India ramps up defence along China border

India has started ramping up military defences in the Ladakh sector of Jammu and Kashmir that faces China, especially after Beijing has ringed the area with at least six airfields, fighter aircraft, all terrain vehicles and special forces that are backed by top-class metalled roads right up to the Line of Actual Control (LAC).

 

New Delhi will be moving an armoured brigade — some 150 T-72 tanks — to Ladakh and also have Smerch multi-barrel rocket launch units placed at key locations. These are capable of hitting targets 70-80 kms away.

 

An armoured regiment — 46 tanks — had moved in last year to join the Kiari-based 70 Brigade and is now located at a forward sector, 20 km inside the LAC, where India suffered a setback in the 1962 conflict with China. This is separate from the upcoming Armoured Brigade that will be directly controlled by the Leh-based 14 Corps. Its three Regiments, comprising 46 tanks each, will be co-located with existing infantry and artillery regiments of the Indian Army. Meaning an armoured component will be available from the northern most tip, that is the base of the Karokaram pass at Daulat Baig Oldie, to the south eastern extreme of Demchok and Chumar, sources said. Adding up the numbers would mean that over the next 18 months India would have stationed 200 of the T-72 tanks in Ladakh and all night-sight equipped.

 

Ladakh being a plateau is ideal tank country. The only effort is in bringing the tanks through the narrow and high Himlayan passes on the Srinagar-Leh route or the Manali-Leh route.

 

The existing numbers of tanks are just not enough in case of an attack, especially after the Indian side was alerted of threat by way of a specialised exercise by the Chinese to have rapid movement across Tibet and Xinjiang, both abutting Ladakh. The Lanzhou Military Area Command of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) of China carried out rapid movement exercises in 2012. The first tank regiment moved to Ladakh in 2013.

 

New Delhi’s fears got an official stamp in March 2013 when the State Council of China published a white paper titled “The Diversified Employment of China’s Armed Forces” that talked about these rapid movements. It claimed the PLA extensively practised the move to concentrate troops. “Trans-military area command movements have been carried out. In 2012, the Chengdu MAC and Lanzhou MAC carried out the exercise.” Lanzhou and Chengdu — are dedicated to India. The Lanzhou MAC is tasked for J&K, Himachal Pradesh and Uttarakhand, while the Chengdu MAC is for Chinese frontiers facing Nepal, Sikkim and Arunachal Pradesh. China in total has seven MACs.

 

China has ringed J&K with new airfields. The Ngari Gunsa airbase in Tibet has come up just 200 km east of Demchok in India. North of J&K, airbases at Kashgar, Yarkand, Hotan and Qeimo (Cherchen) in Xinjiang can be used to launch an attack.

More tanks and artillery

• New Delhi will be moving an armoured brigade, nearly 150 T-72 tanks, to Ladakh and also have Smerch multi-barrel rocket launch units placed at key locations
• An armoured regiment, 46 tanks, had moved in last year to join the Kiari-based 70 Brigade and is now located at a forward sector, 20 km inside the Line of Actual Control
• Three Regiments, comprising 46 tanks each, of Armoured Brigade will be co-located with existing infantry and artillery regiments of the Indian Army

The Indian Army Wins A Big One

The Indian Army won a major victory over the Indian Air Force recently when the government agreed to transfer most attack helicopters from the air force to the army. That means the army gets control of over 270 armed helicopters (22 AH-64s, 179 light combat models, and 76 armed Indian made transports). The air force will continue to operate a dozen or so elderly Mi-25 and Mi-35 helicopter gunships, until they retire by the end of the decade. These are export versions of the Russian Mi-24. The army has long complained that air force control of the armed helicopters, which were designed to support army operations, are sometimes difficult to get from the air force in a timely matter. Another aspect of this deal is a new agreement by the air force to station some transport helicopters at army bases in Kashmir, so that there will not be a delay when transport is needed for an emergency.

This sort of problem between the army and air force is not unique to India and is actually quite common. It all started back in the 1920s. For example, at the start of World War I (1914-18), the British Royal Navy had more aircraft than the Royal Flying Corps (which belonged to the army). But at the end of World War I, it was decided to put all aircraft under the control of the new Royal Air Force (the former Royal Flying Corps). The navy was not happy with this and just before World War II broke out, the admirals got back control of their aircraft, at least the ones that operated from ships (especially aircraft carriers).

The army reformed its Army Air Corps during World War II, to control artillery spotter aircraft, gliders (for parachute divisions), and a few other transports for supporting commando operations. After World War II the Army Air Corps mainly controlled the growing fleet of transport and attack helicopters. The Indian Air Force has always refused to allow the Indian Army to do the same thing after modern India was created in 1947.

Air forces tend to keep at it. Royal Air Force generals recently demanded control of everything that flies, believing that this is more efficient. The army and navy, not to mention the experience of many other nations, said otherwise. At the very least the army needs to control its helicopters and some small transports. In Russia the army always controlled ground attack aircraft, as well as some fighters. In the United States the Marine Corps controlled its own fighters, light bombers, and helicopters. It made a difference, especially to the marines on the ground, that the marine aircraft were being flown by marines.

Another problem with a unified air force is that it becomes, quite naturally, air force centric. This is understandable and the air force proceeds to develop strategies, and tactics, that emphasize looking at military matters from an air force viewpoint. Before World War II this led to the doctrine of strategic bombardment. This was supposed to be a decisive weapon but it wasn't. When nuclear weapons came along the air force believed that it finally had a way to make strategic bombardment decisive. But it didn't, as ballistic missiles (another form of artillery) became the key delivery system for nukes and nuclear weapons were so destructive that they became more of a threat, than a weapon that you could use (and they have not been used again, since the first two atomic bombs were dropped on Japan in 1945). The fact of the matter is that wars are still ultimately won by the ground forces. As the army likes to point out, the ultimate air superiority weapon is your infantry occupying the enemy air bases. Everyone else (the navy and air force) is there to support the infantry in actually winning the war.

India - Challenging the dragon at sea

Amongst the three services — Army, Navy and the Air Force — only the Indian Navy has a proud record of indigenous shipbuilding over the last 50 years. Unfortunately, its record of indigenous construction of conventional submarines (or SSKs) and strategic Arihant-class submarines (or nuclear-powered, ballistic missile-carrying submarines SSBNs) has been comparatively poor. With the arrival of the tactical nuclear submarine (SSN), INS Chakra, on April 4, 2012, the challenge now is how to quickly build indigenous SSNs for the Navy by utilising the massive unused capacity of the private-sector Indian shipyards in a joint-venture with public sector shipyard or yards which have the necessary expertise.

Given China’s continued sabre-rattling in the South and East China Seas, it is only a matter of time before India, and its Navy, are confronted by the dragon at sea. The only viable antidote to the Chinese seaborne threat is the SSN. While a second INS Chakra-type SSN should be acquired from Russia at the earliest, there is no doubt that the Indian Navy urgently needs 6 to 12 SSNs to meet challenges in the vast expanse of the Indian Ocean, especially in the Asia Pacific region.

Building SSKs is a complex and time-consuming process, as it requires dedicated specialised manpower and infrastructure for design and construction. In the case of nuclear submarines (SSNs and SSBNs), the complexity and “degree of difficulty” increases manifold, as design of a safe, reliable miniature reactor and expensive silencing techniques are essential. Between an SSBN and an SSN, the latter is even more complex as the SSN is required to be faster, more silent at higher speeds and capable of operating at depths that are far greater than the SSBN is designed for.

The UK took six years to design their latest Astute-class SSNs and then another 10 years to make the first (HMS Astute) operational in 2011. A total of seven “Astute class” submarines are being built, with a new unit being delivered every two years. The lesson here is that India should aim to build at least 6 to 12 SSNs so that the cost-cum-time benefits of series production, after initial design, are realised.

The universally accepted norm after over a century of submarine construction is to have stringent quality control at the construction stage, the harbour trials stage and the sea trials stage. In addition, building complex platforms, like the SSNs, in acceptable time frames requires joint ventures between two or more shipbuilding yards (either public or private), which can complement the strengths of each other’s infrastructure and manpower, to independently build the various “sections” of the SSN hull, which are welded together to form “blocks”, and then transfer them to a “master yard” which has suitable dry docks, where these “blocks” are welded together to form a complete submarine, which is then “floated out” of the dry dock, for final “Harbour Acceptance Trials” (Hats), followed by “Sea Acceptance Trials” (Sats).

India’s experiments with constructing conventional submarines, on a single tender basis, at Mazagon Docks Limited (MDL), Mumbai, (where two German-designed HDW units were built between 1984 and 1994) were, perhaps, necessary at that time given the paucity of shipyards and dry docks in the country. Nonetheless, this experiment showed that the total building time could have been reduced by half had a joint-venture system been followed (as against the German, which took 56 months, MDL took 96 and 108 months respectively). The same experiment was repeated in 2004, with MDL again being nominated for the construction of six French-designed Scorpene submarines, and the project is already about four years behind schedule.

The Defence Research and Development Organisa-tion’s (DRDO) advanced technology vessel (ATV) project to build a few SSBNs was apparently given to a private yard for fabrication of the hull. Once again, perhaps at that time, there were sound reasons for this single tender project, due to non availability of other suitable yards in the public or private sector. Though the project originated in the Seventies, it was in 1998 that the then defence minister, George Fernandes first publicly mentioned it. The first SSBN (Arihant) was publicly launched on July 26, 2009, in the presence of Prime Minister Manmohan Singh.

The Arihant is yet to start sea trials, while press reports mention two more being built. Given international building norms, the Arihant is a few years behind schedule, but this should be expected in the case of the first indigenous SSBN. However, valuable time can be saved, if future SSBNs are made in a joint-venture with other shipyards which have drydock space and adequate infrastructure. This would harness India’s full shipbuilding capacity and potential.

With the arrival of the third-generation Akula-class SSN at Visakhapat-nam on April 4, 2012, it is but natural to expect India to commence indigenous construction of SSNs on a priority basis. Such a project may involve design and building of a new submarine type by DRDO, and a new and more powerful and silent miniature reactor (with greater exploitation life) by the Bhabha Atomic Research Centre.

Hence, India would need some time for design work, followed by joint-venture construction of at least 6 to 12 SSNs, to replenish the rapidly ageing conventional submarine fleet, especially given the five-year delay in even issuing Request for Proposals for the second conventional SSK production line under Project 75(I). Hopefully, the decision-makers in South Block will take the appropriate steps to make India a submarine-building nation at the earliest, and also provide the Indian Navy the wherewithal to protect our national interests at sea.

India Tests Upgraded Arjun Tank

India has started testing a deeply modernized version of its domestically-developed Arjun main battle tank, The Times of India newspaper reported.

The trials of the Arjun Mark II main battle tank (MBT) began at the Pokhran field firing range in northwestern India on June 22 and will continue until the end of July.

The testing focuses on 19 major modifications to improve the features that came under heavy criticism in its earlier version, the Arjun Mark I MBT, The Times of India cited on Monday India's Defense Research and Development Organization (DRDO) spokesperson Ravi Gupta as saying.

The major upgrades include missile-firing capability against long-range targets, panoramic sight with night vision, additional ammunition types, explosive reactive armor, advanced air-defense gun to engage helicopters, an advanced land navigation system and improved running gear.

The new version, if approved, will supplement 124 Arjun Mark I MBTs already in service. The Indian Defense Ministry has ordered a total of 124 modernized Arjun MBTs to be built at the DRDO's heavy vehicles factory in Avadi, near Chennay.

According to the Indian military experts, the 66-ton Arjun “moves like a 'Ferrari' in the desert” even compared with a lighter 40-ton Russian T-90S MBT, which is also in service with the Indian army.