Australia - The JSF: is it worth the cost?

Lockheed Martin's Joint Strike Fighter is hugely expensive and some experts are questioning its efficacy.

IN A small carpeted room deep in the labyrinthine bowels of the Lockheed Martin facility in northern Texas, a Joint Strike Fighter takes off, slipping nimbly through the air to destroy two enemy jets before touching down softly on a nearby airstrip.

Though the fast jet - marketed by the arms giant as the future of air superiority - is yet to actually encounter a foe, it is here, in the simulator rooms at the Fort Worth production facility, that Fairfax is introduced to what will be the future of Australia's air warfare capability.

And the simulator room - run by a fussy ex-US Air Force pilot who makes taking the fifth-generation fighter-bomber through a mission look as easy as walking to the corner shop and back - is only one corner of the massive operation that is the development of the F-35 Lightning II, more commonly known as the JSF.

Out in one of the facility's hangars a Lockheed test pilot, Bill ''Giggs'' Gigliotti, has the jet opened to display the remarkably pared-down cockpit. Where in the past you might see dozens of dials and gauges covered in arcane markings and numbers, today there are only two large rectangular touch screens, in size and shape much like a pair of oversized iPads.

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The absence of many of the controls is also in part because of the new jet's helmet - which, though still bedevilled by glitches and lags, is expected to one day contain many of the displays traditionally kept on the dash or the heads-up display. Amazingly, Lockheed says the helmet will help pilots turn the jet into something akin to Wonder Woman's invisible jet and allow them a 360-degree view uninterrupted by the jet's walls.

''The best jet I've ever flown,'' says Gigliotti, who has spent the past nine years as an experimental test pilot for Lockheed after 21 years flying jets with the US Navy.

Then again, Gigliotti would say that, given his role as one of the ''faces'' of the Joint Strike Fighter program, which is expected to cost the US the staggering sum of more than $1 trillion over its life. Australia, which in 2002 announced a plan to acquire as many as 100 of the jets, also has a huge amount of money at stake, with $16 billion set aside for the aircraft in what would be the largest defence procurement in the country's history, after the submarine replacement.

Given the astronomical cost of the acquisition - which has climbed about 75 per cent since 2001 - it is worrying, then, that many experts have expressed concerns about the project's progress, and even questioned its efficacy amid the new strategic realities facing Australia in the so-called Asia Pacific century - a period expected to be marked by a strategic tussle between the US and China in Australia's backyard.

Even the nations involved in the JSF project are beginning to lose the enthusiasm they initially expressed for the project. Italy recently cut its planned acquisition from 131 jets to 90. Britain has yet to announce a final number but earlier this year cancelled plans to acquire the aircraft carrier variant. Both the Netherlands and Norway seem to be cooling on the JSF after initial enthusiasm and in Canada the F-35 has become a political football amid claims it is too expensive and that the Canadian Department of National Defence misled Parliament about the jet's true cost.

Australia is also hedging its bets. While expressing interest in as many as 100 jets, so far it is only contractually obliged to buy two and, as part of the deep cuts to the defence budget last month, the decision regarding the purchase of a second tranche of a dozen jets has been delayed by two years, to 2018.

This is why all eyes are focused on the Fort Worth production facility at which the new fighter will be produced.

At the beginning of the remarkable 1.6-kilometre-long production line - an obsessive-compulsive's dream where everything from whole F35 wings to the smallest washer is perfectly labelled and stored - unrecognisable parts of the craft's fuselage hang from a variety of monumental cranes and pincers.

From there Fairfax is driven along the line in a three-car golf-cart train and, while at first the only way to recognise what separates the fuselage from the frames is the colour of the JSF parts' undercoat, a pastel green, the jets slowly take shape until at the far end whole jets sit ready to roll into a hangar.

But while the sheer size and capability of the facility are impressive, not all is going to plan. In fact, Lockheed Martin's much publicised production line is currently being run by a skeleton crew of supervisors and line managers. That is because about 4000 Lockheed machinists and associated workers have been on strike since February, following a failed contract renegotiation between the company and the International Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers.

Lockheed maintains that the five-month strike has yet to affect the schedule but the industrial action by the machinists' union - which is demanding higher base salaries and benefits for its workers - could not have come at a worse time.

Between 2001 and last year, costs per unit have doubled and the program is now $117 billion over budget and delayed by six years.

Simply, the Joint Strike Fighter is now expected to cost the US alone almost $400 billion and full-rate production (when all testing is completed) is now not expected until 2019, when it was originally forecast to begin next year.

These problems have been caused in large part by a series of issues with the program's ''concurrency'', a term referring to Lockheed's attempt to produce units while still developing the plane.

The ambitiousness and complexity of the JSF program - it has three variants, a standard version, an aircraft carrier version and one able to take off and land vertically in the manner of a Harrier ''jump jet'' - as well as the hugely sophisticated helmet, has also added to hiccups and delays .

A US government audit report into the JSF program, released last month, also found that a series of significant concerns remained regarding the concurrent production and testing and further cost hikes and delays were a distinct possibility.

''Developing and integrating the more than 24 million lines of software code continues to be of concern,'' the report, by the US Government Accountability Office, stated. ''Development of critical mission systems providing core combat capabilities remains behind schedule and risky. To date, only 4 per cent of the mission systems required for full capability have been verified.''

All of these concerns must by now be giving the procurement specialists who make decisions on Russell Hill, the Australian Defence Force's headquarters in Canberra, something to worry about. There is no back-up plan if the F-35 turns out to be a lemon.

There remains a lobby inside Australia arguing for the other Lockheed fifth-generation fighter, the F-22, but the last Raptor rolled off the line at Lockheed's Marietta, George facility in May. Though the company will continue to upgrade them for several years, no more will be built.

So the F-35 is likely to remain the only hope for continuing Australian air superiority in our region.

That is one point that the Department of Defence says it's convinced of: the Lockheed Martin fifth-generation fast jet would win if pitted against its main regional competitor, China's in-development answer to the JSF, the Chengdu Aircraft Industry Group-built Jian 20, known more simply as the J-20.

''[The] F-35's combination of stealth, advanced sensors, networking and data fusion capabilities, when integrated with other defence systems, would enable the RAAF to maintain an air combat superiority,'' a Defence spokeswoman said.

Despite such confidence, however, the truth is that no one can definitely say whether the JSF would be a clear winner against the J-20 before the two jets have completed their development phase, set for both planes for some time in the last few years of this decade.

When Fairfax questioned one person involved in Australia's procurement, the source did say that a one-to-one comparison was perhaps not the most accurate gauge, as the Chinese will eventually be able to out-produce any neighbours, guaranteeing them regional air dominance through sheer numbers.

One of Australia's best-informed JSF watchers, the Australian Strategic Policy Institute analyst Andrew Davies, also still has doubts about the JSF program.

While he accepts that there is no viable alternative, he says the fact the strategic locus has shifted from the Middle East towards the Pacific - a region characterised by the need for long-range craft given the large distances involved - means the JSF is less attractive than it was when considering its use in, say, Iraq, Afghanistan or during a Libyan-style intervention.

That is also a concern given that the F-35 has a significantly shorter range than Australia's previous tactical strike jet, the now-retired F-111.

Australia's F-111 variant, nicknamed ''Pig'', had a combat radius of 2140 kilometres, meaning it could take off from Australia's north and be able to strike targets as far away as southern Indonesia.

According to a 2009 Lockheed brochure, the JSF variant Australia will buy has a combat range of less than half that, at 1080 kilometres, meaning its ability to strike targets in the region without basing itself outside of Australian is severely limited.

In response, Defence said that the F-35 is capable of mid-air refuelling, which extends its range, but the F-111 is similarly capable, meaning the JSF is still a shorter range fighter-bomber than its four-decade-old predecessor.

And while countries such as Israel and South Korea - both of which have expressed an interest in the jet - may need the ''stealthy strike'' capability the JSF provides when dealing with their regional neighbours, it is unlikely Australia will ever need it. (It is worth noting that during their almost 40 years of service Australia's fleet of F-111s was never used in combat.)

Defence maintains that the JSF's many other capabilities will all combine to provide an aircraft that will ensure Australia is not only capable of exerting its middle- power status in the region, but will provide the best defence money can buy for the Australian people.

Of course, Defence would say that. As Andrew Davies said in a 2011 assessment of F-35 program: ''The government [needs] to take a hard-headed look at the situation. And it shouldn't rely on Defence for dispassionate advice - their answer will remain 'F-35', pretty much independent of the question.''

Whether or not the Gillard government, beset on so many sides, is able to muster the independent scrutiny that Davies says is needed before next year's white paper remains to be seen.

South Korea Announces Evaluation of F-X Fighter Bids to Begin Next Week

South Korea’s primary defense acquisition agency, the Defense Acquisition Program Administration (DAPA), announced that evaluations would begin next week to select the winning bid in the competition for a $7.3 billion contract for 60 advanced fighter aircraft. Previously submitted bids from three defense contractors were found to be lacking relevant details and were resubmitted, at South Korea’s request, on 5 July.

Lockheed Martin’s F-35 Lightning II, Boeing’s F-15SE Silent Eagle, and EADS’ Eurofighter Typhoon are all in competition for the multi-billion deal. The winning aircraft is intended as a replacement for the aging fighters now in South Korea’s inventory. In 2002, Seoul contracted to procure 60 Boeing F-15s as part of an extensive modernization effort and the present deal is a continuation of that program.

 F-15 ‘Silent Eagle’ flight demonstrator. South Korea is a leading partner in what is considered the final upgrade for the F-15.

A DAPA statement of 5 July announced that the bids would be evaluated “in accordance with due process.” The statement also guaranteed “fair competition” and a “thorough evaluation” to select the aircraft that “most benefits our national interest.”

According to DAPA, a hand-picked team of 15 expert analysts will review each of the three bids in an evaluation that assesses 300 different categories. These evaluations will review and grade the operational capability of the three contenders as well as their levels of compatibility and interoperability with existing South Korean forces. This assessment process is scheduled to be conducted between 9 and 14 July.

Beginning in late July, following the technical evaluation, an elite team of 45 Republic of Korea Air Force (ROKAF) experts will conduct flight tests designed to evaluate 500 performance features of the three competitors. These tests will further evaluate each aircraft’s performance and will measure how well they fit into the existing South Korean military framework and add measurable value to the nation’s warfighting capability.

DAPA announced in June that some evaluations would be performed on simulators since the F-35 Lightning II is still in development. EADS and Boeing are also working on enhancements to the Typhoon and the F-15SE as well.

In earlier statements, DAPA said that final selection of the next-generation fighter would be announced sometime in October. Now, DAPA admits that October is only an optimistic initial target date and the final selection may not be announced until early 2013. DAPA’s director of program management told reporters on 5 July that “the final decision may be put off until into the next administration,” indicating a date sometime in 2013.

 For the Eurofighter groop, FX3 provides an opportunity to bring their Typhoon back to the center stage, after losing the Indian MMRCA bid to Dassault. Photo: Cpl Babs Robinson, RAF

From a purely practical standpoint, the Eurofighter Typhoon is a long shot in this competition. However, EADS is highly motivated to nail this deal down having lost out in several recent high-value contracts. And, with India’s recent decision to buy the French Dassault Rafale, hope continues to spring eternal. With this in mind, it’s probable to suspect that EADS will heat up the competition with an offer that will be very difficult for Seoul to ignore. In EADS’ favor is the Typhoon’s proven performance record and the F-35’s lack of real-world experience.

Boeing’s F-15SE is a strong contender in this competition. The ROKAF currently operates F-16 Falcons and F-15K Slam Eagles as well as other American-made aircraft. South Korea has a long history of flying American aircraft dating back to the Korean Conflict. Saudi Arabia’s recent decision to go with a new variant of the F-15 also bodes well for Boeing. Boeing also is planning to introduce an attractive array of new enhancements to make the Eagle deadlier, stealthier, and more tempting since South Korean forces already have accumulated several years of experience operating the F-15.

As for the F-35 Lightning II, as advertised it is a dream machine of claimed performance that would be unmatched by any other fifth-generation combat aircraft in the world today. Although unproven and plagued by technical problems and cost overruns, the F-35 still has strong support from an impressive list of customer nations and still enjoys the backing of the United States. If the F-35 performs as designed, it would give Seoul an immense performance edge over Pyongyang and possibly even Beijing. Selecting the F-35 would also give South Korea a long-term warfighting machine that shares a common airframe with the US, Japan, Australia, and other Western nations. Weapon’s commonality and interoperability may also prove to be factors that weigh heavily in Lockheed Martin’s favor.

All three defense contractors have a lot riding on this competition. They all need orders to keep their combat aviation production lines humming along in a time of increasingly austere economic forecasts. Let the games begin.

Gripen operational cost lowest of all western fighters: Jane’s

The study conducted by IHS Jane's Aerospace and Defense Consulting, compared the operational costs of the Gripen, Lockheed Martin F-16, Boeing F/A-18 Super Hornet, Dassault’s Rafale, Eurofighter Typhoon and the F-35 aircraft.

The operational cost of the Swedish Saab Gripen aircraft is the lowest among a flightline of modern fighters, confirmed a White Paper submitted by the respected international defense publishing group IHS Jane’s, in response to a study commissioned by Saab.

The paper says that in terms of ‘fuel used, pre-flight preparation and repair, and scheduled airfield-level maintenance together with associated personnel costs’, “The Saab Gripen is the least expensive of the aircraft under study in terms of cost per flight hour (CPFH).”

The study, conducted by Edward Hunt, Senior Consultant, at IHS Jane’s Aerospace and Defense Consulting, compared the operational costs of the Gripen, Lockheed Martin F-16, Boeing F/A-18 Super Hornet, Dassault’s Rafale, Eurofighter Typhoon and the F-35 aircraft.

“At an estimated $4,700 per hour (2012 USD), the Gripen compares very favorably with the Block 40 / 50 F-16s which are its closest competitor at an estimated $7,000 per hour,” says the report, adding, “The F-35 and twin-engined designs are all significantly more expensive per flight hour owing to their larger size, heavier fuel usage and increased number of airframe and systems parts to be maintained and repaired. IHS Jane’s believes that aircraft unit cost and size is therefore roughly indicative of comparative CPFH.”

In comparison, the figure for the F/A-18 Super Hornet ranged from USD 11000 to USD 24000, depending on degree of operational capability. The figure for the Rafale was USD 16500 per flying hour and number for the Eurofighter Typhoon, derived from British Parliamentary figures and seeming to cover only fuel usage, was USD 8200. But Jane’s estimate of the actual Cost Per Flying Hour for the Eurofighter, keeping in mind supplies and scheduled maintenance raised the figure up to USD 18000.

The cost of operation of the F-35 appears to be in a whole other league. Jane’s cites Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF) estimates for the conventional F-35 A, assuming operational service over 30 years with 200 hours per year for each aircraft, to amount to USD 21000 per hour of flight. The paper also sources US Navy projections of the cost of operation of the F-35 B & C variants until the year 2029, which come to USD 31000 per flight hour.

The report says the figures were based on data sourced from the respective operating militaries and governments, disclosed international fighter competition cost figures (Rafale, F-18 E / F, Gripen), manufacturer-stated figures (F-35, Rafale, F-18 E / F, Gripen) and IHS Jane’s estimates for all aircraft.

There are several caveats to this assessment. “Owing to the differing methods of calculating aircraft operating cost per flight hour and the large number of interlinked factors that affect such a calculation, IHS Jane’s believes that any flight hour cost figure can only be regarded as indicative and that there is no single correct answer to such a calculation,” says the report, but adds, “However, we believe that our results are of considerable merit and provide a useful benchmark when considering the costs associated with operating contemporary high performance combat aircraft.”

The report stresses that ‘without access to comprehensive military data over a significant timeframe’ the results ‘can only be regarded as approximate’ and ‘are an average cost across an entire fleet’.

The report says it is most confident about the data and its conclusions on the Gripen, F-16 and the F/A-18 ‘with good primary and secondary source data supported by logical results from our deductive modeling.’

The numbers for the Eurofighter Typhoon and the Rafale are less certain, in comparison, but the report submits that ‘the comparative modeling output appears to confirm IHS Jane’s estimates’ for them.

The report is least sure about the operational cost of the F-35 costs ‘owing to the absence of actual in-service data’. “IHS Jane’s does not feel that the modeled fuel cost figure is representative of likely CPFH costs,” it says.

Besides using primary and secondary sources and their own databases, IHS Jane’s also considered data thrown up by a ‘modelled assessment of relative cost based on fuel usage’. In the absence of a single global standard for calculating cost per flight hour IHS Jane’s arrived upon a list of factors which would determine this cost.

 The study took into account, what it called, Basic cost calculations to the exclusion of a set of factors it grouped under the term, Comprehensive cost calculations, to arrive at a figure determined only by the characteristics of individual aircraft rather than complexity of operations, weapons or support elements.

The study ‘determined that the Basic CPFH was the more common value stated and that this was therefore regarded as a more accurate and useful indication of the cost of sortie generation for a particular aircraft’.

The other factors, under the Comprehensive cost calculations, were ‘more usually considered as part of the platform’s capital cost rather than the daily service cost of which the Basic CPFH was felt to be a more useful representation’.

CPFH composition

On the basis of a 2005 US Air Force study of its F-16 fleet, IHS Jane’s thinks the CPFH is composed of approximately:

– 10-15% Consumable Supplies (small parts, wiring, basic electrical components)

– 20-25% Sortie Aviation Fuel

– 60-70% Depot Level Repair and Systems Maintenance

The study also points to less quantifiable and more intangible factors that could impact CPFH.

For the purpose of modeling to create a standard or benchmark, the study arrived at the ‘aircrafts’ fuel usage, hence cost, based on a theoretical one hour sortie at max dry thrust’, not ‘necessarily reflective of actual fuel consumption and hence fuel cost of a one hour sortie’.

As is evident, the modeled cost pattern is closest to the derived cost pattern in the case of the Gripen, F-16, Rafale, and Eurofighter. The research and the model digress in the case of the F-35 and the F/A-18.

In the case of the F-35, the study says the different ‘costs arise from the differing power and specific fuel consumptions of the A / C and B models. The B model is the top figure in both cases’. The study says, “The single P&W F-135 engine is relatively fuel efficient for its power, resulting in a lower fuel burn at maximum dry thrust than might be expected.” It adds that, although obviously, ‘accurate CPFH for in-service aircraft does not exist’, ‘the US and Australian forecast costs both suggest it will not offer lower CPFH than current aircraft’, considering ‘the aircraft itself is an extremely sophisticated design carrying a large number of new and unproven onboard systems’.

The report thinks the digression with respect to the Super Hornet is ‘due to the size of the fleet and the experience the US Navy has in operating’ it, compared to the ‘small fleet of the Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF) that has yet to reach Full Operational Capability’. It points out that ‘RAAF CPFH has fallen significantly as familiarity with the aircraft has grown, and is likely to fall further as this continues to improve’.

But the report also says the Super Hornet has ‘relatively high dry thrust ratings while the GE F414 engine is less efficient in specific fuel consumption than the engines of the similar-sized Rafale and EuroFighter aircraft’. And everything else being the same, the F/A-18 E/F ‘engines use more fuel and are hence relatively costly’ compared to the SNECMA or Eurojet engines, even though the US Navy aircraft have a relatively low CPFH.