The main reason for the heightened tensions on the northern front is Iran
and Syria's interest to intensify and hasten the arming of Hezbollah.
Tehran apparently believes the West's patience is running out quickly
and that by the end of the first half of 2013, or by the end of the
year, Washington or Jerusalem – or both – will decide on a military
strike against Iran's nuclear facilities.
The Iranians want to deter Israel
and the Western nations from making such a decision by threats of mass
casualties and devastation in the Israeli home front. Tehran plans to
realize this threat with the use of Hezbollah and Syria's huge missile
and rocket arsenal. Particularly important for the Iranians is
Hezbollah's arsenal, which is protected from a ground invasion and is
deployed in the heart of a supportive population in south Lebanon.
While Syria has a far
larger amount of rockets and missiles, it is difficult to gauge how many
of them will actually work when Iran will need them most. Therefore,
Iran is looking to beef up Hezbollah's arsenal with as many accurate and
devastating advanced long-term rockets as possible - rockets such as
the Fateh-110, which are capable of reaching the Tel Aviv metropolitan
area and even further south.
A significant amount of such rockets would allow Hezbollah to
fire a relatively large number of them simultaneously. Assad does not
possess any spare rockets or missiles to give Hezbollah so it may
threaten Israel's cities. The Assad regime needs its missiles in the
fight against Syrian citizens who are assisting the rebels.
However, Hezbollah would very much like to get its hands on
Assad's Yakhont anti-ship cruise missiles, which pose a major threat to
Israeli Navy vessels and gas fields located up to 300 kilometers (186
miles) from the coast. According to the New York Times, Russia has
apparently transferred to Syria recently an improved version of the
missile, outfitted with an advanced guidance system that makes them more
accurate than the older version.
Assad also has an interest in supplying Hezbollah with advanced,
mobile anti-aircraft missile batteries that can protect the Lebanese
Shiite group's surface-to-surface missiles and cause heavy casualties to
the Israeli Air Force that will try to take them out.
Therefore, Iran and Syria currently have a common goal: Bolster
Hezbollah's rocket and missile arsenal while making it more resilient to
Israeli airstrikes.
Israel apparently has no intention of allowing Khamenei and
Assad to intensify the threat already posed to the Israeli home front,
and it does not plan on allowing Hezbollah to diminish the IDF's ability
to quickly neutralize this threat if needed.
This "red line," it has been reported, has been implemented by
Israel three times as of late – when it bombed a convoy en route to
Lebanon and when it attacked missiles stored in Syrian warehouses ahead
of their transfer to Hezbollah in Lebanon. Syria, Iran and Hezbollah
each had its own reasons not to respond to these attacks in the short
term.
The question is – what will happen next time? Assad has
apparently not given up on his plan to supply Hezbollah with "deterrence
diminishing" weapons as a reward for the Shiite group's assistance in
his regime's battle for survival. Assad also wants Hezbollah to
safeguard his strategic weapons systems so they will not fall into rebel
hands.
This is why the West
estimates Israel will apparently be forced to attack - perhaps in the
near future - additional arms shipments making their way from Iran to
Hezbollah via Syria. It is also estimated that Assad would have to
respond, despite the fact that he has almost no effective retaliation
options. The Syrian army, in its current state, cannot attack us on the
ground, and if it fires missiles toward Israel's home front, Israel will
destroy most of the Assad regime's military assets, and other assets,
which are crucial for its continued survival.
Therefore, Assad
will try to attack Israel indirectly in a way that will not draw a
harsh Israeli response. One possibility is a terror attack against an
Israeli target abroad. However, the preparations for such an attack,
with the cooperation of Iran's Revolutionary Guard and Hezbollah's
special unit, may take a long time.
In addition, such an attack would most likely be thwarted by
Israeli intelligence. In any case, the effect of such a Syrian response
would not be worth the effort. The other, more effective option is to
shatter the calm that has prevailed in the Golan Heights
for the past 40 years.
The Syrians realize
that the calm in the Golan is a sensitive subject in Israeli politics
and public opinion. The near hysteric reports in Israel that follow the
landing in the area of every stray mortar shell fired by the Syrian army
or the rebels, or the reports on the UN's plans to withdraw its forces
from the territory - are a testament to this.
Assad, Khamenei and Nasrallah have apparently reached the
conclusion that the Golan Heights is the soft spot which can be used to
effectively deter Israel from thwarting arms transfers to Hezbollah.
Syria, Iran and Hezbollah have issued numerous threats clarifying that
the response to additional Israeli strikes will be "strategic…in the
Golan." The bottom line: Assad will allow Hezbollah to operate in the
Golan, and should Israel attack the transfer of "deterrence diminishing"
weapons in Syria or Lebanon, the lives of Israelis in the Golan will be
similar to the lives of Israelis residing in communities bordering the Gaza Strip.
Israel will not be
able to respond with full force because the terror attack may not be on a
large enough scale to justify confining Israel's citizens to shelters
for a period of a few weeks or because the identity of those who carry
it out will not be clear. This would make it difficult for Israel to
garner international support for a forceful military response.
Assad and Hezbollah's threat on the Golan Heights puts the ball
back in the Israeli court and makes the dilemma all the more difficult:
How will Israel respond the next time a shipment of advanced weapons
makes its way from Syria to Lebanon? For now, Jerusalem (which is
coordinating its strategy with Washington) is not blinking.
To make Israel's intentions clear, a senior official told the
New York Times Israel does not plan on intervening in favor of the
rebels, but it will not allow Syria and Iran to transfer "game-changing"
weapons to Hezbollah.
The Israeli official stressed that any Syrian retaliation to an
Israeli attack will cause Israel to topple Assad's regime. How? By
attacking what is left of his army and other assets that allow for the
Alawite regime's continued survival. More importantly, Israel will
destroy the assets the regime plans to use in order to create an Alawite
enclave that will be connected to the Hezbollah-controlled Bekaa Valley
in Lebanon.
Such an enclave in the Mediterranean Basin is crucial not only
for Assad and his sect, but also for the Iranians and the Russians, who
want to preserve their interests in Syria. An Alawite enclave would
serve this purpose well, and this is why the Iranians are setting up an
international Shiite force that will fight alongside the Alawites in the
enclave and outside of it and also help Assad maintain control over
Damascus. The Russians, for their part, wish to hold on to facilities in
the port of Tartus, which is situated at the center of the future
Alawite enclave.
Israel made it clear to Assad and his patrons that any attacks
in the Golan will dash their hopes of creating a coastal sanctuary in
the Alawite enclave.
The Russians are reading the map well and are aware that in the
current situation Assad does not have the means to deter Israel from
attacking Hezbollah-bound arms convoys. This is why Putin's aides – in
order to deter Israel and the Americans from attacking in Syria - leaked
to the press that Moscow will finally transfer to Syria three S-300
missile batteries. The original agreement for the transfer of long-range
(200 kilometers, or 124 miles) missiles was signed some three years ago
–before the revolt against Assad erupted. Russia has already received
some of the payments, but the missiles have not been transferred to
Syria due to American and Israeli pressure on the Kremlin not to supply
the Assad regime with these missiles, as they may fall into Hezbollah's
hands and undermine regional balance - because the Israeli Air Force
would be forced to act in Lebanon before these missiles hinder its
ability to operate there.
Medvedev, the Russian president at the time, was convinced, and
he decided to freeze the agreement in 2010, but he did not cancel it.
Nothing has changed since then, but Putin wants to use this arms deal to
force Netanyahu to guarantee that Israel will not attack Syria and
threaten the regime there. The Russian president apparently wants a
similar commitment from Obama.
It is safe to assume that Netanyahu did not give such a guarantee to
Putin when the two met on the eve of the Shavuot holiday in Sochi. This
is why Putin is refusing to promise that he will not transfer the
advanced missiles to Syria. This impasse led to the vague statements
made by Foreign Minister Lavrov and Putin's spokesman Peskov, from which
we can understand that Russia plans to transfer the S-300 missiles to
Syria, despite the fact that the two senior officials did not
specifically say so. Based on Russia's conduct in recent years, it may
very well delay the arms transfer.
The Russians certainly
do not want to see their rockets fall into the hands of Islamist Syria
rebels or force Israel to attack and destroy the missiles in order to
restore its freedom to operate in Lebanese and Syrian airspace.
This issue was discussed during the meeting between Defense
Minister Moshe Ya'alon and CIA director John Brennan, who made a
surprise visit to Israel. The two also discussed Iran.
In the meantime, it is safe to assume that Syria and Hezbollah
will not rush to act against Israel in the Golan or along the Lebanese
border, mainly because Iran has an interest in keeping Hezbollah and
Syria's rocket and missile arsenals ready for action in order to deter
Israel and the US from attacking its nuclear facilities. This interest
will remain relevant for at least another six months, perhaps even more.
Therefore, Iran will advise Assad to act with restraint, for now, even
if Israel strikes Hezbollah-bound arms convoys.