Canada has second thoughts about costly F-35 Lightning

O Canada, land of "peace, order and good government." Land of compromise and polite politics. Land of turmoil over whether to buy the F-35.

 

As in the United States, the fighter plane has become a rancorous political issue. What once looked like a sure buy of 65 planes has been bogged down by infighting and un-Canadian vitriol, and the purchase is on hold while Canadian officials consider whether to buy another plane.

 

The F-35 Lightning II is a U.S. plane, made by a U.S. company for the U.S. military. But if the cost for U.S. taxpayers is going to come down to levels that make the plane affordable in the long term, the Pentagon is depending on foreign governments to buy the F-35 as well.

 

From the beginning of the program, Defense Department officials signed up eight international partners, including Canada. Since then, they've crossed the globe looking for additional foreign government customers with some success. Japan and Israel have agreed to buy some of the planes, while South Korea appears likely to make the F-35 its next fighter jet as well.

 

But as Canada shows, not everyone is sold on what has become the most expensive weapons system in U.S. history. In addition to being a symbol of power, might and mind-bending technology, the next-generation Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) has, to some, come to represent waste and unwieldiness — in the United States and abroad.

Many thought that by now Canada would have decided whether to buy the planes — a move that would help drive down costs in the nearly $400 billion program — or instead force the plane's manufacturer, Lockheed Martin, to compete for its business. But it's now unclear when that will happen.

 

Some fear that if nations such as Canada balk, there could be questions about the long-term affordability of the program. Meanwhile, Boeing, one of Lockheed Martin's fiercest competitors, has pounced on what it sees as an opportunity in Canada and other countries to tout its F/A-18 Super Hornet as a proven, affordable alternative.

 

 

Facing budget constraints, Italy and the Netherlands have already curtailed the number of F-35s they said they plan to buy. Denmark is holding a competition that would pit the F-35 against other fighters. Meanwhile, the production line at Lockheed Martin's Fort Worth, Texas, plant has been limited to a little over 30 the past two years, as tightened U.S. budgets and technical problems have forced the Pentagon to significantly slow its procurement as well.

 

"The program is stuck in low production rates and high costs," said Richard Aboulafia, an aerospace industry for the Teal Group. "The production rates are low because costs are high and costs are high because production is low."

 

Currently, the plane's so-called "flyaway cost," which doesn't include research and development, among other things, is approximately $110 million apiece for the Air Force's model, the company says. But Lockheed and Pentagon officials say it could be lowered to less than $80 million by the end of the decade. Lockheed and some of its subcontractors are investing $170 million to reduce the price.

 

Still, the Government Accountability Office recently said that affordability "remains a significant concern" and that "the program is likely to be challenged" to meet cost reduction goals.

While ramping up production would bring the per-plane cost down, it would be unwise to build too many too soon because not all of the necessary testing has been done on the aircraft, said Todd Harrison, director of defense budget studies at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments.

 

Additional testing will inevitably reveal problems that need to be fixed, which then cost money to repair, he said. For years, critics of the program, including Sen. John McCain, R-Ariz., have said that the United States should never have committed to buying the plane while it was still being developed, saying it violated one of the basic rules of airplane acquisition: "fly before you buy."

 

"It gets to the fundamental tension within the JSF — you want to buy more of them because the quicker we buy them, the cost will come down," Harrison said. "But the faster we buy them, that just increases the concurrency in the program. We're buying planes that haven't completed testing and are going to require modifications."

 

The slowed production rate could have another consequence he said.

 

"One of the concerns has been as we've reduced the production rate, people have floated the idea of cutting back on the number of planes the U.S. is going to buy. Then you spook the allies."

But with the relatively large numbers of aircraft the United States plans to buy, he said, "the fate of the program is up to us, not them." Though the Pentagon initially planned to buy 2,852 planes, it has for years remained consistent with its commitment to buy 2,443. Britain, which plans to buy 138 planes, the most of any other nation, also said its confidence in the program remains strong even though the F-35 was grounded after a recent engine fire and missed its international debut at a pair of air shows in England last month.

 

And at a recent "rollout" event in Fort Worth, Australian and U.S. officials celebrated the anticipated delivery of its first two planes. During the ceremony, Air Marshal Geoff Brown, chief of the Royal Australian Air Force, called the F-35 a "revolution" and said it will cause a "step change in the way we prepare for and conduct operations into the future."

 

Lockheed Martin officials are confident that more countries will sign on in the years to come as the need to replace their fighter fleets becomes more urgent. The F-35 is designed to supplant several different legacy aircraft, from the F-16 to the F/A 18 and the A-10.

 

"This is the airplane that's going to replace all those airplanes and create a capability for the next 50-plus years," said Steve O'Bryan, Lockheed Martin's vice president of international strategy and business development.

 

Replacement of the F-16 alone creates a huge market for the F-35, he said. More than 4,500 F-16s have been built, and nearly 30 countries use the aircraft.

 

And while not all of those F-16s will be replaced, "the potential is significant," he said.

 

Potential customers are one thing. Signed contracts are another.

 

It initially appeared as if Canada was definitely going to buy. Defense officials praised the F-35's speed and stealth. At a news conference announcing the purchase to buy 65 F-35s in 2010, then-Defense Minister Peter MacKay called it "the best that we can provide our men and women in uniform."

 

But two years later, the government put the acquisition on hold after an auditor general's report suggested the government misled Parliament, saying that key costs over the course of the fleet's life were much higher than previously stated.

 

Liberals attacked the conservative government. John McKay, a member of Parliament, called it "deceit and incompetence at the highest levels." Another member, Ralph Goodale, wrote that the "F-35 fiasco exposes dishonesty and incompetence."

 

As a result, the Harper administration, while denying it misled Parliament, put the purchase on hold and appointed a National Fighter Procurement Secretariat to ensure the Canadian military acquires the right plane.

 

But Goodale thinks that the government will put off any decision until after the upcoming elections. "This is a hot potato for them," he said. "Their process up to now has been terribly flawed, and they have very little public support for how they've gone about this."

 

The cost has been a big issue, and there was also "concern here in some circles that the F-35 was the anointed choice without having gone through the formality of a competitive process," said Martin Shadwick, a Canadian defense analyst and a professor at York University.

 

Still, he said, "My personal anticipation is that we'll still buy."

 

But Boeing is doing everything it can to change minds.

 

"We certainly believe the Super Hornet is very well-suited for the unique environment and geographical challenges faced by the Royal Canadian Air Force," said Howard Berry, Boeing's F/A-18 international business development team leader. "We continue our battle rhythm. We continue to engage our political colleagues on both sides of the aisle."

Canadian Forces quest to obtain unmanned aerial vehicles – 10 years and counting

The Canadian military’s almost decade-long quest to buy unmanned aerial vehicles has been partly hung up by an internal debate about whether the air forces needs one — or two — different fleets of drones, the Canadian Press news service has reported.

 

A series of internal briefings, stretching back over two years, show that military planners were forced to go back to the drawing board in early 2013 after consultations determined what the country wants to accomplish with the remotely piloted planes might be too broad for just a single type of aircraft, the news service noted.

 

The military expects the drones to not only provide surveillance at home and abroad, but also carry weapons, such as Hellfire missiles, for precision strikes during overseas missions, the Canadian Press reported added.

 

The CP report dovetails into an article that I had in May. In that article, I reported that the Canada military hopes to have a fleet of drones fully operating by 2023.

 

But even that 2023 date is tentative as the government still has to approve the project to buy the unmanned aerial vehicles, also known as UAVs.

 

More from that article:

 

Military staff privately acknowledge that the plan to buy the pilotless aircraft to conduct surveillance off the country’s coasts, in the Arctic and on overseas missions, has fallen behind schedule because of a lack of money and lack of personnel to staff the new squadron.

 

At the time, the RCAF declined an interview on UAVs. Air force spokesman Maj. James Simiana stated in an email that “this project is still pre-definition phase and pre-Government announcement.”

 

But in an April 10 presentation in Ottawa, Col. Phil Garbutt told industry representatives that the project is still a priority and one of the “Big 5” the air force wants to push in the future. He noted the RCAF hopes for the first UAVs to be available for operations in 2021 and that all drones, personnel and infrastructure would be in place by 2023.

 

Details of Garbutt’s presentation were provided to the Citizen.

 

But industry representatives privately question whether that timetable will be kept, noting there has been little movement on the project, estimated to cost more than $1 billion.

 

In his presentation Garbutt acknowledged the dates for the project, dubbed the Joint Unmanned Surveillance Targeting and Acquisition System (JUSTAS), were “notional.”

 

The first of the UAVs were supposed to be operating starting as early as 2010. That was then pushed back to early 2012 and again changed to 2017 by military officers as they dealt with ongoing delays to the project.

 

In 2012 the Citizen reported the RCAF had determined it needed 369 people if it wanted to create a new squadron for unmanned aircraft as promised by Harper. Finding those individuals was a problem, according to the military.

 

Canada has operated UAVs previously. During the Afghan war, the government approved the lease of Israeli-built UAVs from MacDonald Dettwiler and Associates in Richmond, B.C. Those unarmed aircraft operated out of Kandahar airfield.

 

During the Libyan war in 2011, senior Canadian defence leaders pitched the idea of spending up to $600 million for armed drones to take part in that conflict.

 

Documents obtained by the Citizen showed that military leaders saw the Libyan war as a possible way to move the stalled JUSTAS program forward. According to a briefing presented to then Defence Minister Peter MacKay, they pointed out the purchase of such aircraft for the Libyan conflict could kick-start their larger drone project.

 

The war, however, was in its final stages when the briefing was provided and the proposal didn’t get approval from the Conservative government.

 

The Canadian Press report has further details:

 

One briefing, prepared for former associate defence minister Kerry-Lynne Findlay in early 2013, says five of eight companies that responded to a request for information in the fall of 2012 proposed a mixed fleet.

 

The documents show the federal government was prepared to spend to up $3.4 billion to buy and service military drones over 20 years, but those numbers are being revisited because of the delay.

 

With the political firestorm over the F-35 stealth fighter in mind, the Privy Council Office, the bureaucratic wing of Prime Minister Stephen Harper’s office, told the military it wanted to see three viable, “fully costed options.”

 

The documents, obtained by The Canadian Press under access-to-information legislation, also show that the air force has tried and failed six times since 2005 to acquire either a permanent fleet of drones or temporary capability.

 

It did succeed in getting a small fleet of Israeli-built Herons for operations in Kandahar, but that was only because the Manley commission, which examined the war in Afghanistan, made it a condition of Canada’s continued involvement.

 

The leased aircraft were handed to the Australians following the end of Canada’s Kandahar deployment in 2011.

 

Drones are becoming ubiquitous not only in many modern militaries, but commercially.

 

The fact National Defence hasn’t been able to get its act together shouldn’t be surprising given the budget restraints imposed on it, said University of Ottawa defence analyst Philippe Lagasse.

 

The air force’s budget and expectations for replacement aircraft are often directed toward single fleets and having industry come back to say expectations don’t match the technology must have thrown officials for a loop.

 

“Should it be going faster? Sure,” said Lagasse. “Is it easy to do? No.”

 

It is hard to move faster when National Defence has been saddled with so many competing projects and no overarching policy guidance, he added.

 

A rewrite of the government’s defence strategy has been in a holding pattern before cabinet since late last fall.

 

The newly released documents underscore the importance of drone technology, describing it as a “critical enabler” without which surveillance of the country’s vast expanses “will be less effective.”

 

The absence of unmanned aerial vehicles is also being keenly felt as the military looks at other nations and sees what it could be doing — especially on the domestic front where it has been called upon to deal with the aftermath of floods and storms.

 

“Had a (UAV) capability existed it would have been utilized in most, if not all, recent natural disasters,” said an April 2013 slide presentation drawn up by the project management office.

The Cursed Canadian Boats

Ten years after a fire at sea, the Canadian sub HMCS Chicoutimi is returning to service, sort of. Chicoutimi can only make shallow dives until further tests are run. Tests will also be required to make sure the new torpedo handling equipment is working properly. The repairs for the 2004 fire cost $125 million and the fire occurred a month after Chicoutimi entered Canadian service. It may be another year before Chicoutimi is really, really ready for service.  

 

Sixteen years after purchasing four slightly-used British diesel-electric submarines Canada still has not gotten all of them in shape to go to war. Currently, only one of the four Victoria class subs can go to sea actually fire a torpedo. Within a year two more may be ready as well, or maybe not. What Canada has learned from all this is that submarines are expensive boats to build and maintain, even if they are secondhand.

 

It all began in the 1990s, when Canada wanted to replace its 1960s era diesel-electric subs. This did not seem possible, because the cost of new boats would have been about half a billion dollars each which was more than Canada could afford. Britain, however, had four slightly used Upholder class diesel-electric subs that it was willing to part with for $210 million each. That was nearly half what it cost Britain to build these boats in the late 1980s. The Upholders entered British service between 1990 and 1993 and were mothballed shortly thereafter when it decided to go with an all-nuclear submarine fleet.

 

So the deal was made in 1998, with delivery of the Upholders to begin in 2000. Canada decommissioned its older Oberons in 2000, then discovered that the British Upholders needed more work (fixing flaws, installing Canadian equipment) than anticipated. It wasn't until 2004 that the subs were ready and that year Chicoutimi was damaged by fire while at sea. Chicoutimi was supposed to be back in service by 2006 but the repair job was more extensive than first realized and there were other problems found as the repairs proceeded. Thus the initial $20 million repair job just got more and more expensive.

 

The Upholders are now called the Victoria class and are much more modern and capable than the older Oberons. The Victorias are 2,160 tons (displacement on the surface) boats with a crew of 46 and six torpedo tubes (and 18 Mk 48 torpedoes.) The electronics on the Victorias are state of the art and a primary reason for buying these boats in the first place. The subs are to be used to patrol Canada's extensive coastline. The passive sonars on these subs make it possible to detect surface ships over a great distance. But not having any subs on active duty, ready for combat, for most of the last decade has become a major issue in Canada.

 

The problem is that the subs were bought without a thorough enough examination. It was later found that most major systems had problems and defects that had to be fixed (at considerable expense). Thus these boats have spent most of their time, during the last decade, undergoing repairs or upgrades. The final fix was be to get the torpedo tubes working, something that was only completed in the last two years. In any event, a Canadian sub has never fired a torpedo in combat, mainly because the Canadian Navy did not get subs until the 1960s. Lots of Canadian surface ships have fired torpedoes in combat, but the last time that happened was in 1945. The sole operational Victoria class boat is on patrol in the Pacific, listening for trouble which, if found, will be handled as best the only operational submarine in the Royal Canadian Navy can manage.

Republic of Korea Naval Ships Make Historic Visit to Montreal Commemorating Canada's Role in Korean War

Two Republic of Korea Navy (ROKN) ships will visit the Port of Montreal from October 13 to 16, 2013. This historic visit recognizes the 60^th anniversary of the Korean War Armistice and the 50^th anniversary of Korea-Canada diplomatic relations.

 

"I am honoured to welcome our partners on this historic occasion," said Vice-Admiral Mark Norman, Commander of the Royal Canadian Navy (RCN). "This visit will offer a valuable opportunity for the Royal Canadian Navy to renew friendships and strengthen the ties between our two navies."

 

The ROKN ships, Hwa-Cheon and Dae Jo Yeong, with 630 Korean sailors led by Rear Admiral Soo-hong Jang, will participate in various events over the four-day visit. Both ships will also be open to the public each afternoon.

 

A total of 516 Canadian servicemen died during the Korean War. The first Canadian combat units to enter the Korean theatre were RCN destroyers. The 60^th anniversary of the signing of the Korean Armistice took place this year on July 27. This year also marks the 50^th anniversary of diplomatic relations between Canada and the Republic of Korea.

New $531-million submarine contract protects 200 jobs at Esquimalt

B.C.’s shipbuilding and repair industry will get a shot of good news Thursday when the Harper government announces a five-year, $531-million contract extension to repair and upgrade Canada’s fleet of four diesel-electric submarines, The Vancouver Sun has learned.

The contract, following a similar agreement struck in 2008, will protect roughly 200 jobs at the department of national defence’s Fleet Maintenance Facility in Esquimalt, according to a federal official.

Another 200 jobs will be protected at locations elsewhere in Canada, he said.

“This significant federal investment will support more than 400 high-quality jobs, improve the long-term sustainability of B.C.’s shipbuilding industry and provide the best tools for Canada’s sailors,” he said in a prepared statement.

The contract was won in a competitive bid by Babcock Canada Inc., a subsidiary of the British multinational firm Babcock International Group PLC.

Babcock International won the original contract in 2008 after it teamed up with Weir Canada Inc. of Mississauga, Ont., to create a consortium called the Canadian Submarine Management Group.

However, Babcock announced in 2011 that CSMG would be renamed Babcock Canada Inc. after Weir’s share of the joint venture was transferred to Babcock.

The original contract award caused a political flap because Babcock beat out Irving Shipbuilding, which wanted to keep the repair work in Halifax.

One of the critics was Green party leader Elizabeth May, who at the time was planning her run against Defence Minister Peter MacKay in his Nova Scotia riding.

May, who accused the government of an “anti-Atlantic bias,” is now the MP for the Vancouver Island riding of Saanich-Gulf Islands.

The original five-year contract in 2008 was worth $370 million over five years, but if CSMG met performance targets the contract was to be extended over 15 years, for a total value of up to $1.5 billion.

Thursday’s announcement gives a clear indication that Babcock has met those targets.

The fleet of four Victoria-class diesel-electric submarines has had a rocky history after the Liberal government made what appeared to be the bargain-basement purchase of the mothballed subs from the Royal Navy for $750 million in 1998.

It took far longer and was costlier than expected to make the vessels seaworthy, and in 2004 the HMCS suffered a fire that left one officer dead. In 2011, HMCS Corner Brook ran aground near Vancouver Island during manoeuvres.

There are now two subs, HMCS Victoria and HMCS Windsor, that are fully operational.

HMCS Chicoutimi is currently being serviced at Esquimalt but is expected to be ready for sea trials later this year.

The HMCS Corner Brook is also in Esquimalt for both repairs and a refit.

The fleet is “at the highest state of readiness that they’ve ever been,” the source said.

Navy low on frigates to ship back HMCS Toronto crew

A shortage of frigates ready to go to sea is forcing the Royal Canadian Navy to fly hundreds of sailors back and forth from the Middle East.

HMCS Toronto is based in the Arabian Sea, but rather than sail the vessel back to port the navy will instead fly a new crew across the Atlantic and bring the old crew back by the same means.

The unconventional switch is happening as the navy modernizes 12 of its frigates. The navy said it doesn’t want to abandon its commitments patrolling the Middle East.

“This is the most effective and expeditious way to keep our operations going in the Arabian Sea,” said Lt.-Cmdr. Bruno Tremblay, a spokesman for the navy in Halifax.

Five hundred sailors, two helicopters and several dozen civilian dockworkers will begin the crew swap in the upcoming weeks.

The navy said a Canadian Forces aircraft will be used.

HMCS Toronto sailed from Halifax in January.

Harrier For Sale On eBay

A Canadian businessman says he doesn't have the time to enjoy it so he's selling his Sea Harrier jump jet on eBay. Ian Cotton, of Red Deer, Alberta, is hoping to get $1.5 million for the ex-Royal Navy aircraft. He bought the fighter from the British government four years ago and imported it to Canada with an eye to getting it into taxiing condition. To that end he bought another fuselage for spare parts and a flight-worthy Pegasus engine. He said the aircraft is in excellent condition and needs only a few parts to fly but it's being sold as a static display aircraft only. "I can provide an itemized list of the parts needed," he said in an interview with AVweb.

Cotton, who has taken a few lessons but is not a pilot, has five other ex-military jets but he says his natural gas transmission and power generating business keeps him too busy to spend any time with them. He's considering selling off his Hawker Hunters and Lightning fighters but he may keep the Strikemaster trainer/light attack aircraft and get it into flying condition. Cotton said he's so far had a lot of inquiries from the eBay listing but no bids. The Harrier is well known to the people of Red Deer, a resource and farming city about 100 miles north of Calgary. When Cotton first bought the aircraft, he had it parked in his driveway.

Canada - Sea King helicopter replacement hits a new snag

The decades-long project to replace Canada's 50-year-old Sea King helicopters has hit another snag, with the government now hiring an independent expert to study whether helicopter-maker Sikorsky is even capable of delivering a replacement as promised.

CBC News has learned that Public Works Minister Rona Ambrose has gone outside government and hired a consultant to study Sikorsky's work, and Canada's contract, to determine whether it's even possible for the U.S. helicopter giant to deliver the aircraft Canada ordered.

The details of the hire — or the review — are not publicly available and Ambrose's office has yet to provide more information, but Ambrose herself offered the news after questions from the CBC about Sikorsky and its contract.

"I have employed the services of an independent consultant and contractor to undertake a review of the ability of this company to deliver this to the government," Ambrose said.

The Defence Department's maritime helicopter project is the successor to the failed procurement of 50 EH-101 helicopters promised in 1992 by former prime minister Brian Mulroney. That program was cancelled in 1993 as part of an election promise made by Jean Chrétien.

For years, the program lay dormant as Canada's Sea King helicopters slowly gathered wear and tear.

In 2004, Sikorsky won a formal contract to provide 28 new CH-148 Cyclone helicopters to Canada.

The initial contract was worth $1.8 billion for aircraft, and an additional $3.2 billion for 20 years of maintenance and support.

Missed deadlines

Delivery was to begin in November 2008, but it never did. The deadline slipped, and then slipped again.

In 2010, Canada agreed to accept six interim helicopters with lesser capabilities than those ordered by DND, provided Sikorsky agree to deliver "fully compliant" helicopters beginning in June 2012.

So far, only four helicopters have been delivered — all of them interim, and none of them meeting even those lower "interim" standards, said Ambrose.

"I am very disappointed in Sikorsky," she told CBC News. "They have not met their contractual obligations to date. They have missed every deadline and every timeline in the delivery of even the interim maritime helicopter, never mind the fully compliant maritime helicopter."

With the Sea Kings now about to enter their 50th year of service, and maintenance costs soaring, the military is desperate for some form of new maritime helicopter.

The Royal Canadian Air Force realizes the procurement process is slow, and unless the military is able to begin training on some variant of the Cyclone it won't be ready to fly the new helicopters when they finally start arriving.

Now, CBC News has learned Public Works is refusing to allow the military to accept delivery of those four interim helicopters, because they allegedly aren't up to standards.

"The bottom line is that they have not met their contractual obligation," Ambrose told the CBC. "The interim helicopter does not meet the requirements of the air force, so we are not going to take delivery of a helicopter that is not compliant."

Sikorsky seems to be sensitive to Ambrose's criticisms, though it's not clear what it intends to do about it.

"We appreciate the minister's concerns and, consistent with our past practice, will not comment on any discussions we are having with the Canadian government," Sikorsky spokesman Paul Jackson said by email. "The program itself is among the most sophisticated ever conducted by Sikorsky, and it continues to move forward."

Regardless, the 4½-year delay continues to have an effect on military plans.

The air force is already working on how to keep flying its Sea Kings for years more. And that has consequences for the Royal Canadian Navy, too, affecting the long-planned upgrade of its Halifax-class frigates.

The upgrade is necessary to extend the life of the vessels, and naval planners had intended to use that lengthy work period to upgrade the ships' helicopter facilities.

The Cyclone is larger and heavier than the Sea King, and the landing decks and hangars need to be upgraded.

But with no deadline in sight for delivery of the final version of the Cyclones, the navy is planning to keep some of its frigates fitted for Sea Kings. That will necessitate a further refit for the ships, once the Cyclones actually arrive.

Canada’s submarine fleet needs to start from scratch

Defence Minister Peter MacKay blames the Liberals for Canada’s troubled fleet of second-hand Victoria-class submarines. It was the Liberals who purchased the four British-made vessels for the suspiciously low price of $750-million in 1998. Yet it was none other than MacKay himself who, 10 years later, persuaded his Conservative colleagues not to scrap them. It was MacKay who signed taxpayers up for another $1.5-billion worth of refits and repairs, thereby throwing good money after bad.

It was apparent long before 2008 that the submarines were deeply flawed. The diesel engines were designed for railroad locomotives and not the rapid stops and starts required of submarines. There were defects in the torpedo tubes, making it possible for both the inner and outer doors to be open at the same time, even while the subs were submerged. The subs were mothballed in saltwater for four years before Canada bought them, and years more before we took possession. They suffered serious corrosion — the diving depth of HMCS Windsor is now restricted due to rust damage on the hull.

Shortly after Canada took possession, 1,500 litres of saltwater spilled into HMCS Corner Brook because of a malfunctioning Submerged Signal Ejector — a device that is used to deploy decoys while submerged. HMCS Victoria experienced serious problems with its cooling system. And a deadly fire broke out on HMCS Chicoutimi when seawater entering through an open hatch caused an electrical short in wiring that had just one layer of waterproof sealant, instead of the three layers the construction specifications had required. In 2004, the electrical system on Victoria was destroyed when the submarine was hooked up to an on-shore electric supply. The Halifax Chronicle Herald reported that the Navy spent about $200,000 after the accident “to buy old technology that mirrors what the sub’s British builders used” – equipment that one of the Navy’s own “electrical technologists” said “probably goes back to the ‘60s.”

In 2007, Windsor entered a refit that was supposed to take three years but ended up taking six. Documents obtained by the CBC later explained that every system had major problems. Spare parts are also difficult to obtain.

It was in this context that MacKay pushed for the $1.5-billion refit and repair contract, a move rendered all the more perplexing by the fact that, by 2008, the submarines were already between 15-19 years old. This meant that the most one could hope for from the vessels, after their refits, was a single decade of service.

 Which is not very long when you consider that, for the same amount of money, Canada could have procured between 3-4 brand new diesel-electric submarines based on proven designs from France or Germany.

  

Chicoutimi has been out of the water since the fire in 2004, and will remain in dry dock until at least the end of this year

Today, five years after the $1.5-billion contract, MacKay insists the situation is improving. Which is true, if going from horrendous to bad counts as an improvement. Corner Brook was damaged in an accident in 2011 and put out of action until 2012. It is scheduled to return to dry dock for three years in 2014. In December 2012, a defect was discovered in one of Windsor’s two diesel engines, which resulted in the submarine having to operate on just one engine. This put the sub on limited duty. She will be taken out of service later this year so that the engine can be replaced. Chicoutimi has been out of the water since the fire in 2004, and will remain in dry dock until at least the end of this year. Victoria, which emerged from six years in dry dock in 2011, is scheduled to return there for three years in 2016.

According to the Department of National Defence, Canada’s four Victoria-class submarines have accumulated a total of just 1,131 days at sea in the decade since 2003 — about 30 days per submarine per year. It’s time to stop throwing good money after bad. If Canada wants to maintain this capability, we need to start from scratch.

Canadian Navy announces designs for new ships, says the military has placed its future in industry’s hands

The head of the Royal Canadian Navy delivered a poignant reminder Wednesday that the fate of Canada’s military is in industry’s hands as he announced that a design for new resupply ships has been chosen.

The relationship between National Defence and defence companies has been turbulent recently following problems with a number of high-profile procurement projects, including the F-35 stealth fighter, armoured vehicles for the army and search-and-rescue aircraft.

Some of these issues have originated within National Defence and other federal departments, others have been industry’s fault. The result, however, has been the same: delays, cost overruns, and project cancellations or resets.

 Vice-Admiral Paul Maddison said "The Royal Canadian Navy has placed its future in a very real way into your hands."

Speaking to a room full of defence company representatives during a major arms-trade show in Ottawa, Vice-Admiral Paul Maddison noted that the huge opportunity inherent in the Conservative government’s promise to invest hundreds of billions of dollars in Canadian military equipment over the next two decades.

“If we are to collectively succeed, it will be because we enter into this great enterprise in a genuine spirit of strategic trust and co-operation, of frank and honest dialogue and respect,” he said.

Maddison appealed to industry representatives to look beyond their own interests and do the right thing for the country and Canada’s men and women in uniform.

“The Royal Canadian Navy has placed its future in a very real way into your hands,” he said. “The same applies to the Canadian Armed Forces as a whole.”

“We have done so with great optimism and confidence in your ingenuity, your creativity, and your shared determination to succeed. We’ve done so knowing that you have that sense of mission and purpose, which surpasses the fates and fortunes of the firms that employ you.”

He said this is particularly true for the government’s $35-billion national shipbuilding plan, which is emerging as one of the most complex military procurements in Canadian military history.

Maddison, who retires in just over three weeks, said the three major naval projects — new armed Arctic patrol ships; replacements for the navy’s aging destroyers and frigates; and new resupply vessels — are proceeding.

In particular, he revealed that a design had been chosen for the resupply vessels, also called joint support ships, in late April following an in-depth comparison between two options “based on capability, cost and risk.”

The joint support ships were the subject of a Parliamentary Budget Officer’s report at the end of February, which warned the project could cost more than $1 billion more than the government had budgeted. The government refuted the PBO’s findings.

Maddison would not reveal what design had been selected for the vessels, nor could he say when the joint support ships will be built thanks to a scheduling conflict with the Coast Guard’s new polar icebreaker, the CCGS John G. Diefenbaker.

The joint support ships are desperately needed to replace the navy’s two 45-year-old resupply vessels, which were supposed to have been retired in 2012 and have become environmentally unsound and prohibitively expensive to maintain.

But they are expected to be ready for construction at the same time in 2017 as the Canadian Coast Guard’s new polar-class icebreaker, the CCGS John G. Diefenbaker, and the Vancouver shipyard responsible for both projects can only handle one project at a time.

Maddison said there is an “urgent” need to replace both the resupply ships and Coast Guard’s existing heavy icebreaker, the 40-year-old CCGS Louis St-Laurent.

“So the sequencing decision that’s going to be made is, you know, is JSS built first or is the polar (icebreaker) built first,” he said. “So we’ll see how that goes.”

The navy commander could not say whether the navy would still be able to afford the new joint support ship design that had been chosen if construction was delayed in favour of the icebreaker.

He also warned that he did not see the navy’s existing resupply vessels lasting past the end of this decade, though he was confident National Defence would be able to “find a way to innovatively mitigate any capability gap that opens.”

3 Fighter Focus: Eurofighter and Gripen Analyzing the pros and cons of two contenders vying for the title of Canada’s next generation fighter.

No one disputes the fact that Canada needs to procure new fighters, but that’s where universal agreement ends. Several aircraft types are competing to be Canada’s next fighter jet. In this ongoing series, defence analyst Richard Shimooka examines the pros and cons of each contender. In this installment: the Eurofighter Typhoon and the Saab Gripen.

Eurofighter  (Tranche III)

The Eurofighter Typhoon is a multinational fighter program between the United Kingdom, Germany, Spain and Italy. It was originally conceived in the early 1980s to provide West European states with a new air superiority fighter. However, the project was plagued by serious delays and cost overruns during its development, only entering service in 2002. Part of the issue was managing a massive multinational project with a highly defined work share agreement. Currently, the Typhoon is in service with the four partner nations, and won export orders to Austria (2002), Saudi Arabia (2006) and Oman (2012). In total, 559 will be delivered by the current projected end of production, sometime after 2017. Each partner nation possesses a production line, but a Canadian purchase would likely be supplied by BAE Systems’ facility in Warton, UK. 

The Eurofighter Typhoon is a multinational fighter program between the United Kingdom, Germany, Spain and Italy. The European fighter is currently in service with seven different air forces. Eurofighter Photo

 

Capability and Performance

Of all the fighter options likely to be considered by the RCAF, the Eurofighter offers the best overall aerodynamic performance. This was due to the aircraft’s original design requirements. By 1980, the Soviet Union had fielded a new range of fighter aircraft, including the Mig-23, Su-27 and Mig-29. These agile supersonic aircraft and their expected successors were greeted with alarm by European air forces, as they feared they could wrest air dominance from the current generation of western fighters.

In response, the Eurofighter was designed with phenomenal aerodynamic capabilities, including exceptional range, top speed, and maneuverability. Limited consideration was given to air-to-ground capabilities, at least for the initial operating versions. Instead, the Typhoon excelled in two areas: high altitude supersonic regimes for launching long-range missiles, and transonic maneuverability for close-range combat. Its operational range for a long-range northern intercept is likely in excess of 750 nautical miles (nm) based on figures given to the Norwegian government. To achieve this performance, the Eurofighter utilized a somewhat novel delta-canard wing that provided very high levels of agility and lift. Furthermore the aircraft was constructed with a then-unprecedented level of composite materials, which reduced its overall weight. Approximately 40 per cent of the aircraft’s structural weight was made up by composites, compared to 20 to 25 per cent for most contemporary fighters. Finally, the Eurofighter utilizes the Eurojet-200 engine, a powerful high-bypass turbofan developed by the partner states. These aerodynamic advantages were supplemented by its advanced avionics suite, which would allow it to operate in the then-existing high threat environment. It is highly ergonomic and possesses significant sensor fusion capabilities that provide the pilot with great situational awareness, a key advantage over most potential opponents. An example of this is the Defensive Aid Sub System, which is a collection of avionics that identifies incoming missiles, suggests pilot action and automatically deploys applicable countermeasures.

Yet, the initial design choices also had significant consequences for the fighter’s capability. Minimal consideration was given to stealth capabilities, as European states’ research into low observable technologies was in its infancy. This will constrain its ability to operate in future high threat environments against newer generations of lethal surface-to-air missiles and air superiority fighters. In addition, the aircraft’s ground strike capabilities were non-existent until recently; only a handful of RAF Typhoons were able to drop precision-guided munitions with the aid of an older Tornado fighter designating the target. A full suite of air-to-ground capabilities will be delivered with the Tranche III production lot, which should start deliveries later this year. However, even with these enhancements, questions on the Eurofighter’s effectiveness remain. A 2009 Swiss Air Force report evaluation rated the fighter as unsatisfactory for the air-to-ground strike, citing several technical deficiencies in the proposed Tranche III capability.

Of greater concern is the availability of spares for the aircraft. A 2011 UK National Audit Office report identified parts supply problems as a key factor in the unavailability of RAF aircraft for basic operations. In particular, the report stated: "Separate to these two support contracts, there are indications of problems with the collaborative contracts for the supply of spares and repair of equipment. There have been shortages of spares and long timescales for equipment repairs on some of these contracts. To compensate, the Department has had to take parts from some of its Typhoon aircraft to make other aircraft available to fly."

These problems may become even more apparent with a Canadian purchase, since it is not a partner in the Eurofighter consortium. The physical distance between Canada and the European continent could further increase delivery times. Unless Canada would accept a lower level of availability in such a scenario, Canada will either need to purchase additional aircraft to meet its operational commitments, or make a significantly larger purchase of spares than usually required. 

Contract Price and Industrial Benefits 

The Eurofighter is one of the most expensive fighter aircraft available on the international market. The inherent advantages of a multinational production scheme have largely been diluted due to poor management decisions and inefficient manufacturing practices. For example, the potential for manufacturing learning on a large production line was severely reduced due to the separation of assembly to four national facilities and set workshare arrangements. Consequently, the per-unit flyaway cost is approximately C$115.5 million (in 2011), which is the highest among all of the aircraft currently under consideration.  In addition, an export levy is often applied to any UK export, which may add several million dollars to the per unit price. It is unlikely Canada would be able to procure a sufficient fleet of aircraft within the government’s stated $9 billion acquisition cap. 

The Typhoon’s operational cost is similarly high. In 2011, the UK Ministry of Defence (MoD) stated the per-flying hour cost of the Eurofighter as approximately C$110,000. Due to differing accounting practices, this figure is not directly comparable to American figures, and MoD officials have suggested it will decline over the next decade.  Nevertheless, other partner states have similarly noted the Eurofighter’s high cost, including Germany, where it was double the original estimates.

The domestic industrial offset opportunities are likely to be in line with other defence procurements, but with significant limits. First, the fixed collaborative workshare arrangement among the Eurofighter partners and the aircraft’s maturity effectively preclude any participation in the program. Thus, any direct offsets would be limited to the RCAF’s purchases. However, it might be possible to secure significant indirect offsets from BAE Systems or other Eurofighter partner firms such as EADS (the parent company of Airbus.) This, like Boeing’s F/A-18E/F, would likely involve subcontracting on civil airliners for the company’s Airbus division. 

Future Prospects 

A Canadian order would be from the Tranche III production block, which would possess the CAPTOR-E AESA radar and full air-to-ground capability. The latter includes a wide range of air-to-ground weapons commonly used among NATO forces. Tranche III would represent the most capable version of the Eurofighter, and provide a high degree of operational interoperability with Allied forces. Yet, the program’s future prospects are somewhat clouded after that point. The overarching problem surrounds the political and fiscal situation among the partner countries. Deep austerity measures being implemented and the lack of a direct threat has significantly diminished defence spending across Europe. This affects the Typhoon in several different respects. 

Despite its troubled beginning, the Eurofighter Typhoon is finally making a name for itself in the air-to-air role, and now the strike role. RAF Photo

 

First, the Eurofighter does not have a continual (or spiral) improvement process for its systems, unlike the Super Hornet or the F-35. Upgrades are developed into large tranches, which must be collectively agreed to by partner countries. This has been an issue in the past, as states disagreed over funding-specific capabilities. The RCAF may one day face the dilemma of joining an upgrade that might not meet all of its needs or, more likely, be forced to develop key capabilities alone. The latter may not be a financially viable prospect: the high cost of upgrading the first tranche of fighters almost led the RAF to scrap the fleet after only 12 years of service.

Yet, future upgrades are not the only pressing concern. As noted earlier, the Eurofighter suffers from high operational costs and low availability, due in part to inefficient multinational arrangements. While the aircraft is set to become the main fighter for Germany and Spain, Italy and the United Kingdom are also partners in the Joint Strike Fighter program. It is quite possible the latter two may prematurely abandon the Eurofighter in order to purchase the more robust capabilities of the F-35. If the fleet is flown at lower rates due to budget cuts, or fewer countries operate the type, the spares availability issue will only worsen as producers shift production to more profitable ventures.  

Overall, the Eurofighter offers a difficult choice for Canada. Certainly, it is among the most capable aircraft available and would be an asset for the RCAF, particularly in regards to defending the North. Yet, its high costs, complex management arrangements and limited capabilities in some areas should be a serious concern in any competition.

 

Gripen NG  (JAS-39E/F)

The Saab AB Gripen NG (Next Generation) is considered a versatile multi-role fighter, providing a low cost alternative to other major Western designs. It is currently under development with two customers – Switzerland and Sweden – for a total of 82 fighters currently planned. The program has already been beset by cutbacks: the Swedish parliament has reduced the number of planned purchases from 80-100 aircraft to 60. Moreover, at the time of writing, the Swiss parliament had suspended its air force’s purchase. If the project does move forward, initial deliveries are planned for 2018.

If all goes as planned, the first multi-role Gripen NG will enter service in 2018. Overall, the Gripen NG could offer a versatile set of capabilities to Canada. Saab Photo

 

Capabilities

The Gripen NG is currently in the initial development stages, after Riksdagen (the Swedish Parliament) approved the purchase of 60 aircraft. The original Gripen A/B was intended to be a lightweight replacement for two other Saab fighters, the Draken and Viggen. It was a light, agile aircraft, with impressive performance features. In particular, it had exceptional short-range takeoff ability, so that it could operate from unprepared road surfaces in Sweden. It was also extremely affordable, both to procure and operate. The JAS-39A/B/C/D was a moderate export success, with 240 produced between 1993 and 2012.

The JAS-39 E/F builds on the original Gripen, much like how the F/A-18E Super Hornet is an updated and enlarged version of the F/A-18C Hornet. Ironically, it follows the same engine evolution: the Gripen A/C employs a modified GE F404 engine (currently on the F/A-18C); while the Gripen E/F has a GE 414 engine (currently used by the F/A-18E/F). The project attempted to leverage existing technologies or proven suppliers where possible, in order to decrease the development risks facing the program. 

Overall, Gripen NG should offer a versatile set of capabilities to Canada. Its AESA (active electronically scanned array) radar and other sensors will provide good situational awareness, which can be augmented with external sensor pods. The Gripen will have significant organic sensor fusion capabilities, and be able to integrate with NATO operations through Link-16 datalink. The Gripen NG will also be equipped with a Saab proprietary data link that allows for effective battlefield networking between most Swedish-built military aircraft. However, it is not available on any other aircraft, limiting its interoperability to other buyers of Saab products. 

JAS-39E/F’s aerodynamic performance should roughly resemble that of its predecessor, but with some differences. Saab claims the Gripen NG’s long-range air-to-air combat radius is 700 nautical miles (nm) with a 30-minute loiter period. However, this range can only be achieved by loading the aircraft with large fuel tanks, significantly degrading other aspects of flight performance. A Swiss air force evaluation suggested the Gripen NG could remain aloft for only 66 per cent of the Eurofighter’s and Rafale’s time in the air, with a representative combat load for air to air combat. 

Developed by the Swedish aerospace company Saab, the single-engine JAS 39 Gripen is currently in service with five different air forces. Switzerland is the latest country to order the Gripen (JAS 39Es) to replace its F-5 Tigers. Saab Photo

 

The Gripen NG’s largest deficiency is its ability to undertake operations in a denied airspace. The aircraft has only a few low observable features, which will leave it vulnerable to newer generations of air defence systems. Its combat capabilities, including electronic countermeasures and weapon capabilities, are unlikely to exceed that of the F/A-18E/F, given that aircraft’s continual spiral development process. Efforts to keep the Gripen combat capable will also face significant challenges. With no traditional allies planning to adopt the type, Canada may have to shoulder the entire cost and risk of any unique upgrade deemed essential for maintaining its combat effectiveness.  Moreover, as noted above, any appreciable weapon capacity must be carried externally, decreasing range and aerodynamic performance. These factors led Saab AB representatives to suggest that Canada consider a joint purchase of F-35s and Gripens during a 2010 parliamentary hearing. The former would be used mostly for expeditionary warfare, with the latter dedicated to responding to domestic contingencies and operations in less contested airspace. 

Cost and Industrial Competition

Unfortunately, the Gripen suffers from a problem shared by many Western fighters: an inefficient production scale. With only two confirmed clients and relatively small orders, Saab cannot create manufacturing learning curves or economies of scale that would drive down costs. Moreover, the NG is in a very early stage of development, with over 70 per cent of the aircraft’s systems requiring development from the Gripen C. Already Saab’s cost estimates have increased significantly. In 2010, company representatives stated the aircraft’s per unit flyaway cost would be US $57 million dollars (in 2012 dollars). In 2012, this was revised to approximately US$80 million, only then to reveal that the Swiss government’s fixed cost is approximately US$105 million. Similarly, operational costs estimates have also witnessed significant escalation. In 2010, company representatives stated the Gripen NG’s per flying hour cost would be around US $5,000. Yet Saab has now increased this to US$10,000, and the Swiss military has estimated their costs at approximately US$21,000. 

Saab AB has in the past reinvested up to 120 per cent of a contract value into a country as part of an offset package. In addition, it offered to provide complete technology transfer and the option to establish production lines in Canada. However, the latter two are of limited value for Canada. Domestic production will drive up the per-unit costs, as a Canadian line would only manufacture aircraft for the RCAF and never really achieve efficiencies that the Swedish line would. Moreover, technology transfers are unlikely to substantively benefit Canadian industries, as much of the research is only valuable in relation to the Gripen program. It may have some advantages for the RCAF’s ability to maintain and upgrade the aircraft indigenously.

Any direct industrial opportunities on the fighter will likely be limited to the aircraft purchased by the RCAF. Thus, most of the offsets will be indirect in nature, with investment made on projects unrelated to the Gripen’s procurement. Unfortunately, Saab AB has a relatively small industrial relationship with Canadian companies. Thus, it will find difficulty meeting its offset commitment, almost certainly resulting in a lower quality of industrial benefits that are not sustainable for Canadian industries. 

Future Prospects

Saab AB has offered the Gripen NG to several countries, including India, Denmark, Norway, Brazil, the Netherlands and Switzerland. It has thus far only secured two orders: Sweden and Switzerland, with the Danish competition still ongoing. RCAF deliveries would likely start after 2019 if selected, which would easily fit within DND’s planned budget programming and transition plan.

Looking ahead, the Gripen NG seems to have carved out a narrow niche as an affordable versatile lightweight fighter. However, its position is under threat from new competitors in the market. First, the “low” end of the fighter market is becoming increasingly competitive, with new offerings from Korea and other states. Second, Gripen faces tough competition at the “high” end of the market from the Joint Strike Fighter. Given the F-35’s capability and the NG’s high cost (US$80-105 million versus approximately US$95-105 million for a non-partner F-35A), many potential operators may chose to go with the more expensive capability. This situation may leave Saab with fewer market prospects than it enjoyed with the original Gripen. 

Conclusion

If the program is implemented and goes according to plan, the Gripen NG should provide an affordable, relatively low risk capability for the Canadian Armed Forces. Yet as successive military development programs have suggested, these estimates may not come into fruition. Moreover, the Gripen NG has significant capability deficiencies, which may come as a detriment to the RCAF’s ability to undertake foreign operations in the future.   

Richard Shimooka is a defence analyst with the Conference of Defence Associations Institute. Between 2007 and 2012 he was a fellow at the Defence Management Studies Program at Queen’s University, and is a member of the International Institute of Strategic Studies. Richard recently released a report on the F-35 with the CDAI, entitled “Towards an international model for Canadian defence procurement? An F-35 Case Study.” He lives in White Rock, B.C.

CMF Warship Makes Second Drugs Bust in Six Weeks

A warship attached to the Combined Maritime Forces (CMF) has made its second major drugs bust in six weeks, seizing over 300kgs of heroin.

The Canadian frigate HMCS Toronto intercepted a suspect dhow 118 miles of the coast of Tanzania, having tracked her for several days before finally swooping in to make the boarding.

Once on board, Toronto’s crew discovered the drugs hidden underneath a fake rail in the dhow’s stern. After an extensive search,  a total of 317kgs of processed heroin was recovered, along with a small amount of hashish. All the seized drugs have been destroyed.

The success marks Toronto’s second major haul since her deployment to the Middle East began earlier this year, coming hot on the heels of a seizure of 500kgs of heroin from a similar vessel on 29 March.

Toronto’s Commanding Officer, Commander Jeff Hamilton, said: “The success of this operation marks another significant maritime interception of narcotics in the Combined Maritime Forces area of operations.

“Our operations are making a difference to help keep drugs off the streets and out of the hands of criminals.”

Operating under the direction of the French-led Combined Task Force (CTF) 150, Toronto has been patrolling the waters of the Indian Ocean, Gulf of Aden and Red Sea promoting maritime security and stability in the region.

 Captain Jean-Michel Martinet, Commander of CTF 150, said: “This important seizure of drugs, represents another step toward ensuring a secure maritime environment for legitimate mariners in the region and Toronto can be very proud of her achievement.

“It has been a very productive couple of months for CTF 150.  We have shown, and Toronto has shown, thanks to their professionalism and pugnacity, that millions of square miles of ocean are not the property and playground of the smugglers and terrorists.”

CTF150 forms part of the multinational CMF, which draws together assets and expertise from 28 nationsto coordinate maritime security operations across the Middle East.

The CMF mission is to promote security, stability and prosperity across the Arabian Gulf, the Gulf of Oman, the Red Sea and the Indian Ocean. The area encompasses approximately 2.5million square miles of international waters, including some of the world’s most important shipping lanes.

The smuggling of narcotics in the Northern Indian Ocean and surrounding region is a recognised funding source for terrorist organisations. By interrupting the narcotics trade CTF150 is able to deny financial resources to extremist groups.

Commodore Simon Ancona, Royal Navy, Deputy Commander of CMF, said: “To make a second haul of this magnitude is an impressive achievement, and my wholehearted congratulations go out to HMCS Toronto, her crew, and CTF 150.

“Disruptions and seizures like this strike a powerful blow against those who would use the high seas for unlawful purposes, and are the result of multiple nations pulling together to stop illegal activity in the waters of the Middle East.”

Navy frigate spills fuel into Halifax harbour

The Royal Canadian Navy is cleaning up after one of its frigates spilled fuel into the Halifax harbour early Wednesday morning.

Lt.-Cmdr. Bruno Tremblay, a spokesman for the navy in Halifax, said the spill was reported at 5 a.m. by crew aboard HMCS St. John's.

He said they are still assessing how much fuel leaked and how it happened.

A cleanup crew has been dispatched and the harbour master has been alerted.

“Our focus right now is to clean it up and minimize the impact on the environment," said Tremblay.

The ship is anchored near Dartmouth Cove, directly across from downtown Halifax.

The powerful smell of fuel on the water was still evident several hours after the spill was reported

Canada - Feds face tough choice as naval resupply ships, icebreaker on collision course

The Canadian Coast Guard is also designing a new polar-class icebreaker, the CCGS John G. Diefenbaker, to replace its existing heavy icebreaker, the Louis S. St-Laurent (pictured), which is due to be retired in 2017.

 The Harper government is going to have to decide whether resupplying Canada’s navy or Arctic sovereignty is more important thanks to a looming collision at a Vancouver shipyard.

The Royal Canadian Navy is designing new joint support ships to replace its 50-year-old resupply vessels, which were supposed to have been retired in 2012 and have become environmentally unsound and prohibitively expensive to maintain.

The Canadian Coast Guard is also designing a new polar-class icebreaker, the CCGS John G. Diefenbaker, to replace its existing heavy icebreaker, the Louis S. St-Laurent, which is due to be retired in 2017.

But while both are expected to be ready for construction at the same time, the Vancouver shipyard slated to build them can only handle one project at a time.

This scheduling conflict was acknowledged in a recent Defence Department report tabled in Parliament, which noted that “the Joint Support Ship and the Polar Icebreaker are progressing on a very similar schedule such that they both could be ready for construction at the same time.”

The report goes on to say the first joint support ship will be delivered around by 2018, “assuming JSS is not delayed by the initial Coast Guard projects and the Polar Icebreaker program.”

Any delay in replacing the navy’s existing resupply vessels could be potentially devastating for the maritime fleet because new ships are needed immediately, while delays undercut the purchasing power of the $2.6 billion set aside for the project.

This was underscored by a Parliamentary Budget Office report in March that found it could cost as much as $4.13 billion to replace the resupply ships and not $2.6 billion, in large part because of delays already incurred.

Yet delaying construction of the $800-million John G. Diefenbaker could cause its own problems as it could leave the Coast Guard without significant icebreaking capabilities as the Louis St-Laurent is already slated to be decommissioned before the Diefenbaker comes online.

Deciding which project has priority will likely be a political decision — and the government has not yet figured out how to address the competing timelines.

“A decision has not yet been made,” Public Works spokeswoman Lucie Brosseau said in an email. “The (National Shipbuilding Procurement Strategy) secretariat, working together with the Department of National Defence and Canadian Coast Guard, is currently developing the framework for the sequencing decision for the JSS and the Polar Icebreaker projects.”

Vancouver shipbuilder Seaspan Marine, which owns the shipyards where the vessels will be built, did not respond to inquiries.

Conference of Defence Association analyst David Perry said the government faces a tough decision as the navy needs new resupply ships and the Coast Guard needs a new icebreaker.

“The navy needs to get new supply ships ASAP,” Perry said. “But on the other hand our icebreakers were built many, many decades ago.

“They’re basically going to have to decide whether they want to do Arctic operations first, or whether they want to do open-ocean naval operations first,” he added. “They need both and there’s no easy choice.”

The pending conflict is yet the latest issue facing the $35-billion national shipbuilding strategy, which the Harper government has been holding up as an unmitigated success against a backdrop of problems related to the F-35, search-and-rescue airplanes and other military procurement projects.

Canada’s search and rescue system gets boost from defence minister Peter MacKay

The federal government is making changes to help improve Canada’s search-and-rescue abilities, just days after a watchdog warned those capabilities were being threatened by aging aircraft and a shortage of personnel.

Changes announced Thursday include investments in new satellite technology to better detect emergency beacons and a directive to rescue crews to work flexible hours during times of high demand, like fishing seasons.

As well, the government has launched an extensive review of the country’s search-and-rescue network. Expected to be completed by year’s end, that review could prompt further changes and investments, MacKay said.

The announcement was silent on the one big concern flagged by the auditor general — the age of the Buffalo and Hercules aircraft that are the backbone of the rescue responses.

A program has been underway since 2002 to replace both aircraft with a single new rescue plane but has been dogged by delays.

MacKay conceded on Wednesday that Canada’s search-and-rescue system is “not good enough” and promised a review with other departments and stakeholders.

The changes come in the wake of a sharply-critical report by auditor general Michael Ferguson, who highlighted big problems with the search-and-rescue network, including aging aircraft, second-rate helicopters, a shortage of personnel and an outdated information system to coordinate it all.

Ferguson starkly warned that the serious problems put at risk the “sustainability” of the country’s search-and-rescue program.

The six initiatives announced include:

•Better tracking of the status of helicopters and aircraft to ensure their availability to respond to a rescue

•$16.2 million for satellite projects that will better detect emergency beacons signaling someone in distress.

•An improved website where Canadians can register their emergency beacons, providing information which can help rescue officials in times of crisis.

•$2 million upgrade to the rescue coordination centre in Halifax.

•More flexible hours for rescue crews during peak seasons. Opposition MPs have complained about the “banker’s hours” — the 30-minute readiness between 8 a.m. and 4 p.m., two hours on evenings and weekends.

MacKay insisted that the military has the personnel to work the new hours, even though the auditor general noted that staff shortages are already stretching the system thin.

Submarine HMCS Windsor hobbled after $209M refit

More trouble for Canada's fleet of used British submarines.

The Royal Canadian Navy has confirmed that HMCS Windsor – fresh from a $209 million refit – is unable to perform as expected because of a broken mission-critical diesel generator.

"We have restricted her in range of operations and her endurance," Captain Luc Cassivi, director of Canada's submarine force told CBC in an interview.

That means that the Windsor will only be able to operate in Canadian coastal waters until the diesel generator – a huge 16 cylinder engine – is removed from the submarine and replaced.

The Windsor has a second diesel generator which is still working. The diesel generators are used to charge the batteries that allow the submarine to operate under water.

Restrictions in place

A source has told CBC that the submarine's diving depth is severely restricted and the navy has been forced to withdraw the sub from planned exercises off the southern U.S. coast.

Capt. Cassivi said he is unable to provide exact details of the restrictions because they are "classified and linked to operational capabilities," but he denies that any exercises have been cancelled.

"It's an unexpected defect, and that is why we are going through the investigative process," said Capt. Cassivi.

The Halifax–based Windsor went back in the water in April, 2012 after a five-year refit designed to bring the submarine up to Canadian standards. The refit was three years behind schedule and until now, the navy has refused to say exactly how much it cost.

Capt. Cassivi confirmed to CBC that the Windsor's five-year refit totalled $209 million. The cost of removing and replacing the diesel generator is not included in the refit price.

"We have a plan for rectification as soon as the parts are available," said Capt. Cassivi.

The submarine should be hauled out of the water in Halifax in late summer and it could take a "few months" to replace the engine, he said.

One operational submarine

Canada purchased the four Victoria-class submarines in 1998 after the British navy declared them surplus. At $750 million, the deal was hailed as a bargain, and at a price far less than buying new submarines.

HMCS Victoria completed its refit last year at about the same $209 million cost as the Windsor, said Capt. Cassivi.

HMCS Chicoutimi's refit is more complicated and expensive because of damage done to the submarine by a fire that killed one sailor on the boat's first voyage under a Canadian flag. The Chicoutimi has been sidelined ever since the 2004 fire but may become operational by the end of the year.

Also, the refit to HMCS Corner Brook is expected to exceed the $200 million-plus price tag because of damage done to the sub's bow when it slammed into the seafloor off British Columbia. The Corner Brook has not gone to sea since its grounding in June 2011.

The unexpected repairs to the Windsor and the resulting restrictions means that the navy has only one fully operational submarine in service. The west coast-based HMCS Victoria – which was discovered to have a large dent in its hull after delivery – is the only submarine capable of firing torpedoes, unrestricted diving and movement.