Espionage is the second oldest profession, and every country is doing it. During the Cold War, Chinese intelligence and the Socialist countries were spying on each other.
The ancient Chinese writer, Sun Tzu wrote about the importance of spies for finding out the weaknesses of the enemy. Regimes change, but every leadership has its own office for finding out the intentions of foreign countries and internal enemies.
Although the countries of the socialist bloc were fighting under the same flag, this did not mean that they weren’t curious about each other’s military and civil secrets. China was interested in Eastern European, and the Socialist countries wanted to collect information about Beijing, especially after Stalin and Mao's deaths, after which Communism ceased to be a unified ideology.
IImre Okváth, a researcher in the Historical Archive of Hungarian State Security in Budapest, found 14 documents at first glance, all detailing operations against Chinese intelligence in Hungary and Hungarian operations in China.
Operation VICON
Hungarian Intelligence had a large and very promising operation in Hong Kong in 1982. This is outlined in a folder Imre Okváth found in the National Archive of State Security Services, codenamed VICON. “They wanted to establish a joint venture with Chinese, British and Hungarian participants in Hong Kong. This would be a trade company, exporting rice, food, mechanical parts, industrial machinery. The masterminds of Hungarian Intelligence planned to plant officers in traders’ positions, who could be sent to China under cover,” Imre Okváth recounts. At some point the Chinese and the British partners backed out of the joint venture, so the Service had to give up the operation.
Operation Bridges
Information was shared with Moscow
Based on open documents, the Hungarians managed to recruit two Chinese operatives. One of them worked under the codename “Stevie” (Pista), and was recruited in the 50s while studying in Budapest. The other, also more successful, operation was “Bridges” (Hidak); the Chinese agent studied in Budapest and learned Hungarian very well. After a decade he returned to Budapest as a diplomat.
“Between 1965 and 1970 he served as a third secretary of the Chinese embassy. Later, in 1981 he was returned to Vienna, as the leader of the political department of the embassy. After two years he was transferred to Helsinki, and the Hungarian intelligence service followed him to Finland as well,” says Okváth. “The officers of the secret service built a very deep friendship with him, and over fine dinners they discussed Chinese domestic and foreign policy regarding Western, Asian and Eastern European countries,” he continues. This Chinese diplomat did it voluntarily, did not require any payment for his services and probably did not even know that he would be the central character in a secret operation.
Nest of spies - Budapest
“There is a military counter-intelligence document that reveals that in the mid-70s, Budapest was the European center of Chinese military intelligence. This meant that besides the military attaché, under diplomatic cover China undertook economic and political intelligence work very actively,” Okváth explains. Budapest was probably not a central focus during the Cold War, compared to Berlin, and that made covert operations more possible.
The same can be said about Hungarian intelligence as well. Since the mid-70s, there have been more and more reports about China to various ministries, and through them, to the party leadership.
Buying allies
Hungarian intelligence services were present in embassies and commercial agencies in foreign countries, even in Western Europe. One of the main tasks was collecting economic and political information about China from diplomats and third party sources, which is a very common method of gathering information around the world. In international communities – such as the UN in New York – Hungarian officers contacted envoys from the third world, like African and South Asian diplomats, to get information on China's intentions.
As China always positioned itself as the leading power of the third world, Hungarian Intelligence had to make use of this special relationship. One Intelligence agent, for instance, was a Cambodian diplomat working for the UN in New York. He provided confidential information about China's policies and international relations in East and South Asia.
Hungarian Intelligence built connections mainly with attachés from African countries, and for payments they collected information about NATO and the West. African diplomats also provided products and product information from the COCOM list. It is very possible that the Hungarians shared this information with Moscow.
Total counter-intelligence
Based on documents, security services in China used the method of total counter-spying. This meant that they tried to follow or block every step taken by foreign diplomats. They took photos of every visitor entering Chinese embassies and planted technical equipment to listen to and watch every single diplomat. This kind of total counter-spying was phased out in the 50s in Europe. Chinese intelligence tried to recruit agents from groups of exchange students from Socialist countries. Hungarian services clearly used the same methods against China.
Secrets to unveil
The National Archive of State Security Services doesn't contain documents about active cases or information required in daily operations. So, these cases ended before the 90s and participant officers or agents are not active anymore. Right now there are 14 to 15 documents linked to China. According to Imre Okváth, there are obviously more, but the subject has not been researched. As the Hungarian ministries and present services refused to speak about the subject, it can be seen as a sign that Hungarian Intelligence and Counter-Intelligence are dealing with China at this very moment as well.
