Many Iranians consider Iraq
and Afghanistan
as part of “greater Iran”
because both those areas were once part of an Iranian empire (along with most
of Pakistan and
a large chunk of Central Asia). Since the violently
anti-Shia (and anti-Iran) governments were removed from Afghanistan
(in 2001) and Iraq
(in 2003) Iran
has expanded its influence there at the government and ground level. Diplomatic
relations were improved and much charity work was undertaken. But the charity
came with strings; recipients were restricted to those who were pro-Iran, or
willing to be. This made it much easier to recruit spies and terrorists, or
just mobilize a large pro-Iran (or anti-American) demonstration. Iran
has always preferred the long game and knows that if it keeps at it, eventually
Iraq and Afghanistan
will become, if not part of Iran,
than very cooperative with Iran.
The sanctions are hurting in politically uncomfortable ways.
The sharp drop in oil exports has seen the cost of imports more than double
(because of the loss of oil income and plunging value of the Iranian rial). Oil
accounts for 80 percent of exports (the source of foreign currency to buy
foreign goods) and half the government budget. In order to keep unrest down,
the government allowed imports to climb from $39.1 billion to over $60 billion
in the last seven years. Now that is being reversed, and Iranians are
encouraged to be more self-sufficient. This is not popular. Not only are
popular imports (consumer goods and foods not produced in Iran) more expensive,
or unavailable, but many essential raw materials or components needed for local
manufacturing are missing as well, causing factories to shut and increasing (to
nearly 30 percent) unemployment. Inflation is 25 percent and increasing. Even
using smugglers doesn’t help, because there is a lot less money available to
pay the foreign suppliers (who won’t take Iranian currency).
One foreign country where Iranian cash is still popular is Syria,
where thousands of Iranian military and intelligence personnel try to keep the
Assad dictatorship in power. Rebels report (and pass on cell phone pictures) of
cash seized from captured soldiers or pro-government militiamen. Some Iranians
have been captured as well, but Iran
is apparently pouring a lot more money into Syria
and, because of the sanctions, it can no longer afford to send dollars and
other foreign currencies. Few of the Iranians are involved in direct combat,
and many are serving as bodyguards for senior government officials (Syrians can
no longer be trusted for this sort of work.)
The loss of Iranian oil is not being felt in the global oil
market. Libya, Iraq
and Saudi Arabia
are pumping more oil and the rapidly growing American and Canadian production
of oil and gas from shale formations is sharply reducing demand in North
America. In the past, Iran
thought oil export sanctions would not work because of growing demand and tight
supplies. That situation no longer applies and the growing use of shale based
oil and gas world-wide will keep supply ahead of demand for some time to come. Iran
is trying several schemes to circumvent the oil export sanctions, but it
finding that the sanctions quickly catch up.
The EU (European Union) has imposed additional sanctions on
trade with Iran.
The restrictions make it more difficult for banks and suppliers (of just about
everything) to deal with Iran.
The huge increase in sanctions this year have overwhelmed Iran’s
extensive smuggling network. More of the smugglers are being caught or driven
out of the business because of increased scrutiny (by financial regulators and
customs inspectors).
President Ahmadinejad is now feuding with the judiciary
(which is directly controlled by the senior clerics who have veto power over
anything the elected government does), which will not all him to visit a prison
where one of his senior aides is being held.
Iran
continues to deny it had anything to do with Cyber War type attacks on Western
banks and Saudi Arabian oil operations. The attacks have been low grade stuff
and the release of a vicious virus (that deleted hard drive data on over 30,000
Saudi PCs) in August are believed to be the work of a small group of amateur
hackers (who support Islamic terrorism and Iran). Iran
is developing a Cyber War ability, but mainly to defend itself. Meanwhile, Iran,
Syria and Lebanon
are still suffering from stealthy software that monitors what happens on
infected PCs. This “Flame” software is believed to have been created by the United
States and Israel.
The government has denied that it has agreed to secret talks
with the United States
over the sanctions and Iran’s
nuclear weapons program.
October 24, 2012:
The army and air force announced plans for a large-scale exercise on the Iraqi
border.
October 23, 2012:
Sudan reported
that one of their ammunition factories blew up and blamed an Israeli air raid.
Many Sudanese believe the bombed factory actually belongs to Iran
and was part of an Iranian weapons smuggling effort that supplies Islamic
terrorists throughout the Middle East. Israeli officials
refused to comment. Israel
did carry out a similar raid 18 months ago. Israel
repeated its criticism of Iranian weapons smuggling via Sudan,
which Iran
denies.
October 22, 2012:
Two European satellite TV and radio providers invoked sanctions on Iran
and halted delivery of Iranian programming outside Iran.
Syria and Iran
then began quietly jamming BBC, France 24, Deutsche Welle and the Voice of
America broadcasts, via radio and satellite, to Iran
and Syria (who
denied they were jamming). There is ample evidence that the jamming is coming
from Syria and Iran.
October 19, 2012:
A bomb went off in a Christian neighborhood in the Lebanese capital, killing a
senior security official (and seven others) who was openly anti-Syria (and
anti-Assad and anti-Iran). This angered many Lebanese who are still bitter
about decades of Syrian interference in Lebanese affairs. Hezbollah has long
used non-Shia allies, as well as Syrian agents, to carry out attacks on
political rivals. This attack led to more gunfire between pro and anti-Syria
factions in Lebanon.
Iran is
believed to have approved the attack, as they do any major Hezbollah operation.
Iran media
blamed Israel
and the U.S.
for the attack, which is a normal reaction in Iran
(which blames Israel
and the United States
for the rebellion in Syria).
Most Iranians consider it their right (and responsibility), as the regional
superpower to interfere in Lebanon,
Syria, Iraq,
Afghanistan and
anywhere else in the area. What Iranians do not like is their government
spending a lot of money on these operations. The billions spent to prop up
Hezbollah in Lebanon
and the Assad dictatorship in Syria
is not popular at all.
A suicide bomber set off his explosives at the entrance to a
mosque near the Pakistani border, killing himself and two guards.
October 18, 2012:
The United States announced rewards for the capture of two senior al Qaeda
officials believed hiding out in Iran.
Al Qaeda financier Muhsin al Fadhli now has a $7 million price on his head and
$5 million for his deputy Adel Radi Saqr al Wahabi al Harbi.
October 17, 2012:
Turkey is
prosecuting two Iranians for espionage.
October 16, 2012:
The government claims that Iranian UAVs, flying out of Lebanon,
have made dozens of recon sorties over Israel.
An Iranian UAV was shot down over Israel
on the 9th and Israel
doubts that any other Iranian UAVs have been able to sneak in undetected.
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