In the last few
months the U.S. military has lost fifteen marines and SEALs in training
accidents. Commanders are bracing themselves for the usual flood of
demands from media and politicians that something be done. Often the
result is to forbid dangerous training activities and subtly let it be
known that any officer associated with a fatal training accident can
expect problems with their next promotion. Yet a decade of war has
reminded many in the military that strenuous (and often dangerous)
training saves you even more casualties in combat. This is nothing new.
For thousands of years, experienced combat troops have known that, "the
more you sweat in peace, the less you bleed in war." During World War
II, the U.S. Army surveyed the troops to see what they thought about
their training, leadership and a host of other items. One of the more
surprising things to come out of these surveys was the feeling among
combat troops that their training wasn't tough enough. World War II
"basic" was generally quite intense, more severe than anything recruits
experienced in the last fifty years. But actual combat quickly revealed
that even more intensity in that training would have been a big, often
life-saving, help.
During wartime, the troops get better. Practice and experience
definitely have an effect. But during peacetime something worse
happens. Not only does the lack of practice make the troops less ready
to survive actual combat but the commanders have a vested interest in
denying that this is happening. The rot sets in rather quickly after a
war has ended. Training for combat is not only a lot of work, but it's
also dangerous. Realistic training means some of the troops are going to
get hurt or killed. This is a political no-no, at least in democracies.
At the same time, a democracy demands accountability from its elected
officials. If the taxpayers are going to fork over billions a year for
defense, they want to be reassured that the money is buying real, kick
ass, combat power. That often results in unpleasant truths being hidden
or just ignored.
When American troops entered combat in large numbers during
the 2003 Iraq invasion it quickly became clear that many troops were not
ready. The reason for this was simple, but generally ignored by the
media and politicians. It all began in the 1990s when basic training was
changed from a conditioning process that turned undisciplined civilians
into disciplined soldiers into something far less. Discipline is
essential for military operations. In life and death situations, failure
to act promptly and efficiently when ordered to will get you, and
others, killed.
This destruction of basic training was not done on purpose,
but to accommodate the decision in the early 1990s to integrate men and
women in basic training. For decades, male and female recruits got their
basic separately. By putting them together it became obvious that the
women could not compete physically and psychologically with the men. But
a new policy, pushed by many in Congress, declared that men and women
were equal on the battlefield and should take the same basic training.
When the military found this did not work, they (with the exception of
the Marines, who resisted the political pressure and continued separate
training) lowered the standards to suit the weakest women. Much of the
yelling and verbal abuse delivered by drill sergeants was also
eliminated, for while it turned the men into disciplined soldiers, it
encouraged too many women to quit. After all, women did not join the
army with any thought of combat, but for a job. Most of the men did not
get combat assignments either, but everyone was aware that in a tight
situation the non-combat soldiers might actually have to use their
rifles and the place to make that point was basic training. In effect,
1990a basic became the old, but kinder and gentler, female version that
taught you how to wear a uniform, march in formation and provided some
familiarization with basic infantry weapons.
This change in basic training had a profound effect that no
one wanted to admit. Basically, the troops were much less disciplined
and required much more supervision. This meant, among other things, that
officers often did supervisory tasks that NCOs used to handle. And the
men going into combat jobs, in effect, did basic over, the old fashioned
way, when they were given their additional training for specific jobs
(infantry, artillery, tanks.) But the rest of the troops were less
soldiers and more like civilians. It became harder to keep the troops on
the straight and narrow.
As a result, all services liberally used "administrative
discharge" (ie, they fired troublesome soldiers) to get rid of most
ill-disciplined troops, or those who simply could not come to terms with
being in the military. But this made more difficult to keep units up to
strength. Commanders were encouraged to fire fewer troops and, in
effect, put up with many of their young men and women who had not been
convinced by basic training lite that they were now in the military.
It got worse. The shrinking budgets in the 1990s generated a
situation where more money could be put into developing new weapons,
keeping unneeded bases open, upgrading barracks and family housing,
funding the needs of single parents, or training. Something had to give,
and it was training, which was needed more than ever. But then, the
loss would only be noticed if we went to war and American politicians
were very much against any American casualties. Can't have a real war
without someone getting killed, so training costs were cut. There was
less money for using tanks, aircraft or ships. Fewer spare parts were
bought (a lot of spares were needed if you used equipment a lot.) There
was another reason for reducing training, doing it energetically tended
to get troops killed or injured. This was more of a problem now that so
many recruits were getting eight weeks of coed camp instead of basic
training. So combat training for non-combat troops was avoided.
When there was a military operation, like Kosovo units
worldwide were stripped of competent troops and working equipment to
fill the need. While much was said about having armed forces that could
fight two wars at once, it turned out that the U.S. was barely able to
support a few months of air operations over the Balkans. And the
subsequent occupation of Kosovo with ground units left far more units
elsewhere incapable of combat operations.
All that began to change after September 11, 2001 and the
change accelerated after 2003. The combat deficiencies of non-combat
troops became painfully obvious during the advance into Iraq. But now
the trend is to back off on training and go back to getting the troops
less ready for combat, so that we can repeat the same cycle again and
again. What goes around comes around, it surely does.
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