Showing posts with label Iranian Revolutionary Guards.. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Iranian Revolutionary Guards.. Show all posts

Saturday, 8 October 2016

Iranian commander breaks silence on wartime arms imports

Mohsen Rafiqdoost (R) attends the inauguration ceremony for the new chairman of the Foundation for the Disinherited and War Disabled in Tehran, July 28, 1999. (photo by REUTER/JDP)

Prominent Iranian Brig. Gen. Mohsen Rafiqdoost went into unprecedented detail in a interview about his time as minister of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). During the 1980-88 Iran-Iraq War, the IRGC had its own ministry within the administration that took care of its logistical affairs. Meanwhile, the Ministry of Defense was responsible for the logistics of the army.

In an interview with the Reformist Shargh Daily, Rafiqdoost said, “Although at the beginning of the revolution and during the early days of the war, the East and the West were coordinated [against Iran], we still built the defense capabilities of the IRGC with ‘Eastern weapons.’ My first time buying weapons, I bought 2,000 Kalashnikovs and 500 RPG-7s. Later, I would get weapons from Syria and Libya and eventually I connected with North Korea.”

Rafiqdoost spoke about the deep collaboration between Iran and the Eastern Bloc countries during the Iran-Iraq War, explaining, “After North Korea, I also connected with Poland, Hungary, Yugoslavia and the Eastern bloc, in that order. … Of course, we would buy ammunition for Western-manufactured cannons from Switzerland. … We needed surface-to-air missiles, which were more tactical, and therefore we went and negotiated and brought them to Tehran. In exchange, we gave them a Hague system. That is all. The goods we received from Libya, for free, were worth more than $800 million.”

Rafiqdoost finally spoke about the IRGC’s connections with Beijing and Moscow. “At a certain point we connected ourselves to Communist China, and when that happened, we were connected to the source. We halted our relations with other [weapons] suppliers almost completely. China sold weapons to us directly and did it in high volume. Gradually, it started selling us strategic weapons such as coast-to-sea missiles and other types of strategic missiles as well. Gradually, and because of our connection to China, the Russians started to sell us weapons too.”

Rafiqdoost’s comments break the tradition of the past three decades, when Iranian commanders claimed that Iran did not receive military backing from any country during its war with Iraq. Emphasizing their commitment to the Islamic Revolution, these commanders had always reiterated the revolutionary slogan of “Neither West nor East.”

The reality is that after the Cold War, the relationship between the IRGC and the Eastern bloc, which had began near the end of the Iran-Iraq War, had grown so much that almost all weapons used by the IRGC today are either produced by countries such as Russia, China, Ukraine, North Korea and Belarus, or are the result of reverse engineering those products or produced under license from one of these countries.

After the end of the Cold War, the IRGC bought hundreds of tanks and armored personnel carriers from Russia. It also purchased Sukhoi Su-25 Frogfoot ground support aircraft and other items such as speed boats, cruise and ballistic missiles — from China and North Korea — increasingly steering its defense organization toward that of Eastern countries.

However, while the weapons system of the IRGC is based on the Eastern model, the IRGC has adopted the US model pursued by the General Staff of the Armed Forces since before the revolution as far as defense strategy and deployment are concerned. Here, it is important to bear in mind the criticism leveled at the army during the Iran-Iraq War, when IRGC commanders constantly accused it of being incapable of holding territory seized from Iraqi forces. But what is the real story behind this criticism?

The Iraqi deployment during the Iran-Iraq War was completely Eastern: The front line had limited combat capabilities while the main military power was behind. In Iran, on the other hand, the deployment was Western: The massive volume of human resources and equipment at the IRGC’s disposal was deployed on the front lines. Therefore, the IRGC could successfully break Iraq’s relatively weak defense lines and then hand over the conquered territories to the army. Due to the counterattacks initiated by Saddam’s powerful army, Iran's — which suffered from a shortage of motivated and organized forces as well as inadequate supplies of equipment and spare parts — would quickly lose ground. As a result, the perception was that the IRGC was better at fighting the war than the army. The reality, however, was different.

Rafiqdoost’s comments are important as they clarify the reasons the army was ineffective compared to the IRGC during the war.

After the revolution, the modernization of Iran's army was halted by the obstruction of foreign governments and Western arms suppliers. As a result, suspicion of Western powers continues to dominate the policies of the General Staff of the Armed Forces, while it is an unwritten rule that the Ministry of Defense will not pursue imports of Western-manufactured weapons.

The unilateral suspension of deliveries of Western-manufactured weapons to Iran’s army has left the regular navy, ground forces and the air force with worn-out, inefficient and old weapons and facilities. The IRGC, however, has had the option of buying weapons from the Eastern bloc countries and thus has continuously upgraded its defense systems with the latest missile systems, armor, personnel equipment, marine capabilities and signal systems. Therefore, although the combat organization of the IRGC is much smaller compared to that of the army, the combat power of the IRGC has in practice advanced much further.


Lastly, it should be noted that although the UN Security Council arms embargo imposed on Iran will be lifted in eight years, according to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, Iran will for legal and political reasons continue to expand its military relations with the Eastern bloc. Naturally, the bulk of these military purchases will go to the IRGC. Considering the growing needs of the IRGC and the fact that the budget allocated to it is much greater than the funds allocated to the army, in the future the IRGC will be able to purchase the newest Russian, Chinese and North Korean equipment. This resource will push the defense policies of the IRGC more toward alignment with Eastern interests in the region, as military trade relations are a strong motivation for deepening security and diplomatic relations between the buyer and the seller.

Thursday, 6 March 2014

Iran delivers ballistic missiles to armed forces

The Iranian Defense Ministry has delivered a massive consignment of domestically made ballistic missiles to the armed forces. 
 
During the handover ceremony on Wednesday, the Qadr, Qiam, Fateh 110, and Khalij-e-Fars (Persian Gulf) ballistic missiles as well as Mersad air defense system, all designed and produced by the aerospace division of the Defense Ministry, were delivered to the Islamic Revolution Guards Corps (IRGC) and the Khatam al-Anbiya Air Defense Base.
 
At the ceremony, Defense Minister Brigadier General Hossein Dehqan told reporters that his ministry continues to advance the country’s deterrence and defense capabilities.
 
The delivery, General Dehqan said, proves that the enemies’ various sanctions, which were strictly imposed on the defense sector, could not even slightly affect it.
 
He added that the missiles are able to precisely hit and destroy the enemy’s targets.

Monday, 13 May 2013

Oh Dear! - Iran to equip IRGC Navy with advanced cruise missiles

Iran’s Defense Ministry plans to equip the naval fleet of the Islamic Revolution Guards Corps (IRGC) with cruise missiles having a range of more than 300 kilometers.
 
The cruise missiles have different ranges and have super advanced capabilities, Director of Iran’s Defense Ministry’s Aerospace Organization Brigadier General Mehdi Farahi said in a Sunday interview.

“The precision and range of the new missiles have been enhanced compared with those of the 300 km-range missiles that the IRGC Navy already has,” Farahi pointed out.

On April 27, Iranian Defense Minister Brigadier General Ahmad Vahidi announced Iran’s plans to unveil indigenous ballistic and cruise missiles as well as other new military achievements within the next five months.

In recent years, Iran has made great achievements in its defense sector and attained self-sufficiency in producing essential military equipment and systems.

Tehran has repeatedly assured other nations that its military might poses no threat to other countries, stating that the Islamic Republic’s defense doctrine is entirely based on deterrence.

Thursday, 20 December 2012

Iran to Equip IRGC with New Types of Submarines


Iranian Defense Minister Brigadier General Ahmad Vahidi said that the country plans to equip the Islamic Revolution Guards Corps (IRGC) naval force with new submarines. 

 "Production of different types of submarines are on our agenda and naturally they will be delivered to the IRGC whenever they reach their final phase," Vahidi told FNA on Wednesday, adding that the ministry plans to equip the IRGC Navy with its new home-made submarines.

As regards the features and specifications of the new submarines, Vahidi said, "These submarines will be in models other than Qadir (light submarines) and their production and delivery to the IRGC are underway."

He said that
Iran is producing military tools based on its doctrine of asymmetric defense.

Last month,
Iran boosted its naval power in Persian Gulf waters after a new missile launching vessel and two light submarines joined its Navy fleet.

During the ceremony attended by Iranian Navy Commander Rear Admiral Habibollah Sayyari, two Qadir-class light submarines also joined the Iranian naval fleet.

All parts of the Qadir-class submarines, including the hull, radar equipment and advanced defense systems, have been made domestically.

The submarines are appropriate vessels for different naval missions, including reconnaissance and combat in territorial waters, specially in the
Persian Gulf and the Strait of Hormuz which are not wide enough for the maneuvering of large warships and submarines.

Homemade In Iran



At the end of November, Iran announced a new class of warships, the Sina-7 class frigates. All that was shown was pictures of the completed hull and superstructure. The ship had yet to be fitted out with weapons, electronics, or most other equipment. That is supposed to take place over the next year or two. But the Iranians couldn’t wait to announce what a great ship this would be. These announcements are seen as useful to cheer the population up.

The Sina-7 appeared to be a 2,000-2,500 ton vessel armed with one 76mm gun, missiles, and a helicopter. Basically its an improvement over the earlier Jamaran class corvettes. Two of these have been put into service so far. Until the Sina-7 came along the Jamaran class was the largest locally built surface warship in Iran. One of the Jarmarans was assigned to the Caspian Sea, the other to the Indian Ocean. The Jarmarans were described as “destroyers” when first announced (as under construction) five years ago. In fact, it's a 1,400 ton corvette. The new ship has a crew of 140 and is equipped with anti-aircraft, (one 40mm and two 20mm cannon, four small missiles) anti-submarine (six torpedoes), and anti-ship (four C-802 missiles) weapons. At the moment, the Jarmaran seems to be filled mostly with hope and press releases. The navy made a point that the Sini-7s were better built than the Jarmarans. 

The Iranian navy could certainly use some new warships. Currently, the only major surface warships it has are three elderly British built frigates (1,540 tons each) and two U.S. built corvettes (1,100 tons each). There are about fifty smaller patrol craft, ten of them armed with Chinese anti-ship missiles. There are another few dozen mine warfare, amphibious, and support ships. The three most powerful ships in the fleet are three Russian Kilo class subs. There are about fifty mini-subs, most of them built in Iran.

All that's been heard of from Iran's naval shipbuilding facility at the Bushehr shipyard are reports of labor problems. There have been strikes and lockouts as well as complaints of poor designs and sloppy management. Iran has, for the last two decades, announced many new, locally made, weapons that turned out to be more spin than substance.

Iran does have commercial shipbuilding firms that produce merchant ships that are larger than destroyers. Thus it was believed that Iran could build something that looks like a destroyer. The Jamaran class ships have Chinese C802 anti-ship missiles, but a lot of the other necessary military electronics are harder to get and install in a seagoing ship. Iran has coped by using commercial equipment. This does not make for a formidable warship but does enable high seas operations.

Iran is trying to expand its growing (slowly) naval power on all its coasts (Caspian Sea, Persian Gulf, and Indian Ocean). Thus, for the last four years, Iran has had one or more of its few surface warships working with the international anti-piracy patrol off Somalia. This was the first time since the 1970s that the Iranian Navy has conducted sustained operations outside its coastal waters. Despite their own Islamic radical government, the Iranian sailors have got along with the other members of the patrol, including the United States (which is officially the "Great Satan" back home). 

Encouraged by this, Iran announced that it would send more of its warships off to distant areas, mainly to show the world that Iran was a naval power capable of such reach.

Technically, the Iranians can pull this off but just barely. And this is mainly because, in the last decade, Iran has been building some larger warships. Not really large but big enough to take trips across the Indian Ocean. Two years ago, for example, the Iranian Navy sent its first domestically built destroyer, the Jamaran, to sea. In two years it hopes to do the same with the larger Sina-7s. But both these vessels are hastily built by yards with no experience in building surface warships. That means a lot of mistakes will be made. Moreover, the Iranians cannot get modern weapons and are equipping these ships with whatever they can scrounge up.

Monday, 19 November 2012

Iran to launch satellite to space by solid-fueled missile




Chief Commander of Iran's Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Mohammad Ali Jafari announced that Iran will launch new satellite to GEO orbits in space by solid-fueled missile, Fars reported.

Jafari said that as part of marking the first anniversary of IRGC general Hassan Tehrani's death, Iran will be launching its satellite into space by a solid-fueled missile.
One year ago, IRGC General Hassan Tehrani got killed as a result of an explosion occured during the missile test, that was supposed to test the solid-fueled rocket carrying a satellite to space.

"Iran has not launched a over 100-kg satellite (by liquid-fueled missile) to GEO orbit so far, but we planned this project and developed after Tehrani's death," he added.
Iran has already sent three satellites into space. On February 3, the country successfully launched its third domestically manufactured satellite, named the Navid (Promise), into orbit.

The Safir one satellite carrier rocket was used to launch the Navid research satellite.

The commander, Gen. Hassan Tehrani Moghaddam, was a major figure in IRGC efforts to build long-range missiles, who died reportedly during a test of missile in a military base last November.
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Thursday, 25 October 2012

Iraq - Fear Of The Iranian Ally



Iraqi Shia from pro-Iranian militias in Iraq have been encountered in Syria. Many of them are not there to back the Assad government but to protect Shia religious shrines. There is growing fear that the Syrian rebels, especially the Sunni radical groups, will attempt to destroy Shia holy places in Syria. Sunni radicals frequently do this sort of thing. Lebanese Shia from Hezbollah have also been seen in Syria as well as Shia volunteers from some other nations. Despite this help, the Assad government is on the defensive and losing ground. Despite the declining fortunes of the Assads at the hands of the Sunni rebels, Iraq still tries to limit the activity of Iraqi Sunnis trying to help the Syrian rebels. Iraq officially limits the number of Syrian refugees (most of them Sunni) from entering Iraq. Iranian arms shipments to Syria (via Iraq) are technically illegal, but continue anyway. Iraq pretends to halt these shipments, to keep the Americans and the Sunni neighbors happy.

Most Iraqi Shia (over 60 percent of the population) don’t trust Iran. This is largely the result of ethnic differences (Iranians are Indo-European, not Semitic and have long openly despised and abused Arabs) and a long history of Iranian aggression. There is still religious unity, but, again, many Iraqi Shia are not comfortable with Iranian efforts to replace the Sunni Sauds as the protector of the Islamic holy places in Mecca and Medina. After all, over 80 percent of Moslems are Sunni and the Shia would just like to be left alone. That is unlikely to happen, not with Iran lusting after Iraq (as it has in the past) and the Sunni world increasingly seeing Iran as a religious and military threat.

Within Iraq, Sunni terror groups continue to thrive. These terrorists have killed over a thousand people in the last four months. The Sunni terrorists survive because many Iraqi Sunni Arabs tolerate or support them. Nearly all the violence is directed at Shia (especially government officials and the security forces) and Kurds (who, although Sunni, are hostile to Sunni radicals, be they Arab or Kurd.) There continue to be attacks on pro-government Sunni Arabs. Many, if not most, Sunni Arabs back the new democracy and that’s what keeps the government from allowing the Shia militias to resume their terror campaign against Sunni civilians. Up until 2007, these Shia groups used death squads to murder and terrorize the Sunni population. This was a major reason for many Sunni tribal leaders turning against Sunni terror groups. Since then many Sunni Arab leaders have changed their minds and come to back the Sunni terrorists, or backed off from actively opposing them. Many Sunni Arabs believe they will eventually regain control of the country, because that’s the way it is supposed to be. Some Iraqi Sunnis don’t want to wait.

The U.S. now has to deal with the fact that any military equipment they sell to Iraq will be made available for examination by Iranian military officials. The Iraqi security forces are dominated by Shia officers, many of them pro-Iranian (to one degree or another). Then there is the corruption. Iran can always buy cooperation if they can’t get it for free. At the same time Iraq is asking the United States to speed up deliveries of weapons.

October 21, 2012: Over 6,000 Turkish pilgrims were allowed to proceed to Saudi Arabia. The Turks had been held at the border (between Kurdish and Arab Iraq) for three days because Iraq refused to recognize the transit visas issued by the Kurdish government in the north. This was all part of a dispute with Turkey, which refuses to extradite fugitive Iraqi politician Tariq al Hashimi. Last month Iraq halted new Turkish businesses from being established in Iraq in an attempt to get Hashimi. When the Turkish government protested, the Iraqis said it wasn't really about Hashimi, but administrative problems. The Turks know better. On September 9th a court in Baghdad sentenced Sunni Arab vice president Tariq al Hashimi to death for organizing over 100 terror attacks from 2005 to 2011. The Hashimi trial appeared to be more for show than an effort to determine true guilt or innocence. Last December Hashimi was first accused of running a death squad and other terrorist activities. In response Hashimi fled the country while 73 of his employees and followers were arrested. Many confessed that their group committed 150 assassinations and bomb attacks over the last three years. Since then Hashimi has received asylum in Turkey, which is, for the moment, ignoring an Interpol arrest warrant. This has caused anti-Turk demonstrations in Iraq, but not in the Kurdish north, where a lot of the investments in new businesses have come from Turkey. The Turks and their money are welcome in the Kurdish north.

October 16, 2012: In the Yemen capital, two gunmen on a motorcycle killed an Iraqi general, who was acting as an advisor to the Yemeni security forces. The Iraqi general had a lot of experience in fighting al Qaeda.

October 12, 2012: Al Qaeda took responsibility for the September 27 jail break that saw 102 prisoners escape, including 47 condemned to death. This is why Iraq continues to execute lots of Islamic terrorists instead of sentencing them to long prison terms. The prisons are not secure, but graves are.

The air force is buying 28 Czech L-159 jet trainers for a billion dollars. This includes training, maintenance equipment, spare parts and lots of bribes (the L-159 normally sells for less than $20 million each or $30 million if you include training, maintenance equipment, spare parts.)

October 11, 2012: Turkish F-16s bombed several suspected PKK camps in northern (Kurdish) Iraq.

October 10, 2012: The Turkish parliament approved a continuation (for another year) of cross-border raids into Iraq against Kurdish separatists. Iraq protests these air raids and occasional ground troop incursions, but is unable to do anything about it.

October 9, 2012: Iraq agreed to buy $4.2 billion worth of Russian weapons and military equipment. All details were not released, but among the major systems mentioned were 30 Mi-28NE attack helicopters and up to fifty Pantsir-S1 (SA-22) mobile anti-aircraft systems. There has also been mention of MiG-29M2 jet fighters. Although MiG-29s have acquired a reputation for being unreliable and expensive to operate, the new M2 model is supposed to have addressed those problems and it being offered at less than half the price of a comparable (on paper) F-16.

October 8, 2012: Turkish F-16s bombed several suspected PKK camps in northern (Kurdish) Iraq.

Sunday, 7 October 2012

'Iran withdraws elite Qods Force brigade from Syria'



Iran has withdrawn 275 members of its elite Qods Force from Syria in the face of its domestic economic crisis, The Sunday Times reported on Sunday.

The members belong to a brigade known as Unit 400, which fought alongside Syrian President Bashar Assad against Sunni rebels, the report quoted a western intelligence officer as saying. According to The Times, the unit flew out of Syria last week. The report added that the information was confirmed by a relative of a Unit 400 officer.

The withdrawal of Iranian troops from Syria was seen by some as an indicator of waning confidence among Iran’s Shi’ite leaders in Assad’s ability to survive the uprising.

According to The Times, there have been loud complaints about an estimated $5 billion of Iranian money spent to prop up the Assad regime in Damascus.

There are signs that Iran’s oil wealth, which pays for its nuclear program and support for Assad, is eroding. Iran faces new sanctions for failing to cooperate with Western concerns about its nuclear program, and the sanctions are taking its toll, evident in the fall in the value of the rial and soaring food prices.

Last week, Finance Minister Yuval Steinitz predicted that Iran's economy is edging towards collapse due to international sanctions over its controversial nuclear program.

"The sanctions on Iran in the past year jumped a level," Steinitz said. "The Iranians are in great economic difficulties as a result of the sanctions," he added.

A Foreign Ministry document leaked last week also said sanctions had caused more damage to Iran's economy than at first thought and ordinary Iranians were suffering under soaring inflation.

On Saturday, US Defense Secretary Leon Panetta warned Iran that the international community is ready to impose more sanctions if the country does not begin to address concerns about its nuclear program.

The first official acknowledgement from a senior military commander that Iran has a military presence on the ground in Syria came last month. Commander-in-chief of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Mohammad Ali Jafari admitted: "A number of members of the Qods Force are present in Syria."

However, he denied the existence of on the ground assistance, stating, "the IRGC is giving intellectual help and even financial assistance but there is no military presence."

"We all have a responsibility to support Syria and not allow the line of resistance to be broken," Fars news agency, which claims to be independent but which is widely known to have close ties to Iran's Revolutionary Guards, quoted Hossein Taeb, the intelligence unit head, as saying.

Following the admission, Western members of the UN Security Council blasted Iran for providing Assad with weapons to help him crush an 18-month-long uprising by rebels determined to topple his government.

"Iran's arms exports to the murderous Assad regime in Syria are of particular concern," US Ambassador to the United Nations Susan Rice told the 15-nation council during a meeting on the world body's Iran sanctions regime.

A UN Security Council panel of independent experts that monitors sanctions against Iran has uncovered several examples of Iran transferring arms to Syria's government. Damascus has accused Qatar and Saudi Arabia of arming rebels determined to topple Assad's government.

Source: The Sunday Times

Friday, 5 October 2012

FSA threaten to kill Iranian hostages if rebels not freed



The Free Syrian Army has reportedly threatened to execute its Iranian hostages if the Assad government does not free rebel prisoners within 48 hours. The group says the hostages are Iranian government troops, but Iran claims they are pilgrims.

A brigade from the Free Syrian Army (FSA) known as the Bar’a released a video aired on Al-Arabiya in which they warned they would execute an Iranian prisoner “for each martyr who is killed.”

The militia group kidnapped 48 Iranians at the beginning of August, claiming that they were members of the elite Iranian Revolutionary Guards. However, the Iranian government says they are pilgrims on their way to visit a shrine in southeast Damascus and has appealed to Qatar and Turkey to help free the hostages.

Iran admitted in September that it had posted members of the Guard in Syria, working as “high-level advisors.”

In an interview with Al-Arabiya the commander of the Bar’a said that the 48 hostages were part of a group of 150 troops sent by Iran for “reconnaissance on the ground.”

Although this is not the first time the Free Syrian Army has taken hostages. Back in February the group sequestered eleven Iranian pilgrims and five Iranian technicians in the flashpoint city of Homs in December.

This is the first occasion when they have threatened to execute their prisoners if their demands are not met. This new aggressive stance taken by the militant group is more reminiscent of tactics employed by Al-Qaeda.

An independent UN panel confirmed earlier in September that a number of “foreign elements” and “jihadists” were found to be operating in Syria. It was the first report in which they conceded that outside terrorists had joined the conflict.

The panel said that the presence of such elements would “push anti-government fighters towards more radical positions.”

The Assad regime has continually branded the opposition forces in Syria as armed terrorists and decried the West and some of its Gulf neighbors for offering support to the rebel forces.

Syria’s Foreign Minister Walid al-Moallem addressed the UN last week accusing countries such as the US, Saudi Arabia, Qatar and Turkey for supporting the opposition's "terrorism." Walid decried these countries for prolonging the Syrian conflict and condemned the calls for Syrian President Bashar al-Assad to step down.

"This terrorism which is externally supported is accompanied by unprecedented media provocation based on igniting religious extremism sponsored by well-known states in the region," he told the UN General Assembly.

He went on to accuse Western powers of promoting instability in Syria to create a premise for foreign military intervention.