Hundreds of Taliban fighters begin offensive near Afghan capital

Some 700 Taliban fighters armed with heavy machine guns are battling Afghan security forces in Logar province, just outside the capital Kabul, Afghan officials said on Tuesday.

 

"There are some 700 of them and they are fighting Afghan forces for territorial control and they have also brought with them makeshift mobile (health) clinics," Niaz Mohammad Amiri, the provincial governor of Logar, told Reuters by telephone.

 

No longer pinned down by U.S. air cover, Taliban fighters are attacking Afghan military posts in large numbers with aim of taking and holding ground, a shift from the hit-and-run strikes to posses of gunmen, explosives and suicide attacks.

India-Pakistan: Taliban Plead For Mercy

The Pakistani Taliban have called for a ceasefire to halt daily air strikes that have (since February 19 ^th ) caused them several hundred casualties and the loss of many buildings and lots of vehicles, equipment and weapons. Over a hundred Taliban have been killed by the F-16s and helicopter gunships employed. The army recently revealed that over a hundred soldiers had been killed in the tribal territories since September 2013. The government is going through the motions of recognizing this Taliban ceasefire but are not allowed (by the media and the military) to ignore the fact that the Taliban have always broken ceasefires and peace agreements. In the seven years of Taliban insurrection the Islamic terrorists have only agreed to ceasefires or peace deals when faced with major military operations. There are currently nearly 200,000 troops in the Pakistani tribal territories, and over 40,000 surrounding North Waziristan. This is an area of 4,700 square kilometers, with 365,000 people that is the only sanctuary Islamic terrorist groups like the Taliban and Haqqani Network have in the tribal territories. North Waziristan has been surrounded since late 2009, but until recently Pakistani generals refused to go in and shut down this terrorist refuge. Politicians have been under growing pressure from the West, especially the United States to do something about the continued terror attacks by what the Pakistanis call "bad Taliban". These are mostly Pakistani Taliban who wants to establish a religious dictatorship in Pakistan and some of them have been increasingly active attacking other Pakistanis. This has caused a shift in public opinion against the Taliban, although there is still a lot of support for Islamic terrorists who only attack India, Afghanistan or Western nations.

 

The Afghan Taliban, who wants to establish a similar government in Afghanistan are considered "good Taliban" along with the minority of Pakistani Taliban who don't want to overthrow the government. In the last four years, the Pakistani Taliban have also caused over a thousand of casualties among pro-government tribesmen throughout the tribal territories. It's no secret that the army hires tribesmen and puts them in dangerous situations to minimize army casualties. The army cannot afford to lose the support of the loyal tribes up there. All this has put pressure on the army to eliminate the refuge the killers can flee to in North Waziristan.  Several times, because of the demands of Pakistani and American politicians, the Pakistani generals have said they will consider advancing into North Waziristan. But it hasn't happened yet. Despite that, in the last week the generals have openly talked about actually going in on the ground and eliminating the North Waziristan Islamic terrorist sanctuary. The Pakistani military has explicitly declared that it would not attack its longtime and loyal terrorist allies (especially Haqqani Network) in North Waziristan or anywhere else in the tribal territories or any other terrorists who do not attack targets inside Pakistan. The air force has only been bombing Taliban targets and those of other Islamic terrorist groups openly making terrorist attacks inside Pakistan.

  

The basic problem here is that the Taliban is a coalition where the factions cooperate when each feels like it and the more extreme groups oppose any talks or peace deals with the government. In short, the head of the Pakistani Taliban does not control an entire organization in the same way the commander of an army does. The government and Taliban began the current peace negotiations on February 6^th. Although both sides agreed that the talks would not be about changing the constitution, one of the Taliban negotiators announced on the 7^th that there could be no peace unless the nation accepted a religious dictatorship and the imposition of strict Islamic law. This was the extremist faction problem once more. For the rest of February there were more Taliban terrorist attacks by the extremist factions. The Taliban refused to try and discipline these factions and the government refused to recognize these divisions and just hold the violent factions responsible. In part this was because the more extreme factions do not seek a lot of publicity and know that their best defense is to remain within the larger Taliban organization. The government is thus forced to go after Taliban factions only suspected of anti-government activity as well as those who openly declared their intentions. The Taliban refuse to discipline their uncontrollable factions. That is largely the result of tribal and local politics. If the Taliban factions fight each other they risk starting blood feuds and upsetting many tribal alliances. All politics is local, especially in the tribal territories.  

 

In Pakistan growing threats from China to cut off and withdraw investments if security for these operations is not improved has led to assigning soldiers to provide security for the largest Chinese companies.

 

In eastern India the campaign against the Maoist rebels grinds on. There is little that is considered newsworthy in these operations. It’s largely patrols, intelligence collecting and analysis. There are occasional clashes and arrests. Over the last few years the Maoists have been losing ground, and personnel. Desertions are becoming more of a problem as is organized resistance from rural populations who rarely resisted before.

  

In the Pakistani tribal territories (40 kilometers northwest of Peshawar) gunmen fired on a convoy of trucks carrying NATO supplies and killed two drivers. This comes a week after a court declared that a local political party was breaking the law and had to halt its blockade of this road to trucks carrying NATO supplies. This blockade led to lots of locals losing their jobs and that was not popular at all.

 

March 3, 2014: In the Pakistani capital (Islamabad) six or more Islamic terrorists attacked a court complex, detonating two suicide bombs and killing 11 people, including one judge. Pakistan ordered more security for courts as these have become a popular target for Islamic terrorists.

  

In Indian Kashmir police and soldiers, acting on a tip, found an Islamic terrorist hideout in a forest. Seized were an AK-47, 58 rounds of ammo and 18 grenades in addition to cold weather clothing and equipment. Elsewhere in Kashmir gunmen shot dead two policemen outside a court complex.

  

March 2, 2014:  Pakistan declared a suspension of air strikes against Taliban targets in the tribal territories, but not before an attack on a Taliban faction (in the Khyber area) took credit for yesterday’s attack on a polio vaccination team.

  

March 1, 2014: The Pakistani Taliban declared a month-long ceasefire. That did not stop one Taliban faction from continuing its attacks against polio vaccination efforts by ambushing (with a roadside bomb and gunfire) two vehicles carrying vaccination personnel and killing twelve people, eleven of them policemen.

  

In Pakistan a senior army general announced (without providing much detail) that five Iranian border guards who were kidnapped inside Iran and moved into Pakistan on February 7^th had been released. The Iranians were held just across the border in Pakistan (Baluchistan). There are Baluchi tribes on both sides of the border. The religious dictatorship in Iran is hostile to Sunnis and the Iranian Baluchis do not like this at all. The Iranian Baluchi rebels have become bolder and more successful in their attacks on Iranian security forces. Iran has responded by executing more captured Baluchi rebels and that has resulted in even more Baluchi violence. Iran demanded that the Pakistani government find the five Iranian border guards. Iran threatened to send its own troops into Pakistan to free the captive border guards if Pakistan did not act. Elsewhere in Baluchistan police raided a village near the Iranian border and freed 11 foreigners (eight Iranians, two Tunisians and one Yemeni) being held captive by a drug smuggling gang.

 

February 28, 2014: A coalition of major Sunni and Shia Islamic scholars declared today “Anti-Taliban” day. That was a courageous act as any Islamic cleric who openly condemns the Taliban is liable to be put on the hit list of the many Taliban death squads that operate throughout Pakistan, especially in the tribal territories and Karachi (the largest city in Pakistan.) The Pakistani government said that no ground operations were planned in the tribal territories although as a precaution army units in the tribal territories were on a high degree of alert and were readying themselves for Islamic terrorist attacks. That would include counterattacks if necessary.

  

In the Pakistani tribal territories (Khyber) an Islamic terrorist leader and two subordinates were killed at a checkpoint where the three were challenged and opened fire.

  

February 27, 2014: In Indian Kashmir a soldier went berserk at his base, killed five other soldiers and then himself. 

  

February 26, 2014: Pakistan revealed that the American CIA refused to use its UAVs to carry out intelligence missions for help in planning Pakistani air strikes against the Taliban. The Americans say this is because they have found that they cannot trust their counterparts in the Pakistani intelligence agencies. Pakistan has its own growing force of UAVs. These are less capable (than the American Predators and Reapers) but can get the job done and are locally made. Pakistan has received Chinese UAVs and these apparently influenced the design of the locally made ones that entered service in late 2013.

  

February 25, 2014: In Indian Kashmir troops clashed with a group of Islamic terrorists and killed six of them. Documents on the men revealed that all were Pakistanis belonging to a Pakistani Islamic terrorist group long involved with terrorism inside India.

  

In the Pakistani tribal territories (Peshawar) a suicide bomber attacked outside the Iranian consulate, killing himself and two security guards. 

  

February 24, 2014:  In the Pakistani tribal territories (North Waziristan) unidentified gunmen shot dead a senior Taliban commander. The dead man was a proponent of a negotiated peace and it appears he was murdered by one of the radical factions that are violently opposed to any peace deal that does not involve establishing a religious dictatorship in Pakistan.

  

Saudi Arabia is trying to persuade Pakistan to supply Pakistani made anti-aircraft and anti-tank missiles for delivery to the Syrian rebels. The only problem with this is that Pakistan would be blamed for any civilian aircraft brought down by the missiles.

  

India and China agreed to be nice to each other. This includes holding joint military drills this year so their military forces could learn how to work together in disaster relief or peace keeping missions. All this feel-good stuff was a win for India because China is reducing its military and diplomatic pressure on India to surrender Indian territory China has claims on. The basic problem is that India and China have never agreed on where their mutual border is. Because of that the border is called the LAC (Line of Actual Control) and is also known as the MacCartney-MacDonald Line. It has, since the 19^th century, been the unofficial border between India and China and gives rise to a lot of disputes over who owns what. Most of this is about Chinese claims on territory India currently controls. The LAC is 4,057 kilometers long and borders the Indian States of Ladakh, Kashmir, Uttarakhand, Himachal, and Arunachal. On the Chinese side it is mostly Tibet. China has become less vocal about its claims on Indian territory recently but has not abandoned these assertions. Cooling down these tensions is a big relief to India, which has a defense budget one third that of China’s.

 

February 23, 2014: The Pakistani Taliban told the government that a peace deal was not possible unless it was agreed that the country would be run according to Islamic law. This would quickly lead to a religious dictatorship which only a minority of Pakistanis support.

  

Although Bangladesh has much less of an Islamic terrorism problem than India and Pakistan, there is still some Islamic terrorism there. This was seen today when a prison van carrying three convicted Islamic terrorists was ambushed. One of the police escorts was killed and the attackers wounded three others. The three prisoners were freed and made a getaway with their liberators.  Two of the escapees had been convicted of terrorism and sentenced to death. One of these men was found the next day and shot to death when he refused to surrender. 

  

February 22, 2014: In the Pakistani tribal territories (Kohat) a bomb went off in a bus terminal killing 14 people. Since most of the victims were Shia this was believed to be another attack by Sunni Islamic terrorists. 

  

February 18, 2014: In the Pakistani tribal territories at least two soldiers have been killed in the last two days by Islamic terrorist attacks.

Afghanistan: I See Dead People

February 19, 2014:  President Karzai and many Pushtuns want all the foreign troops gone so the Pushtuns have a better chance of reestablishing their dominance of the government and all of Afghanistan. The non-Pushtun majority opposes that and wants some of the Americans and other foreign troops to remain. Afghanistan is headed for another civil war.

 

The Pushtun lost control in 2001 when the Northern Alliance triumphed.  The northern  Afghan  tribes remember that in September 11, 2001 they were still fighting the Taliban government that had not yet gained control over all of Afghanistan.   T he "Northern Alliance" of non-Pushtun tribes was still holding out. The United States sent in a few hundred Special Forces and CIA operators, a hundred million dollars in cash and a few thousand smart bombs to help the Northern Alliance out, and the Taliban were broken and fleeing the country within two months.  The Pushtun still resent this and the non-Pushtuns tried to accommodate the Pushtuns when a new government was formed.  The northern tribes didn't mind Pushtuns getting  some of  the top jobs in the  new  government (including the presidency), but  were  no longer willing to meekly follow the Pushtun lead blindly. The Pushtun see it differently, claiming (with some truth) that they did most of the fighting against the Russians in the 1980s, and that many of the northern tribes cut deals with the Russians (as did some Pushtun tribes, something the Pushtuns don't like to talk about). That had more to do with Afghan politics, (the northern and southern tribes disagreed on how to deal with Russia and modernization) than with anything else. Then came the Taliban (a cynical invention of the Pakistanis, created from Pushtun refugees convinced that a Holy War would bring peace to Afghanistan). Meanwhile, the heroin trade (growing poppies and using a chemical process to turn the sap from these plants into opium and heroin) moved from Pakistan (where the government saw it as a curse) to Afghanistan. Many of the same tribes that produced the refugees who became the Taliban, also produced the most successful drug lords. The Pushtun are many things, including well organized and ambitious and Russia has always been a willing ally of the northern tribes.  The Taliban today are basically a faction of the Pushtun tribes and the drug trade is basically run by Pushtuns. For most Afghans, the Pushtuns (40 percent of the population) are the enemy and Russia is a neighbor that has more often than not been a useful friend. The Russians are also interested in stopping the Pushtun drug trade and this gives the northern tribes and Russia a common goal to work towards. Expect to see more of Russia in Afghanistan after NATO forces depart next year. 

 

Afghan army leaders and most of the troops want the Americans to stay, at least to provide air support and help with logistics, training and intelligence collecting. The military, which is largely non-Pustun, fears that without the American assistance they will be more vulnerable to the Taliban and drug gangs, both of whom are dominated by Pushtuns from the south (mainly Kandahar and Helmand provinces.) President Karzai and his clan are from Kandahar, but the army is largely non-Pushtun.  While 40 percent of Afghans are Pushtuns (the majority in the south, and within the Taliban), far fewer Pushtuns are in the army. Most troops are from anti-Taliban northern groups (Tajiks, Hazara, Uzbek). 

 

For the last decade it has been fashionable to play down ethnic animosities. But occasionally a Pushtun leader will appear in the media casually reminding everyone that Pushtuns were “born to rule” or “are the true owners of Afghanistan.” Sometimes these attitudes get into print. In  2012  t he government fired four Pushtun academics for publishing a book on the ethnic groups of Afghanistan that described the Hazara as "liars, stubborn, violent and anti-Islamic."  Hazara politicians and non - Pushtuns in general, were enraged. That's because to  the Pushtuns, anyone who is not Pushtun is "them" and nothing but trouble. Same deal with the northern tribes, who are weakened by their lack of ethnic and tribal unity (the Uzbeks are Turks, the Hazara are Mongols and the Tajiks are, like the Pushtuns, cousins to the Iranians and Indians). Thus no matter how successful the Taliban might be in the south, among their fellow Pushtun (many of them anti-Taliban), they still have to face  " them"; the northern tribes, who now have powerful foreign allies , a combination  that proved invincible in 2001, and can do so again if called on.  But that is more likely if some American troops remain in the country. This the Taliban, drug gangs and Pushtuns in general are opposed to. Without their American allies, the Pushtun believe they can, as they usually do, intimidate the more numerous and divided non-Pushtuns into compliance with Pushtun domination.  

 

The  current  Afghan government survives by maintaining some form of good relations between the haughty Pushtuns, and the real majority of Afghanistan (the non-Pushtuns). The Hazara have long been a particular target of Pushtun anger. In part, it's because the Hazara are Shia, while most Afghans are Sunni. Al Qaeda and the Taliban are Sunni radicals, and Sunni radicals consider Shia heretics and in need of killing. The other reason for Hazara hatred is that the Hazara are the descendants of the Mongol conquerors of Afghanistan. The Pushtun do not like to be reminded of what the Mongol invaders did to them. The Pushtuns have specific reasons for disdaining the Turks and Tajiks. 

 

Then there is the fact that the Taliban are a minority within a minority (Pushtuns are 40 percent of the population.) There are some Islamic radicals among the other ethnic minorities, but the Pushtuns dominate the Taliban (in terms of leadership and numbers overall). The biggest asset the Taliban have is their alliance with the drug gangs. This is because the Taliban tolerated and taxed the drug gangs in the 1990s, and continue with that policy. This gives the Taliban the cash they need to keep their terror campaign going, but this also associates the Islamic radicals with the hated drug gangs. Most Afghans will hold their nose and take a drug gang or Taliban bribe. Yet in the overall scheme of things, the majority (over 70 percent) of Afghans would prefer to see the Taliban and drug gangs dead and gone. With the foreign troops gone, that kind of civil war situation is likely to develop. 

 

The Pushtun are worried about the upcoming (April 5th) presidential elections. Karzai cannot run again (constitutional term limits) and the leading candidate is a non-Pushtun (and former Northern Alliance member). The Pushtun are not ready to accept a non-Pushtun as the ruler of all Afghanistan. Non-Pushtuns were not surprised with recent revelations that Karzai had been holding secret meetings with the Taliban. While foreigners may not believe a lot of the stories about corruption in the Karzai clan and connections with the drug gangs and Taliban, most Afghans accept this as perfectly normal. Afghans, most of whom want the Status of Forces agreement with the United States signed, see these links as the main reason Karzai will not sign the agreement. Non-Pushtun politicians are hoping to solve this problem by electing a non-Pushtun as president. The Pushtuns will attempt to prevent this using traditional methods (lots of terror and dead people). Karzai really believes that he can negotiate a peace deal with the divided Taliban. He knows that many Taliban leaders have become very corrupt. A lot of the cash from drug gangs (for security and other services) goes to buying SUVs, trucks and nice houses for the Taliban leaders. These same Taliban seek out equally corrupt army and police commanders to share the wealth (in return for occasional inaction). In many cases this works, but there’s still a problem with the fact that most people in the security forces are not Pushtun and oppose the Pushtun dominating the non-Pushtun majority. There has always been some of this, but now the non-Pushtuns want to share power, not just take whatever the Pushtuns give them (from the foreign aid and other national income there is to share). The non-Pushtuns see an end to Pushtun domination while the Pushtun see any attempt to impose that producing a lot of dead people. Karzai also knows that the Taliban are running out of cash, because many foreign donors have stopped giving because of the growing number of women and children killed by Taliban violence. These donors also know of the corruption among the Taliban leadership and at the moment are more attracted to Islamic terrorists in Syria, 

 

The Afghan government has made itself unpopular with many foreign aid donor nations by refusing to take back Afghans who showed up in the West (usually) seeking asylum. Since the Soviets invaded in the early 1980s Afghans have been the most numerous asylum seekers on the planet. People smuggling has been a major industry in Afghanistan for over three decades because many (if not most) Afghans would rather be anywhere but in Afghanistan. It costs thousands of dollars to get smuggled out of Afghanistan and into a Western country. There Afghans demand amnesty and social welfare benefits, secure in the knowledge that their own government does not want them back. While most of these illegal migrants settle down and become good citizens in their new countries, some are attracted to crime or Islamic terrorism. Not as often as most other Moslem migrants, but enough to make Afghan illegals unpopular, if only because there are so many of them. Some of these illegals did not go far, with millions moving across the border into Iran and Pakistan in the 1980s. While most of these have since returned, several million (usually the descendants of the original refugees) refuse to go back and some find a people smuggler and head for the West.

 

Nearly 3,000 civilians were killed by fighting between the security forces and the Taliban or drug gangs in 2013. That’s up 14 percent from 2012. This is mainly because most of the fighting is being done by Afghan soldiers and police and they, like the Taliban, are less concerned about civilian losses. Over 70 percent of the civilian deaths were due to Taliban action, as the Taliban likes to use indiscriminate weapons (like rockets and roadside bombs) as well as lots of terror to keep civilians cooperative. Civilian deaths are actually much higher but those additional deaths come from the usual family violence, banditry and crime in general. Afghanistan is a violent place. It always has been and still is. 

 

February 17, 2014: Afghan police acting on a tip found and seized four 122mm rockets that were to be fired into Kabul. The rockets each have a range of 20 kilometers, are 2.9 meters (9.5 feet) long and weigh 55.5 kg (147 pounds). The captured rockets were elderly, probably dating back to the 1980s. Not very accurate when new, these rockets do not improve with age. 

 

Outside Peshawar (the largest city in the Pakistani tribal territories) a former minister in the 1990s Taliban government was murdered by gunmen. Several Taliban leaders have been killed this way in the last year and the Taliban blame Afghan intelligence for a campaign of assassination against Taliban leaders. Afghanistan denies this, but to many Afghans this would be perfectly legitimate since the Taliban have long gone after Afghan government leaders. 

 

February 16, 2014: In the northeast (Kapisa Province) police found and seized over a ton of Taliban ammo (rockets, RPG warheads, rifle ammo and mortar shells). This stockpile was apparently for use to try and disrupt the upcoming national elections.  

 

February 13, 2014: After months of threatening to do so, president Karzai freed 65 Taliban fighters accused by their American captors of being involved in the deaths of at least 32 Americans and 23 Afghans. This move was very popular with Karzai’s Pushtun allies (some of them Taliban and drug gang leaders) but very unpopular with the majority of Afghans (especially the non-Pushtun majority). Karzai insisted that there was not enough evidence against the 65 to get a court conviction and that’s why they were freed, the U.S. pointed out that many such captured Taliban cannot be successfully prosecuted because their buddies have threatened witnesses and made a conventional prosecution impossible. Moreover the Americans also point out that releases like this now are a bigger threat to Afghan security forces than to foreign troops because the Afghans have taken over most security tasks. The Afghan solution to this new Karzai policy will be to take far fewer prisoners and simply kill (“while trying to escape”) Taliban they do take alive but later decide are a long-term threat. This doesn’t bother Karzai much as non-judicial executions are more of an Afghan tradition than trial by jury. 

 

February 11, 2014: It was confirmed that a young girl living outside Kabul had recently caught polio and was partially paralyzed. This was the first known case of polio in Afghanistan since the Taliban were overthrown in late 2001 (many people can catch polio and not become sick). The reason for this is that the Taliban changed their policy of opposing polio vaccinations once they were out of power. Not so the Pakistani Taliban, which officially opposes vaccination. Most Taliban, on both sides of the border, believe the polio vaccination program is really a Western plot to poison Moslems. Thus even though the Afghan Taliban support vaccinations there is still violence. For example on January 24th a 16 year old medical volunteer was murdered by a Taliban death squad down south (Helmand province). The young man was administering polio vaccinations. There are many active cases of polio just across the border in the Pakistani tribal territories, one of the few places on the planet where people are still being infected. This has caused small outbreaks in countries where people from the tribal territories visit (including Syria, where many Pakistani Islamic terrorists have gone and triggered at least 20 cases of polio so far).  Afghanistan will no increase vaccination efforts. 

 

February 10, 2014:  In the northeast (Logar Province) police found and seized over a ton of Taliban ammo (mostly rockets and mortar shells). This stockpile was apparently for use to try and disrupt the upcoming national elections. One Taliban was arrested when the stockpile was seized.

Afghanistan - Taliban Killing Taliban

Despite Taliban boasts that this year’s Summer Offensive would do great damage to Afghan and foreign forces, the results were quite dismal. For example, last month only 12 foreign troops were killed, less than half the number killed in September 2012. For the year so far, foreign troop deaths are down 58 percent compared to last year. The Taliban effort to kill foreign troops via Afghan troops or Taliban in Afghan uniforms was way down (over 70 percent) this year compared to last. Much of the decline in foreign troop casualties is due to Afghan forces taking over primary responsibility for security in most of the country this year. Last year 10-11 Afghan soldiers or police were killed each day. This year it is more like 15 a day, and at least half are from landmines and roadside bombs.

 

Taliban losses have been higher and the Taliban goal of demoralizing Afghan soldiers and police was not achieved. The Taliban hoped greater use of roadside bombs against Afghan forces would terrorize these troops into staying in their bases and leaving the Taliban and drug gangs to do as they wished. That has not happened. Afghan police and soldiers, using equipment and techniques developed by the Americans, keep contested roads open and kept after the Taliban.

 

Efforts to negotiate terms for remaining U.S. troops (after all other NATO forces have left after 2014) continue to go nowhere. Even the recent visit by the American Secretary of Defense made little difference. The Afghan politicians have been playing hardball with the Americans on this, refusing to agree to continue American immunity from the corrupt Afghan justice system after 2014. The U.S. has told the Afghans that if they don’t get a Status of Forces (immunity) agreement by the end of 2014, then the U.S. will withdraw all their forces. Such “Status Of Forces” agreements are standard practice for foreign troops overseas and, in the case of Afghanistan, are necessary to protect American troops from abuse by corrupt Afghan judges and prosecutors. If the U.S. withdraws completely a lot of the foreign aid might stop coming as well, as well as essential logistical, training, and air support for Afghan security forces. The implication here is that if the Afghans prove unable to govern themselves and the country once more becomes a terrorist haven, the bombers and commandoes will come back and the Afghan leaders responsible will be primary targets. That threat carries more weight since Osama bin laden was finally taken down in 2011. So far this threat has not persuaded the Afghan leaders to compromise. They know they can do that at the last minute, and in the meantime their stubbornness costs them nothing and is, by Afghan standards, entertaining and potentially profitable.

October 15, 2013: In Logar province (southeast of Kabul) the Taliban killed the provincial governor by planting a bomb in a copy of the Koran. The governor was giving a speech in a mosque at the start of a Moslem holy day. The Taliban threatened to kill a lot of senior officials this year but had had few successes. Killing someone in a mosque using a bomb in a Koran will not win the Taliban many new friends in Afghanistan or the Islamic world in general. The dead governor was known to be an honest and particularly effective official, just the sort of man the Taliban want out of the way.

  

October 13, 2013: The Taliban fired several rockets into the Bagram air base but caused no casualties or property damage.

  

October 10, 2013: In the east (Khost province) a Taliban suicide car bomber attacked a NATO convoy but managed to wound four ivilians. None of the foreign troops were hurt. The Taliban later announced heavy NATO casualties but the locals know better because some of them stood around watching the aftermath and noted that the only casualties being taken away were Afghans, and the only fatality was the driver of the car with all the explosives. The roadside bombs, while intended for Afghan and foreign security personnel, tend to mainly hurt civilians and the civilians know it. The Taliban stick with these weapons because fighting the security forces directly is suicidal and makes Taliban recruiting impossible. 

  

October 8, 2013: In the east (Kunar province) Afghan Taliban attacked a Pakistani Taliban camp near the Pakistan border and killed three Pakistani Taliban leaders and several of their followers. Battles like this have been more common since earlier this year. That’s because after years of pleading by Pakistan, Afghanistan (both the government and the Taliban) agreed to go after Pakistani Taliban who have set up camps just inside Afghanistan. From there they raid into Pakistan and then retreat back across the border if facing an intense army or police reaction. But the armed force assembling to go after the Pakistani Taliban camps are not Afghan soldiers or police but Afghan Taliban and tribal militias. This is the result of the Afghan Taliban agreeing to join with the Pakistani Army in an attack on the Pakistani Taliban. There has long been bad blood between the Afghan and Pakistani branches of the Taliban. Part of it is due to the usual feuds between rival Islamic terror organizations. But the basic problem is that each branch wants to take control of the country they are from and that means Pakistani Taliban are welcome (unofficially) in Afghanistan and the Afghan Taliban (officially) in Pakistan. The Afghan Taliban depends on the Pakistani sanctuary it has in and around Quetta, the largest city in Baluchistan (southwest Pakistan). Quetta is safe because Pakistan will not let American UAVs to operate there. Quetta is where the Afghan Taliban leadership has been sheltered since 2002 and is right across the Afghan border from the Taliban heartland in Kandahar and Helmand provinces. Since the Afghan Taliban has not made (or sponsored) terrorist attacks in Pakistan, there has been an unofficial truce with the Pakistani government. For over a year now the Pakistani military has been trying to persuade the Afghan Taliban to help deal with anti-Pakistan Islamic terrorists in Pakistan. Most of these attacks are carried out by the Pakistani Taliban, whose main base area is in North Waziristan, where the pro-Pakistan Haqqani Network also takes shelter. Haqqani is mostly Afghans and only attacks inside Afghanistan. For years the U.S. has been pressuring Pakistan to shut down the North Waziristan sanctuary. Now it appears that Pakistan might possibly sort-of do that but will probably leave Haqqani alone. The Afghan Taliban will help by going after the growing number of Pakistani Taliban camps just across the border in Afghanistan. The Afghan Taliban refuse to admit to this plan and say that they will only carry out attacks outside Pakistan, which is mainly inside Afghanistan.

  

Some Afghan Taliban are still supporting the Pakistani Taliban. Both branches of the Taliban are composed of many factions or, in the case of the Pakistani Taliban, independent groups that joined the Pakistani Taliban coalition. All the Pakistani Taliban can agree on is the need to replace the current elected government of Pakistan with a religious dictatorship. That is not popular with most Pakistanis, which has been a major problem for Pakistan.

  

October 7, 2013: In eastern Afghanistan (Khost province, near the Pakistan border) U.S. troops captured Latif Mehsud, a Pakistani Taliban media official. Mehsud was in charge of arranging meetings between Pakistani Taliban officials and journalists. The Pakistani Taliban waited a few days before admitting Mehsud had been taken. Mehsud was in Afghanistan to negotiate the ransom for some Afghans the Pakistani Taliban had kidnapped. Mehsud apparently felt he would have no problem with Afghan security forces, but he was stopped by American troops. President Karzai was angry over Mehsud being arrested as Karzai is trying to negotiate some kind of peace deal with the Pakistan Taliban. 

  

October 2, 2013: In Tajikistan the parliament approved an extension of the military cooperation treaty with Russia to 2042. This includes Russia continuing to station four-thousand troops there, mainly on the Tajik southern (Afghan) border to help keep out drugs and Islamic terrorists. This involves running three Russian bases in Tajikistan. Russia also continues to train Tajik military personnel (mainly officers) and supply weapons and ammo at low cost or for free. In Afghanistan many Taliban operate to provide security for heroin smuggling. The Central Asian route (via Tajikistan to West Europe and North America) is long but for most of the way you can bribe your way past border security. The Taliban are much more unpopular in northern Afghanistan and are often informed on or even attacked by hostile tribesmen. With Russian help the Tajiks have made their border guards more resistant to Taliban bribes and more likely to prevent smuggling. This can be seen by the numerous seizures of drugs and gun battles with the heavily armed smugglers. A lot of drugs do get through, but for the Russians every ton that is stopped is helpful. Drug addiction is a big problem in Russia.

Continuing IED Attacks Draw Attention to Pakistan's MRAP Shortage

An IED attack on a paramilitary convoy in Peshawar on Sunday has once again drawn attention to Pakistan’s lack of suitable vehicles to combat what will likely remain terrorists’ favored mode of attack.

The Associated Press of Pakistan quoted an official saying the IED was composed of mortar rounds and improvised explosives weighing some 40 kilograms hidden in a car parked by the roadside and detonated once the convoy drew close.

However, nearby women and children appeared to make up the majority of the 14 dead and approximately 20 injured.

Nevertheless, it has highlighted the continuing threat from such devices, and the lack of suitable MRAP vehicles in sufficient number for the security services.

The threat was further underlined today by the death of four soldiers in and IED attack near Miranshah in Northern Waziristan in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas bordering Afghanistan.

With the drawdown of ISAF forces in neighboring Afghanistan, Pakistan has been mentioned in media reports as being in line to receive some surplus US equipment.

The equipment does not include MRAP vehicles, many of which are reported to be scrapped in Afghanistan.

When contacted for clarification on what surplus equipment Pakistan may receive, the US Embassy here in Islamabad could not provide details.

A spokesperson for the Embassy said, “Military gear that has been determined to be excess defense articles will not be brought back with US forces from Afghanistan as they redeploy elsewhere. The United States intends to offer this equipment to Afghanistan and other partners, but no final determinations have been made yet.”

The spokesperson further stated, “It is premature to speculate on what may be provided and to whom.”

Neither Pakistan’s Ministry of Defence, nor the military’s Inter Service Public Relations (ISPR) media branch replied to requests for clarification, or indeed confirmation that surplus MRAP vehicles were offered to Pakistan, but declined.

Pakistan’s indigenous MRAP vehicle, the Burraq, manufactured by the state-owned Heavy Industries Taxila AFV builder, also appears nowhere in sight despite Defense News being told in March it was only a matter of months from finally being unveiled.

Former Australian defense attaché to Islamabad, Brian Cloughley, said there could be a good reason for such an offer being declined.

“Of course it would be attractive to acquire such vehicles” he said, “but the associated problems are probably too great to make this practicable.”

While highlighting that MRAP vehicles are becoming increasingly important in global conflicts, Cloughley says, “costs and practicalities have to be considered.

“First of all, the vehicles are enormously expensive. Pakistan simply couldn’t afford a state-of-the-art MRAP vehicle. But even if they were donated by the US on grounds that they were surplus stock [and even then, Congress might not give approval], the operating and maintenance costs would be enormous,” he said.

With Pakistan beset with crippling economic woes, keeping finances tight is a major concern for the military, but operational costs, especially against the Taliban, are already prohibitively expensive.

“It is all too often forgotten that Pakistan is finding it extremely difficult to meet the day-to-day costs of military operations in the Tribal Areas, where so many thousands of its soldiers have died in the conflict that erupted after Afghanistan went critical,” says Cloughley.

“The expense of running ordinary resupply vehicles, alone, is extremely high. Factor in a brand-new type of vehicle, with requirement for training, and staggering running and maintenance costs, and it’s a very big problem indeed,” he adds.

If the door on surplus US counter-IED equipment has closed, the two day visit of UK Prime Minister David Cameron over the weekend may offer something of an alternative.

A joint statement issued during the visit said, “The UK will work in partnership with Pakistan providing expertise in support of Pakistan’s developing strategy on counter terrorism. The UK will provide more equipment to tackle the scourge of improvised explosive devices and support Pakistan in improving the security of its infrastructure, including sharing the UK’s expertise in safeguarding sporting events.”

However, the details of this offer are not known, and despite requests no clarification was forthcoming from the UK’s High Commission here in Islamabad, with a spokesperson referring Defense News back to the joint statement.

It appears to be part of or a follow-on from similar efforts announced in April 2011 as part of the Anglo-Pakistani Strategic Dialogue.

At the time, a spokesman at the High Commission said Britain welcomed “Pakistan’s efforts to develop a national counter-IED strategy aimed at combating this phenomenon using a holistic, interagency approach.”

Britain was to help establish “a ‘center of excellence’ that will train and equip front-line law enforcement and security forces to deal with IED threats whenever and wherever they occur.”

British help would also extend to dealing with the aftermath of IED attacks, specifically “training experts to make sure that forensic evidence can be recovered from IEDs,” in order to strengthen the legal cases against terrorist suspects and those suspected of manufacturing and using IEDs.

This latter aspect was not thought to be a specific strong point of Pakistan’s security and law enforcement bodies at the time.

Hard fight remains for Afghanistan's Nangarhar province

The platoon sets out on a moonless night to patrol a nearby village where Taliban gunmen are known to lurk.

Though normally accompanied by their Afghan counterparts, U.S. forces operate alone on this night. An insider attack that killed two U.S. officers just a day earlier in a nearby province prompts forces at Forward Operation Base (FOB) Connolly to take extra precautions. Because of the threat of follow-up attacks, patrols with Afghan soldiers and police are temporarily suspended.

Operating alone, troops approach a high-walled compound and halt. Through their interpreter, they alert anyone inside that U.S. forces are in their midst. Moments later, gunfire erupts from the compound. Hundreds of rounds are fired from both sides and several grenades tossed. No one is killed or wounded.

In the aftermath of the fight, U.S. forces learn that a member of the Afghan Local Police (ALP) are inside, along with several others including women and and elderly man. The men are taken away for questioning. ALP leaders insist it was a case of mistaken identity and that their man meant no harm.

Sgt. 1st Class Danny Del Castillo disagrees. “We called out to them four times,” says Del Castillo, recalling how they yelled to the men inside, in several languages, to make sure they knew that American forces were outside. “And they still shot at us.”

As their deployment winds down, and U.S. forces hand over FOB Connolly to Afghan forces, soldiers here in Khogyani District contend that there have been vast improvements to security in the area with the help of the Afghan National Army and the Uniformed Police. Yet the insurgency in Nangarhar province persists, as do questions about the loyalties of the ALP and whether Afghan forces can keep the Taliban from reclaiming the province.

“I’m hard-pressed to believe it was confusion and not an opportunity for unsavory individuals” to harms U.S. troops, says 1st Lt. Josiah Spinelli about the attack on his platoon, noting several similar experiences during their deployment to Nangarhar, where opium production continues and Taliban fighters are ever-present.

Just to the south of FOB Connolly are the infamous Tora Bora mountains where Osama bin Laden during the initial invasion of Afghanistan. Through those mountains runs the Wazir Pass, a natural conduit to Pakistan for readily resupplying Taliban with fighters and arms. Khogyani is said to be the home of several senior Taliban leaders and 200-300 gunmen from various factions of the Taliban and other militant groups.

FRUSTRATION AND SUCCESS

Afghan forces throughout the country like those in Khogyani recently took the final steps toward assuming full security responsibility for all of Afghanistan. Many smaller bases like Connolly have already been turned over to the Afghans or shut down and destroyed. The turnovers are precursors to the end of 2014 drawdown if U.S. combat forces from the country.

But before handing over FOB Connolly to the Afghans, soldiers here, along with other from the 1st Brigade Combat Team, 101st Airborne Division, joined Afghan forces in an operation to the west in Nangarhar’s Hezerak District. The area is a known haven for the Taliban that borders two other militant strongholds: Logar province and Kabul province’s Surobi District. The operation in May — led by Afghan troops — was touted by U.S. officials as a success “clearing operation” that robbed the Taliban a foothold in the region to launch attacks on other parts of Nangarhar, including provincial capital and one of Afghanistan’s largest cities, Jalalabad.

“It was a big setback for the insurgents in the area,” Maj. Drew Davies says.

However, several officers at FOB Connolly noted that just weeks after the operation the Taliban had returned to Hezerak.

The Taliban’s return to Hezerak illustrates the difficulty of the fight in the part of eastern Afghanistan. Company commander Capt. Justin Liesen says some of the village elders surrounding Connolly remain on the fence when it comes to choosing between the Taliban and Afghanistan’s central government, which some resent for destroying opium poppy crops, an essential to the survival of many Afghans in this area.

“A large contingent of the population aren’t supporters of GIROA (Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan) because they lost their livelihood” to opium eradication operations conducted by Afghan Uniformed Police, Liesen says.

Still, the captain says his forces made significant progress in their corner of Nangarhar, having improved the efficacy of the Afghan forces, particularly its commanders, through constant training. Liesen notes that at the beginning their deployment some nine months ago, Afghan forces weren’t particularly eager to join their American counterparts on patrols. Now, he says, those same Afghan forces are planning their own missions and executing them without U.S. soldiers. And despite the recent altercation with the ALP, who are trained by a small U.S. Special Forces unit, he says that relations between the Americans and Afghan forces here have improved during their recently completed tenure at Connolly.

“There are plenty of success,” says Liesen. “There are some frustrations, sure, but there are successes too.”

IMPROVED RELATIONS

Relations between U.S. and Afghan forces at Connolly have not always been strong. Last year, an Afghan soldier turned his weapon on two U.S. soldiers here killing them in what has become commonly known as “Green on Blue” attacks, which have increased in recent years throughout Afghanistan. The Taliban often takes responsibility for these attacks and attribute them to their success in infiltrating the Afghan National Security Forces.

According to several officers, residents of Khogyani District have been tied to several insider attacks in other parts of Afghanistan, saddling the region with a dubious reputation.

Since then, relations between the Afghan and American soldiers at Connolly have improved, leaders from both side maintain.

Liesen notes that the Afghan Army unit that was posted at Connolly during last year’s insider attack was replaced by the current Kandak (equivalent of a U.S. Army battalion) and its leaders take seriously the threat of potential insider attacks.

Shortly after the fatal Green-on-Blue killings in nearby Paktika province, U.S. and Afghan officers at Connolly met to discuss the incident, which helps restore a sense of normalcy to relations.

“I promise you guys it won’t happen here,” says Afghan Maj. Shafiullah Kohstani to a group of American soldier advisers known as Security Forces Advise and Assist Team, or SFAAT, which over the past year has spearheaded the training of Afghan forces throughout the country in anticipation of the 2014 drawdown.

The SFAAT at Connolly expresses confidence in the current commander here but notes previous Afghan officers they considered substandard. “Over our time here, we’re been able to remove some (Afghan) leaders that weren’t very good and replace them with much better officers,” Capt. John Irivine says.

SAFETY CONCERNS

Amid the praise for the Afghan Army and Uniformed Police, concerns about the reliability and allegiances of ALP in Khogyani and throughout Afghanistan persist. While the local police force is touted by U.S. military commanders as the first line of defense against Taliban incursions into small villages, the ALP have also been criticized for human rights abuses and corruption rackets that extort rural Afghans for protection money.

After the ALP was established in Khogyani, they were regularly targeted by the Taliban, whose senior leaders, including Mullah Omar, have accused the force of being traitors to Afghanistan. One of the local police was recently discovered murdered. “There is a legitimate concern for ALP’s safety,” Spinelli says.

Concerns for their safety, allegiance and the ethics of the ALP has some wondering whether it will eventually break down once U.S. troops leave Afghanistan. Some contend that the ALP will be absorbed by the Taliban, as some of its ranks are reconciled militants. Anthony Cordesman, a security expert for the Strategic Center for International Studies, says the ALP are not integrated into the rest of the Afghan National Security Forces and are “serving their own special interests.”

“They’ll hold some areas (of Afghanistan) and lose others,” Cordesman says. “The question is: Can they be effective enough?”

India-Pakistan - Making Treason Stick

In Pakistan the civilian government has decided to prosecute former military dictator and army chief general Pervez Musharraf for treason (various crimes committed during and after his 1990 government takeover). This is a first in Pakistan and it is feared that many other senior commanders will be dragged into the process and prosecuted as well (for working with Musharraf). This is a major threat to the military, where prosecution by civilian courts and obedience to elected governments was, until recently unheard of. That is changing, but there remains the risk of the generals taking over, or trying to, once more.

 

China and India will hold border negotiations in China starting tomorrow. India continues to have problems with Chinese troops crossing the unofficial border both nations share. The negotiations mean to adjust the Tibet border (which a temporarily independent Tibet adjusted in India’s favor in 1914) to please both nations. There are many disputed portions along the 4,000 kilometer long frontier, most of them involving Chinese claims on territory India has occupied for a long time. 

 

Just across the Pakistani border in Afghanistan Afghan troops and Afghan Taliban have been attacking bases used by Pakistani Taliban. The Afghan security forces and the Taliban gunmen are not cooperating but they are both going after the Pakistani Taliban. This is apparently part of a deal the Afghan Taliban agreed to recently with the Pakistani Army for joint attacks on the Pakistani Taliban. The Afghan Taliban depends on a sanctuary it has in and around Quetta, the largest city in Baluchistan (southwest Pakistan). Quetta is safe because Pakistan will not let American UAVs to operate there. Quetta is where the Afghan Taliban leadership has been sheltered since 2002 and is right across the Afghan border from the Taliban heartland in Kandahar and Helmand provinces. Since the Afghan Taliban has not made (or sponsored) terrorist attacks inside Pakistan, there has been an unofficial truce with the Pakistani government. For over a year now the Pakistani military has been trying to persuade the Afghan Taliban to help deal with anti-Pakistan Islamic terrorists in Pakistan. 

 Most of these attacks are carried out by factions belonging to the Pakistani Taliban. The Afghan Taliban were persuaded to help as long as they only had to attack the Pakistani Taliban inside Afghanistan. There was another reason for this as well. Pakistan assisted the Afghan Taliban in getting permission to open up an official office in the Persian Gulf state of Qatar recently. Pakistan has also persuaded some Islamic terror groups that operate mainly against India to join in attacking the Pakistani Taliban. In return for that Pakistan has increased its assistance in financing terrorist training camps near the Indian border and using Pakistani troops to fire on Indian border guards in order to help the Islamic terrorists get across the border into India. 

 

These deals with the Afghan Taliban and Islamic terrorists who concentrate in India make it clear that for Pakistan the main enemy is India and that the Taliban (of whatever flavor) are simply another weapon in their arsenal. Thus there is growing cooperation between Afghanistan and India because the Afghans see Pakistan as their most dangerous foe. The Taliban were created by Pakistan to gain a greater degree of control over Afghanistan and the Afghans will never forgive Pakistan for that.  

In southwest Pakistan (Quetta, the provincial capital of Baluchistan) a suicide bomber and a nearby civilian were killed at a bus stop when the explosive vest the bomber was carrying (not wearing) went off. This was apparently not intended and terrorists was either on his way to use the vest himself or delivering it to someone who would. 

 

June 26, 2013: Bangladesh has agreed to participate in a Chinese project that would build a highway from southwestern China (Kunmin) through Burma and Bangladesh to eastern India (West Bengal). This is an outgrowth of an earlier Chinese effort to rebuild the World War II "Stillwell (or Ledo) Road", from northeast India into Burma. That road was originally, in 1942, built to replace the "Burma Road" that got Allied military aid to Chinese troops fighting the Japanese. But Japan captured Burma in 1942, and cut that connection. The new Burma Road was to bypass India, and just go from China into Burma. India was not happy about being left out and now everyone seems onboard for this project. The new road will be of great benefit for all areas it passes through as it will make trade, and travel, with China cheaper and more convenient. Previously India was concerned about the military implications, but now trade looms larger than potential Chinese invasion. Pakistan is trying to interest China in building a similar road, and railroad, to Pakistani ports. So far China has not been interested, probably because the Pakistan route goes through more difficult (and expensive to build in) terrain and the security situation in Pakistan is much less stable than in Indian, Burma and Bangladesh. China is particularly angry about how three of its citizens were recently murdered at a mountain climbing base camp in northern Pakistan. 

 

In Kashmir Pakistani troops opened fire across the LOC (Line of Control, the unofficial border separating Indian and Pakistani portions of Kashmir) despite a cease fire arranged after the similar attacks yesterday. Inside Indian Kashmir Islamic terrorists murdered a local pro-Indian politician.

In Karachi (Pakistan) Islamic terrorists attempted to kill a senior judge with a roadside bomb. The judge escaped injury but nine others in his convoy, or nearby civilians, were killed

 

June 25, 2013: In Kashmir Pakistani troops opened fire across the Line of Control from several of their border posts. Indian troops returned fire and it soon became apparent that this was another attempt by Pakistani troops to create a diversion while Islamic terrorists (four of them this time) sneaked into Indian Kashmir. While the ceasefire between Pakistan and India has greatly reduced the violence along the border, there is still shooting. The Indian troops usually fire back and Pakistan will often try to create an issue out of that, claiming that the Indians started it all. 

 

In Pakistan's tribal territories ( Khyber ) a suicide bomber attacked a funeral killing 29 people. One of the victims (believed to be the main target) was a recently elected member of parliament. There were over 800 people at the funeral service. 

 

Indian and American military commanders met in Hawaii to discuss how the two countries could cooperate to deal with growing Chinese military power and aggression in waters off China and the Indian Ocean. 

 

In eastern India (Bihar) about twenty Maoists dressed in police uniforms attacked the home of a bank executive and killed two people. The Maoists are generally hostile to banks and accuse them of exploiting the poor. 

 

June 24, 2013: In Indian Kashmir two Islamic terrorists ambushed an army convoy killing eight soldiers and wounding 19. This was the most damaging such attack in a long time. So far this year thirty Indian soldiers have been killed in Kashmir as Pakistan has increased its efforts to sneak Islamic terrorists into the area. The terrorists are housed and trained in camps across the LOC in Pakistan. The violence had been declining in the last decade as Indian security measures became more effective and Pakistan finally agreed to talk peace. But pro-terrorism commanders in the Pakistani military and intelligence agencies (ISI) appear to have gained more influence of late and the Islamic terrorists have become more active. This is seen as a Pakistani tactic to encourage more Islamic terror groups to make peace with Pakistan and halt their attacks inside Pakistan. These terrorists are angry at Pakistani cooperation with Western (especially American) antiterrorism efforts. 

Some of the local Islamic radicals also want Pakistan run by a religious dictatorship, not a democracy. That only appeals to a minority of Pakistanis, but this is a radicalized minority that accepts the use of terror to achieve their goals.  The Pakistani government hopes to isolate these radicals by offering other radicals most assistance in getting into India and making attacks there. This is all unofficial, of course, as Pakistan has never admitted that it is sponsoring Islamic terrorism, especially groups operating against India. This stances has been the source of growing embarrassment as more and more evidence piles up proving Pakistani involvement. 

 

June 23, 2013: In southwest Pakistan (Baluchistan) the army launched another major search operation against tribal rebels. Locals complained that the troops were firing indiscriminately at unarmed people. This is a common complaint during such operations. 

 

In eastern India (Jharkhand) police arrested a local Maoist commander, one of his followers and captured weapons and a large quantity of bomb making equipment. 

 

June 22, 2013: In northern Pakistan fifteen Taliban, disguised as local tribal paramilitary police (the Gilgit Scouts), hiked two days up to a complex of base camps for foreign mountain climbers and killed nine of them (including American, Chinese, Lithuanian, Nepali, Slovakian, Ukrainian victims) along with a Pakistani cook. Many potential victims managed to flee. Northern Pakistan contains some of the highest, and most difficult to climb, mountains in the world. The area had always been quiet and safe and the government encouraged the development of tourism. Foreign climbers were particularly attracted to the remote area and their visits have become a major part of the local economy. For a while at least, that is all gone. Even Pakistani tourists are cancelling. Many non-climbers, especially Pakistanis, came to the area for its cooler weather in Summer and reputation for safety from terrorism and crime. After this recent attack the government managed to get all the other foreign climbers off the mountains and back to safety. Soldiers and police are searching the area for the attackers, who will have a hard time evading detection. Satellite phones got word of the attack out quickly and the site of the crime had few escape routes. For now, and the next few years, the economic damage is done and the locals will suffer a sharp decline in living standards until tourists return. That can take a few years, or longer if the Taliban continue operating in this area. A Taliban faction took credit for the attack and said it was revenge for a fatal UAV attack against one of their leaders last month. 

 

June 19, 2013: In Pakistan's tribal territories (outside Peshawar) Islamic terrorists ambushed an army convoy and killed six soldiers. Some of the attackers were killed or wounded but they all got away before army reinforcements arrived. 

 

June 16, 2013: In northeastern Pakistan (Swabi) two more volunteer health workers were killed by Islamic terrorists because the victims were immunizing children against polio. The Islamic terrorists consider these immunization efforts un-Islamic. 

 

June 15, 2013: In southwest Pakistan (Baluchistan) 23 people were killed (including 14 female college students) by two terrorist attacks in the Quetta (the provincial capital). A faction of the Pakistani Taliban claimed responsibility. This group usually attacks local Shia, but in this case they managed to mainly kill local Sunnis. The Taliban agree with al Qaeda that women should not be educated and that Shia are heretics who must die.

Military probing Taliban attack that killed 2 Marines and destroyed 6 warplanes

The U.S. military has begun to investigate a Taliban attack on a U.S.-British base in Afghanistan last September that killed two Marines and destroyed six aircraft and put on hold the announced promotion of the two-star Marine general who was in charge there at the time, officials said Thursday. 

Marine Maj. Gen. Charles M. Gurganus was the senior commander in southwestern Afghanistan when 15 Taliban fighters breached the security perimeter of Camp Bastion in Helmand province and carried out their stunning attack. All but one of the fighters was killed in a Marine counterattack.

Gurganus earlier this year was picked for promotion to lieutenant general and assignment as director of the Marine Corps staff at the Pentagon. A Pentagon official said Thursday that his promotion has been placed on hold pending the outcome of the Central Command investigation. The official spoke on condition of anonymity because he was not authorized to discuss the matter publicly.

A few weeks after the Sept. 14 attack, Gurganus told a news conference that "there's no mystery" to how the Taliban managed to get onto the supposedly secure base and launch their deadly attack using rocket-propelled grenades.

Gurganus said they used simple wire cutters to penetrate the perimeter fence, which was not equipped with alarms. "We have sophisticated surveillance equipment, but it can't see everywhere, all the time," he said. "This was a well-planned attack. I make no excuses for it. This was well planned and it was well executed."

In fact, at least one of the guard towers near the Taliban fighters' entry point was unoccupied at the time, officials have said.

Despite the loss of two Marines and the destruction of almost an entire squadron of Marine AV-8B Harrier jets valued at about $200 million, no formal investigation was undertaken to determine whether anyone should be held to account for failing to stop one of the most audacious attacks of the war.

Killed in the attack were Lt. Col. Christopher Raible, 40, and Sgt. Bradley Atwell, 27.

Britain's Prince Harry, a helicopter pilot, was serving at Camp Bastion at the time of the attack. Officials said he received additional protection when the attack occurred.

At the recommendation of Gen. James Amos, commandant of the Marine Corps, a U.S. Central Command investigation was ordered this week by Army Gen. Lloyd Austin, the head of Central Command, according to his spokesman, Oscar Seara.

Austin ordered that the probe report on "any fault, negligence or failure of responsibility by U.S. commanders and staff" responsible for security at the base, which is surrounded by open terrain and adjacent to the Marine's main base, known as Camp Leatherneck. Because Leatherneck does not have a runway, Marine aircraft use Bastion's airfield headquarters in Helmand.

The Washington Post was first to report that Central Command had opened an investigation.

Seara said Austin determined that a formal investigation was warranted to "ensure all matters of U.S. accountability have been appropriately addressed."

Afghanistan - Fatal Embarrassment

The main problem with Afghanistan is that the Taliban are not seen as an aberration but rather a familiar development in Afghan culture and history. Warlords are the Afghan way of showing how successful you are. It’s all about power, and using that power to get what you want. The Taliban are one of the largest warlord coalitions in the country. The other big one is the drug gangs who tend to cooperate more than battle each other. The drug gangs and Taliban cooperate a lot. Then there are the local warlords, who are often government officials as well as local lads made good. The government and the drug gangs are both sources of money, so it’s not surprising that both control the most armed men. Military commanders, especially battalion and regimental commanders out in the countryside operating alone, tend to act like warlords, because that’s the thing to be in Afghanistan.

 

While all warlords are constantly engaged in feuds with nearby rivals, which sometimes turn into gunfire and explosions, most are eager to maintain some order so they get wealthy without any interruptions. The Taliban are different because they, unlike all the other warlords, want to run the country. They tried that in the 1990s, and while they gained control of most of Afghanistan, they could not conquer it all and were eventually overthrown by their enemies (with a big assist from a few hundred American CIA agents and Special Forces operators plus a few thousand smart bombs) after September 11, 2001. Few in Afghanistan believe the Taliban could get that close again, but the drug gangs tolerate these ambitions because it keeps the security forces busy and makes it easier to produce and export the heroin. Now, for the first time in over five years the Taliban are trying to launch a proper Spring Offensive. So far Taliban attacks are up more than twenty percent over last year. But once more the Taliban are not making much progress and getting a lot of civilians killed or injured in the process. Worse, most of the opposition this year consists of Afghan soldiers and police and a growing number of anti-Taliban tribal militia. 

 

While the Taliban have a great PR operation, getting all their violence and manifestos out onto the Internet, this masks the fact that the Taliban are hated by most Afghans and no one inside Afghanistan ever expects the Taliban to be more than a nuisance, another bunch of violent gunmen who can’t be reasoned with and must be killed. This the Afghan security forces are doing in an impressive fashion. So far this month the Afghan troops and police have killed nearly 500 Taliban. 

This is four times as many dead as the security forces suffered. This kind of loss, to an Afghan foe, is very demoralizing to the average Taliban gunmen. These guys expect to get hammered by the foreign troops, but to take this kind of beating by fellow Afghans dressed like the foreign troops is very discouraging. This is one reason why the security forces have also captured over 600 Taliban so far this month. 

 

The recent surge in Taliban violence has made most Afghans less inclined to support peace talks with the Islamic radicals. More and more Afghan clerics are risking assassination by openly denouncing the Taliban as un-Islamic, blasphemers, criminals and so on. Clergy are particularly angry with the Taliban because of the million or so Afghans (mostly young men) hopelessly addicted to heroin and opium. These addicts are a huge burden, and embarrassment, to their families. Since the Taliban protect the drug gangs, most people hold the Taliban responsible. When the Taliban ran most of the country in the 1990s they taxed the drug gangs and outlawed the sale of heroin or drugs within Afghanistan. That kept the number of addicts way down. But now the Taliban even tolerate some of their own members getting high from time to time. Islamic clerics see this as an abomination and call out the Taliban on this point. Most Afghans agree with these clerics. While the Taliban is still popular among some Islamic conservatives, that popularity is not widespread. 

 

Afghan businessmen complain that the growing corruption is hurting the economy because greedy warlords and officials will steal (or extort) so much that businesses cannot operate. This hurts everyone, but the eagerness to steal and ignore the side-effects is an old Afghan tradition. This is why so many of the most capable Afghans give up trying and emigrate, especially the places (like the West) where there is a lot less corruption. 

 

With NATO leaving next year, Afghanistan is getting friendlier with India. This has now gone as far as asking for Indian troops to work in Afghanistan (as trainers and to provide security for Indian aid projects) and for direct military aid (Afghanistan wants artillery, transport aircraft, military engineering equipment and trucks). India has been providing aid and Indian personnel (including civilian security personnel) for nearly a decade. India is receptive to increasing this aid, despite being primarily Hindu, a religion particularly reviled by Moslems. The Afghans are not as upset at this as the Pakistanis are. India and Afghanistan actually have a long history. Afghanistan may appear to be at the corner of no and where, but it is actually astride the primary invasion route from Central Asia to India (including Pakistan which is still, historically and culturally, part of India). The Afghan tribes have long since learned to step aside as the foreign invaders moved through. Actually, many Afghans would join the invaders, so much so that these invasions, and the loot and stories the survivors brought back, have become a major part of the Afghan collective memory. Some local names recall all that. For example the Hindu Kush Mountains in Afghanistan mean, literally, “slaughter Hindus.” 

Most Westerners have not got a clue about this cultural tradition, and how much it influences the behavior of most Afghans. While Pakistani Islamic conservatives still yearn to conquer and convert Hindu India, the Afghans are rather more pragmatic and realistic. Since Pakistan has been a growing threat to Afghanistan since India was partitioned over the last 60 years (into India, Pakistan, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka) the Afghans have sought local allies. The Afghans see this as one of those “the enemy of my enemy is my friend” situations and the Indians seem to agree so far.

May 29, 2013: In the east ( Jalalabad) two Taliban gunmen attacked a Red Cross compound. A security guard was killed but the Red Cross staff got away with only one wounded. The Red Cross has 1,800 staff in Afghanistan and spends $90 million a year on various projects. The Taliban see such foreign aid as un-Islamic. 

 

May 28, 2013: In the south a series of raids by Afghan security forces left 29 Taliban dead and 45 under arrest. In the northeast (Kapisa Province) Afghan commandos killed four Taliban and captured more than 80. 

 

May 25, 2013: In the south ( Helmand Province) some 200 Taliban, including some foreigners, attacked Afghan troops and were repulsed. In Kabul the Taliban attacked a foreign aid group compound. Several aid workers were wounded. The attack was repulsed with four terrorists killed. One policeman and two civilians died as well. Police later determined that the attack was the work of the Haqqani Network, an Afghan terror group and criminal gang based in Pakistan. 

 

May 24, 2013: In the east ( Ghazni Province) a shipment of Taliban explosives went off by accident in a mosque where it was being stored. Four civilians and eight Taliban died in the blast (perhaps as the result of trying to build a bomb). 

 

May 20, 2013: In the north ( Baghlan P rovince ) a suicide bomber attacked a government building and killed 13 people. 

 

May 18, 2013:  Parliament refused to approve a law that would have made illegal new laws against violence towards women and children. For many legislators this went against ancient Afghan custom.

Taliban leader arrested in Afghanistan

A top Taliban leader was seized during a military operation in Afghanistan's northern Baghlan province Friday, officials said.

The operation was carried out jointly by Afghan and coalition security forces, Khaama Press reported.

The NATO-led International Security Assistance Force, in a statement about the operation, said: "An Afghan and coalition security force arrested a senior Taliban leader during an operation in Baghlan-e Jadid district, Baghlan province, May 17. The senior leader oversees the operations of multiple insurgent cells in Baghlan-e Jadid district. He and his subordinates are responsible for numerous attacks against Afghan and coalition forces. He also collects illegal taxes from local civilians, facilitates the movement of weapons and military equipment for use in operations, and interfaces with senior insurgent leadership in order to pass operational information to his fighters. The security force also seized one pistol as a result of the operation."

The ISAF said the operation followed a successful operation on Thursday in Helmand province, during which security forces arrested one insurgent, seized a weapons cache and about 5,511 pounds of wet and dry opium. In another operation Thursday, nine insurgents were arrested, the ISAF said.

Karzai for Indian arms, stronger military ties

As plans to reduce Western troops gather pace in Afghanistan, the war-torn country on Thursday hoped to establish enhanced defence ties with India, including the supply of lethal and non-lethal military equipment.

Kabul’s demand also comes just ahead of President Hamid Karzai will visit to India next week from May 21-22.

Asked about what kind of defence assistance Afghanistan was looking to get from India, Afghanistan’s ambassador to India Shaida Mohammad Abdali said, “The partnership agreement does not distinguish between lethal and non-lethal (military equipment). We have talked about security and defence cooperation.” 

Abdali also talked about interest in Indian Army training for troops.

“Other assistance in small stages is most welcome... but we would like to go beyond the current trend of cooperation between the two countries in the defence sector,” he added. 

At present, India provides training to some Afghan Army officers. Pakistan has been wary of India’s role in Afghanistan and any move to step up defence ties would add to scepticism. 

This demand is also coming at a time, when Pakistan-Afghanistan ties are frayed. India has followed a policy of keeping the military engagement to a minimum with Afghanistan in the past.

“It is a critical time for all of us and we need to do more than what we are doing right now,” he said. 

The Afghan envoy also welcomed India’s recent commitment of upgrading the strategically important Chabahar port in Iran that would help India get access to land-locked and resource- rich countries. An estimated $100 million (approximately R548.7 crore) is required for the modernisation of the port.

“We would like to see the conclusion of the agreement on the Chabahar port,” Abdali said.

“We are very happy that this is gathering momentum. We hope that we sign the trilateral trade agreement among India, Afghanistan and Iran as quickly as possible. We are optimistic after Indian external affairs minister Salman Khurshid’s visit to Iran.”

Meanwhile, the European Union (EU) special representative for Afghanistan Vygaudas Ušackas, who is presently visiting India, also sought Indian government’s active cooperation in the development of the country. 

Ušackas said the EU is committed to long-term association with the development of the region, which became centre of US’ ‘War on Terrorism’ after the September 11, 2001, attacks there.