships will stay in Odessa until April 20. During their visit, the crew and commanders will meet with the command of the Ukrainian Navy, the heads of the Odessa Regional State Administration, and the Odessa City Council.
“The program of the visit also includes drills aimed at testing the durability of the ships, visits aboard NATO ships by Ukrainian Navy servicemen and sports competitions between them and the ships’ crew,” the press service stated.
Last month, NATO member nations agreed to increase the alliance’s presence in the Black Sea at a ministerial meeting of the bloc on February 16.
“We agreed on two additional maritime measures: an increased NATO naval presence in the Black Sea for enhanced training, exercises and situational awareness, and a maritime coordination function for our Standing Naval Forces when operating with other Allied forces in the Black Sea region,” Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg announced at the time.

PUTIN'S CANNON FODDER - Russian Activists Say Suspicious Military Deaths Often Tied To Extortion Schemes

The Russian military says Ilya Gorbunov, 19, died when a tank he was driving rolled off a bridge. His sister says that a soldier from her brother's unit said Ilya died after being locked in a tank and suffocating.

At 10 a.m. on February 17, Russian draftee Arkady B. jumped out of a third-story window of his barracks outside Moscow. Doctors say it was a miracle that he survived, with multiple compression fractures, a concussion, and other injuries. They are optimistic that Arkady, who asked not to be identified for this article, will walk again after a few months of rehabilitation.

"They were squeezing money out of me," Arkady told RFE/RL. "They wanted 110,000 rubles ($1,860). Supposedly some things went missing -- a tent, some shoes, some sort of spare parts. They found a naïve idiot and pressured me hard."

Arkady's mother, Natasha, told RFE/RL that he had repeatedly reported widespread extortion in his unit to his division psychologist, but no action was taken.

"He called home several times and complained about the extortion," Natasha said. "He called on the 10th, 11th, and 12th of February, saying that if he didn't come up with 110,000 rubles, they would either put him in prison or force him to sign up for a stint as a volunteer soldier. He couldn't take the pressure, so he jumped out a window."

Arkady's story is hardly unique. Although the Russian government does not release statistics on crime in the military, reports of suicides and suspicious deaths in the armed forces are depressingly common. According to government figures, cases of extortion overall more than doubled between 2015 and 2016, and rights activists say cases inside the military are also on the rise.

"Violence and extortion haven't gone anywhere in the military," Sergei Krivenko, head of the Citizen And The Army NGO and a member of Russia's Human Rights Council, said. "But the form of these things has changed. Hazing as a day-to-day form of control by senior soldiers over recruits has been superseded by a system where violence is determined on ethnic grounds or by region of origin. The point of the violence now is not maintaining some sort of discipline but the extraction of money."

Denis Khamidullin, 19, died on March 7 at his military unit outside Yekaterinburg. The military provided no details on his death, which was ruled a suicide. His family says he regularly asked for money.

Though the Russian Defense Ministry remains silent on such incidents, Citizen And The Army's most recent semiannual report, covering the second half of 2016, provides glimpses into the closed world of the Russian military.
-- On July 28, a soldier died when he fell from a barracks window in the Kaliningrad region. The incident is under investigation.

-- On the night of August 4-5, a soldier in the Novosibirsk region was found dead from hanging, a suspected suicide.

-- On August 8, the body of an 18-year-old soldier was found in a St. Petersburg cemetery about 10 kilometers away from his unit. The case is under investigation.

-- On September 26, a soldier was found hanged near Bryansk. His mother reportedly received an SMS from him four days earlier asking for money. His body was reportedly bruised, with two broken ribs.

-- On October 17, the body of a soldier was discovered in Amur Oblast. He had been shot dead and, officially, the incident was ruled a suicide.

-- On November 19, a 26-year-old lieutenant was stabbed to death in Volgograd by a soldier over a "conflict about money."

-- On December 27, an 18-year-old soldier was found hanged in a shower near Dzherzhinsk. The incident was ruled a suicide, although the body was scratched and bruised.

Activists estimate there are 200 to 300 such suspicious incidents in the Russian military each year.

Many of these cases are connected with extortion, Krivenko said.

"Extortion within military units has been on the rise in recent times," he said. "Many connections between soldiers have literally turned into money relationships: 'If you don't want a particular duty, pay. If you want to make a phone call home, pay.' And it must be understood that these crimes are, as a rule, unreported. Many soldiers are afraid to complain, thinking it will only make things worse. Very often, information about extortion only comes out during the investigation of other crimes."

After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the military fell on hard times, with massive reductions and spending cuts, as well as a sharp loss of social prestige. Hazing, or dedovshchina, was rampant, often with fatal results. Under Russian President Vladimir Putin, the military's budget has been sharply increased. The state has prioritized upgrading the military's equipment and the creation of volunteer, contract-based units.

Hazing, in its pure form, has been on the decline, but extortion has become "the norm" in the military, says Veronika Marchenko, an activist with the NGO Mother's Rights.

"The vast majority of these crimes go unreported and taking a case to court is extremely hard," Marchenko said. "The soldiers are afraid to complain, preferring just to pay in the hope that they will then be left to serve out their term in peace. But then their parents get their sons back in a zinc coffin. And when we investigate these cases, either we learn that either the soldier was driven to take his own life or it was a murder that was covered up to look like a suicide. Very often, the root of these tragedies is extortion as draftees are squeezed for money."

In many cases, the ultimate culprits are officers, extorting money from soldiers either for their own benefit or to purchase things for their unit. Aleksandr Gorbachyov, a lawyer with the Committee of Soldiers' Mothers in St. Petersburg, told RFE/RL that officers often use collective discipline among soldiers to pressure recalcitrant recruits.

"The soldiers, as a rule, pay, of course," Gorbachyov said. "There are those who don't pay, but they have problems with their units because resistance is collectively punished -- for instance, by denial of permission to call home or by depriving them of sleep."

On February 6, 19-year-old Ilya Gorbunov died at his military unit outside of Moscow after just three months of service. According to military officials, Gorbunov died from injuries suffered when a tank he was driving rolled off a bridge. The incident aroused suspicion because no other soldiers were reported injured, although the T-80 tank should have a crew of three. In addition, Gorbunov's sister said her brother had no driving license or experience.

Ilya Gorbunov had repeatedly contacted his family by SMS, seeking money
Maria Gorbunova told RFE/RL that her brother had contacted her repeatedly in the days before his death asking for money.

"First, he called and asked if we could quickly sell his share in our apartment," she said. "An officer supposedly lost 58,000 rubles and, Ilya said, they were making the four soldierswho were on duty at the time pay the money back. He said he had to give his portion immediately."

Gorbunova said Ilya told her that he was beaten regularly along with another soldier who reportedly suffocated to death in a storage closet in January.

"Another SMS from Ilya was asking for money that he needed to pay for a notebook computer that disappeared from his unit," Gorbunova said. "We immediately sent him 18,500 rubles. But that money didn't save him in the end."

She says a soldier from her brother's unit told her Ilya had been severely beaten by three other soldiers and locked in a tank. When they went to let him out three hours later, he was dead.

"Ilya is the third soldier to die in that unit since the beginning of the year," Gorbunova said.

On March 7, 19-year-old Denis Khamidullin died at his military unit outside Yekaterinburg with only two months left to serve. Officially, his death was ruled a suicide, although the military provided no details.

His family says he regularly asked for money. In November, he sought 5,000 rubles and in February, 2,000 rubles more.

"He spoke to his sister several times in January and February," Khamidullin's mother, Dina Khamidullina told RFE/RL."'I have such problems, if you only knew,' he told her. But she hid that from me."

"We spoke to him for the last time on March 7," she said. "We were cut off, but I didn't bother calling back. I figured I'd talk to him again. But there was no 'again.'"

EU Slams Russia Over Crimea Annexation On Third Anniversary

The European Union on March 17 condemned Russia’s seizure of Ukraine’s Crimea territory, calling Moscow’s annexation of the Black Sea peninsula a “direct challenge to international security.”
The statement by EU foreign affairs chief Federica Mogherini came one day ahead of the third anniversary of Russia’s formal incorporation of Crimea that was dismissed as illegitimate by Ukraine, the United States, and more than 100 countries in the United Nations General Assembly.
“Three years on from the illegal annexation of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol by the Russian Federation, the European Union remains firmly committed to Ukraine's sovereignty and territorial integrity,” Mogherini said.
Both the EU and the United States hit Russia with several rounds of sanctions in response to the land grab and Moscow’s backing of separatists whose war against government forces has killed at least 9,940 people in eastern Ukraine.
That conflict continues to grind on despite a 2015 peace deal reached in Minsk, Belarus. The Ukrainian military said on March 17 that two of its soldiers were killed and eight others wounded a day earlier in attacks by the separatists in the swathe of eastern Ukraine known as the Donbas.
Separatist leader Igor Plotnitsky vowed on March 17 that a referendum would be staged on the incorporation of separatist-controlled areas into Russia.
Prior to annexing Crimea, Russia staged a referendum on the peninsula following the seizing of key government buildings there by unmarked Russian special forces after former Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovych fled to Russia amid mass street protests across the country.
Moscow used the poll, rejected by Kyiv and the West as illegal, as justification for taking control of Crimea, claiming it represented the will of the people there.
Russian President Vladimir Putin's drew international condemnation last month by signing a decree ordering Russian authorities to recognize identity documents issued by the separatists who hold parts of Ukraine's Donetsk and Luhansk regions.
The Kremlin however, is not considering integrating the separatist-controlled areas into Russia, spokesman Dmitry Peskov said on March 17.
"We do not see any eventual deliberations as possible in this context," he said.
He accused Ukraine of "deliberately rejecting" the region, criticism that came days after Ukrainian authorities announced the suspension of all cargo traffic with areas held by the separatists.
Addressing the anniversary of the Crimea annexation, Peskov told reporters that Russia hopes that "sooner or later Kyiv will start to treat the will expressed by the several million Crimean residents with respect and will accept the results" of the 2014 referendum staged by Moscow there.
Russia has portrayed its military operation in Crimea following Yanukovych’s ouster as necessary to protect ethnic Russians and other residents of the peninsula from oppression by pro-Western officials that eventually took power in Kyiv.
That narrative is rejected by Ukraine and Western governments, which accuse Russian-backed authorities in Crimea of rights abuses against Crimean Tatars and others opposed to Moscow’s rule there.
Referring to the annexation, Mogherini said in her March 17 statement that the EU “reiterates that it does not recognize and continues to condemn this violation of international law.”
“It remains a direct challenge to international security, with grave implications for the international legal order that protects the unity and sovereignty of all states,” she said.
While U.S. President Donald Trump has said he wants to improve ties with Russia and previously indicated he could consider lifting sanctions against Moscow related to Crimea, his young administration has repeatedly denounced Russia’s takeover of the peninsula.
State Department spokesman Mark Toner said in a March 16 statement that Washington “again condemns the Russian occupation of Crimea and calls for its immediate end.”

Attacks on Ukraine by Russian Armed Forces and their Terrorist's


Saturday, 8 October 2016

AFP: Syrian government 'take back control' of rebel held areas in Aleppo

Syrian government have retaken control of rebel held areas in the Southern provinces of Aleppo city according to a monitor.


The Syrian observatory of Human Rights told AFP that the Syrian government had "retook full control of the Ramussa district after ferocious clashes with [Syrian] rebels".

Friday, 7 October 2016

War Criminal Putin's Ass licking Stooges

Whether it is the United States, NATO, the EU, or the Paralympics, in Russian media, everyone’s getting called a "fascist."

Liwa Sayf al-Haq Assad Allah al-Ghalib: A Republican Guard Militia in Sayyida Zainab


Emblem of Liwa Sayf al-Haq Assad Allah al-Ghalib. With a balance flanked by two Syrian flags, the bottom of the emblem features the legendary Dhu al-Fiqar sword of Imam Ali, with the inscription: “There is no hero but Ali and no sword but the Dhu al-Fiqar.”

The Sayyida Zainab area in Damascus- home to the Sayyida Zainab shrine- serves as a primary base for many Shi’i militias, including a number of Iraqi formations like Liwa al-Imam al-Hussein, Liwa Dhu al-Fiqar and the Rapid Intervention Regiment. The Sayyida Zainab area is also the main base for the Syrian Shi’i militia Liwa Sayf al-Mahdi, which is affiliated with the 4th Armoured Division and has primarily served to maintain checkpoints. Somewhat similar in nature to Liwa Sayf al-Mahdi is Liwa Sayf al-Haq Assad Allah al-Ghalib (“The Sword of Truth Brigade: The Conquering Lion of God”). The latter part of the group’s name is a reference to Imam Ali. The imagery is reinforced by the inclusion of the Dhu al-Fiqar in the emblem.

Like Liwa Sayf al-Mahdi, Liwa Sayf al-Haq Assad Allah al-Ghalib is a Syrian militia with its base in the Sayyida Zainab area. However, its affiliation is not with the 4th Armoured Division, but rather the elite Republican Guard. This point is corroborated in open source data and the testimony of one Abu al-Layl al-Sadri, a fighter with Liwa Dhu al-Fiqar who resides opposite the militia’s base. According to Abu al-Layl al-Sadri, Liwa Sayf al-Haq Assad Allah al-Ghalib’s base is located in the vicinity of the Mudhafa Fatimiya (‘Guest-House of Fatima’) in the Sayyida Zainab area. For context, the Mudhafa Fatimiya has also served as a conference venue, featuring one in November 2014 on the rebellion of Imam Hussein organized by Ayatollah Khamenei’s office in Syria and attended by the Social Committees Commission in the Sayyida Zainab area. More recently, the venue hosted a solidarity event with Hezbollah in March 2016 following its designation as a terrorist organization by Gulf Arab states. The event was notably attended by pro-regime Palestinian factions and militias, such as the PFLP General Command.

Though the group’s emblem suggests that Liwa Sayf al-Haq Assad Allah al-Ghalib is a Shi’i militia, Abu al-Layl al-Sadri noted that this impression is not quite the case. Whereas Liwa Sayf al-Mahdi is described as a militia composed of Syrian Shi’a, he clarified that the members of Liwa Sayf al-Haq Assad Allah al-Ghalib “show affection- you can say- and believe in the traditions of the Shi’a, following and participating in the occasions.” This may reflect a trend whereby some pro-regime factions, on account of the important role played by Iran and foreign Shi’i militias in supporting the regime, display affinities with Shi’i Islam even if there is no outright conversion, which has taken place in the case of Liwa al-Baqir, a militia of Shi’ified Bekara tribesmen in Aleppo.

The trend of affinity with Shi’i Islam can be influenced by recruitment of Syrians into the ranks of the foreign militias and close cooperation between those militias and the native formations. For example, a video uploaded by Liwa Salah al-Din al-Ayyubi, one of the components of the Dir’ al-Watan (‘Homeland Shield’) collection of Syrian militias led by Hayder al-Juburi (leader of the Iraqi Shi’i militia Liwa Dhu al-Fiqar), features the song ‘Ya Zainab’ by the Iraqi Shi’i munshid Ali al-Mawali. In a similar vein, Muhammad Suleiman Harura, a declared ‘martyr’ for the Palestinian militia Liwa al-Jalil (which seems to be inactive at the present time), posed with insignia and banners of ‘Labbayk ya Zainab’ (‘At your service, oh Zainab’). Yet another example of Zainab sloganeering can be found in the militia Fawj Abu al-Harith 313 (also known as Saraya al-Areen), which appears to be based in Latakia and has fought on that front in addition to Aleppo.

Abu al-Layl al-Sadri added that the group’s formation dates back to two years ago. Under the leadership of one Ghalib Abu Ahmad (whose son Ahmad is actively involved in fighting, distinguishing himself in the Qalamoun mountains), Liwa Sayf al-Haq Assad Allah al-Ghalib’s main engagements to date appears to have been in Damascus and the wider countryside area. For example, in January 2015, the group posted photos of its fighters in the snow-covered Qalamoun mountains. In March 2015, the group posted a photo of a group of its fighters near the locality of Falita in Qalamoun. In May-June 2015, the group claimed participation alongside Hezbollah and the Republican Guard in fighting against rebels in the Jaroud al-Qalamoun area. Later in the year, the group claimed to be fighting on the periphery of Dahiyat al-Assad and the Harasta area to the northeast of Damascus alongside the Syrian army, in addition to maintaining frontline positions in the Qalamoun mountains and participation in efforts to reopen the Harasta highway.

In the fighting on the periphery of Dahiyat al-Assad, the group claimed at least three ‘martyrs’. During the Harasta operations, a ‘martyr’ was claimed for Liwa Sayf al-Haq Assad Allah al-Ghalib in one Haitham Hayel Saleh. Originally said to have been from the Palestinian refugee camp of Sabina in Damascus, he was buried in the Martyrs cemetery in the Sayyida Zainab area.


‘Martyrdom’ portrait for Haitham Hayel Saleh. Note the inclusion of the Dome of the Rock in Jerusalem and the Palestine flag covering the entirety of what is the Israel-Palestine area today.

Most recently this month, Liwa Sayf al-Haq Assad Allah al-Ghalib’s leader announced the loss of a field commander by the name of Nour Abdullah Muhammad, said to have been killed fighting on the East Ghouta front.
Coffin for Nour Abdullah Muhammad. Note the ‘Liwa Sayf al-Haq’ inscription.

Ghalib Abu Ahmad’s son advertising his presence as being in the Ghouta area, late August 2016.

Social media content for Liwa Sayf al-Haq Assad Allah al-Ghalib also points to social outreach activities. For example, the militia’s leader has participated in events to commemorate ‘martyrs’, including the annual occasion of Martyrs Day in May.


Ghalib Abu Ahmad (centre) at Martyrs Day commemoration: “Religion is for God and the homeland is for all [a saying attributed to Sultan Pasha al-Atrash, the Druze leader of the Great Syrian Revolt in the 1920s], in the presence of the sheikhs al-‘aql of the Bani Ma’arouf [Druze]: they had a distinguished presence.”


Liwa Sayf al-Haq Assad Allah al-Ghalib, like Liwa Sayf al-Mahdi, presents an interesting case of a militia with a religious image attached to an elite Syrian army division: an image no doubt influenced by the presence of the group’s base in the Sayyida Zainab, the main hub of Shi’i militancy in Syria. This phenomenon undoubtedly contributes to sectarian perceptions of the Syrian civil war along the Sunni-Shi’i line.

Aleppo and America’s Syria Policy

A Historical and Contemporaneous Context for American Policy on Syria

With Aleppo under indiscriminate heavy bombardment and siege by the Syrian regime and its allies, Russia, Iran, Iraqi Mobilisation Units and Hezbollah, the pitch of the chorus of voices blaming and shaming the U.S. for not intervening militarily in Syria to stop the bloodshed has reached a crescendo not seen since the days preceding the U.S. invasion of Iraq. Whereas some critical views offered heartfelt appeals to salvage Syria as a state and a nation, others bluntly blamed the failed policies of the Obama Administration for the tragedy befalling Syria.

This debate over the Obama’s administration policy on Syria was put recently on display by Secretary of State John Kerry. In a meeting with a small number of Syrian civilians, Secretary Kerry confessed that he had lost an argument within the Obama administration to back up diplomatic efforts with the threat of using military force against the Syrian regime. He also added that Congress would never agree to the use of force. According to the New York Times, several comments made in the meeting “crystallized the widespread sense of betrayal even among the Syrians most attractive to Washington as potential partners, civilians pushing for pluralistic democracy.”

No doubt, this notion of American betrayal and culpability cast a pall over the reliability and essence of Washington’s role in the Middle East in general and in Syria in particular. On closer examination, however, it becomes clear that the American role in Syria, though not beyond criticism, has been more emotively criticized than cerebrally expounded, especially as it relates to American national interest. Herein lay the confusion over and frustration with American foreign policy. In fact, the American role in Syria cannot be fully understood without being contextualized in a framework of reference according to which American national interest is evaluated on the basis of the modern history of U.S.-Syrian relationship, the crisis of the Arab world and American war on terrorism, and the new dawning of a global reality.


The history of the U.S.-Syrian relationship is conflicted and had been grounded in ambivalence, making a potential U.S. military involvement in Syria hardly possible. As I have shown in Syria, United States and the War on Terror in the Middle East, U.S.-Syrian relations have been marked by antagonism and ambivalence, not limited to the Asads’ reign. In fact, U.S. overtures to Syria were not only shunned but opposed. The U.S., unlike Britain and France, entertained no colonial ambitions in the Middle East. The U.S. relationship with Israel and Syria started on an equal footing after World War Two. The U.S. recognized the independence of Syria before supporting the creation of the state of Israel. The support for Israel was not meant to serve either as a bridgehead to American influence or as an outpost of imperialism. Nor was it a ploy to dictate Syrian policies. The Cold War and Arab nationalist policies, which equated Israel with colonialism, opened the gates of the heartland of the Middle East to the rivalry between the U.S. and the Soviet Union. The main objective of the U.S. was to check Soviet expansion in the region, which fed on Arab grievances against the Western powers and their support of Israel.

When in November 29, 1947 the UN General Assembly voted for the partition of Palestine into two states, one Jewish and the other Arab, with Jerusalem as a separate enclave to be administered by a governor appointed by the international organization, Syrian demonstrators attacked the U.S. legation in Damascus.  When in October 1950, the U.S., Britain, France, and Turkey formally proposed to Egypt the formation of a Middle East Defense Organization (MEDO), the purpose of which would serve to extend the containment of the Soviet Union to the heartland of the Middle East, Syrians denounced MEDO as an imperialist plot. Egypt’s refusal to enter MEDO and Syria’s opposition to it doomed it to failure. At the time, the U.S. had no special relations with either Syria or Israel. Its concern with containing the Soviet Union made it look at Israel and Syria through the prism of Cold War politics. When Western powers supported the Baghdad pact of 1955 as a means to counter the threat of communism, “progressive forces” in Syria, the Ba’th, the Democratic Bloc, and the Communists opposed the pact and consequently moved Syria in the direction of Egypt and the Soviet Union. This set the stage for the Middle East to become a ground of rivalry between the U.S. and the Soviet Union.

No sooner, in July 1956, after Nasser nationalized the Suez Canal, the British, French, and Israelis led a joint attack on Egypt in late October, which was frowned upon by the U.S. This emanated from a cluster of complex considerations. Prominent among them was, on the one hand, the attempt to woo away Egyptian nationalists from the Soviet embrace and, on the other hand, the concern over taking action that could deepen the Soviet embrace. In his memoirs, Eisenhower emphasized the implications of the attack for Arab nationalism:

I must say that it is hard for me to see any good final result emerging from a scheme that seems to antagonize the entire Moslem world. Indeed I have difficulty seeing any end whatsoever if all the Arabs should begin reacting somewhat as the North Africans have been operating against the French.[i]

The U.S. compelled Israel to withdraw from the Sinai Peninsula and the Gaza strip, both captured during the Suez war. Syria, for its part, immediately supported Egypt when the three powers invaded it. At the height of the crisis, Syrian president Shukri al-Quwatli flew to Moscow to seek political and military support. Clearly, despite the high ground the U.S. had achieved in the Middle East in the aftermath of the Suez crisis, the Syrians saw in the Soviet Union a protector that readily poured much needed economic and military assistance in perilous times. Similarly, U.S. expectations of appreciation from the Arabs for intervention in the Suez crisis in their favor turned hollow.

Consequently, the U.S. feared a total Soviet victory in the region. In January 1957, Dulles addressed Congress stressing that “it would be a major disaster for the nations and peoples of the Middle East, and indeed for all the world, including the U.S., if that area were to fall into the grip of international communism.” He added that the U.S. “must do whatever it properly can to assist the nations of the Middle East to maintain their independence.”[ii] The Eisenhower administration had its way when Congress passed the joint resolution in March 1957, henceforth known as the Eisenhower Doctrine, conceding to the administration request that

The president is authorized to…employ the armed forces of the United States as he deems necessary to secure and protect the territorial integrity and political independence of any such nation or group of nations requesting such aid against overt armed aggression from any nation controlled by International Communism.[iii]

The U.S. president sent Ambassador James P. Richards to the Middle East to inaugurate the new doctrine. Only Lebanon and Iraq endorsed the Doctrine. Syria refused to receive the Ambassador. Initially, Syria had rejected the Eisenhower doctrine on the grounds that intervention in the affairs of a nation over economic interests was a flagrant violation of the sovereignty principle; and that the American assertion that a power vacuum existed in the region was but a pretext for imperialist intervention and hegemony.[iv] By August 1957, the relationship between the U.S. and Syria sank to a new low when the Syrian government charged the U.S. with an attempt to overthrow it. The Syrian Ministry of Foreign Affairs released a communiqué on August 19 announcing the discovery of the American plot. The communiqué emphasized that the goal of the Eisenhower doctrine was to seize the independence of Middle Eastern countries and offer them as easy prey to Zionism and imperialism. The U.S. rebuffed Syrian accusations, interpreting them as a “smokescreen behind which people that have the leftish leanings are trying to build up their power.”[v] Subsequently, the U.S. and Syrian ambassadors were declared personae non gratae in their respective host countries.

In 1963, the Ba’th party came to power through a coup d’etat. In order to support its militant attitude toward the Arab-Israeli conflict and its socialist domestic policy, the Ba’th government cooperated closely with the Soviet Union to obtain financial and military aid. By contrast, Syria’s relations with the U.S. continued to deteriorate. The U.S., however, held both Syria and Israel responsible for the growing violence along their borders[vi]. It called later on upon Syria to insure that its territory would not be used as a base for terrorism against Israel.[vii] Heightened tension along the Israeli-Syrian border contributed to the eruption of the June 1967 War, following which Damascus broke off diplomatic relations with Washington.

US-Syrian relations remained abysmal until Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, following the 1973 war, brokered the 1974 Israel-Syria Disengagement Agreement over the Golan Heights. Kissinger’s shuttle diplomacy was arduous but important because it conveyed to Arab leaders and particularly to Syrian president Hafiz Asad that without American support there is no return to the status quo ante. This complemented the overall strategy of the Nixon Administration in the Middle East, which set out to demonstrate that the Soviet Union’s capacity to foment crises was not matched by its ability to resolve them.[viii] The underlying implications of the American strategy were to prod the Arab leaders to approach Washington for assistance in the peace process and to make manifest the Arab’s anachronistic concept of all-or-nothing approach towards Israel.

This uneasy rapprochement between the U.S. and Syria was carried on by the Ford and the Carter administrations, especially that the latter had made the reflection of American values in foreign policy one of its central themes. The realpolitik and elliptical approach to foreign policy, which had characterized the State Department under Kissinger, was to be replaced by an open foreign policy, substituting “world order” for “balance of power,” and placing Human Rights issues high on the Administration’s agenda. Not surprisingly, Carter’s quest for idealism in foreign policy clashed with his geopolitical realism, resulting in an ambivalence, which was reinforced by the divergent world views of his principal advisers.

Significantly, this brief evolution of U.S.-Syrian relations was seriously hobbled when Syria appeared on the US State Department’s “terrorism list” in 1979. Still, Washington maintained a belief in Syria’s key regional role and in its capacity to influence events in the region. This led to the emergence of Washington’s ambivalent attitude toward Damascus, which became first apparent in Lebanon and then a hallmark of US-Syrian relations until the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003. Ironically, the terrorism issue, which precluded the US from improving its relationship with Syria, became the issue responsible for bringing the two countries together.

At the same time, U.S.-Syrian relations, mainly in the 1980s, were affected by the Cold War and the complexities and harsh realities of the Middle East in general and Israel and Syria’s struggle for Lebanon in particular. Significantly, the Reagan administration launched a peace initiative following Israel’s invasion of Lebanon in 1982. However, the American involvement in Lebanon suffered a painful blow when 240 U.S. marines died in a terrorist attack on their headquarters in West Beirut in October 1983. Though fingers were directed to Iran as the sponsor of the terrorist who carried out the suicidal attack, Syrian involvement could not be ruled out.

The U.S., backing its diplomacy with the threat of force, fired battleship guns (the carrier, New Jersey) on Syrian dominated Lebanese positions. Syria fired back and shot down two American war planes, which had engaged in an exchange of fire. This marked the first direct confrontation between Washington and Damascus. However, amid sharp division and opposition to the U.S. role in Lebanon within the Reagan administration, President Reagan chose not to escalate the skirmishes to a full war. Both complexities and treacherous realities of the Lebanese civil war and the Arab-Israeli conflict flew in the face of America’s policy in the region. The U.S. redeployed its troops to U.S. ships offshore and put the peace initiative on the back burner.

US relations with Syria remained ambivalent straddling the ground of sanctions and cooperation. Interestingly, Syria was the only country listed on the US State Department’s terrorism list with which Washington maintained diplomatic relations. The height of cooperation ensued when Iraq invaded Kuwait in 1990 and Syria participated in the US-led international coalition to extract Iraq from Kuwait. Consequently, US-Syrian relations warmed and Damascus became central to the Arab-Israeli peace process launched after the end of the Gulf War. Asad was hailed in the Arab world as Salahuddin, who wrested Jerusalem from the Crusaders, and the steadfast Arab nationalist leader. During the peace process, Asad helped build the power of Hezbollah in Lebanon at the expense of the legitimacy of the state. Arab leaders and many intellectuals applauded him.

Upon his assumption of power after the death of his father in 2000, Bashar Asad promised an era of political openness. Syrian intellectuals and quasi-civil society groups responded by what became known as the Damascus Spring. However, their call for pluralism and political and civil rights were soon muzzled. Clearly, the Syrian regime feared on his hold to power and decided to censor all socio-political activities. Syrian activism reemerged following the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003. Notably, the activists’ call for reform was couched in the interest of safeguarding Syria from the spillover of the profound changes sweeping Iraq and by extension the region. No calls for removing Asad or his regime were declared. No less significant, reformers of all ideological stripes and backgrounds failed to unite. In hindsight, no time period during the modern history of Syria was more opportune to pressure the regime into making significant changes than in the aftermath of the U.S. invasion of Iraq. Washington’s relations with Damascus swiftly deteriorated once Asad opposed the U.S. invasion of Iraq, and then sank to a dangerous low when the Syrian regime helped Jihadists cross Syria into Iraq to fight U.S. troops. Yet, Arab condemnation of U.S. invasion of Iraq to remove a Ba’thi dictator stood in sharp contrast to the deafening silence of Arab condemnation of Syrian complicity in murdering U.S. troops. This attitude prevailed in Syria until the eruption of the rebellion against the Asad regime.

Simply put, Syria, throughout most of its modern history, did not support the U.S. Even during the peace process no relational structures were considered by either country to support a warm and/or mutually beneficial strategic cooperation or alliance between the two countries. Taking all this under consideration, one cannot fail but observe that American attitudinal role in Syria has been more or less affected by the history of this conflicted and ambivalent U.S.-Syrian relationship.

Second, for a nation fighting a war on terrorism whose ideology and praxis are mostly traced to the Middle East, it is arguably hardly possible for United States to entertain a role in Syria not associated with counterterrorism. Admittedly, the Obama administration has done serious mistakes, chief among them calling on President Asad to step down and creating a red line against the regime’s use of chemical weapons. Eventually, the U.S. did not back its words with action. At the same time, the U.S. relegated the political initiative to deal with the Syrian crisis to Saudi Arabia and Turkey. Whereas the first fanned the ideological and monetary support for the jihadists, the other paved for the Jihadists the route to Damascus. Yet, the U.S. has struggled to support moderate opposition groups. As it turned out, some of these groups have shifted their allegiance to al-Nusra Front or other Salafi-Jihadist groups, which are dedicated to killing Americans. In addition, can the moderate opposition be absolved of the tragedy befalling Syria? When the U.S. designated al-Nusra Front as a terrorist organization in November 2012, members of the Syrian opposition deplored the American act, asserting the indispensability of the al-Qaeda-affiliate group in fighting the Asad regime. This was a serious strategic mistake that helped further legitimize Salafi-jihadism within the Syrian revolution. Therefore, how could anyone blame the U.S. for the rise of Salafi-jihadism in Syria? Did the U.S. support, equip, train, or fund Salafi-jihadists? Did the U.S. prefer supporting Jihadists more than the moderate opposition? In fact, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Qatar, Kuwait and UAE all supported various Islamists and Jihadists significantly more than the moderate opposition. No less significant, it is the Arab world, which applauded and hailed the violent and oppressive Asad regime, that supported the jihadists and helped bring Syria to its tragedy. Certainly, ISIS is the latest manifestation of an Arab world mired in deep social and political crisis.

Meanwhile, once the regime’s hold onto power had begun to teeter, despite considerable support from Iran and Hezbollah, Russia stepped in not only to save its old satellite capital but also to entrench itself in the Mediterranean basin as a bulwark against what it considers American hegemony. Strategically speaking, by helping the Syrian regime, Moscow would create in Western Syria a bastion of Iranian influence beholden to Russian power, while at the same time turning the Eastern Mediterranean into a Russian lake. No doubt, the entry of Moscow into the Syrian fay further complicated Washington’s maneuvers. Whereas Moscow came to the help of an old client, Washington has had reservations with certain predominant Salafi-jihadist group spearheading the opposition. And, if history is any guide, it is naïve to think that Russia would not pursue a Grozny-like campaign to ensure that its military involvement in Syria would not become ominously perpetual. This explains the forcible displacement of Sunnis from parts of Western Syria and the savagery with which Russia and its allies have pursued their campaign to seize full control of Aleppo.

Consequently, Washington found itself in a quandary. It ironically found itself on the same side with Russia and the Syrian regime fighting Salafi-Jihadist opposition groups while at the same time supporting the moderate opposition whose power paled in comparison to the Jihadists.  Expectedly, neither the Obama Administration, Congress, nor the US public support sending troops to an unfriendly land crisscrossed by jihadists on one side, and Iranian Revolutionary Guards, Hezbollah and Iraqi Mobilization units on the other. How could one expect the U.S. to attack the regime, even in a limited capacity, without potentially incurring the wrath and retaliation of its Russian, Iranian, Hezbollah and Iraqi allies, all of which are really running the deadly show? Similarly, should anyone expect that Salafi-jihadists will not jump at the opportunity of Washington striking at the regime to widen their sphere of influence and in the process slaughter non-believers? Or should anyone brush aside the possibility that the Iraqi mobilization units would use their partnership with the Iraqi government to attack the approximately 6000 American soldiers advising the same government? Or should American people forget the high pitched fictitious slogan that Iraqis would welcome Americans with flowers as liberators in 2003? Certainly, the U.S. is in an unenviable position in both Syria and Iraq, where American enemies vastly outnumber American friends! Nevertheless, The U.S. has been the largest donor of humanitarian aid for Syrian refugees, and has sent dozens of U.S. troops to train and equip moderate Syrian opposition forces.

Speaking recently before the UN General Assembly, the UN Secretary General Ban Ki Moon drew a bleak but accurate picture of the Syrian crisis: “Present in this hall today are representatives of governments that have ignored, facilitated, funded, participated in or even planned and carried out atrocities inflicted by all sides of the Syria conflict against Syrian civilians…Many groups have killed innocent civilians — none more so than the government of Syria, which continues to barrel bomb neighborhoods and systematically torture thousands of detainees.”

This is the tragedy of Syria and, by extension, the tragedy of the Muslim world in the Middle East. Be that as it may, the U.S. should apply its soft influence to reach a permanent cease fire and end the slaughter and displacement of Syrians. No doubt dealing with Russia is exhausting and at times unproductive. But the reality of the world today is that the U.S. cannot force a cease fire as part of a settlement on its own without introducing a massive number of troops to eventually occupy Syria.  In his most recent book World Order, Henry Kissinger affirms that the main challenge for the twenty-first century is how to shape an international order in a world buffeted by violent conflicts, technological proliferation and radicalism. He adds that unless the major powers reach a new kind of accommodation about their global roles chaos would ensue. In other words, the United States would find it difficult to play the leadership role it had carried out in post-Cold War. Consequently, the United States confronts a paradox whereby it continues to be the undisputed global leader but in an often contested, sometimes uncertain global position. This is the international backdrop against which the tragedy in Syria continues to unfold.

More specifically, however, Syria as a nation is paying the deep price for the social, political and sectarian flaws in Arab society. Following the Arab defeat in 1967, the Syrian and Arab philosopher par excellence Sadek al-Azm wrote a book entitled Al-Naqd al-Thati Ba’da al-Hazima (Self-Criticism After the Defeat), in which he argued that the defeat of Arab armies was not brought about by the might of the Israeli army but rather by the flaws of Arab society. Today these flaws are deeper than ever!


Currently, the tragic reality today is that Aleppo is all but a foregone conclusion, for the city is essential to consolidate Russian-Iranian-Syrian regime control over Western Syria. It’s clear from Secretary Kerry’s statements that the U.S. will not go to war with Russia over Aleppo. But that does not mean that the U.S. and the international community should not apply significant pressure, including by proxy, on Russia and the Syrian regime to stop their indiscriminate warfare. This begs the essential question following the day after the likely fall of Aleppo: How to change the dynamics in Syria in favor of the moderate opposition without creating a bigger war and tragedy. Until a new American administration moves into the White House, this remains to be seen!

By Robert G. Rabil