Counter-Terrorism ---- The Downside Of Victory

Even before September 11, 2001 counter-terrorism experts were becoming aware of how crucial money and other forms of material support are to even the most fanatical terrorist organizations. The intense scrutiny of Islamic terror groups in the last two decades revealed some other interesting angles to international terrorism. For example, after the Cold War ended many in the West were surprised to discover the extent to which the Soviet Union had provided support for terrorist groups.

 

There was not only an extensive network of terrorist training schools in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe but also cash subsidies, weapons and specialized equipment as well as technical advisors for terrorists outside the Soviet controlled countries. Western counter-terrorism organizations knew this support existed but not, until the Soviet Union fell in 1991 and their archives were opened for a few years, the extent of that support.

 

Islamic radical terrorists did not get much support from the Soviet Union because these groups considered the Soviets anti-Islam and prime targets for Islamic terrorism. The Soviets managed to keep the Islamic terrorists out of the Soviet Union and cut off from any Soviet support. The Islamic radicals learned to adapt by relying on pious, newly rich, Arabs from countries with lots of oil to export. After the Arab led oil cartel was formed in the 1970s and forced up oil prices there was a lot more Islamic charity for Islamic terrorist groups to tap into.

  

This brings us around to Somali Islamic radical group al Shabaab. Originally the fanatic wing of a more moderate Somali movement trying to impose law and order after more than a decade of chaos, al Shabaab soon became a major law and order problem itself. There are still several thousand armed al Shabaab men in Somalia after several years of fighting and losing to African peacekeepers and Somali troops. Al Shabaab suffered major losses last year and has scattered into smaller groups that hide out in remote parts of Somalia. At the moment al Shabaab is more interested in raising cash as the group is broke following its expulsion from the lucrative cities of Mogadishu and Kismayo over the last two years. There are now fewer opportunities to kidnap foreigners and the pirates, who used to share ransoms with al Shabaab, have not taken a ransomable ship in over a year. In short, al Shabaab needs money.

  

The effort to further weaken (and eventually obliterate) al Shabaab has now shifted to the group’s finances. This is a battle that gets little publicity and is easy to keep out of the news because it is, well, stuff that mostly happens out of public view. Al Shabaab is believed to be seeking cash from wealthy Arabs in Arabia, These are men who like to donate to Islamic charities that support Islamic radicalism. For nearly a decade both oil rich Arab countries and their Western allies have been trying to stop this source of terrorist funding, but have only been able to reduce it. The money still gets through to Islamic terror groups that have lots of media coverage. For that reason it is believed al Shabaab will try to carry out more spectacular attacks outside Somalia. That way al Shabaab can gain more media coverage and easier access to wealthy donors. 

  

This strategy is easier now because a recent power struggle within the organization has left the “Foreign” faction in charge. For years al Shabaab had been divided as the “Somalia” nationalist faction opposed the foreign volunteers who were eager for al Shabaab to carry out more terrorism outside Somalia. The Somalia faction wanted to hold off on this until they had all of Somalia under their control. But the Foreign faction believed that would take too long, especially once the foreign terrorists came to understand how fragmented Somalia was by clan and warlord politics. The foreigners concluded that Somalia would never be united, because it had never been united (for long) in the past. This is something most Somalis do not want to dwell on. Meanwhile in the past year many prominent al Shabaab nationalist (keep operations inside Somalia) faction leaders were killed or driven away from al Shabaab, which now sees itself primarily as an international terrorist organization. Thus the eagerness of American, Israeli, British and other European countries to help destroy al Shabaab in Somalia once and for all. As long as al Shabaab survives in Somalia the organization can reach out to Somali communities in other countries, especially the West, for donations, new recruits and overseas targets.

  

The loss of Kismayo last year was a major blow to al Shabaab finances because that port could be used to smuggle illegal goods (especially ivory) out of the country. Al Shabaab also collected fees on anything leaving or entering via Kismayo. Now al Shabaab has limited, and irregular, access to smaller ports on the coast. The financial loss to al Shabaab has been huge. Al Shabaab charged fees (for protection from al Shabaab retaliation) to businesses in all areas it controlled. This covered an enormous amount of legal and illegal trade via Kismayo. Kismayo alone was worth over $50 million a year to al Shabaab. For every million dollars of income al Shabaab could keep 400-500 armed men in action. Major operations, like suicide car bombings, can cost several thousand dollars (to get the car, build the bomb and train the suicide bomber) and intelligence gathering costs money, if only because bribes are an easy way to find out things but that can be expensive, even in Somalia. 

  

With most of that income gone in the past year, al Shabaab has begun to unravel. The loss of income led to many desertions and the inability to make attacks within Somalia. This is a common pattern in Islamic terror organizations. The less cash they have the fewer senior staff they have. This group includes skilled leadership and technical experts (for building bombs, planning attacks and working the media). These core members usually have families to support and need cash to do their work. Without the spectacular attacks potential recruits and donors won’t know you exist and you will fade away. Counter-terrorism efforts now try to induce this form of natural selection and al Shabaab is one of the primary targets. Al Shabaab is adapting and trying to establish branches in nearby countries with ethnic Somali populations. Thus al Shabaab becomes a more widespread threat and it becomes weaker overall. When the rats abandon a sinking ship the rats show up somewhere else.

Pirates Get Good News And Bad News

Piracy has been making a comeback in the last decade, mainly because of a surge in attacks off the Somali coast. In the last few years a massive international response to the Somali piracy problem has all but shut down the pirate gangs operating there. Yet worldwide piracy activity is up, mainly because of resurgence in small scale piracy against fishing boats, offshore oil field support craft and attacks on larger ships for the purpose of robbing or kidnapping some of the crew, not stealing the entire ship.

 

The increased attacks on smaller fishing boats is largely because of the growing prosperity among these “artisanal fishermen” caused by the rapidly increasing prices for fish, especially the popular fish taken off the coasts of some countries (like Ecuador). The artisanal fishing boats are no longer powered by oars and sails, with navigation via a cheap compass. These days there’s an outboard motor, GPS and cell phones or radio for keeping in touch with other boats and the family ashore. All these items are sought by the pirates, who can usually find buyers a few villages away down the coast. When there is enough pirate activity there were develop a network of brokers (“fences”) who will take the stolen engines and electronics and get them sold far enough away so the victim does not see his own stuff again and call the police. These small scale pirates usually do not kill their victims, as police tend to be more energetic about solving murders than robbery at sea.  

 

The big time piracy is largely out of business because warship patrols and better security aboard large ships passing Somalia has made it nearly impossible to seize these vessels. Holding ships for ransom only worked initially because Somalia, a state without a government sine 1991, provided small ports on the coast of East Africa where pirates could bring the merchant ships they had captured, and keep them there, safe from rescue attempts, until a ransom could be negotiated. 

 

Off West Africa, pirates have come up with another angle. These pirates, believed to be only a few well-organized gangs, target small oil tankers operating in the Gulf of Guinea (where Nigeria and its neighbors have oil fields). The pirates quickly board and seize control of a tanker at night. The crew is locked up in an internal space and the tracking devices are disabled. Then the tanker is taken to rendezvous with another tanker, which takes the oil from the hijacked tanker, along with the pirates and their other loot and makes for a port where oil brokers willing to buy stolen oil (at a steep discount) take the pirated cargo, pay the pirates, and perhaps tip the pirates off on another small tanker that could be hit.

 

The hijacked tankers, stripped of portable items of value and then set adrift, are soon found and the crew released. Normally, pirates attack merchant ships anchored near the coast grab all the valuable portables and quickly leave. This is considered armed robbery, although some pirates will kidnap a few of the ships officers and hold them for ransom. But this requires a good hideout and more resources. The pirates who steal oil cargoes require even more technical organization and connections. But because the payoff is so high (millions of dollars for a stolen oil tanker cargo), a growing number of skilled gangsters are being attracted to the business.

 

All this has produced something of a piracy revival. Piracy hit a trough from the late nineteenth century into the later twentieth. That was because the Great Powers had pretty much divided up the whole planet and then policed it. Piracy began to revive in a modest way beginning in the 1970s, with the collapse of many post-colonial regimes.

 

Note that what constitutes an act of piracy is not clearly defined. It essentially comes down to non-state sanctioned use of force at sea or from the sea. This could include intercepting a speedboat to rob the passengers, but that's usually just thought of as armed robbery. And something like the seizure of the Achille Lauro in 1985 is considered terrorism, rather than piracy. In the past some marginal states have sanctioned piratical operations, like the North African Barbary States, but that is rare any more. The trend, however, is definitely up.

 

Pirates usually function on the margins of society, trying to get a cut of the good life in situations where there aren't many options. This is usually in areas where state control is weakest or absent, in failing and "flailed" states (a flailing state is something like Nigeria, Indonesia, or the Philippines, where the government is managing to just barely keep things together, unlike a failed state such as Somalia, where there isn't any government at all).

 

The solution to piracy is essentially on land, where you go into uncontrolled areas and institute some law and order and remove the pirate safe havens. This has been the best approach since the Romans eliminated piracy in the Mediterranean over 2,000 years ago. Trying to tackle piracy just on the maritime end can reduce the incidence of piracy but can't eliminate it. In the modern world the "land" solution often can't be implemented. Who wants to put enough troops into Somalia to eliminate piracy? And flailing states are likely to be very sensitive about their sovereignty if you offer to help them control marginal areas.

 

A new industry has developed that attempts to "pirate proof" ships operating off Somalia. The most successful (and most expensive) technique is to put a small number of armed guards on each ship. That, and warship patrols, has greatly reduced piracy off East Africa (Somalia). But off West Africa (especially the Gulf of Guinea) the piracy threat is growing because pirates have found ways to get more valuables off ships before security forces (police, coast guard, or navy) can show up.

Netherlands beefs up anti-piracy forces

The Netherlands will boost its military contribution to the NATO force fighting piracy in Somali waters after the country's Parliament approved funding.

The Dutch Parliament voted last week to spend $16.5 million to provide extra personnel, two Cougar helicopters and an unmanned aerial vehicle to join Operation Ocean Shield, in which NATO warships and aircraft have been patrolling the waters off the Horn of Africa.

Also part of the new deployment will be an additional submarine to join the mission in the second half of 2012, Radio Netherlands reported.

The Netherlands has committed two vessels to Operation Ocean Shield as part of the expansion of forces. They include the helicopter-carrying frigate Evertsen, which is on its way to the region, and the amphibious transport ship Rotterdam, which will carry the two Cougar helicopters as well as the drone, the national broadcaster said.

Meanwhile, the multipurpose frigate Van Amstel, which has been deployed as part of the EU's Operation Atalanta, will return to the Netherlands this month.

The mission of Operation Ocean Shield is to counter maritime piracy and build policing capacity with governments in the Horn of Africa region. It operates in conjunction with other naval forces including U.S.-led maritime forces, Operation Atalanta and national actors operating against the threat of piracy in the region.

The North Atlantic Council in March extended Operation Ocean Shield's mandate until the end of 2014.

NATO in May released new statistics on piracy in the region showing a marked decline in the number of hijacking attempts.

Officials said a five pirate hijackings were recorded over the first four months of 2012, which would put the region on a pace for 20 for the year. That's compared with 24 in 2011 and 45 each in 2010 and 2009.

But significantly, only 15 unsuccessful pirate attacks were seen between January and April -- a pace of 60 for the year -- while last year 129 such unsuccessful attacks by were recorded on shipping in the Somali Basin, the Gulf of Aden and the Arabian Sea.

As of May 11, pirates were holding eight ships with an estimated 235 hostages, NATO said.

A Dutch officer this month assumed command of Operation Ocean Shield. Commodore Ben Bekkering of the Dutch navy said the effort has been bearing fruit under the previous commander, Rear Adm. Sinan Azmi Tosun of the Turkish navy.

"On Admiral Tosun's 6-month watch, the success rate of pirates has seen a sharp decline," Bekkering said. "Pirates find it increasingly difficult to deploy from the coast and hunt at sea.

"But the many incidents over the last few months, including attacks and hijackings, make it absolutely clear that we can't let our guard down," he added. "I see it as my absolute task to ensure the trend continues and engage with all partners in the region to maximize our combined effect."

The Dutch Parliament at the same time, however, turned down an appeal from ship-owners to allow merchant ships to hire private protection forces.

Defense Minister Hans Hillen said he understood the ship-owners' position but said the government needed to retain control of armed forces at sea.

"All armed organizations have to fall under the state's responsibility to ensure accuracy and proportional measures," he told lawmakers.

U.S. declassifies attacks in Yemen, Somalia

The White House is partially lifting the lid of secrecy on its counterterrorism campaign against al-Qaida in Yemen and Somalia by formally acknowledging for the first time that it is conducting lethal attacks in those countries, officials said Friday.

The White House’s semiannual report to Congress on the state of U.S. combat operations abroad, delivered Friday, mentions what has been widely reported for years but never formally acknowledged by the administration: The U.S. military has been taking “direct action” against members of al-Qaida and affiliates in Yemen and Somalia.

The report does not elaborate, but “direct action” is a military term of art that refers to a range of lethal attacks, which in the case of Yemen and Somalia include attacks by armed drones. The report does not mention drones or other weapons.

The report applies only to U.S. military operations, including those by special operations forces — not those conducted by the CIA.

The report does not provide details of any military operations in either Yemen or Somalia. It merely acknowledges they have happened. Killings of terror suspects overseas are acknowledged by the administration, but it does not mention the involvement of drones. The CIA and military have separate drone fleets.

The decision by President Obama to declassify the existence of the counterterror actions in those two countries amounts an incremental move toward greater openness about the use of U.S. force overseas. It does not reflect any change in the intensity or basic character of the U.S. campaign to defeat al-Qaida.

A previous step in the direction of greater official transparency came in April when the White House’s counterterrorism chief, John Brennan, made the first formal confirmation that the U.S. uses armed drones against terrorists. But he did not mention their use in specific countries.

The new information in Friday’s report comes amid outcries from some in Congress about leaks to the news media about details of classified activities such as the existence of a White House “kill list” of targeted al-Qaida militants. The accusation, mostly by Republicans, is that the White House has orchestrated the leaks to improve Obama’s re-election chances, an allegation the president has rejected as “offensive” and “wrong.”

Three administration officials who briefed The Associated Press on the decision to declassify the existence of the military’s counterterrorism campaigns in Yemen and Somalia said Obama determined that the time was ripe, in part because the U.S. has built closer relations with the Yemeni government and with governments interested in eliminating extremist elements in Somalia. Somalia has not had a fully functioning government since 1991.

The officials said the declassification of further details in future reports to Congress would remain under White House review.

Under the War Powers Resolution of 1973, the White House is required to report to Congress every six months on U.S. combat operations abroad. Friday’s report includes a secret attachment with classified details, which was not released publicly.

The last report, on Dec. 15, 2011, made no mention of Yemen or Somalia. Instead it said that in relation to efforts against al-Qaida, the U.S. was working with partners “with a particular focus on countries within the U.S. Central Command’s area of responsibility,” which is a broad swath of territory that includes the entire Middle East and Central Asia.

Friday’s report was more explicit. It said that in Somalia the U.S. military has worked to counter the terrorist threat posed by al-Qaida and al-Qaida-associated elements of a militant group called al-Shabaab.

“In a limited number of cases, the U.S. military has taken direct action in Somalia against members of al-Qaida, including those who are also members of al-Shabaab, who are engaged in efforts to carry out terrorist attacks against the United States and our interests,” it said.

It said the U.S. military also has been working closely with the Yemeni government to “operationally dismantle and ultimately eliminate” the terrorist threat posed by al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula, or AQAP.

It called AQAP “the most active and dangerous affiliate of al-Qaida today.”

“Our joint efforts have resulted in direct action against a limited number of AQAP operatives and senior leaders in that country who posed a terrorist threat to the United States and our interests,” the report said.

Great Britain, France to Attack Somali Pirates

Great Britain and France are forming strike task force in order to destroy land infrastructure of Somali pirates, sources report

The task force includes French nuclear-powered aircraft carrier Charles de Gaulle, British light aircraft carrier HMS Illustrious, amphibious assault ship HMS Bulwark, and support ships. The task force mandated by the EU last month to attack land assets of Somali pirates will be deployed near the Horn of Africa since coming August.

Pirates are traditionally most active early in autumn when summer heat is gone, said a British security expert. That is when their infrastructure will be attacked, he added.

According to the reports , European military experts reached a conclusion that pirates' fast-speed boats should be destroyed in basing sites, i.e. ports of southern Somalia; they also decided to destroy land infrastructure including fuel depots. For this purpose, it is planned to use helicopters like Apache based on HMS Illustrious. Landing assault operation is not slated.