No one disputes the fact that Canada needs to procure new fighters,
but that’s where universal agreement ends. Several aircraft types are
competing to be Canada’s next fighter jet. In this ongoing series,
defence analyst Richard Shimooka examines the pros and cons of each
contender. In this installment: the Eurofighter Typhoon and the Saab
Gripen.
Eurofighter (Tranche III)
The Eurofighter Typhoon
is a multinational fighter program between the United Kingdom, Germany,
Spain and Italy. It was originally conceived in the early 1980s to
provide West European states with a new air superiority fighter.
However, the project was plagued by serious delays and cost overruns
during its development, only entering service in 2002. Part of the issue
was managing a massive multinational project with a highly defined work
share agreement. Currently, the Typhoon is in service with the four
partner nations, and won export orders to Austria (2002), Saudi Arabia
(2006) and Oman (2012). In total, 559 will be delivered by the current
projected end of production, sometime after 2017. Each partner nation
possesses a production line, but a Canadian purchase would likely be
supplied by BAE Systems’ facility in Warton, UK.
The Eurofighter Typhoon is a multinational fighter program between the
United Kingdom, Germany, Spain and Italy. The European fighter is
currently in service with seven different air forces. Eurofighter Photo
Capability and Performance
Of
all the fighter options likely to be considered by the RCAF, the
Eurofighter offers the best overall aerodynamic performance. This was
due to the aircraft’s original design requirements. By 1980, the Soviet
Union had fielded a new range of fighter aircraft, including the Mig-23,
Su-27 and Mig-29. These agile supersonic aircraft and their expected
successors were greeted with alarm by European air forces, as they
feared they could wrest air dominance from the current generation of
western fighters.
In response, the Eurofighter
was designed with phenomenal aerodynamic capabilities, including
exceptional range, top speed, and maneuverability. Limited consideration
was given to air-to-ground capabilities, at least for the initial
operating versions. Instead, the Typhoon excelled in two areas: high
altitude supersonic regimes for launching long-range missiles, and
transonic maneuverability for close-range combat. Its operational range
for a long-range northern intercept is likely in excess of 750 nautical
miles (nm) based on figures given to the Norwegian government. To
achieve this performance, the Eurofighter utilized a somewhat novel
delta-canard wing that provided very high levels of agility and lift.
Furthermore the aircraft was constructed with a then-unprecedented level
of composite materials, which reduced its overall weight. Approximately
40 per cent of the aircraft’s structural weight was made up by
composites, compared to 20 to 25 per cent for most contemporary
fighters. Finally, the Eurofighter utilizes the Eurojet-200 engine, a
powerful high-bypass turbofan developed by the partner states. These
aerodynamic advantages were supplemented by its advanced avionics suite,
which would allow it to operate in the then-existing high threat
environment. It is highly ergonomic and possesses significant sensor
fusion capabilities that provide the pilot with great situational
awareness, a key advantage over most potential opponents. An example of
this is the Defensive Aid Sub System, which is a collection of avionics
that identifies incoming missiles, suggests pilot action and
automatically deploys applicable countermeasures.
Yet,
the initial design choices also had significant consequences for the
fighter’s capability. Minimal consideration was given to stealth
capabilities, as European states’ research into low observable
technologies was in its infancy. This will constrain its ability to
operate in future high threat environments against newer generations of
lethal surface-to-air missiles and air superiority fighters. In
addition, the aircraft’s ground strike capabilities were non-existent
until recently; only a handful of RAF Typhoons were able to drop
precision-guided munitions with the aid of an older Tornado fighter
designating the target. A full suite of air-to-ground capabilities will
be delivered with the Tranche III production lot, which should start
deliveries later this year. However, even with these enhancements,
questions on the Eurofighter’s effectiveness remain. A 2009 Swiss Air
Force report evaluation rated the fighter as unsatisfactory for the
air-to-ground strike, citing several technical deficiencies in the
proposed Tranche III capability.
Of greater
concern is the availability of spares for the aircraft. A 2011 UK
National Audit Office report identified parts supply problems as a key
factor in the unavailability of RAF aircraft for basic operations. In
particular, the report stated: "Separate to these two support contracts,
there are indications of problems with the collaborative contracts for
the supply of spares and repair of equipment. There have been shortages
of spares and long timescales for equipment repairs on some of these
contracts. To compensate, the Department has had to take parts from some
of its Typhoon aircraft to make other aircraft available to fly."
These
problems may become even more apparent with a Canadian purchase, since
it is not a partner in the Eurofighter consortium. The physical distance
between Canada and the European continent could further increase
delivery times. Unless Canada would accept a lower level of availability
in such a scenario, Canada will either need to purchase additional
aircraft to meet its operational commitments, or make a significantly
larger purchase of spares than usually required.
Contract Price and Industrial Benefits
The
Eurofighter is one of the most expensive fighter aircraft available on
the international market. The inherent advantages of a multinational
production scheme have largely been diluted due to poor management
decisions and inefficient manufacturing practices. For example, the
potential for manufacturing learning on a large production line was
severely reduced due to the separation of assembly to four national
facilities and set workshare arrangements. Consequently, the per-unit
flyaway cost is approximately C$115.5 million (in 2011), which is the
highest among all of the aircraft currently under consideration. In
addition, an export levy is often applied to any UK export, which may
add several million dollars to the per unit price. It is unlikely Canada
would be able to procure a sufficient fleet of aircraft within the
government’s stated $9 billion acquisition cap.
The
Typhoon’s operational cost is similarly high. In 2011, the UK Ministry
of Defence (MoD) stated the per-flying hour cost of the Eurofighter as
approximately C$110,000. Due to differing accounting practices, this
figure is not directly comparable to American figures, and MoD officials
have suggested it will decline over the next decade. Nevertheless,
other partner states have similarly noted the Eurofighter’s high cost,
including Germany, where it was double the original estimates.
The
domestic industrial offset opportunities are likely to be in line with
other defence procurements, but with significant limits. First, the
fixed collaborative workshare arrangement among the Eurofighter partners
and the aircraft’s maturity effectively preclude any participation in
the program. Thus, any direct offsets would be limited to the RCAF’s
purchases. However, it might be possible to secure significant indirect
offsets from BAE Systems or other Eurofighter partner firms such as EADS
(the parent company of Airbus.) This, like Boeing’s F/A-18E/F, would
likely involve subcontracting on civil airliners for the company’s
Airbus division.
Future Prospects
A
Canadian order would be from the Tranche III production block, which
would possess the CAPTOR-E AESA radar and full air-to-ground capability.
The latter includes a wide range of air-to-ground weapons commonly used
among NATO forces. Tranche III would represent the most capable version
of the Eurofighter, and provide a high degree of operational
interoperability with Allied forces. Yet, the program’s future prospects
are somewhat clouded after that point. The overarching problem
surrounds the political and fiscal situation among the partner
countries. Deep austerity measures being implemented and the lack of a
direct threat has significantly diminished defence spending across
Europe. This affects the Typhoon in several different respects.
Despite its troubled beginning, the Eurofighter Typhoon is finally
making a name for itself in the air-to-air role, and now the strike
role. RAF Photo
First,
the Eurofighter does not have a continual (or spiral) improvement
process for its systems, unlike the Super Hornet or the F-35. Upgrades
are developed into large tranches, which must be collectively agreed to
by partner countries. This has been an issue in the past, as states
disagreed over funding-specific capabilities. The RCAF may one day face
the dilemma of joining an upgrade that might not meet all of its needs
or, more likely, be forced to develop key capabilities alone. The latter
may not be a financially viable prospect: the high cost of upgrading
the first tranche of fighters almost led the RAF to scrap the fleet
after only 12 years of service.
Yet, future
upgrades are not the only pressing concern. As noted earlier, the
Eurofighter suffers from high operational costs and low availability,
due in part to inefficient multinational arrangements. While the
aircraft is set to become the main fighter for Germany and Spain, Italy
and the United Kingdom are also partners in the Joint Strike Fighter
program. It is quite possible the latter two may prematurely abandon the
Eurofighter in order to purchase the more robust capabilities of the
F-35. If the fleet is flown at lower rates due to budget cuts, or fewer
countries operate the type, the spares availability issue will only
worsen as producers shift production to more profitable ventures.
Overall,
the Eurofighter offers a difficult choice for Canada. Certainly, it is
among the most capable aircraft available and would be an asset for the
RCAF, particularly in regards to defending the North. Yet, its high
costs, complex management arrangements and limited capabilities in some
areas should be a serious concern in any competition.
Gripen NG (JAS-39E/F)
The
Saab AB Gripen NG (Next Generation) is considered a versatile
multi-role fighter, providing a low cost alternative to other major
Western designs. It is currently under development with two customers –
Switzerland and Sweden – for a total of 82 fighters currently planned.
The program has already been beset by cutbacks: the Swedish parliament
has reduced the number of planned purchases from 80-100 aircraft to 60.
Moreover, at the time of writing, the Swiss parliament had suspended its
air force’s purchase. If the project does move forward, initial
deliveries are planned for 2018.
If all goes as planned, the first multi-role Gripen NG will enter
service in 2018. Overall, the Gripen NG could offer a versatile set of
capabilities to Canada. Saab Photo
Capabilities
The
Gripen NG is currently in the initial development stages, after
Riksdagen (the Swedish Parliament) approved the purchase of 60 aircraft.
The original Gripen A/B was intended to be a lightweight replacement
for two other Saab fighters, the Draken and Viggen. It was a light,
agile aircraft, with impressive performance features. In particular, it
had exceptional short-range takeoff ability, so that it could operate
from unprepared road surfaces in Sweden. It was also extremely
affordable, both to procure and operate. The JAS-39A/B/C/D was a
moderate export success, with 240 produced between 1993 and 2012.
The
JAS-39 E/F builds on the original Gripen, much like how the F/A-18E
Super Hornet is an updated and enlarged version of the F/A-18C Hornet.
Ironically, it follows the same engine evolution: the Gripen A/C employs
a modified GE F404 engine (currently on the F/A-18C); while the Gripen
E/F has a GE 414 engine (currently used by the F/A-18E/F). The project
attempted to leverage existing technologies or proven suppliers where
possible, in order to decrease the development risks facing the
program.
Overall, Gripen NG should offer a
versatile set of capabilities to Canada. Its AESA (active electronically
scanned array) radar and other sensors will provide good situational
awareness, which can be augmented with external sensor pods. The Gripen
will have significant organic sensor fusion capabilities, and be able to
integrate with NATO operations through Link-16 datalink. The Gripen NG
will also be equipped with a Saab proprietary data link that allows for
effective battlefield networking between most Swedish-built military
aircraft. However, it is not available on any other aircraft, limiting
its interoperability to other buyers of Saab products.
JAS-39E/F’s
aerodynamic performance should roughly resemble that of its
predecessor, but with some differences. Saab claims the Gripen NG’s
long-range air-to-air combat radius is 700 nautical miles (nm) with a
30-minute loiter period. However, this range can only be achieved by
loading the aircraft with large fuel tanks, significantly degrading
other aspects of flight performance. A Swiss air force evaluation
suggested the Gripen NG could remain aloft for only 66 per cent of the
Eurofighter’s and Rafale’s time in the air, with a representative combat
load for air to air combat.
Developed by the Swedish aerospace company Saab, the single-engine JAS
39 Gripen is currently in service with five different air forces.
Switzerland is the latest country to order the Gripen (JAS 39Es) to
replace its F-5 Tigers. Saab Photo
The Gripen NG’s
largest deficiency is its ability to undertake operations in a denied
airspace. The aircraft has only a few low observable features, which
will leave it vulnerable to newer generations of air defence systems.
Its combat capabilities, including electronic countermeasures and weapon
capabilities, are unlikely to exceed that of the F/A-18E/F, given that
aircraft’s continual spiral development process. Efforts to keep the
Gripen combat capable will also face significant challenges. With no
traditional allies planning to adopt the type, Canada may have to
shoulder the entire cost and risk of any unique upgrade deemed essential
for maintaining its combat effectiveness. Moreover, as noted above,
any appreciable weapon capacity must be carried externally, decreasing
range and aerodynamic performance. These factors led Saab AB
representatives to suggest that Canada consider a joint purchase of
F-35s and Gripens during a 2010 parliamentary hearing. The former would
be used mostly for expeditionary warfare, with the latter dedicated to
responding to domestic contingencies and operations in less contested
airspace.
Cost and Industrial Competition
Unfortunately,
the Gripen suffers from a problem shared by many Western fighters: an
inefficient production scale. With only two confirmed clients and
relatively small orders, Saab cannot create manufacturing learning
curves or economies of scale that would drive down costs. Moreover, the
NG is in a very early stage of development, with over 70 per cent of the
aircraft’s systems requiring development from the Gripen C. Already
Saab’s cost estimates have increased significantly. In 2010, company
representatives stated the aircraft’s per unit flyaway cost would be US
$57 million dollars (in 2012 dollars). In 2012, this was revised to
approximately US$80 million, only then to reveal that the Swiss
government’s fixed cost is approximately US$105 million. Similarly,
operational costs estimates have also witnessed significant escalation.
In 2010, company representatives stated the Gripen NG’s per flying hour
cost would be around US $5,000. Yet Saab has now increased this to
US$10,000, and the Swiss military has estimated their costs at
approximately US$21,000.
Saab AB has in the
past reinvested up to 120 per cent of a contract value into a country as
part of an offset package. In addition, it offered to provide complete
technology transfer and the option to establish production lines in
Canada. However, the latter two are of limited value for Canada.
Domestic production will drive up the per-unit costs, as a Canadian line
would only manufacture aircraft for the RCAF and never really achieve
efficiencies that the Swedish line would. Moreover, technology transfers
are unlikely to substantively benefit Canadian industries, as much of
the research is only valuable in relation to the Gripen program. It may
have some advantages for the RCAF’s ability to maintain and upgrade the
aircraft indigenously.
Any direct industrial
opportunities on the fighter will likely be limited to the aircraft
purchased by the RCAF. Thus, most of the offsets will be indirect in
nature, with investment made on projects unrelated to the Gripen’s
procurement. Unfortunately, Saab AB has a relatively small industrial
relationship with Canadian companies. Thus, it will find difficulty
meeting its offset commitment, almost certainly resulting in a lower
quality of industrial benefits that are not sustainable for Canadian
industries.
Future Prospects
Saab
AB has offered the Gripen NG to several countries, including India,
Denmark, Norway, Brazil, the Netherlands and Switzerland. It has thus
far only secured two orders: Sweden and Switzerland, with the Danish
competition still ongoing. RCAF deliveries would likely start after 2019
if selected, which would easily fit within DND’s planned budget
programming and transition plan.
Looking ahead,
the Gripen NG seems to have carved out a narrow niche as an affordable
versatile lightweight fighter. However, its position is under threat
from new competitors in the market. First, the “low” end of the fighter
market is becoming increasingly competitive, with new offerings from
Korea and other states. Second, Gripen faces tough competition at the
“high” end of the market from the Joint Strike Fighter. Given the F-35’s
capability and the NG’s high cost (US$80-105 million versus
approximately US$95-105 million for a non-partner F-35A), many potential
operators may chose to go with the more expensive capability. This
situation may leave Saab with fewer market prospects than it enjoyed
with the original Gripen.
Conclusion
If
the program is implemented and goes according to plan, the Gripen NG
should provide an affordable, relatively low risk capability for the
Canadian Armed Forces. Yet as successive military development programs
have suggested, these estimates may not come into fruition. Moreover,
the Gripen NG has significant capability deficiencies, which may come as
a detriment to the RCAF’s ability to undertake foreign operations in
the future.
Richard
Shimooka is a defence analyst with the Conference of Defence
Associations Institute. Between 2007 and 2012 he was a fellow at the
Defence Management Studies Program at Queen’s University, and is a
member of the International Institute of Strategic Studies. Richard
recently released a report on the F-35 with the CDAI, entitled “Towards
an international model for Canadian defence procurement? An F-35 Case
Study.” He lives in White Rock, B.C.
