Showing posts with label iran. Show all posts
Showing posts with label iran. Show all posts

Saturday, 8 October 2016

Iranian commander breaks silence on wartime arms imports

Mohsen Rafiqdoost (R) attends the inauguration ceremony for the new chairman of the Foundation for the Disinherited and War Disabled in Tehran, July 28, 1999. (photo by REUTER/JDP)

Prominent Iranian Brig. Gen. Mohsen Rafiqdoost went into unprecedented detail in a interview about his time as minister of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). During the 1980-88 Iran-Iraq War, the IRGC had its own ministry within the administration that took care of its logistical affairs. Meanwhile, the Ministry of Defense was responsible for the logistics of the army.

In an interview with the Reformist Shargh Daily, Rafiqdoost said, “Although at the beginning of the revolution and during the early days of the war, the East and the West were coordinated [against Iran], we still built the defense capabilities of the IRGC with ‘Eastern weapons.’ My first time buying weapons, I bought 2,000 Kalashnikovs and 500 RPG-7s. Later, I would get weapons from Syria and Libya and eventually I connected with North Korea.”

Rafiqdoost spoke about the deep collaboration between Iran and the Eastern Bloc countries during the Iran-Iraq War, explaining, “After North Korea, I also connected with Poland, Hungary, Yugoslavia and the Eastern bloc, in that order. … Of course, we would buy ammunition for Western-manufactured cannons from Switzerland. … We needed surface-to-air missiles, which were more tactical, and therefore we went and negotiated and brought them to Tehran. In exchange, we gave them a Hague system. That is all. The goods we received from Libya, for free, were worth more than $800 million.”

Rafiqdoost finally spoke about the IRGC’s connections with Beijing and Moscow. “At a certain point we connected ourselves to Communist China, and when that happened, we were connected to the source. We halted our relations with other [weapons] suppliers almost completely. China sold weapons to us directly and did it in high volume. Gradually, it started selling us strategic weapons such as coast-to-sea missiles and other types of strategic missiles as well. Gradually, and because of our connection to China, the Russians started to sell us weapons too.”

Rafiqdoost’s comments break the tradition of the past three decades, when Iranian commanders claimed that Iran did not receive military backing from any country during its war with Iraq. Emphasizing their commitment to the Islamic Revolution, these commanders had always reiterated the revolutionary slogan of “Neither West nor East.”

The reality is that after the Cold War, the relationship between the IRGC and the Eastern bloc, which had began near the end of the Iran-Iraq War, had grown so much that almost all weapons used by the IRGC today are either produced by countries such as Russia, China, Ukraine, North Korea and Belarus, or are the result of reverse engineering those products or produced under license from one of these countries.

After the end of the Cold War, the IRGC bought hundreds of tanks and armored personnel carriers from Russia. It also purchased Sukhoi Su-25 Frogfoot ground support aircraft and other items such as speed boats, cruise and ballistic missiles — from China and North Korea — increasingly steering its defense organization toward that of Eastern countries.

However, while the weapons system of the IRGC is based on the Eastern model, the IRGC has adopted the US model pursued by the General Staff of the Armed Forces since before the revolution as far as defense strategy and deployment are concerned. Here, it is important to bear in mind the criticism leveled at the army during the Iran-Iraq War, when IRGC commanders constantly accused it of being incapable of holding territory seized from Iraqi forces. But what is the real story behind this criticism?

The Iraqi deployment during the Iran-Iraq War was completely Eastern: The front line had limited combat capabilities while the main military power was behind. In Iran, on the other hand, the deployment was Western: The massive volume of human resources and equipment at the IRGC’s disposal was deployed on the front lines. Therefore, the IRGC could successfully break Iraq’s relatively weak defense lines and then hand over the conquered territories to the army. Due to the counterattacks initiated by Saddam’s powerful army, Iran's — which suffered from a shortage of motivated and organized forces as well as inadequate supplies of equipment and spare parts — would quickly lose ground. As a result, the perception was that the IRGC was better at fighting the war than the army. The reality, however, was different.

Rafiqdoost’s comments are important as they clarify the reasons the army was ineffective compared to the IRGC during the war.

After the revolution, the modernization of Iran's army was halted by the obstruction of foreign governments and Western arms suppliers. As a result, suspicion of Western powers continues to dominate the policies of the General Staff of the Armed Forces, while it is an unwritten rule that the Ministry of Defense will not pursue imports of Western-manufactured weapons.

The unilateral suspension of deliveries of Western-manufactured weapons to Iran’s army has left the regular navy, ground forces and the air force with worn-out, inefficient and old weapons and facilities. The IRGC, however, has had the option of buying weapons from the Eastern bloc countries and thus has continuously upgraded its defense systems with the latest missile systems, armor, personnel equipment, marine capabilities and signal systems. Therefore, although the combat organization of the IRGC is much smaller compared to that of the army, the combat power of the IRGC has in practice advanced much further.


Lastly, it should be noted that although the UN Security Council arms embargo imposed on Iran will be lifted in eight years, according to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, Iran will for legal and political reasons continue to expand its military relations with the Eastern bloc. Naturally, the bulk of these military purchases will go to the IRGC. Considering the growing needs of the IRGC and the fact that the budget allocated to it is much greater than the funds allocated to the army, in the future the IRGC will be able to purchase the newest Russian, Chinese and North Korean equipment. This resource will push the defense policies of the IRGC more toward alignment with Eastern interests in the region, as military trade relations are a strong motivation for deepening security and diplomatic relations between the buyer and the seller.

Thursday, 6 October 2016

What's Behind Sudden Clashes In Northwestern Iran?

Clashes erupted this month between Kurdish fighters and Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC), with each side claiming to have inflicted casualties on the other. The country's heavily censored media have even reported the fighting and acknowledged fatalities on the government side. But why the sudden flare-up?

Who is fighting and how widespread is the violence?

The past two weeks of fighting have reportedly pitted official forces against members of the Kurdish Democratic Party of Iran (KDPI), with deadly clashes between the IRGC and Kurdish rebels in heavily Kurdish northwestern Iran, near the border with Iraq. Combat was reported on June 15-16 in Oshnavieh, in Iran's West Azerbaijan Province. More fighting followed in the nearby Sarvabad, Mahabad, and Marivan regions.

On June 28, the IRGC said its forces had killed 11 Kurdish rebels in the Sarvabad region. An IRGC commander, Mohammad Hossein Rajabi, said three of his troops were also killed in the clashes. The KDPI claims that several of its fighters and more than 20 IRGC members have been killed, and it accuses Iranian forces of shelling villages on the border over the weekend.



What are the militants after, and why now?
The KDPI has been waging a battle for independence and greater rights for Iranian Kurds for decades. The KDPI's military operations and confrontation with the Iranian regime surged following the 1989 assassination of the party's leader, Abdol Rahman Ghassemlou. But the group, whose fighters are mostly based in northern Iraq, announced a cease-fire in 1997.
The fresh clashes follow an announcement by the KDPI's secretary-general, Mostafa Hejri, urging Kurdish youths to join its ranks and unite "the struggle in the cities and in the mountains." Hejri's statement, made in March to mark the Persian New Year, Norouz, was interpreted as a call to renew the armed struggle against Iran.
But KDPI officials have suggested that the group is merely trying to expand its contacts with Kurds inside Iran and recruit new forces.
"We are not trying to launch a war -- the war with the Islamic republic [Iran] has been going on for the past 37 years," Rostam Jahangiri, a member of the political office of the KDPI, told RFE/RL last week in a reference to the postrevolutionary establishment nearly four decades ago of Iran's theocratic government.
Kamran Matin, a senior lecturer in international relations at the University of Sussex, says the KDPI claims it no longer has to sacrifice its own interests -- meaning Iranian Kurds' interests -- to ensure the security of Iraq's Kurdistan regional government.
"They feel it's time for them to be present inside Iranian Kurdistan," Matin says of the heavily Kurdish region of Iran. "It's important to note that they don't claim they have initiated a new round of armed struggle. They claim they simply send their troops to be present, they're acting in self-defense. But then, in military terms, if an armed group is inside Iranian territory, it's highly likely to be attacked by the Iranian security forces."
Stockholm-based journalist Saman Rasoulpour says the KDPI's leadership appears to believe that confrontation with Iranian forces might win the group new supporters among Iran's estimated 8 million Kurds, who have long complained of discrimination, repression, and political underrepresentation.
"The leaders of this party believe that military activities -- which according to their interpretation are defensive actions [against Iranian forces] -- is a sign of a party's dynamism that could strengthen their base within the population," Rasoulpour says.
"In a way, in their eyes, armed struggle means that they're active and that they can create challenges for the [Iranian] establishment," he adds.
KDPI officials have signaled that the group's fighters will continue their excursions into Iranian territory.
"Our party is determined to fulfill our pledge to interlock the struggle [of the Kurdish forces] in the mountains with the struggle [of the Kurdish people] in the cities," Hejri was quoted as saying by the KDPI's website on June 19.
What are Iranian authorities saying publicly about the violence?
IRGC commanders have said they have been fighting "terrorists with ties to counterrevolutionary groups." The IRGC has warned that its forces are carefully monitoring "any movement" in the border region and will not allow the "sustainable peace and security" of the people to be disrupted by "terrorists."
The commander of IRGC ground forces, Mohammad Pakpour, has warned that Iran could launch raids on KDPI positions in Iraq's Kurdistan region.
"Since the main bases of these terrorists is in northern Iraq, if they fail to act on their commitments not to engage in anti-security measures, their bases will be targeted wherever they are," Pakpour was quoted as saying by domestic media earlier this week.
In 2011, Iran targeted the camps in Iraq of another Kurdish rebel group, the Party of Free Life Of Kurdistan (PJAK).
Does this fighting represent any genuine threat to Iran?
Despite claims by KDPI leaders about the group's strength and support among Iranian Kurds, analysts generally agree it does not possess the capability to pose a serious military threat to Iran.
"The KDPI doesn't have that level of force to conquer territory and hold it or to inflict massive casualties on Iranian troops, simply because of the demographic proportion of the Kurdish population in Iran. Also because they have not been engaged in military activities for almost two decades, so even on a very simple military training [level], they're not really ready to cause any large-scale problems for the Iranian state," analyst Matin says.
Is this in any way related to Iranian military involvement elsewhere in the region?
The clashes are not likely to affect Iran's involvement in Syria.
If the violence in northwestern Iran continues and Tehran acts on its pledge to attack KDPI bases inside Iraq, that could create tensions in the region.
Matin says it remains to be seen how Iraq, the United States, and countries such as Turkey will react. "It can escalate," he says.
But Matin speculates that Iraqi Kurdish parties, due to their "strategic dependence" on Iran, are unlikely to allow the KDPI to continue its operations against Iran "for any extended period of time."

Friday, 13 May 2016

Iran Begins Receiving the S-300 Air-Defense System


Nearly a decade after initially signing a contract with Russia, Iran has finally begun to take delivery of the S-300 air-defense system. On April 11, Iranian Foreign Ministry Spokesman Hossein Jaberi Ansari announced that “the first phase of the [S-300] contract has run its course.” Russian Deputy Prime Minister Dmitry Rogozin confirmed that the deliveries had occurred, noting that the deal would be complete before the end of the year.

The delivery is likely to have taken place from Russia’s Astrakhan across the Caspian Sea to Bandar-e-Anzali in Iran. Though Ansari did not identify the type of S-300 that Iran had received, Rostec CEO Sergei Chemezov noted in an interview with the Wall Streeet Journal last month that Iran would be receiving the S-300 PMU-1. Given that Russia suspended production of the S-300 and export variants in 2014, it is believed that the ones sent to Iran are from Russian stores and were upgraded prior to delivery

The sale of the S-300 to Iran has long been plagued by issues, prompting skepticism right up to this first delivery. In 2007, Moscow and Tehran reached an agreement regarding the missile system, wherein Iran would receive five battalions of S-300s, at a cost of around $800 million.

Despite Iran making a down payment for the S-300s, Russia never delivered them. Three years later, in 2010, then-President Dmitry Medvedev announced a freeze on the export, in line with a new arms embargo unveiled by the United Nations Security Council. In retaliation, Iran initiated a $4 billion lawsuit against Russia. Tehran also began moving forward with a locally-produced answer to the S-300, called the Bavar 373, which is due to enter service in March 2017.

Russia’s S-300 export ban remained in place through last April, when Russian President Vladimir Putin decided to lift it, citing progress in nuclear negotiations with Iran. After Russia removed the freeze – and particularly after the nuclear deal was concluded – Moscow and Tehran entered a new round of discussions over the S-300 and “fundamentally solved” the issue in August 2015.

However, disputes between the two continued to delay finalization of the contract. Crucially, Iran’s $4 billion lawsuit still remained in place. Though Moscow wanted the lawsuit removed prior to deliveries, Tehran was adamant that the lawsuit would not be rescinded until after the first delivery had been made. After negotiating on this matter, Russia finally agreed to Iran’s demands.

Throughout the end of 2015 and into early 2016, a number of false starts occurred. The two countries initially reported that deliveries were beginning in late November and early December. This was later changed, to January. After January passed with no S-300 transfer, Iranian media reported in February that the deliveries were imminent as Iranian Defense Minister Hossein Dehqan traveled to Russia – only to have the Kremlin reveal that Iran had not completed its payment for the contract.

The S-300 deal grew more bizarre in March, when Kuwaiti news agency Al-Jarida reported that Russia had suspended the delivery once more. Al-Jarida claimed that Moscow canceled the S-300 sale in response to an alleged transfer of Pantsir S-1s from Iran to Hezbollah. Iranian officials denied these allegations.

Finally, on April 8, Rogozin stated that the contract had been concluded, indicating that payment had been completed (and no further cancelation had occurred). Interestingly enough, the delivery timeframe between the two countries may still not have been clear, for on April 9 Ali Akbar Velayati said in a televised interview that the delivery would take some time, even though the initial batch arrived less than two days later.

Now that Iran has begun receiving its S-300s, the country is likely to try to move forward with acquiring other items on its military shopping list. The list’s contents vary – ranging from tanks to missiles to fighter jets – and could be worth up to $8 billion.

Iran, however, is likely to find these procurements similarly tricky to complete. Russia has ruled out financial assistance for Iranian military acquisitions, and the U.S. has already stated it intends to block the sale of Su-30s to Iran, which can be done through the U.N. Security Council for the next five years, per Resolution 2231. In other words, the S-300 deliveries may have begun, but Iran’s post-arms embargo shopping spree still has a ways to go before the country will begin upgrading its forces with new hardware.

Sunday, 24 August 2014

Iran to Produce Short-Range Missiles, Drones – Reports

Tehran has inaugurated four new defense achievements by the Air Industries Organizations , including the production of two new short-range missiles and two types of drones, Islamic Republic News Agency (IRNA) reported Sunday.
 
According to the agency, the reconnaissance drone is the latest in the chain of indigenous unmanned aerial craft which is designed and manufactured by the Iranian defense experts.
 
The newest type of cruise missiles manufactured in Iran is designated as Qadir and has the capability of targeting enemies at the range of up to 100 kilometers. Qadir could be launched from both - sea and coastal platforms.
 
Since 1992 Iran has been ramping up its defense industry. Iran has manufactured its own tanks, armored personnel carriers, missiles, radars, boats, submarines, unmanned aerial vehicles, and fighter planes.
 

Tuesday, 19 August 2014

Iran to put Fateh submarine into operation by late-November

Iranian Navy Commander Habibollah Sayyari announced that the home-made Fateh (Conqueror) submarine will join the Navy in late-November.
 
The commander went on to note that Iran achieved the technology for building submarines 20 years ago, the country's official IRNA news agency reported on Aug. 18.
 
Iran has failed to unveil the Fateh submarine despite earlier announced dates.
 
In 2011, for the first time Iranian officials announced that Fateh would launch operation, then in 2013 Sayyari said that "the submarine will become operational in the current year."
 
Iran's Defense Minister Brigadier General Hossein Dehqan announced this March that the submarine would probably join the Navy on May 24, the date honoring the anniversary of the liberation of Khorramshahr city during the eight-year war with Iraq.
 
Dehqan said that the submarine has undergone necessary tests and its faults have been corrected.
Fateh weighs nearly 500 tonnes and it is Iran's newest semi-heavy submarine.
 
The Iranian media outlets reported that Fateh class subs can operate more than 200 meters below the sea surface for nearly five weeks.
 
The country has so far launched different classes of home-made advanced submarines including Ghadir, Qaem, Nahang, Tareq and Sina.
 
Sayyari underlined that Iran is currently mass-producing Ghadir class submarines.

Navy Commander: Iran Plans to Launch Production Line of Destroyers

"Today, the Navy has acquired the capability to launch the production line of destroyers and our project for building destroyers has started at the order of the Supreme Leader since a while ago and we are witnessing newer and more updated achievements in this project now," Sayyari told reporters in Tehran on Monday.
 
He said that Iran's new destroyer named Sahand is 30% more advanced than the country's first destroyer, Jamaran.
 
Sayyari also said that Iran will launch its new submarine, Fateh, on the Navy Day (November 28).
In recent years, Iran has made great achievements in its defense sector and attained self-sufficiency in producing essential military equipment and systems.
 
Sayyari in July announced the Iranian Navy's plans to launch one of its advanced home-made destroyers, named Damavand, in the country's territorial waters in the near future.
 
"Destroyer Damavand will join the Islamic Republic of Iran's Navy in the near future," Sayyari told FNA.
 
Elsewhere, he referred to the Iranian Navy's deployment in the international waters, and said, "Iran's 31st fleet of warships is sailing towards the region of its mission to replace the 30th fleet."
 
He said that the 31st fleet of warships consists of Bayandor destroyer and Bandar Abbas warship.
 
Tehran launched an arms development program during the 1980-88 Iraqi imposed war on Iran to compensate for a US weapons embargo. Since 1992, Iran has produced its own tanks, armored personnel carriers, missiles and fighter planes.
 
Yet, Iranian officials have always stressed that the country's military and arms programs serve defensive purposes and should not be perceived as a threat to any other country.
 
In June 2013, Iran launched its overhauled and modernized destroyer named Bayandor in the Southern waters of the country in the presence of Army Commander Major General Ataollah Salehi and Rear Admiral Sayyari.
 
Army officials said the Iranian Navy's power of safeguarding the country's territorial waters as well as maintaining security in regional and international waters will increase after the launch of Bayandor.
 
Overhauling the main engines, heat exchangers and fuel and oil systems as well as optimizing the monitoring control systems are among the measures adopted before launching the destroyer.
 
Navy experts have also mounted a fire control system for the destroyer's weapons, a 76-mm and a 40-mm canons and a surface-to-surface Nour (Light) missile system on the destroyer.
 
Iran's first home-made destroyer, Jamaran, was launched in late February 2010. The Mowdge Class vessel has a displacement of around 14,000 tons and is equipped with modern radars and electronic warfare capabilities and is armed with a variety of anti-ship, surface-to-surface and surface-to-air missiles.

Monday, 11 August 2014

Iran ready to revive Nabucco project, supply gas to Europe

As Europe intends to diversify energy resources routes, Iran with its major gas fields could supply gas to Europe via Nabucco.
 
Iran is ready to supply Europe with gas via Nabucco, an abortive gas pipeline project, Iran’s top official said on Monday, adding that two European countries had already showed interest.

As Europe intends to diversify energy resources routes, Iran with its major gas fields could supply gas to Europe via Nabucco, Deputy Minister of Petroleum for international affairs Ali Majedi told Iranian media on Monday, adding that Nabucco would be useless without the Iranian gas.
 
Delegations from two European countries have visited Iran recently to discuss possible routes for gas deliveries, he said without naming the countries. Majedi said different routes were possible, including supplies via Turkey, Iraq, Syria, Caucasia and the Black Sea, adding that he saw the Turkish route as the best option.
 
The deputy minister said gas from Shah Deniz gas field in the Caspian Sea would not be enough for the pipeline, as production at Shah Deniz would not exceed eight billion cubic meters a year, while the designed capacity of the pipeline was at least 23 billion cubic meters.
 
Ali Majedi also said Turkey had showed interest in taking part in gas deliveries from Iran to Europe. Besides, Iran could potentially supply liquefied natural gas to Europe, he said.
 
Nabucco is an abortive project of a 3,300-kilometer-long gas pipeline from Turkmenistan and Azerbaijan to European Union countries, first of all to Germany and Austria. The project was estimated at 7.9 billion euros. OMV Gas GmbH (Austria), BOTAS (Turkey), Bulgargaz (Bulgaria) and Transgaz (Romania) were parts in the consortium for pipeline construction.

Work on the project began in 2002. Initially, plans were to launch the construction in 2011, finishing it by 2014, but the project was repeatedly postponed because of problems with possible gas suppliers. In 2011, it was reported that the launch date was shifted to late 2018. In June 2013, an announcement came that the project had been closed in favour of a more promising project - the Trans-Adriatic pipeline.

Thursday, 6 March 2014

Iran delivers ballistic missiles to armed forces

The Iranian Defense Ministry has delivered a massive consignment of domestically made ballistic missiles to the armed forces. 
 
During the handover ceremony on Wednesday, the Qadr, Qiam, Fateh 110, and Khalij-e-Fars (Persian Gulf) ballistic missiles as well as Mersad air defense system, all designed and produced by the aerospace division of the Defense Ministry, were delivered to the Islamic Revolution Guards Corps (IRGC) and the Khatam al-Anbiya Air Defense Base.
 
At the ceremony, Defense Minister Brigadier General Hossein Dehqan told reporters that his ministry continues to advance the country’s deterrence and defense capabilities.
 
The delivery, General Dehqan said, proves that the enemies’ various sanctions, which were strictly imposed on the defense sector, could not even slightly affect it.
 
He added that the missiles are able to precisely hit and destroy the enemy’s targets.

Wednesday, 26 February 2014

Space: The Growing Iranian Space Program

Iran recently announced that their scientists and engineers had built two new space satellites. This was done at a university. One of the satellites was for communications, specifically for supporting satellite phones that use encryption. Just the thing Quds Force requires for its agents overseas. Quds Force supports Islamic terrorists that are allies of Iran. The second satellite can take photos and transmit them back to earth. This one is capable of 100 meter resolution (pictures taken allow the identification of any object 100 meters wide or larger.) You can get higher resolution photos on the web. But the point Iran is making here is that it is becoming less and less dependent on other nations for space satellites. The many sanctions against Iran make it increasingly difficult to buy satellites from foreign manufacturers so Iran must learn to build its own or do without.
 
When Iran could buy foreign satellites they did so and paid for foreign rockets to launch them. This is how Iran launched its first satellites in 2005. This was the Sina-1 communications and photo-reconnaissance satellite that was capable of performing espionage, especially against Israel. Launched in October 2005 on a Russian rocket, the satellite was described as being used for scientific purposes only. With a three year lifetime, the Iranians described camera equipment as capable of 50 meter resolution (pictures taken allow the identification of any object 50 meters wide or larger.) This is not military grade resolution. You can get better stuff from Google Earth.
 
Russia built the 110 kg (375 pound) Sina-1, and is unlikely to have secretly provided higher resolution (and much more expensive) camera gear. Besides, you can’t get high res equipment into a satellite of that size. Russia received a $132 million contract with Iran, to build and launch this satellite, so the Russians kept quiet about the Iranian claims. The “spy satellite” claim by Iran is apparently for domestic consumption, another attempt to show the Iranian people that the country is getting its money’s worth and to buff the country’s anti-Israeli reputation.
 
Even before Sina-1 Iran has been caught using spies to steal Western satellite technology. They have had some success with this espionage and smuggling effort. Iran launched its second satellite in 2008 using a Chinese rocket. In 2012, for the third time in the previous three years, Iran put a satellite (Navid) into orbit using one of its own rockets. Navid was a 50 kg (110 pound) photo satellite with an estimated lifespan of 18 months. Navid was also used for testing other functions, like communications. Iran launched the Rasad-1 photo satellite in 2011. The first Iran launched satellite, Omid, was called an experimental telecommunications effort, and it went up in 2009.
 
Since 2005 Iran has been trying to get an Italian firm to let go of a $10 million Mesbah-1 telecommunications satellite built for Iran. Shipment of the satellite was halted when new sanctions were slapped on Iran, which made the paid-for satellite illegal for Italy to export. When Iran made the Mesbah-1 deal, the 75 kg (175 pound) satellite was to be launched using a Russian rocket. But now Iran has rockets that can launch small satellites, and wants to get their hands on Mesbah-1 and launch it themselves. But that won't happen with the sanctions. And even more recent sanctions make it illegal for Russia to launch the Mesbah-1. Since the Mesbah-1 was somewhat low-tech, Iran went ahead and built one itself, which it plans to launch on an Iranian rocket this year, and hopes their version (of both the rocket and the satellite) will work.
 
In 2009, using a modified Shahab 4 ballistic missile, Iran put a crude satellite into low earth orbit. This was done to coincide with the 30th anniversary of their Islamic revolution. The satellite was described as a "communications satellite", but it was actually nothing more than a transponder, giving off a signal that could be tracked. What Iran has done is carry out the same kind of early satellite launches Russia and the United States did in the 1950s. Iran then announced that they were building more satellites and they have done that. But given the level of technology they have access to, these have been low capability birds, launched in to low orbit and have short lifetimes.
The Iranian launch is similar to the Russian Sputnik launch of 1957, which was the first satellite ever put in orbit. The U.S. followed in 1958. Since then, eight other nations, including Iran, have done the same. Ukraine was the last to do so, in 1995. Israel launched its first satellite in 1988. France launched its first satellite in 1965, Japan and China in 1970, Britain in 1971, and India in 1980.
 
Iran is continuing to combine ballistic missile and satellite launcher development. Most of the larger ballistic missiles, especially ICBMs, can launch satellites. The U.S. and Russia have used retired ICBMs for this. Iran is following the same path, sort of.

Monday, 21 October 2013

Russian Commander Admires Iran's Ability to Optimize S-200 Defense System

Russian Air Force Commander Lieutenant General Viktor Bondarev praised Iran for its ability to optimize the Russian-made S-200 long-range air defense missile system to cover mid-altitude flying targets, Commander of Iran’s Khatam ol-Anbia Air Defense Base Brigadier General Farzad Esmayeeli said.

"We briefed the Russian Air Force commander on the changes we have made in the (S-200) system and he admired these capabilities," Esmayeeli told reporters after a meeting with Bondarev in Tehran on Sunday.

"We told him that the system was a long-range system completely made by Russia, but we could add up to its capabilities to cover mid-altitude threats by changing the structure and protocol of the S-200 system and using Sayyad-2 missiles and we also told him that this (new) capability has proved successful on the scene of practical tests,", Esmayeeli added.

Iran announced in August that it has used the latest home-made missile production, Sayyad (Hunter) 2, in its sophisticated S-200 anti-aircraft system.

Speaking to reporters in August, Esmayeeli said that the country had used "Sayyad 2 missiles in its S-200 defense systems", and pointed out that the restructuring of the system was the result of the industrious efforts made by experts at the Iranian defense industries and his base.

In similar remarks in July 2011, Esmayeeli had announced that the country's experts have been able to optimize the Russian-made S-200 anti-aircraft missile system so well that the Iranian version of the system has stunned Russian experts.

In November 2010, Iran successfully test-fired its sophisticated S-200 anti-aircraft missile systems.
Iran's S-200 system is a very long range, medium-to-high altitude surface-to-air missile (SAM) system designed to defend large areas from bomber attack or other strategic aircrafts. Each battalion has 6 single-rail missile launchers and fire control radar. It can be linked to other, longer-range radar systems.

Each missile is launched by 4 solid-fueled strap-on rocket boosters. Maximum range is between 200 and 350 km depending on the model. The missile uses radio illumination mid-course correction to fly towards the target with a terminal semi active radar homing phase.

Friday, 5 July 2013

Iran upgrades missile defense system

Iran has optimized its Russian-made, S-200 long-range missile defense system and reduced its firing time, an Iranian air force general said.

Brig. Gen. Farzad Esmaveeli told the semi-official Fars news agency Tuesday the quicker reaction time from detection to firing has enhanced the country's air defense capabilities, enabling it to defend larger areas from bomb attack. 

The system is capable of detecting objects within a 3,000-kilometer (1,864.2-mile) range, has the ability to adjust its altitude and can target aircraft heading to Iran from distances farther than Qatar or Afghanistan, the news agency said.

The missile defense system has medium- to high-altitude surface-to-air missiles. Each missile is powered by four solid-fuel, strap-on rocket boosters and uses radio illumination mid-course correction to fly toward a target with a terminal semi-active radar homing phase, the agency said.

Thursday, 4 July 2013

Navy Moves Smaller Coastal Craft To Persian Gulf As We Pull Big Ships


Once again, the US Navy is moving more warships to the Persian Gulf. This time, though, we’re not sending an extra aircraft carrier or another task force. This is arguably a de-escalation of possible tensions with Iran. In a nutshell, the Navy is replacing big ships with small ones.

The three new ships – Tempest, Squall, and Thunderbolt – are Cyclone-class PCs, which stands not for “personal computer” or “politically correct” but “patrol, coastal.” They are relatively small vessels – 179 feet long, 380 tons displacement, and boasting just 28 crew. They are well-suited to shallow waters, protecting oil rigs, and working with our Arab allies’ modest fleets. Another two PCs, Hurricane and Monsoon, will join the Bahrain-based 5th Fleet next year, leaving just three in US home waters to do (primarily) counter-drug operations for 4th Fleet out of Mayport, Florida. Meanwhile, however, the Navy’s cutting back on aircraft carriers, destroyers, and even minesweepers on duty in the Gulf.
 
That’s not to say the Cyclones can’t fight. In fact, the five already homeported in Bahrain are being upgunned with Raytheon-made Griffin missiles, the same relatively short-ranged weapon being added to the controversial Littoral Combat Ships. (The newly arriving PCs will get their Griffins later). Last year, the Navy just happens to have successfully tested the Griffin against small fast-attack craft, the favored watergoing weapon of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps.
“We’re just installing the Griffin missile system on the patrol craft now. That’s a laser-guided rocket that will help counter any kind of swarm tactic,” said Capt. Joseph Naman, commander of 5th Fleet’s coastal patrol craft, in a conference call this morning with reporters. “I would take the PC over a swarm [of fast-attack boats]. Pound for pound the punch is much harder.”

 Three Navy coastal patrol craft arrived in the Persian Gulf this morning aboard a transoceanic transport ship
Loading up small craft with heavy machineguns and rocket-propelled grenades is a cheap way to put firepower on the water, but they may not hit much of anything. “The speedboats with the guns and the guys hanging off with RPGs, all those [weapons] are unguided, all those are not stabilized,” Naman explained. In the Gulf, “we’re normally seeing about one to three-foot [waves] on a good day and maybe five to seven-foot seas on some of the interesting days we have.” That’s bad news for the Revolutionary Guard gunner trying to eyeball his target from a jouncing deck. By contrast, even before the Griffins are installed, the Cyclones have two 25-milimeter quick-firing cannon and a multitude of machineguns, all on stabilized mounts to keep them on target in rough seas.

 The coastal patrol craft USS Tempest in the Persian Gulf.
That’s still a lot less firepower than the bigger and more-expensive-to-operate warships that the Cyclones are effectively replacing. This spring, the Pentagon announced the Navy would halve the number of aircraft carriers patrolling the Persian Gulf at any given time from two to one – which also cuts in half the accompanying cruisers, destroyers, and submarines – because it simply could not afford to sortie the carrier strike groups under the budget cuts known as sequestration. (The uncertainty over a stopgap spending measure called the Continuing Resolution, since resolved, was also a major factor).

The Navy’s also cutting back on patrols by its workhorse Arleigh Burke DDG-51 destroyers, Capt. Naman said. “The slight decline in DDGs closely correlates to our decline in forces in Iraq and our drawdown in Afghanistan,” he told reporters. To support the wars on land, the fleet has been making longer and more frequent deployments over the last decade, to the point that both ships and their crews are getting tired. Now, said Naman, “we’re trying to stretch [out] the time between deployments a little bit longer so we can do the maintenance on the ships we need to.” (But sequester complicates maintenance as well).

“It doen’t mean we’re going to do away with the DDGs,” Naman emphasized. But as the patrol craft flotilla increases from five historically to eight now and 10 next year, he said, “we’re picking up a lot of the missions they were doing.”

 Tugboats move the newly arrived USS Tempest into harbor in Bahrain.
Most of those missions are low-profile cooperation with the Gulf Cooperation Council states – Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, the UAE, and the big brother, Saudi Arabia. Building up local partners is the best long-term bulwark against Iran, and those partners’ own fleets consist largely of smaller coastal craft much more similar to the Cyclones than to the Arleigh Burkes. Those international missions include training exercises – “there’re over 15 of them we do every year with the GCC nations,” said Naman – and protecting offshore or coastal installations such as the ports, oil rigs, and desalinization plants on which the region’s economy depends. In the shallow waters of the Gulf, small can be beautiful, Naman said: “We can go more places with the PC than we can with the DDG based on the draft alone.”

A mission the Cyclones can’t perform, however, is minesweeping. The Navy doubled the number of Avenger-class mine counter-measures (MCM) ships in the Gulf from four to eight last year amidst Iranian threats to close the Strait of Hormuz, but now it’s sending the extra four Avengers home again. “They made a conscious decision to bring additional MCMs over here temporarily,” said Naman. “It wasn’t a homeport shift; it was a deployment….We have moved some portion of those back; the remaining ones will go back this fall.”

In the long run, the mine-clearing mission will fall to the Littoral Combat Ship, which will also hunt submarines and Iranian-style small attack boats. (The LCS will have plug-and-play “mission modules” to tailor it for each of the three threats). While the Navy has made major progress on LCS’s costs, it’s still working out both tactics and technology for the highly unconventional new ships.

Both variants of the Littoral Combat Ship are also about eight times larger than a coastal patrol craft (3,000 tons displacement versus 380). So even in the future, the Navy will likely need both types for different missions in different depths of water. For now, until the LCS becomes fully operational, it’s up to the Cyclones to patrol the shallows.

Wednesday, 3 July 2013

Iran importing missile-grade French, German ore

Export data shows Tehran exploiting loophole in sanctions to obtain metals that could be used to make missile components.

Exploiting a loophole in Western sanctions, Iran is importing a high grade of refined alumina ore from several European countries including Germany and France that Tehran could be using to make armor parts and missile components.

Western measures imposed on Iran over its disputed nuclear program have hit many sectors of its economy including steel and other metals, where it is heavily dependent on imports. Tehran says its atomic work is peaceful.
 
The refined ore has been excluded from European Union sanctions, but tightened US sanctions that came into effect on July 1 seek to close the loophole. According to a US Treasury briefing, the latest measures will cover "raw or semi-finished metals" that include aluminum.

"After July 1, new sanctions will blacklist metals trade with Iran including aluminum, coal, steel, gold, silver and platinum amongst others, and should include alumina," said Mark Dubowitz, who has advised President Barack Obama's administration and US lawmakers on sanctions.

Alumina is a refined version of the raw ore bauxite. It is typically used to make aluminum, but in its high purity or 'chemical grade' form, it has non-metal applications that have sensitive military uses.

Export data from independent firm Global Trade Information Services showed that between January 2012 and March 2013, around 4,000 tons of alumina had been sold to Iran mostly from Germany and France, but also from Slovenia, Italy, Hungary and Belgium.
 
Experts and traders say the high price paid of $700-$1,000 a ton and relatively low amounts involved indicated the exports were most likely high purity chemical grade alumina.

Mark Gorwitz, previously with the US Department of Defense and now a consultant specializing in nuclear and missile-related technologies, says Iran is able to manufacture weapons grade ceramic composites using chemical alumina.

"Iran definitely has the ability to manufacture missile parts locally. They've done quite a bit of work on ceramic composites made with alumina, and used for manufacturing armor parts and missile components like nozzles," he said.

Gorwitz cited an academic paper seen by Reuters on the scientific properties of alumina armor, published in 2011 by researchers at Malek Ashtar University, an entity listed by the EU in 2008 as linked to Iran's nuclear activities.

Chemical alumina, a powder, has to be combined with other materials to make ceramic composites for missiles and armor.

David Albright, a former UN weapons inspector now president of US-based think-tank the Institute for Science and International Security, said Iran had been studying the use of chemical alumina for years, citing three scientific journal papers published by Iranian academics between 2008 and 2009.
 
"The documents show that there's an interest in mastering the use of chemical alumina for a broad set of uses which include military," he said.

Chemical alumina can also be used to make transparent ceramics used in lasers and night vision devices. But its use in protective cones for missiles potentially links it to Iran's nuclear program.

"In general, Iran has been trying for three decades to develop ballistic missiles," said Michael Elleman with the London-based International Institute for Strategic Studies.

"Transparent ceramics are a type of sapphire made using chemical alumina. Sapphire can be used as a missile component. Whether the missile carries explosive or nuclear warheads is not the point; most missiles are dual capable."

A spokesman for Tehran's UN mission in New York said sanctions were "counterproductive in terms of confidence building between Iran and some members of the Security Council who level some allegations against my country.”

"Iran has never violated its international commitment and always remains committed to its obligations," he said.

Data from the International Aluminum Institute showed Europe produced 2.38 million tons of chemical grade alumina between January 2012 and June 2013, accounting for about a third of the total chemical alumina produced globally.

"None of the military and defense-related applications use particularly large tonnages of alumina," a Western specialist familiar with alumina processes said.
Iranian military commanders regularly announce what they say
 is significant progress in the manufacture of defense systems and missiles, which are tested during regular drills and war games. But western analysts say their real capabilities cannot be independently verified.

A spokesman for EU foreign policy chief Catherine Ashton said the export of all forms of crude aluminum products as well as other aluminum products were prohibited under EU sanctions.

"Whereas the export of aluminum ore - alumina - is not," the spokesman said. "It is an area that may be looked at in the future."

As of July 1, however, the tightened US sanctions might hamper the alumina trade with Iran as companies involved, who also have U.S. interests could be targeted by Washington.

"Any European companies found selling alumina, for example, will face the full weight of US law. Alumina previously has sailed past the radar under previous US and EU sanctions and should not be overlooked again as an important target of pressure," Dubowitz said.

Earlier this year, Switzerland-based commodities giant Glencore Xstrata said it had done nothing wrong when they engaged in alumina-for-aluminum swap deals with Iran. Another Swiss group Trafigura was involved in similar deals.

One industry source said at present alumina made in Europe was reaching Iran via middlemen operating from the Middle East Gulf who transport the cargoes on barges from the United Arab Emirates. Alumina can be shipped in general cargo vessels.

"There's a number of small-time traders in Dubai dealing with alumina from Europe. They buy it from Europe and ship it to (Iran's major cargo port) Bandar Abbas," said a Europe-based alumina player familiar with the trade.

"It's a lucrative market ... these small guys have not got that much reputation to lose even if they get caught."

The surprise victory of moderate cleric Hassan Rouhani in Iran's presidential election last month has raised hopes for an easing of tension in the decade-old nuclear dispute, although he is not expected to opt for dramatic change, given his ties with the religious leadership.

"It seems unlikely that the presidential elections will have a significant effect on Iran's military program - at least in the short term," said Hannah Poppy at consultancy Risk Advisory.

"Military spending is a long-term budgetary issue, and the President's control over the military is limited. Also, Iran has invested a considerable amount to support its regional allies Syria and Hezbollah, so a major reduction in military aid or rhetorical support would be counter-intuitive."

Orbital Blockade Imposed On Iran

This month most international suppliers of space satellite communications are blocking Iran from receiving or sending material (especially TV) via satellite. This is in compliance with more severe sanctions placed on Iran last year. The satellite providers are being pressured to ignore this shutdown because the sanctions do not cover media. But the satellite provider lawyers advised a shutdown because the United States appears ready to punish any firm that tries to keep transmissions going for Iran on “media” grounds.
 
Iran protests this denial of service, which is ironic as for years Iran has been actively trying to block satellite signals it does not like. Iran is not alone in this. Communications satellites operating in 36,000 kilometer high stationary (geosynchronous) orbits are increasingly victims of jamming and other forms of interference. There is a solution for military users, who can use existing anti-jamming technologies like frequency hopping and DSSS (Direct Sequence Spread Spectrum) on the sending and receiving end. But all users of civilian satellites cannot be equipped with these anti-jamming devices. The satellite operators can use this stuff for the control signals (going to and coming from the satellite) and that is increasingly becoming necessary. Another problem with this approach is that jamming protection reduces the amount of data that can be sent, which is a serious, and expensive, cost for commercial communications satellites.
 
Meanwhile, the jamming of civilian users grows, usually as part of a state censorship program. For example, late last year Syria and Iran were accused of jamming news service sent to Iran and Syria by BBC, France 24, Deutsche Welle, and the Voice of America, via radio and satellite. This jamming was apparently in retaliation for European communications satellite operators refusing to continue carrying 19 Iranian TV and radio channels (as part of the growing embargo on Iran) to audiences outside Iran. Syria and Iran denied they were jamming but there is ample evidence that the jamming is coming from those two countries. Over the last decade the U.S. has developed equipment and techniques for locating the source of jamming with considerable accuracy and that effort has most frequently caught Iran doing what it always denies.
 
Then there are the increasing number of incidents of space satellites being "hacked". It turned out that this was actually just an increase in the number of satellites up there and the number of ground stations broadcasting information up into the sky. Most of these "hacks" are just satellite signals interfering with one another. Same with cases where people believe their GPS or satellite communications signals are being jammed. On further investigation the real reasons tend to be less interesting and a lot more technical. All this usually has a large element of human error mixed in. But the recent problems with satellite reception problems in Iran and Syria appear to be jamming.
 
But all this accidental jamming only demonstrates how easy it is to do it on purpose, and there have been several examples of that. In response the U.S. Air Force, which has taken the lead in developing electronic tools for attacking and defending satellite communications, and the satellites themselves and has been training people to use these techniques. This effort involves figuring out new, or improved, ways to jam satellites. Then you keep that stuff secret, in case potential enemies have not figured this out themselves. Next, you work on ways to defeat the weapons developed. Most of this is playing around with the signals themselves. You can un-jam a jamming signal with another signal. 

However, a lot of trial and error is required and you want to get that done way in advance of any actual war. When you do have to use this stuff for real, you have to expect that the enemy may well have come up with some angle you missed. Thus, there will be some rapid improvisation, and you will have more time and resources for this if you have worked out ahead of time the details of disasters you have already anticipated. No one is releasing much information about this, for obvious reasons. There won't be much discussion from any government, unless there is a terrorist attack using these techniques. That's yet another thing to worry about. There have already been such attacks in China, by a banned religious group, and elsewhere. It can be done, it just isn't easy and it's not getting easier.

Tuesday, 2 July 2013

Wars Update - More Violence, Fewer Dead Bodies

The "Arab Spring" has devolved into the “Arab Fall” as the “successful” uprisings against dictators and monarchs (Tunisia, Egypt, Yemen, Libya) turned out to have superficial impact on the corrupt and mismanaged societies that were seeking some fundamental reform and improvement. Other candidates for Arab Spring failed or never got going (Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Algeria, Morocco, Lebanon). Syria is not over but the rebels are winning. In Egypt, the disgruntled population is moving towards a revival of the uprising because the new bosses are too similar to the old ones.

Libya was won by armed civilians assisted by NATO smart bombs and warships. The Syrian rebels want this kind of help but the West is reluctant to do this again. Arab gratitude is brittle and can quickly turn to treachery or hate. The uprisings were mostly about corruption and the resulting massive poverty. For that reason, the Saudi Arabian monarchy was able to buy its way out of an uprising. Yemen mutated into low level civil war that was soon over, while Syria grew slowly into a countrywide guerilla war. Egypt and Tunisia were over quickly, but subsequent elections put Islamic conservatives in power and left most of the corruption alone. In Egypt the military was able to maintain its corrupt grip on the economy. It's unclear how this will turn out because the Islamic and secular rebel groups are spending most of their time going after each other. Indeed, the biggest problem was that these dictatorships were not just the single dictator but that segment of the population that kept the dictator in power, were well rewarded for that and were not eager to flee or give up their wealth. The dictator's supporters are striving to retain or regain their power. The Old Order has substantial economic and political resources and is willing to use them to retain power and wealth.

Most current wars are basically uprisings against police states or feudal societies, which are seen as out-of-step with the modern world. Many are led by radicals preaching failed dogmas (Islamic conservatism, Maoism, and other forms of radical socialism), that still resonate among people who don't know about the dismal track records of these creeds. Iran has replaced some of the lost Soviet terrorist support effort. That keeps Hezbollah, Hamas (until recently), and a few smaller groups going, and that's it. Terrorists in general miss the Soviets, who really knew how to treat bad boys right.

The War on Terror  has morphed into the War Against Islamic Radicalism. This religious radicalism has always been around, for Islam was born as an aggressive movement that used violence and terror to expand. Past periods of conquest are regarded fondly by Moslems, who are still taught by many of their religious leaders and teachers that non-Moslems ("infidels") are inferior. The current enthusiasm for violence in the name of God has been building through most of the 20th century. Historically, Islamic radicalism has flared up into mass bloodshed periodically, usually in response to corrupt governments, as a vain attempt to impose a religious solution on some social or political problem.

 The current violence is international because of the availability of planet wide mass media (which needs a constant supply of headlines) and the fact that the Islamic world is awash in tyranny and economic backwardness. This is why the Arab Spring uprisings, and their desire to establish democracies, may do some permanent damage to the Islamic terrorism tradition. There are already more condemnations of Islamic radicals by Islamic clerics and media in Moslem nations. These changes have not come as quickly as many hoped, but at least they finally arrived. This came as a surprise to many Moslems. That’s because the past has had a huge influence on Islamic societies. For many, resistance to change is considered a religious obligation. Many Moslems consider democracy a poisonous Western invention. There is still a lot of affection for the clerical dictatorship of legend, a just and efficient government run by virtuous religious leaders. The legends are false and there are centuries of failed religious dictatorships to prove it. But this legend has become a core belief for many Moslems and will be shaken by reality or the historical record. 

Islamic radicalism itself is incapable of mustering much military power, and the movement largely relies on terrorism to gain attention. Most of the victims are fellow Moslems, which is why the radicals eventually become so unpopular among their own people that they run out of popular support and fade away. This is what is happening now. The American invasion of Iraq was a clever exploitation of this, forcing the Islamic radicals to fight in Iraq, where they killed many Moslems, especially women and children, thus causing the Islamic radicals to lose their popularity among Moslems. The sharp decline in the Islamic nation opinion polls was startling. 

Normally, the West does not get involved in these Islamic religious wars, unless attacked in a major way. Moreover, modern sensibilities have made retaliation difficult. For example, fighting back is considered, by Moslems, as culturally insensitive ("war on Islam"), and some of the Western media have picked up on this bizarre interpretation of reality.  It gets worse. Historians point out, for example, that the medieval Crusades were a series of wars fought in response to Islamic violence against Christians, not the opening act of aggression against Islam that continues to the present. Thus, the current war on terror is, indeed, in the tradition of the Crusades. And there are many other "Crusades" brewing around the world, in the many places where aggressive Islamic militants are making unprovoked war on their Christian and non-Moslem neighbors. Political Correctness among academics and journalists causes pundits to try and turn this reality inside out. But a close look at the violence in Africa, Asia, and the Middle East shows a definite pattern of Islamic radicals persecuting those who do not agree with them, not the other way around.

While Islamic terrorism grabs most of the headlines, it is not the cause of many casualties, at least not compared to more traditional wars. The vast majority of the military related violence and deaths in the world comes from many little wars that get little media attention outside their region. Actually some of them are not so little. While causalities from international terrorism are relatively few, the dead and wounded from all the other wars actually comprise about 95 percent of all the casualties.

The Islamic terrorism looms larger because the terrorists threaten attacks everywhere and at any time, putting a much larger population in harm's way, and the more numerous potential victims are unhappy with that prospect. In the West, and most Moslem nations, Islamic terrorism remains more of a threat than reality. In fact, casualties from terrorist attacks have been declining. Most of the victims are in Iraq and Afghanistan, where they have been operating for decades. Before 2003, many of the current Sunni terrorists were on Saddam’s payroll, carrying out “legal” terrorism. 

There are a lot of people dying from armed and organized (sort of) violence word-wide. But most of this violence involved one, or both sides, operating as armed civilians. One of the bloodiest of these irregular conflicts is the one going on in Mexico, where drug gangs battle over who shall control the lucrative drug smuggling routes into the United States. Most of the killings are done by drug gang gunmen in civilian clothes. The death toll is over 80,000 since 2007. That's right up there with the wars that get a lot more media coverage (Afghanistan, Pakistan, Syria, Sudan, Somalia). That's no accident, as the Mexican drug war includes a lot of violence against the media, mainly local print and electronic outlets. The drug gangs don't want any unfavorable coverage and are willing to kill those who dare to say unkind things. This is common in many of the wars where one, or both sides are basically outlaws and able to do as they please.

Despite the growing military power of China, and the saber rattling from Russia, the major military powers continue the Great Nuclear Truce (GNT) that began in the 1950s, when Russia got nuclear weapons and suddenly realized they could not afford to use them (without risking more destruction than past foes like the Nazis or Mongols inflicted). As more major powers got nukes, the "we can't afford to use them, but they're nice to have" attitude, and the unprecedented truce, persisted. There have been wars but not between the big players (who have the largest and most destructive conventional forces). Thus a record was broken in 1986, as there had never before (since the modern state system developed in the 16th century) been so long a period without a war between a major powers (the kind that could afford, these days, to get nukes). Since the Cold War ended in 1991, there have been fewer wars (in the traditional sense) and more low level conflicts (rebellions, civil wars).

Most people are unaware of this situation because the mass media never made a lot of the GNT, it was something that was just there and not worth reporting. Besides, "nukes (bombs, power plants, medicine) are evil" sells if you are in the news business. Calling any incident, with a lot of gunfire and a few dead bodies, a "war" has also been misleading. The fact is, worldwide violence has been declining since the end of the Cold War and the elimination of Russian subsidies and encouragement for pro-communist (or simply pro-Russia) rebels and terrorists. The media also has a hard time keeping score. For years Iraq was portrayed as a disaster until, suddenly, the enemy was crushed and the war was won. Even that was not considered exciting enough to warrant much attention, and that story is still poorly covered. Same pattern is playing out in Afghanistan, where the defeats of the Taliban, and triumph of the drug gangs, go unreported or distorted. However, if you step back and take a look at all the wars going on, a more accurate picture emerges.

Current wars are listed in alphabetical orders. Text underneath briefly describes current status. Click on country name for more details. 

AFGHANISTAN 

The government continues trying to negotiate a deal with pro-Taliban Pushtun tribes and clans in the south. The Taliban leadership (most of them live in the Pakistan sanctuary of Quetta) oppose this sort of thing, as they have done for years. But more clans and tribe leaders make deals and this further splinters the Taliban and lessen the risk of another civil war between Pushtuns (and among Pushtun factions) and the other ethnic groups (who are 60 percent of the population but much less violent than the Pushtuns). Most NATO troops in Afghanistan will be gone by 2014. The drug gangs and their Taliban allies are depending on this departure for long-term survival. But that could create a heroin producing, Islamic terrorist and gangster sanctuary in Central Asia. If you want to know how that works out, look at Chechnya in the late 1990s and Somalia during the last decade. No one has come up with any cheap, fast, or easy solution for that. Meanwhile, Afghanistan's core problem is that there is no Afghanistan, merely a collection of tribes more concerned about tribal, than national, prosperity and power. Ten percent of the population, mostly living in the cities and often working with the foreigners, believes in Afghanistan the country. But beyond the city limits, it's a very different Afghanistan that is currently motivated by growing prosperity brought on by a decade of relative peace. By Afghan standards, an unprecedented amount of cash has come into the country since September 11, 2001. Between economic growth, the growing heroin sales, and foreign aid, plus lower losses from violence, it's been something of a Golden Age. But Afghanistan has a long history of civil war and endemic tribal violence. For example, it's often forgotten that the 1990s civil war was still active on September 11, 2001.

The Taliban (or, more accurately, Pushtun nationalists from the southwest) have been trying to make a comeback ever since. Meanwhile most Afghans are more interested in grabbing a chunk of the new economic opportunities. Despite a decline in civilian deaths (and the fact that most of them are caused by the Taliban), the Afghan government plays up every civilian death caused by foreign troops as a bargaining chip in the effort to cripple NATO anti-corruption efforts. There hasn't been a real "Taliban Spring Offensive" for the last seven years and that’s partly because of cash flow problems.
 
The key Taliban financial resource, heroin in Helmand and Kandahar provinces, has been under heavy attack for over four years now. The poppy (the source of opium and heroin) crop has been hammered by drought and disease, growing competition from Burmese heroin and drug gang income has suffered. The Taliban expected drug gang profits, al Qaeda assistance, and Pakistani reinforcements to help them out. But al Qaeda is a very junior, and unpopular, partner, and the death of Osama bin Laden in 2011 was a big blow to morale. Pakistani Taliban are mostly sending refugees, not reinforcements. In the last half of 2011, the Taliban were much reduced, and for the year their attacks were down and casualties are up. Losses for foreign troops were also way down from the peak year of 2010 (711 dead). Foreign troop deaths began to rapidly decline in the second half of 2011, with casualties among Afghan police and soldiers rising as Afghans took control of security in more of the country. The higher foreign troop casualties in 2010 were because there were more foreign troops in action during that year, and those troops were much more aggressive.

The Taliban roadside bomb weapon has lost its punch because of more MRAPs and specialized intel and engineer troops moved in from Iraq. Thus the proportion of foreign troop deaths from roadside bombs declined from a peak of 61 percent in 2009, to under 40 percent last year. This has not helped civilians, who suffer far more deaths from Taliban action. In fact, independent minded tribes, warlords, corruption and drug gangs remain a greater threat to peace,  prosperity, and true national unity than the Taliban (on both sides of the Pakistan border). Newly wealthy civilians are buying rifles and pistols for self-defense. Moreover, the "Taliban" are not an organization but a Pushtun movement that is active on both sides of the border and supported by less than ten percent of the 40 million Pushtun in the region. Five years ago the Pakistani government finally agreed to take on the pro-Taliban tribes and various Islamic terrorist organizations. That has put pressure on Taliban on both sides of the border. There are fewer safe havens for the Taliban. Violence inside Afghanistan is growing, largely because of the drug gangs and their support for tribes (especially pro-Taliban ones) that oppose the corrupt (in part because of drug gang bribes) national government.

The foreign nations, fighting their war on terror in Afghanistan, have finally realized that there has never been an Afghan national government that was not corrupt, and changing that is going to be more difficult than fighting the Taliban. NATO is now fully aware of the trans-national nature of the Pushtun tribes and the Taliban movement. The "war in Afghanistan" is more of a "Pushtun Tribal Rebellion," and is being handled as such. Most NATO nations with troops in Afghanistan are willing to just walk away and deal with the fallout later. Afghanistan has become politically unpopular and the easiest way out (for Western politicians) is to get out and let their successors deal with the fallout.

ALGERIA 

The Arab Spring made only a slight impact here. Many locals are still traumatized by the 1990s war against Islamic terrorists, which is still not completely over. But the anger is growing because of decades of inept dictatorship. There are few Islamic radicals left in Algeria. Over the last decade most of them were killed, captured, or ran off to Europe or south into the desert and across the southern borders into Black Africa. Many of those showed up in Mali over the last year, where a lot of them were killed by the French counter-offensive earlier this year. That operation also did a lot of damage to the al Qaeda smuggling gangs that have been moving South American cocaine north for several years. The few remaining Islamic terrorists in Algeria have few hiding places left. Despite the large amount of uninhabited mountains and forests along the eastern coast, the police and army have been operating there for so long that it's difficult to stay hidden. Too many civilians are hostile to Islamic radicalism and will phone in a tip. Algeria has become a very dangerous place for Islamic terrorists.

 There was a slight increase in terror attacks, as Islamic radicals tried to capitalize on the Arab Spring unrest in neighboring Tunisia and Libya. But in both those countries, the popular uprising was against the local dictators and for democracy, not Islamic radicalism. Islamic political parties were popular, but not Islamic radicals. The uprisings in Tunisia and Libya weakened the local security forces, and made it easier for Islamic radicals to move around and recruit. Algeria increased its border security and has had to deal with more Islamic terrorist just across the border in Tunisia and Libya. The major problem remains, an Algerian government that is basically a corrupt military dictatorship that uses the national oil wealth to buy enough votes to get elected again and again. So more Algerians are fleeing, or vacillating between despair and a desire to fight. The corrupt government insures that there are always more desperate young men willing to give Islamic terrorism a try, but not enough to overthrow the government or even keep Arab Spring demonstrations going. Many expect another, and larger, Arab Spring in Algeria eventually, but so far the geriatric government is making concessions and trying to reform itself. This is delaying another revolution.

BALKANS  

Corruption, crime, and the pursuit of past glories continue to be the main cause of violence here. An Islamic government in Turkey is looking east and south, like the late Ottoman Turk Empire. But to the east and south there is only trouble, while Turkey's growing economy looks west, where the major trading partners are. Meanwhile, there is growing popular unrest in Turkey over the Islamic government’s arrogant and intolerant attitudes towards dissent and criticism. A major outbreak of public protest has forced the government to reconsider its policies. Greece's economic meltdown meant big cuts in the Greek military budget, ending the decades-long arms race with Turkey. Cyprus also suffered an economic meltdown, complicated by the fact that Cyprus had become an offshore banking haven for Russian criminals and corrupt officials. Russia continues to throw its weight around (or at least try to), if only because Russia has spent centuries meddling in the Balkans and just can’t stop. Despite that, the West Europeans got their way, and Kosovo became independent. Serbia disagrees with that, and Big Brother Russia offers all manner of support and threats. But no one is willing to resume the war, yet. No one is willing to renounce war as an option, either. Bosnia continues to attract Islamic terrorists, despite the local government becoming increasingly hostile to these foreign troublemakers and alien Islamic conservatism. Moldova continues to muddle and Bulgaria and Romania continue to fight corruption and lose. The EU is pulling its peacekeepers out of the Balkans, leaving the gangsters, Islamic radicals, and corrupt officials more freedom of action.

CENTRAL ASIA 

The Arab Spring tried to spread to this area but didn't take hold. Local dictators continue to brew rebellion by suppressing democrats, Islamic radicals, and anyone else who objects to strongman rule. Not much violence most of the time, just a lot of potential and a growing number of local Islamic militants who seem determined to use violence to change things. The dictators in the "Stans" (the former provinces of the Soviet Union that became five independent nations, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan, and Tajikistan) have been rebuilding the Soviet era secret police. The new dictators have noted that the Soviets never had any problems with Islamic terrorism, or any other kind of terrorism, and are going old school on this new problem. Nevertheless, popular uprisings have succeeded here. The continuing unrest in Kyrgyzstan demonstrates that there are limits to what a dictatorship can do. That’s one reason Kyrgyzstan is seeking closer economic and political ties with Russia, just in case the local situation gets out of control. Russia stands ready to provide similar help to the other Stans, which are all being pulled back into the Russian economic and political orbit. 

CHAD 

Chad and Sudan halted their support for each other's rebels four years ago and formally made peace. Now the biggest problem along the border is the bandits, who prey on the refugees and the foreign aid workers. The peacekeepers have left, and the foreign aid groups threatened to follow if Chad security forces were unable, or unwilling, to deal with the banditry in and around the refugee camps. Chadian soldiers and police did keep the bandits in check, and the aid groups (a major source of economic activity in eastern Chad) remained. This success led Chad to send several thousand troops to Mali to assist the French in clearing out an infestation of Islamic terrorists. This might be considered payback for assistance France has given Chad in the past. Meanwhile the unrest along the Sudan border is caused by refugees from tribal battles in Sudan, who bring their feuds with them. Prospects for peace are not good in Sudan, so the Sudanese refugees remain a problem. Chad is now quieter but not peaceful. Same with its neighbor, the CAR (Central African Republic), which suffers from the same plague of multiculturalism induced rebellions. The civil war in CAR flared up in the past year and escalated in 2013, to an overthrow of the CAR government. That change of government has settled down things in CAR, but the situation still remains volatile in Sudan. For both Chad and CAR, corruption, poverty, disorder, and starvation are larger problems than armed violence.

CHINA 

China is edging towards war with its neighbors. North Korea is now on this list because the North Koreans have openly defied China, which is not happy with having an unstable nuclear power as a neighbor. North Korea is getting threats, some of them public, from China. Meanwhile, in the South China Sea China has embraced the idea that this entire area is not international waters nor the property of the nearest country but part of China. This violates international agreements on such matters, but China disagrees and is becoming more aggressive in enforcing these claims. China is using the “death by a thousand cuts” approach, constantly pushing other nations away from disputed rocks and reefs and threatening worse if anyone tries drilling for oil or gas in these offshore waters.

China is applying the same tactics on India along their 4,000 kilometer land border. Meanwhile, there are growing problems at home, where growing success in using the Internet for espionage did not translate in the ability to establish a lot of control over Internet use within China. The government has been unable to create a new domestic information monopoly (as existed in the pre-cell phone/Internet days). Bad news gets out and causes growing unrest or corruption and abusive government. There are thousands of large protest riots each year, and some towns are openly rebelling. It's all because of an un-elected government run by communists who no longer believe in communism. The growing corruption taints everything. For example, military reforms are crippled by corruption and energetic government efforts to clean it up constantly fail. In late 2012, the government launched another major anti-corruption drive but, as in the past, most of those prosecuted are low level operators while the biggest (and most senior) offenders continue doing the most damage with the least risk. China continues its long-range plan to be a military superpower. World class weapons are planned for the future, some 10-20 years from now, but every year China offers more advanced weapons to the world market. Chinese military technology is suspect, as much of it is based on Russian stuff, and during the Cold War Russian weapons always seemed to be what the losers used. A lot of this new tech is aimed at India. The rivalry between China and India becomes more obvious and dangerous. China is mainly concerned about its trade routes through the Indian Ocean. The confrontation with Taiwan continues to subside, replaced by kind words and gracious lies, along with increases in trade and commerce. Taiwan buys more arms and China speeds up modernization of its armed forces, with an emphasis on protecting its sea trade routes and overseas economic interests. Thus the world is seeing more Chinese in peacekeeping missions as well as growing Chinese threats to peace. 

COLOMBIA 

Peace talks with the major leftist rebel group FARC are proceeding slowly. After nearly half a century of violence, leftist rebels are rapidly losing support, recruits, and territory.  The drug gangs and leftist rebels have merged in many parts of the country, and the war is increasingly about money, not ideology. The leftist rebels are definitely fading but all that drug money can keep them in the game for quite a while. Many of the leftists are disillusioned and it is becoming harder to recruit new gunmen. In Venezuela the country moves closer to civil war. Radical populist president Hugo Chavez died in March, after he had trashed the Venezuelan economy and democracy. His handpicked replacement had to rig the election to become the new president. That just caused more popular discontent in Venezuela, which is threatening to turn that country into another 20th century Colombia. The old Chavez dream of Venezuela becoming a socialist dictatorship supported by oil revenue is rapidly fading, along with cash reserves and the national credit rating. While Venezuela is headed for civil war Colombia continues to prosper and reduce drug gang and leftist rebel violence.

CONGO 

The UN, having tried everything else, finally authorized a special brigade of peacekeepers who have a license to kill and kill as often as needed to eliminate the last few rogue militias operating in the east. This may solve the peacekeeping problems out there but not the fact that Congo has returned to being a one party dictatorship based on corruption and exploiting ethnic divisions. Multiple tribal and political militias, plus an increasing number of bandits, continue to roam the eastern border area, perpetuating the bloodiest (and least reported) war of the last decade (several million dead, depending on who is counting). There are fewer places where the bad guys can roam freely. Attempts to absorb rebels into the army have not worked well. The last major problem is a Tutsi militia, which will not disarm until the government destroys Hutu militias, organized by Hutu mass murderers who fled neighboring Rwanda in the 1990s. The Congolese government finds it cannot (and to a certain extent, will not) cope with this. The reason is money, the millions of dollars available each year to whoever has gunmen controlling the mines that extract valuable ores and allow the stuff out of the country. UN peacekeepers are criticized for not fighting more, but that’s not their job. The Congolese army is not up to it yet either, and late last year one of the more troublesome militias (a Rwanda supported Tutsi outfit) rebelled and rolled over army and peacekeeper troops. The rebels did not seek to overthrow the national government but remain in control of much of the eastern border area. This is where the new UN combat brigade is operating. Meanwhile, the inept and corrupt government creates more anger than contentment, setting the stage for another civil war. The population is not eager for more violence, not after two decades of mayhem. 

ETHIOPIA 

Peacekeeping has proved to be a useful endeavor for Ethiopia. A few thousand troops helped crush the al Shabaab Islamic militia in Somalia. Ethiopia is accustomed to dealing with the Somalis, something the rest of the world should study more closely. Internally, rebellious Moslem groups are a constant threat, especially with more active support from Eritrea. Another force of peacekeepers helped keep the peace in South Sudan, which was rewarded with a transit deal for Ethiopian oil and other goods. Egypt made some nasty, but toothless, threats over Nile River water (and Ethiopian hydroelectric dams). The border dispute with Eritrea festers, and rebellion by ethnic Somalis in Ogaden province persists. There's oil in Ogaden and that has caused the Ethiopians to be brutal to the rebels. 

INDIA-PAKISTAN

This year, for the first time in Pakistani history, an elected civilian government succeeded an earlier elected civilian government. Before that there was always a military dictatorship in between. But now the military has lost a lot of prestige and popular support. This trend began in May 2nd, 2011, when a U.S. raid into Pakistan killed Osama bin Laden. That caused an unexpected popular backlash against the Pakistani military. Not just for sheltering bin Laden (which the generals always denied) but for being unable to spot the "invading Americans", or stop local Islamic radicals from carrying out "revenge attacks" that left hundreds dead. This led to a continuing series of confrontation between the Pakistani military and the civilian government and growing hostility towards military economic and political power. The generals had created a confrontation with the United States as a way to get their own civilian leaders to back off on plans to trim the independence (and wealth) the Pakistani military has long enjoyed. This did not work, nor did an effort to increase hostility with India. This is the result of growing Indian anger at Pakistani support of Islamic terrorism and realization that China is the main enemy now, with Pakistan fading fast.

After the Mumbai terrorist attacks in late 2008, India pressured Pakistan to quit playing media games and get serious about anti-Indian Islamic terrorists (created and sustained by the Pakistani military) based in Pakistan. This caused a struggle within the Pakistani government, over how to deal with Islamic radicalism and their own armed forces. Pakistan quietly backed off on any efforts to suppress its anti-India Islamic terror groups (who are popular with nationalistic Pakistanis). Meanwhile, India has to deal with religious (Islamic) separatists in Kashmir, plus tribal rebels in the northeast, and Maoist (communist) ones in between. In 2010, India launched a large offensive against the Maoists, a war they expect to take several years to finish and, not surprisingly, is proceeding slowly. Pakistan has Islamic radicals in the north and rebellious Pushtun and Baluchi tribes along the Afghan border. The Taliban had become stronger in Pakistan, where it originated, than in Afghanistan. The elected (2008) Pakistani government tried to make peace with the Taliban and when that failed, invaded the Taliban heartland. The previous military government had always avoided open war with the Islamic radicals. But this time the Taliban were beat up pretty bad, and the number of Taliban sponsored terrorist attacks increased in response. The military refused to clear the Islamic radicals out of their two last refuges in North Waziristan and Quetta (Baluchistan). Meanwhile the economy is a mess and the favorite national pastime is blaming foreigners for all these problems.

By way of comparison, Moslem Bangladesh, which broke away from being part of Pakistan in the early 1970s, has no such Islamic radical problem (leftist rebels are the major troublemakers). India and Pakistan both have nukes, making escalation a potential catastrophe. As a result, recent peace talks have lowered the possibility of war, but both sides continue an arms race. Pakistan has always been a mess and does not appear to be getting better. For a while there was an effort to be less hospitable to Islamic radicals. But those Islamic terrorists who concentrated on attacking India were too popular to suppress. The military saw their control of these terrorists as a potential tool to keep the civilian government in line. It was a military government that, in the 1970s, introduced Islamic radicalism as a political tool for controlling the country and for making war against India. Many of the Islamic terrorists eventually turned on the military and were a dangerous failure as a tool for foreign policy. The military continues to support Islamic terrorists, especially those going after India, by providing secure bases in Pakistan and active support in getting into India. There are still many Pakistanis, including government officials, who back Islamic radicalism, but continued attacks on Pakistani civilians have made it more popular to criticize Islamic radicals for the many problems they cause. Pakistan still has a way to go in dealing with that demon.

 The U.S. has threatened to invade if Pakistan based Islamic terrorists launch a successful terror attack in the United States. Evidence is piling up that Pakistani based groups have supported, and still support, efforts to carry out attacks in the U.S. America has told Pakistan that this would have consequences, but the Pakistanis fear a larger civil war of their own if they go after the radicals, mainly because about a third of Pakistanis still back Islamic radicalism. The moderates are a majority, but the minority is more willing to die for their beliefs. That, however, is beginning to slowly change, aided by recent Taliban attacks on women doing “un-Islamic” things (like backing education for girls or vaccinating children against polio). There are also a lot of Pakistanis who are more comfortable with the “there is a Western conspiracy to destroy Islam and we must fight it” view of the world. Pakistan needs help, but mostly from Pakistanis, as the ills that torment Pakistan can only be resolved from within.

INDONESIA 

Mostly at peace but separatism, pirates, Islamic terrorists, and government corruption create a volatile situation that could get hot real fast. Islamic terrorists have been greatly diminished, as Islamic moderates flex their traditional popularity. But Islamic radicals are allowed to continue harassing non-Moslems and Moslems who are not Moslem enough. This is causing growing friction. Aceh still has a few diehard separatist rebels. There is growing separatist unrest in Papua. Newly independent East Timor has taken the leap and replaced peacekeepers with local police but is still stuck in a cycle of perpetual poverty. 

IRAN 

Last year brought many new economic sanctions that cut oil income sharply and resulted in more inflation and unemployment. The government says it will take care of all this, in time. Meanwhile the radical, Israel hating, and anti-corruption president Ahmadinejad openly took on the senior clerics (who hold the ultimate power) and failed. The recent presidential elections saw him replaced by one of the eight candidates the senior clerics allowed to run for election. None of them was anything like Ahmadinejad, who was popular because of his anti-corruption efforts. This was a major problem because the major crooks are senior clerics or their kin. The clerics fought back and Ahmadinejad had no chance of reelection. Meanwhile, popular unrest has been greatly reduced by intense government suppression. The basic problem, for all the things that bother Iranians, is that an Islamic conservative minority has veto power over any attempts at reform from within. Any other reformers are considered enemies of the state. Most Iranians just want a better life. The supply of peaceful solutions is drying up. After that comes another revolution. There are some more complications. Half the population consists of ethnic minorities (mainly Turks and Arabs), and some of these groups (Arabs, Kurds, and Baluchis) are getting more restive and violent (for different reasons).

Meanwhile, the Islamic conservatives are determined to support terrorism overseas and build nuclear weapons at home, rather than concentrating on improving the economy and living standards. All this is made more complicated by a year of more damaging economic sanctions which have cut oil income in half. The economy is a mess, Syria and Lebanon are in danger of being lost as allies, and unrest and terrorist violence are becoming more common in Iran. The government still seeks foreign adventures to distract an unhappy population but too many Iranians see through that and it just increases the popular anger with the government. The inept management of the economy is creating more unemployed young men desperate for a solution. The religious dictatorship is backed by religious fanatics that are willing to kill to stay in power, and guys like this are very difficult to remove. These are also the kind of men who would follow orders and take on the world (over access to the Persian Gulf). The nuclear weapon program moves forward and is very popular with nearly all Iranians (who feel they are a great and powerful people who need nukes to prove it once more).

IRAQ 

All American troops are gone for over a year and Islamic terrorists are now a local police problem. Terrorist violence continues because of diehard Sunni Arabs who refuse to accept Shia domination and growing support from Sunni Arabs elsewhere in the region who fear growing Iranian efforts to spread Shia Islam via Iraq. More areas of the country are now at peace (as some have been since 2003) but the 2007 Sunni Arab peace deals with the majority Kurds and Shia Arabs are unraveling.

Some Sunni Arabs, who had fled the country, are returning but nearly half the Sunni Arabs are still gone (either outside the country or hiding inside Iraq). The uprising in Syria is led by the Sunni Arab majority there (against the ruling Shia Arab minority). Iraqi Sunni Arabs are enthusiastically aiding the Syrian rebels and the Iraqi government is officially neutral (but actually doing much of what Iran asks to support the Syrian government). The Iraqi Shia militias, who were earlier defeated by Iraqi police and troops seven years ago are now being allowed to help suppress the Sunni Arab terrorists. This is what the Sunni Arabs fear most, because the Shia militias use death squads to murder Sunni Arabs, often indiscriminately. Corruption and inept government are major problems with potential Iranian meddling (or even invasion) a permanent threat. For example, the Iranians have had their way and Iraq has quietly allowed Iran to ship weapons via Iraq to Syria. Yet the government backed off on attempts to discourage Iraqi Sunni Arabs from supporting their Sunni brethren in Syria. There are growing tensions between the Kurds in the north (over northern oil fields) and the Arab majority. That could trigger a civil war. Because the Kurds are better prepared for war, and the oil money is very important to preserving their autonomy, the Kurds might win. Plus, the Kurds don't trust the Arabs. To make matters worse for the Iraqi government, Turkey backs the Kurds. 

ISRAEL 

Hamas is under intense pressure to halt rocket attacks from Gaza. That’s because they signed a truce with Israel over this matter and Hamas must get smaller Islamic terror groups in Gaza to go along, otherwise Israel will resume air, and possibly ground, attacks aimed at destroying most of the Hamas rocket stockpile. Hamas remains dedicated to destroying Israel and that rocket stockpile (built by smuggling Iranian rockets in for years) is the only thing that gives Hamas any credibility as a threat to Israel. Hamas needs all the respect it can get in the Arab world because it is losing popular support in Gaza (where its 1.6 million Palestinian subjects are angry at not being able to vote Hamas out of power and being forced to submit to more and more Islamic lifestyle rules). Fatah still rules in the West Bank and is still corrupt, inept, and unpopular. Neither Palestinian faction is interested in real peace talks with Israel. That's because Palestinian leaders continue to preach endless war against Israel and the destruction of the Jewish state. Any peace deal is seen as a stepping stone towards that ultimate goal. Some Palestinians keep trying to make any kind of peace, in order to reverse the economic disaster they brought on themselves as a result of their 14 year old terror campaign against Israel. Polls show that Palestinians are tired of terrorism, even though they still support it (in order to destroy Israel, which remains an article of faith in the Palestinian community).

The Palestinian economy in Gaza has collapsed, as a major component, foreign charity, was reduced because the people elected the Hamas (Islamic terrorists) party to power in 2007. Hamas is trying to convince foreigners that it has changed (it hasn't) in order to get more cash to keep their religious dictatorship going. Iran recently cut aid (over a million dollars a month) because Hamas came out against the Shia Assad government of Syria (under attack by rebels from the Sunni Arab majority). Palestinians are mainly Sunni and not known for religious fervor, so Hamas felt it had to renounce support for the Iran-backed government of Syria in order to placate its Gaza subjects. The antagonism between radical Hamas and corrupt Palestinian old guard (Fatah) has split Palestinians. But that’s not the biggest problem. Long time Arab allies are giving up on the Palestinians, who seem to have abandoned any meaningful attempt to unite and make some kind of peace with Israel. Iran backed Islamic radicals (Hezbollah) and Hamas are still allies, and most Lebanese back the destruction of Israel. Hezbollah violence threatens to drag Lebanon into another civil war or another war with Israel. Hezbollah followed Iranian orders and sent several thousand fighters into Syria. The Arab Spring in Syria has removed Syria as a threat to Israel for the moment and made Hezbollah vulnerable. Egypt has adopted a new constitution which threatens to turn into a religious dictatorship. Many Egyptians oppose that and are increasingly violent about it. Meanwhile, the Israeli economy booms, partly because of a very effective counter-terrorism campaign. This annoys Arabs most of all and a growing number of Arab countries are increasing their unofficial ties with Israel. Much of this has to do with cooperating against mutual enemy Iran, but it’s also a growing consensus that Israel is not going away and much effort is being wasted in trying to make that happen.

KOREA 

China has finally turned on its wayward client North Korea. China does not want an irrational nuclear power on its border and is cutting off various forms of aid in an effort to get North Korea to reform its economy and get rid of its nukes. China is also furious about public defiance from North Korea and is also going public with its criticism and threats. The death of Kim Jong Il in 2011 made Chinese style economic reforms more acceptable, but not in a big way. Continued famine in the north prompted China to send more and more troops to the border to keep hungry North Koreans out. China also pressured the north to implement Chinese style economic reforms. The North Korean government has been split into reform and conservative factions, making change difficult to achieve. China has made it clear that North Korea is a Chinese responsibility and if the North Korean government collapses China, not South Korea, will pick up the pieces. South Korea does not agree with that, and this could be a big problem in the future.

The death of northern ruler Kim Jong Il changed nothing, yet. Growing unrest, corruption, and privation continue to weaken the iron control that has long kept the north peaceful and the Kim family in control. North Korea continues to destroy its economy, in order to maintain armed forces capable of invading South Korea and maintaining its own population in bondage. North Korean military power declines, as lack of money for maintenance or training causes growing rot. Torpedoing of a South Korean warship and firing artillery at a South Korea island in 2010 are seen as a signs of factions maneuvering for control, as once Kim died, several key people associated with those attacks disappeared from power. There have since been a lot more changes in the military high command. South Koreans are growing tired of the madness that still reigns in the north and have, for the first time in over half a century, promised retaliation if the north fires again. This could lead to war, especially since North Korea sees this threat as, well, a threat. Meanwhile, it's become clear that political collapse in the north is now a matter of when, not if. Growing popular unrest in the north is more evident with each passing month. North Korean leader Kim Jong Il selected his youngest son, Kim Jong Un, to succeed him. Some factions were not enthusiastic about this but China endorsed the heir, and that seems to have been decisive and the reason why Kim Jong Un is getting away with removing so many dissident leaders from power. It’s unclear if Kim Jong Un is willing or able to trade the nukes for a better economic and political future. 

KURDISH WAR 

Earlier this year the Turks and Kurdish rebels worked out another peace deal. It’s unclear if this one will work, but so far there is no major opposition. That could change, and it will take up to a year to see if this peace deal is the real deal. Last year Iraqi Kurds agreed to crack down on the PKK separatists, the Turks have been fighting for over a decade. But the crackdown never did as much damage as the Turks want. The PKK has a lot of quiet support among Kurds. As a result, Kurds continued their 5,000 year long struggle to form their own country. Iran has also cracked down on its Kurds, in cooperation with Turkey. There are different Kurdish rebel organizations in Turkey (PKK), Iran (PJAK), and Syria (PYD), and PKK is not the absolute leader in the field of Kurdish separatism. Meanwhile, Iraqi Kurds believe they will get control of some Iraqi oil fields, providing cash for all manner of opportunities. But that is opposed by Iraqi Arabs and other minorities, although it is now encouraged by Turkey. Turkish success in dealing with the autonomous Kurds of northern Iraq helped build support in Turkey for Turkish Kurds to have autonomy and freedom to be Kurds (and not "mountain Turks"). Iraqi Kurds have Turkey guaranteeing their autonomy in Iraq (and ability to control local oil fields) in return for keeping a lid on the PKK and helping broker a wider peace deal. That works for the Turks but has the Arab dominated government in Iraq threatening yet another war with its own Kurds. That has already happened in neighboring Syria, where the Kurdish minority have chased government soldiers and Sunni Arab rebels out of their territory and are threatening to secede (and probably merge with the northern Iraq Kurds) if not given more autonomy in the post Assad government. 

MALI  

France took swift action in January and led an operation to clear Islamic terrorists out of northern Mali. Aided by Chad and a growing number of other African peacekeeping contingents, this operation is expected to continue for years. It all began early in 2012, when Tuareg tribal rebels (with the help of al Qaeda affiliated Islamic terrorists) in northern Mali chased out government forces and declared a separate Tuareg state. The army mutinied down south but backed off when neighboring nations threatened to intervene. The thinly populated northern two-thirds of the country has a population of less than two million, out of 15 million for all of Mali. The north was very poor in the best of times and over a year of violence there has halted tourism (a major source of income, especially in the three major cities) and the movement of many goods. Al Qaeda, better financed and more fanatic, soon took over from the tribal rebels. The Tuareg rebels had objected to the imposition of Islamic law, but the Islamic radical gunmen drove the Tuareg fighters out of the cities and large towns. There were only about 2,000 Islamic terrorists up north, which was, a year ago, declared a sanctuary and base for Islamic radicals. The few thousand Tuareg rebels began negotiating with the Mali government about cooperation. The UN approved an invasion of the north by a force of about 7,000 troops, with half from Mali and half from neighboring countries. France agreed to lead a NATO effort to train, equip, supply, and support the invaders. The invasion was supposed to take place in late 2013, but France concluded that even this might be too ambitious for an African force and decided to act largely alone in January. This was triggered in part by al Qaeda efforts to invade southern Mali while setting up training camps in the north. The bold French move paid off, although Mali still has internal problems (corruption and an independent minded military) and an unhappy Tuareg majority in the north. 

MEXICO 

Violence with drug cartels refuses to be put down. A newly elected PRI (the party that controlled the government for most of the 20th century until finally eased out by reformers in 2000) president promised changes but has found that determination is more needed than change. Nearly all the cartel violence (which accounts for three percent of all crime) occurs in 3.2 percent of the 2,500 municipalities. But the often spectacular Cartel War violence gets the headlines, making it appear that the entire country is aflame. Because so much of the violence is on the U.S. border, it seems, to Americans, that Mexico is a war zone. The passing of one-party rule, the growth of drug gangs, and increasing corruption in the security forces has triggered unprecedented levels of violence and unrest in the areas involved. The government has gone to war with the drug gangs, and the outcome is still in doubt. Presidential elections returned PRI to power last year, and now there is fear that the decades old PRI deal with the drug gangs (keep quiet and the police won't bother you) will be quietly reinstated. 

MYANMAR (Burma)

The new government is actually trying to not be a tool of the former military junta. Reforms are slowly being made. Elections in November, 2010 replaced the military dictatorship with many of the same people, out of uniform and trying to hide the fact that they rigged the vote. The rural tribes in the north revolted (again) but most were persuaded to make peace deals in the past year. Decades of low level fighting against ethnic separatists in the north has resulted, during the last decade, in major victories for the government. There is not a lot of fighting but major movements by Burmese troops into separatist areas that were long outside the control of the government. Temporary peace deals were made but the tribal rebels are producing major quantities of methamphetamine, and increasing amounts of heroin, to support continued fighting. China is not happy with many of these drugs (particularly heroin and meth) coming into China. That is difficult to change because the tribes are poor and the drug money is very attractive. China is also concerned with the popular opposition to major Chinese economic projects (dams and pipeline) in the north but the fundamentals remain the same. Tribal separatists continue to flee into Thailand. The half century old military elite remains entrenched in power, even as it makes moves to change its status as an international pariah. Economic and political progress is slow. 

NIGERIA 

A group of Taliban wannabes (Boko Haram) in the north were subjected to a major counteroffensive in the last two months. Suddenly the Boko Haram were on the defensive. Having been chased out of its urban and suburban bases in the three northeast states they were most active in, several hundred surviving Boko Haram members have set up operations in the mountain forests along the Cameroon border. The terrorists got in touch with Boko Haram groups known to exist across the border in Cameroon. The army is now visiting the area and seeking the new Boko Haram camps. There are still some armed Boko Haram members in the cities, especially Maiduguri. There they are sheltered by civilians and are difficult to root out. By itself Boko Haram is too small to have much impact on a national scale. But the attacks against Christians in the north have triggered revenge attacks against Moslems in the north and, more ominously, in the south. Efforts to suppress Boko Haram made some progress, but the Islamic radical group was still operating and this prompted the major operation in the northeast. Meanwhile, too many tribes, not enough oil money, and too much corruption create growing unrest. The government continues to placate the ethnic oil gangs and rebels in the oil producing region (the Niger River Delta) with a 2009 amnesty deal. That worked because, while the gangs were getting organized, and a lot more violent, the government was moving more police and military forces into the region. Most gang members accepted the amnesty, rather than take on the armed forces. The amnesty deal did not hold, and there are still attacks on oil facilities. It was later discovered that local politicians and business leaders had taken over the oil theft business from the disarmed tribal rebels, and the thefts are larger than ever. Meanwhile, the northern Moslems want more control over the federal government (and the oil money).  The situation is still capable of sliding into regional civil wars, over money and political power. Corruption and ethnic/tribal/religious rivalries threaten to trigger, at worse, another civil war and, at least, more street violence and public anger.

POTENTIAL HOT SPOTS 

Various places where the local situation is warming up and might turn into a war. The most recent one has been in CAR (Central African Republic) where rebels united, after years of struggling independently and managed to overthrow the corrupt government. 

PHILIPPINES 

The Islamic minority in the south agreed to a peace deal that gave it more autonomy but not its own country and the expulsion of non-Moslems. The government convinced the separatists to settle for less. Working out the details is taking longer than the Islamic rebels expected but everyone is still talking. Communist rebels fight on for social justice and a dictatorship, but the government believes the leftists are on the way out. The communists are taking a beating and agreed to negotiate a peace deal. The Moslems have, as always, lots of clan feuds and internal violence, which will survive the autonomy deal with the government. One of these feuds spilled over into neighboring Malaysia, where local security forces had to deal with several hundred invading Filipino clan gunmen. Meanwhile, most Filipinos are more concerned with endemic corruption and the resulting economic stagnation. There is also the Chinese threat, with more Chinese warships showing up in what had been, until recently, unquestionably Filipino coastal waters. 

RUSSIA  

Rebuilding and reforming the decrepit Soviet era armed forces continues. It has not been easy because the Soviet Union left a lot of bad habits behind. The defense industries still suffer from second-rate technology and management. The military is also torn by infighting among traditionalists and reformers. This rebuilding must succeed because the Cold War era weapons are wearing out fast. It's either new stuff or being stuck with nothing that works anymore. The major problem the reformers are facing is corruption and resistance to change. The war against gangsters and Islamic radicals in the Caucasus (Chechnya and its neighbors) has been sort of won, but the Islamic radicals continue to operate in the Caucasus, preventing the government from proclaiming peace. Corruption keeps rebellion alive down there. Russia has returned to police state ways and the traditional threatening attitude towards neighbors. Rather than being run by corrupt communist bureaucrats, the country is now dominated by corrupt businessmen, gangsters, and self-serving government officials. The semi-free economy is more productive than the centrally controlled communist one but that just provides more money to steal. A rebellion against the new dictatorship is brewing, showing enough democratic impulses remain to shape government and push reform. But for now, most Russians want economic and personal security and are willing to tolerate a police state to get it.

RWANDA & BURUNDI 

Wars between better organized and more aggressive Tutsis and more numerous Hutu tribes have died down in both countries. It's been going on for centuries, but the latest installment has finally, mostly, ended, with the last Hutu group in Burundi giving up, then changing its mind,but not making nearly as much trouble as in the past. Rwanda was blamed for continuing violence in eastern Congo, as they attempt to destroy Hutu terrorists based there. As long as there are armed Hutus fighting, the 1990s wars will never be over. 

SOMALIA 

Al Shabaab, an Islamic radical group, has been crushed but not completely destroyed. Al Shabaab has been driven out of most of the territory it controlled for years. The economy is reviving but it is still a dangerous place to be. Kenyan troops invaded from the south in 2011, and Ethiopian troops from the west. Al Shabaab has fragmented into factions and most of the international (pro-al Qaeda) members are dead or fled. The imposition of oppressive Taliban-like lifestyle rules created local armed opposition that contributed to the collapse of Islamic radical control. Between that and the peacekeepers and Western trained troops of the transitional government, the Islamic radicals were doomed. But al Shabaab is not gone and remnants will linger for a while. The new Somali government, propped up by foreign aid (most of which is stolen) was forced to elect a permanent government last year. Somalia is still a failed state that defies every attempt at nation building. But the situation is worse than it appears. Somalia was never a country, but a collection of clans and tribes that fight each other constantly over economic issues (land and water). The country remains an economic and political mess, a black hole on the map. Not much hope in sight, until the pirates (which have been around for a decade) became a major problem. The major trading nations launched a counter-piracy effort which, in the last year, reduced pirate success (captured ships) considerably. In fact, no large ships have been captured in over a year. The northern statelet of Puntland was persuaded (and subsidized) by wealthy seafaring nations to attack the pirate bases. There are not many pirate groups left, because of the lack of multi-million dollar ransoms. The far south (where the second major port, Kismayo is), a third statelet (after Puntland and Somaliland in the north), is trying to form as Jubaland. The UN backed government in the center is trying to prevent this, but the problem remains the independent minded clans. There is not a lot of enthusiasm among local leaders for a national government. 

SUDAN 

An unofficial state of war developed after the south became an independent "South Sudan" in 2011. The northern government agreed to the vote and the split but did not really back the idea and sent troops and pro-government militias to seize disputed border areas. The border fighting continues. Moslems in the north tried, for decades, to suppress separatist tendencies among Christians in the south, and Moslem rebels in the east (on the coast) and west (non-Arab Darfur). All this was complicated by the development of oil fields in the south and Moslem government attempts to drive Christians from those oil regions. The central government tried to halt, or rig, the independence vote in the south. Meanwhile, battles over land in the west continue to pit Arab herders against black Sudanese farmers. Both sides are Moslem but the government has long backed the Arabs. The government uses Arab nationalism and economic ties with Russia and China to defy the world and get away with driving non-Arab tribes from Darfur. Sudan is also an ally of Iran and recipient of weapons and advice on how to best terrorize a population into submission. The government believes time is on its side and that the West will never try anything bold and effective to halt the violence. So far, the government has been proven right but keeps losing control of Sudan, bit by bit.

SYRIA

Going into its third year, this has become a proxy war between Iran and the Sunni states (and their Western allies). The pro-Iran Syrian government has the backing of Russia, China, North Korea, Cuba, and the other usual suspects. The West does not want the expense and bother of doing another Libya (air support and special operations troops on the ground) but that is where this is headed. Syria was one of the many Arab Spring uprisings but one that did not end quickly (as in Tunisia and Egypt), evolve into a brief civil war (as in Libya and Yemen), or get suppressed (Saudi Arabia and Bahrain). The Syrian protests just continued and turned into armed rebellion in late 2011. Syria is, like Iraq under Saddam, a Baath Party dictatorship. But there are two differences. Unlike Iraq, where a Sunni minority dominated a Shia majority, it's just the opposite in Syria. More importantly, Syria has little oil wealth and the government depends on subsidies from Shia Iran to survive. Despite growing international criticism (even from the Arab League) the government refused to stop using violence and other police state tactics to suppress the pro-democracy demonstrations. In over two years of growing violence, nearly 100,000 people have died. The outcome is no longer in doubt. The growing strength of the armed rebels has doomed the stubborn dictatorship, despite reinforcements from Iran (mainly in the form of several thousand Hezbollah gunmen from Lebanon). 

THAILAND  

Malay Moslems in the south (three percent of the population) continue to cause problems.  In the last year the government was able to find someone down there to negotiate with and these talks are making progress. Most Thais are ethnic Thais and Buddhist while the southerners are Moslem and ethnic Malays. In the south Islamic radicalism arrived a decade ago along with an armed effort to create a separate Islamic state in the three southern provinces. Islamic terrorists grew more powerful month by month for several years and refused to negotiate. Security forces persisted and are making progress in identifying and rounding up the terrorists. But there is no quick victory in sight. Up north, a civil war over military control of the government has been avoided, for the moment, as has war with Cambodia over border disputes. Burma is causing more problems with its growing illegal production of drugs (heroin, meth, and ecstasy). 

UGANDA 

Religion and tribalism created unrest (the LRA or Lord's Resistance Army) in the north that just will not go away. LRA was driven out of Uganda over six years ago but has since been marauding its way through neighboring states. A final peace deal with LRA rebels proved impossible to negotiate because no amnesty was possible. Meanwhile, Ugandan peacekeepers in Somalia briefly brought Somali Islamic terrorists to Uganda. This turned out to be more threat than reality and the biggest problems in Uganda remain corruption and tribal feuds. Uganda is still relatively stable (for the region and Africa) and has become a major source of peacekeepers for less stable states in the area. 

WAR ON TERROR 

September 11, 2001, and the aftermath forced the Moslem world to confront their self-inflicted problems. Al Qaeda is as self-destructive as its many predecessors. Al Qaeda suicide bomb attacks killed civilians, turning Moslems against al Qaeda in a big way. But the terrorists justify such counterproductive attacks because their doctrine holds that Moslems who don’t agree with them are not really Moslems. You can imagine how well that goes over with the survivors and the many potential victims. You can, but al Qaeda can’t, and that is what guarantees their decline and eventual transformation into an obscure cult (which is where groups like it begin). Since all this is religion based, and Islam is a faith that calls for world conquest and violent intolerance of other faiths, you have a large pool of ambitious and murderous new recruits who have been staffing major outbreaks of this terrorism for over a thousand years. Many Moslems insist they do not support the "world conquest" crowd, but few are willing to confront the maniacs head-on and denounce the killing on religious grounds. Islam has some internal problems that Moslems will have to deal with before all this unpleasantness goes away. Meanwhile, it is interesting to note that the various Arab Spring movements were initially dominated by pro-democracy groups. Islamic radicals were a minority, and one that was often better organized, feared, and not trusted, either. Thus the Islamic conservatives were better organized and have been winning the elections and providing more sanctuary for Islamic terrorists (for a while, anyway). Osama bin Laden was killed by American commandos in 2011, and there were some "revenge" attacks (mostly in Pakistan, where bin Laden was hiding in plain sight). But it's not the terrorist backlash that's important. International terrorism has created an international backlash and a war unlike any other. These days, most terrorist victories are in the media. On the ground, the terrorists are losing everywhere. Their last refuges are chaotic, or cynical, places like Iran, Syria, Lebanon, Somalia, Gaza, Mali, the Sahel, a few of the Philippine islands, and especially tribal regions of Pakistan (where al Qaeda is staging a well-publicized last stand). They were chased out of Iraq (and replaced by terrorists who were diehard Sunni Arab nationalists), Indonesia, and the Philippines. Iran continues to support terrorism in the face of much local disapproval. Lebanon is in chaos because of Iranian subsidized terrorists. Gaza went the same way. Islamic radicals are a traditional reaction to tyranny in their region and the inability of local despots to rule effectively. Economic and diplomatic ties with the West are interpreted as support for "un-Islamic" thought and behavior, leading to attacks on Western targets. After 2001, this resulted in a devastating counterattack that continues, despite frustration at the slowness of the Moslem world to act. 


YEMEN 

It's still unclear where the al Qaeda survivors of last year’s anti-terrorist offensive will flee to, as all of the usual refuges are not so safe anymore. Mali attracted some Yemeni based terrorists for a few months last year, until France led a surprise (and very fast moving) offensive into northern Mali seven months ago. Some terrorists from Mali have moved back to Yemen, where small groups of Islamic terrorists are operating from remote rural bases. These remnants are broke, disorganized, and desperate. Sounds like Yemen in general. The Arab Spring hit Yemen hard and upset the "arrangement" that left one group of tribal, criminal, and business leaders in charge for over three decades. This uprising was finally resolved towards the end of 2011. A successor coalition emerged and persuaded (with the promise of amnesty) the old dictator Saleh to step down. Meanwhile, there are still many Yemenis who have a grudge against the government. Most of this can be traced back to the civil war that ended, sort of, in 1994. That war was caused by the fact that, when the British left Yemen in 1967, their former colony in Aden became one of two countries called Yemen. The two Yemens finally united in 1990, but another civil war in 1994 was needed to seal the deal. That fix didn't really take and the north and south have always been pulling apart. This comes back to the fact that Yemen has always been a region, not a country. Like most of the rest of the Persian Gulf and Horn of Africa region, the normal form of government, until the last century or so, was wealthier coastal city states, nervously coexisting with interior tribes that got by on herding or farming (or a little of both). This whole "nation" idea is still looked on with some suspicion by many in the region. This is why the most common forms of government are the more familiar ones of antiquity (kingdom, emirate or modern variation in the form of a hereditary dictatorship). For a long time the most active Yemeni rebels were the Shia Islamic militants in the north. They want to restore local Shia rule in the traditional tribal territories, led by the local imam (religious leader). This arrangement, after surviving more than a thousand years, was ended by the central government in 1962. Yemen also became the new headquarters of "Al Qaeda in Arabia" (Saudi Arabia no longer being safe for the terrorists) after 2007. Islamic terrorists have been more active since the government began arresting key members of al Qaeda in 2010. Other groups (mainly tribal leaders) in the south wanted more say in the government and a larger share of the oil revenue and foreign aid. In early 2012, the new ruling coalition massed its military and tribal forces and decisively defeated al Qaeda in the south. The tribes that had allied themselves with al Qaeda quickly made temporary peace but the separatists are still active, as are the Shia tribes in the north.