The
Indian Army won a major victory over the Indian Air Force recently when the
government agreed to transfer most attack helicopters from the air force to the
army. That means the army gets control of over 270 armed helicopters (22
AH-64s, 179 light combat models, and 76 armed Indian made transports). The air
force will continue to operate a dozen or so elderly Mi-25 and Mi-35 helicopter
gunships, until they retire by the end of the decade. These are export versions
of the Russian Mi-24. The army has long complained that air force control of
the armed helicopters, which were designed to support army operations, are
sometimes difficult to get from the air force in a timely matter. Another
aspect of this deal is a new agreement by the air force to station some
transport helicopters at army bases in Kashmir, so that there will not be a
delay when transport is needed for an emergency.
This
sort of problem between the army and air force is not unique to India and is
actually quite common. It all started back in the 1920s. For example, at the
start of World War I (1914-18), the British Royal Navy had more aircraft than
the Royal Flying Corps (which belonged to the army). But at the end of World
War I, it was decided to put all aircraft under the control of the new Royal
Air Force (the former Royal Flying Corps). The navy was not happy with this and
just before World War II broke out, the admirals got back control of their
aircraft, at least the ones that operated from ships (especially aircraft
carriers).
The army
reformed its Army Air Corps during World War II, to control artillery spotter
aircraft, gliders (for parachute divisions), and a few other transports for
supporting commando operations. After World War II the Army Air Corps mainly
controlled the growing fleet of transport and attack helicopters. The Indian
Air Force has always refused to allow the Indian Army to do the same thing
after modern India was created in 1947.
Air
forces tend to keep at it. Royal Air Force generals recently demanded control
of everything that flies, believing that this is more efficient. The army and
navy, not to mention the experience of many other nations, said otherwise. At
the very least the army needs to control its helicopters and some small
transports. In Russia the army always controlled ground attack aircraft, as
well as some fighters. In the United States the Marine Corps controlled its own
fighters, light bombers, and helicopters. It made a difference, especially to
the marines on the ground, that the marine aircraft were being flown by
marines.
Another
problem with a unified air force is that it becomes, quite naturally, air force
centric. This is understandable and the air force proceeds to develop
strategies, and tactics, that emphasize looking at military matters from an air
force viewpoint. Before World War II this led to the doctrine of strategic
bombardment. This was supposed to be a decisive weapon but it wasn't. When
nuclear weapons came along the air force believed that it finally had a way to
make strategic bombardment decisive. But it didn't, as ballistic missiles
(another form of artillery) became the key delivery system for nukes and
nuclear weapons were so destructive that they became more of a threat, than a
weapon that you could use (and they have not been used again, since the first
two atomic bombs were dropped on Japan in 1945). The fact of the matter is that
wars are still ultimately won by the ground forces. As the army likes to point
out, the ultimate air superiority weapon is your infantry occupying the enemy
air bases. Everyone else (the navy and air force) is there to support the
infantry in actually winning the war.
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