As Egypt nervously counts the last of the votes which will determine the identity of its next president, the tension has spread to other Arab countries – along with Iran.
Will a victory by Mohammed Morsi rebuild the Tehran-Cairo axis? Will Cairo thus become Saudi Arabia's rival? What would be its relationship with Syria? And, how will Hamas be able to maintain its stance of not recognizing Israel while the Muslim Brotherhood supports the Israel-Egypt peace accord?
A Muslim Brotherhood victory will hold the answers, and may determine the make-up of the regional strategic coalition. More importantly, they might determine whether Israel and the U.S. will be able to view the Brotherhood as a political ally, despite the ideological divisions.
The relationship between Iran and the Muslim Brotherhood has known its ups and downs. Following Iran's 1979 Islamic Revolution, the Muslim Brotherhood expressed limited support, but after the murder of Egypt's President Sadat in 1981, the Brotherhood began severely criticizing Tehran.
"We have supported the Islamic Revolution which expressed a release from a rule of a tyrant. However, from a religious perspective, the Sunna is one thing and the Shia is another," Muslim Brotherhood leader Umar Talmasani said in 1982.
Three years later, Iran agreed to release Egyptian citizens who were fighting alongside Iraq in the war with Iran, at the request of the Muslim Brotherhood's General Guide, Muhammad al-Ghazali.
Former General Guide Mahdi Akaf said a few years ago that the Muslim Brotherhood and Iran see eye-to-eye on the Palestinian issue, but refrained from stating that there exists a "fraternity" between Sunnies and Shiites. 18 months ago, Yusuf al-Qaradawi, an important religious leader of the main faction in the Muslim Brotherhood, publicly warned of the danger that Shia Islam could penetrate Egypt.
However, the Muslim Brotherhood did not object to the ties that formed between Hamas, which is considered the Brotherhood's ideological offspring, and Iran, though they were not excited about it.
"It's a constraint with no shame," one of the Brotherhood's speakers said at the time, explaining that the struggle against the Israeli occupier "requires the use of all measures" – especially when Egypt's Mubarak was seen as an obstacle to Hamas.
Since these words were spoken, other transformations have taken place. It was today's secular candidates for presidency, such as Amr Moussa and Nabil Elaraby before him (later chairman of the Arab League), who publicly supported renewed ties with Iran.
"Iran is not an enemy state and the poor relations with it were a political mistake," said Amr Moussa. Compared to Moussa, the Brotherhood's Muhammad Mursi was hesitant, stating, "Iran is an Islamic country and a connection with it should exist."
In rehabilitating or freezing relations between Cairo and Tehern, Egypt will have to consider another important partner – Saudi Arabia, which in recent decades, and more intensely in the past seven years, has been conducting a fierce battle with Iran.
In order to ensure that Egypt, even under the rule of the Muslim Brotherhood, would not take Iran as a partner, Saudi Arabia hurriedly deposited over $2.5 billion, promising more grants and loans. Well-acquainted with Egypt's tremendous financial difficulties, the Muslim Brotherhood holds a deep debt of gratitude to Saudi Arabia - not only for the money, but because it may serve as an alternative for loans made by the International Monetary Fund, which comes with strings attached.
The Muslim Brotherhood's attitude toward Iran could also be affected by the Syrian regime's response to the rebellion of its people. The Hama massacre of thousands of Muslim Brotherhood activists in 1982 is engraved in the movement's collective memory, and although every branch of the movement is independent, Brotherhood officials in Egypt voiced harsh criticism, even more severe than that of the Arab League. In the recent struggle in Syria, the Brotherhood is standing at the side of Saudi Arabia and the West, not on Iran's.
An equally interesting question is how Muslim Brotherhood rule in Egypt would affect a Hamas decision to recognize Israel. The Brotherhood, including Mursi and former presidential candidate Khairat El-Shater, made clear their support for the Camp David peace accord, which recognizes Israel. Hamas will have to clarify, or at least come up with an excuse, for its stand against such recognition.
And so, while Israel is panicking over the attacks at the Egyptian border and is quick to link them to the rise of the Muslim Brotherhood, it is possible that geopolitical considerations will give rise to a more reasonable balance of power from Israel's point of view.
Compared to Ahmed Shafiq, who would have to work hard to attain national and religious legitimacy, the Muslim Brotherhood's base is covered. The Brotherhood is both its own religious guide and a symbol of the revolution.
The Palestinian problem will continue to be at the center of its foreign policy, and their harsh criticism over Israel will still echo. However, in issues concerning Iran, Saudi Arabia and the United States, the Muslim Brotherhood may turn out to be an undeclared ally.
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