India's effort
to build six submarines (French Scorpenes), under license, has been
delayed once again. The problem is mainly poor management. An example of
this occurred quite recently with the departure of ten Spanish
technical advisors for the Scorpenes. Their contract expired at the end
of March and, despite the expiration date being well known Indian
bureaucrats were unable to get a new contract in place on time. Similar
avoidable delays have occurred several times already and the price has
gone up with each delay. Last year it was announced that the first
Scorpene sub would not be ready until 2015. The new delays push that to
2017.
Building the subs in India will leave India with thousands of
workers and specialists experienced in building modern submarines. All
that will be wasted because the defense procurement bureaucrats seem to
have learned nothing. These officials already caused numerous delays and
cost overruns during negotiations to build these diesel-electric
submarines. The bureaucrats mismanaged this deal to the extent that it
is now five years behind schedule. But it is even more behind schedule
if you count the several years the Indian bureaucrats delayed it even
getting started. The delays and mismanagement have so far increased the
cost of the $4 billion project by 25 percent (to $834 million per sub).
The original plan was to have the first Indian built Scorpene
delivered at the end of 2012. But now, because of problems getting the construction facilities and skilled workmen ready, the first Scorpene won't be
delivered until 2017, with one each year after that until all six are
delivered. That schedule is subject to change, and probably will, for
the worse.
After the bureaucrats and politicians dithered for nearly a
decade, in 2005, India finally signed a deal to buy six French Scorpene
class boats. The delays led to the French increasing prices on some key
components and India has had some problems in getting production going
on their end. The first Scorpene was to be built in France, with the
other five built in India. While some problems were expected (India has
been doing license manufacturing of complex weapons for decades), the
defense ministry procurement bureaucrats never ceased to amaze when it
came to delaying work or just getting in the way.
The Scorpenes are similar to the Agosta 90B subs (also French)
that Pakistan recently bought. The first of the Agostas was built in
France, but the other two were built in Pakistan. The Scorpenes purchase
was seen as a response to the Pakistani Agostas. The Scorpene are a
more recent design,
the result of cooperation between French and Spanish sub builders. The
Agosta is a 1,500 ton (surface displacement) diesel-electric sub with a
36 man crew and four 533mm (21 inch) torpedo tubes (with 20 torpedoes
and/or anti-ship missiles carried). The Scorpene is a little heavier
(1,700 tons), has a smaller crew (32), and is a little faster. It has
six 533mm torpedo tubes and carries 18 torpedoes and/or missiles. Both
models can be equipped with an AIP (air independent propulsion) system.
This enables the sub to stay under longer, thus making the sub harder to
find. AIP allows the sub to travel under water for more than a week, at
low speed (5-10 kilometers an hour). Two of the Indian Scorpenes are to
have Indian made AIP installed.
All this ineffective urgency is in play because India's
submarine fleet is dying of old age and new boats are not going to
arrive in time. It's not like this was a surprise, but the Indian
defense procurement bureaucracy has long been noted as slow, sloppy, and
stubborn, especially in the face of demands that it speed up. The
twisted tale of the tardy submarines is particularly painful.
The plan was to have a dozen new subs in service by the end of
the decade. At present, there will be (with a bit of luck) three or
four of them in service by then. The procurement bureaucracy is still
seeking a supplier for the second batch of six diesel-electric subs.
This second six probably won’t even begin arriving by the end of the
decade. It's hard to say, although the defense procurement nabobs speak
of "fast tracking" this project, but long-time observers not expecting
speed.
There's some urgency to all this because this year five of
India's 16 diesel-electric subs (10 Kilo and two Foxtrot class Russian
built boats and four German Type 209s) were to be retired (some are
already semi-retired because of age and infirmity). Because of the
Scorpene delays, the Type 209s are being kept in service (but not
allowed out to sea much) for several more years. That leaves India with
14 subs. But in the next year or so several of the older Kilos will
reach retirement age. Thus, by the time the first Scorpene arrives in
2017, India will only have five or six working subs. India believes it
needs at least 18 non-nuclear subs in service to deal with Pakistan and
China.
The hulls of all six Scorpenes have been completed, but
filling those subs up with all the necessary equipment is an even more
difficult task. Moreover, India insists that some of that equipment be
manufactured in India and that introduces even more complications and
delays. Indian firms have a spotty track record in this area.
India is also building and buying nuclear subs. India received
a Russian Akula nuclear attack (SSN) sub last year. This one is on
lease with the option to buy. Indian SSNs and SSBNs (missile carrying
boats) are under development, as they have been for decades.
While India was largely concerned with the Pakistani navy when
the Scorpene contract was negotiated and signed, China is now seen as
the primary adversary. The Chinese subs are not as effective as the
Pakistani boats, both because of less advanced technology and less well
trained crews. India could use their Scorpenes to confront any Chinese
attempt to expand their naval presence into the Indian Ocean. Thus the
delays and cost overruns with the Scorpenes are causing quite a lot of
commotion in India. But at the rate India is going, it will be over a
decade of construction before all six of the Scorpenes are in service.
At that point, India would have about a dozen subs (including nuclear
powered models under construction). China will have over 60 boats, about
20 percent of them nuclear. China does have a lot for its warships to
deal with off its coasts and in the Western Pacific but it does retain
the capability of putting more subs off the Indian coast than can the
Indian Navy.
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