Saving Soldiers From Good Intentions

In the last few months the U.S. military has lost fifteen marines and SEALs in training accidents. Commanders are bracing themselves for the usual flood of demands from media and politicians that something be done. Often the result is to forbid dangerous training activities and subtly let it be known that any officer associated with a fatal training accident can expect problems with their next promotion. Yet a decade of war has reminded many in the military that strenuous (and often dangerous) training saves you even more casualties in combat. This is nothing new. For thousands of years, experienced combat troops have known that, "the more you sweat in peace, the less you bleed in war." During World War II, the U.S. Army surveyed the troops to see what they thought about their training, leadership and a host of other items. One of the more surprising things to come out of these surveys was the feeling among combat troops that their training wasn't tough enough. World War II "basic" was generally quite intense, more severe than anything recruits experienced in the last fifty years. But actual combat quickly revealed that even more intensity in that training would have been a big, often life-saving, help.

 

During wartime, the troops get better. Practice and experience definitely have an effect. But during peacetime something worse happens. Not only does the lack of practice make the troops less ready to survive actual combat but the commanders have a vested interest in denying that this is happening. The rot sets in rather quickly after a war has ended. Training for combat is not only a lot of work, but it's also dangerous. Realistic training means some of the troops are going to get hurt or killed. This is a political no-no, at least in democracies. At the same time, a democracy demands accountability from its elected officials. If the taxpayers are going to fork over billions a year for defense, they want to be reassured that the money is buying real, kick ass, combat power. That often results in unpleasant truths being hidden or just ignored. 

 

When American troops entered combat in large numbers during the 2003 Iraq invasion it quickly became clear that many troops were not ready. The reason for this was simple, but generally ignored by the media and politicians. It all began in the 1990s when basic training was changed from a conditioning process that turned undisciplined civilians into disciplined soldiers into something far less. Discipline is essential for military operations. In life and death situations, failure to act promptly and efficiently when ordered to will get you, and others, killed. 

 

This destruction of basic training was not done on purpose, but to accommodate the decision in the early 1990s to integrate men and women in basic training. For decades, male and female recruits got their basic separately. By putting them together it became obvious that the women could not compete physically and psychologically with the men. But a new policy, pushed by many in Congress, declared that men and women were equal on the battlefield and should take the same basic training. When the military found this did not work, they (with the exception of the Marines, who resisted the political pressure and continued separate training) lowered the standards to suit the weakest women. Much of the yelling and verbal abuse delivered by drill sergeants was also eliminated, for while it turned the men into disciplined soldiers, it encouraged too many women to quit. After all, women did not join the army with any thought of combat, but for a job. Most of the men did not get combat assignments either, but everyone was aware that in a tight situation the non-combat soldiers might actually have to use their rifles and the place to make that point was basic training. In effect, 1990a basic became the old, but kinder and gentler, female version that taught you how to wear a uniform, march in formation and provided some familiarization with basic infantry weapons. 

 

This change in basic training had a profound effect that no one wanted to admit. Basically, the troops were much less disciplined and required much more supervision. This meant, among other things, that officers often did supervisory tasks that NCOs used to handle. And the men going into combat jobs, in effect, did basic over, the old fashioned way, when they were given their additional training for specific jobs (infantry, artillery, tanks.) But the rest of the troops were less soldiers and more like civilians. It became harder to keep the troops on the straight and narrow. 

 

As a result, all services liberally used "administrative discharge" (ie, they fired troublesome soldiers) to get rid of most ill-disciplined troops, or those who simply could not come to terms with being in the military. But this made more difficult to keep units up to strength. Commanders were encouraged to fire fewer troops and, in effect, put up with many of their young men and women who had not been convinced by basic training lite that they were now in the military. 

 

It got worse. The shrinking budgets in the 1990s generated a situation where more money could be put into developing new weapons, keeping unneeded bases open, upgrading barracks and family housing, funding the needs of single parents, or training. Something had to give, and it was training, which was needed more than ever. But then, the loss would only be noticed if we went to war and American politicians were very much against any American casualties. Can't have a real war without someone getting killed, so training costs were cut. There was less money for using tanks, aircraft or ships. Fewer spare parts were bought (a lot of spares were needed if you used equipment a lot.) There was another reason for reducing training, doing it energetically tended to get troops killed or injured. This was more of a problem now that so many recruits were getting eight weeks of coed camp instead of basic training. So combat training for non-combat troops was avoided. 

 

When there was a military operation, like Kosovo units worldwide were stripped of competent troops and working equipment to fill the need. While much was said about having armed forces that could fight two wars at once, it turned out that the U.S. was barely able to support a few months of air operations over the Balkans. And the subsequent occupation of Kosovo with ground units left far more units elsewhere incapable of combat operations. 

 

All that began to change after September 11, 2001 and the change accelerated after 2003. The combat deficiencies of non-combat troops became painfully obvious during the advance into Iraq. But now the trend is to back off on training and go back to getting the troops less ready for combat, so that we can repeat the same cycle again and again. What goes around comes around, it surely does.

NATO troops rescue 4 hostages in Afghanistan

It was a risky, but successful operation: British and other NATO forces stormed a cave tucked in the mountains before dawn Saturday and rescued two foreign female aid workers and their two Afghan colleagues being held hostage by Taliban-linked militants.

Helicopters, flying under the cover of darkness, ferried the rescue team to extreme northeastern Afghanistan where they suspected the hostages were being held. After confirming the workers were there, they raided the site, killed several militants and freed the hostages, ending their nearly two-week ordeal.

Helen Johnston, 28, from Britain; Moragwa Oirere, 26, from Kenya; and their two Afghan colleagues were kidnapped May 22 while traveling on horseback in Badakhshan province. The four work for Medair, a humanitarian non-governmental organization based near Lausanne, Switzerland.

“They were kidnapped by an armed terrorist group with ties to the Taliban,” said Lt. Col. Jimmie Cummings, a spokesman for the U.S.-led military coalition fighting in Afghanistan. “The kidnappers were armed with heavy machine guns, rocket-propelled grenades and AK47s. ... The hostages were being held in a cave in the mountains.”

Past rescue attempts in Afghanistan have not always gone so well.

In 2009, Sultan Munadi, an Afghan translator kidnapped alongside New York Times reporter Stephen Farrell, was killed in a hail of bullets during a rescue attempt by British commandos. In 2010, the U.S. Navy’s SEAL Team 6 tried to rescue Linda Norgrove, a Scottish aid worker, from her Taliban captors in Afghanistan. She was killed by a grenade thrown in haste by one of the American commandos.

Afghan officials said seven militants were killed during Saturday’s rescue operation, which was launched about 1 a.m.

British Prime Minister David Cameron approved the rescue operation Friday afternoon after becoming increasingly concerned about the safety of the hostages. The mission was carried out by British troops in cooperation with other NATO and Afghan forces, Cameron told reporters outside 10 Downing Street in London.

He said it was “extraordinarily difficult” to decide to go ahead with the operation, which involved a “long route march” without being discovered.

“It was an extraordinarily brave, breathtaking even, operation that our troops had to carry out,” Cameron said.

British Army Lt. Gen. Adrian Bradshaw, deputy commander of the NATO military coalition in Afghanistan, said the rugged area had steep mountains, deep gullies and demanding terrain.

“The hostages are in good health — we’ve seen all four of them this morning,” Bradshaw said, adding they would be reunited with their families soon.

Johnston’s family expressed delight over the news that the aid worker and her colleagues had been freed.

“We are deeply grateful to everyone involved in her rescue, to those who worked tirelessly on her behalf, and to family and friends for their love, prayers and support over the last twelve days,” the family said in a statement.

Medair spokesman Aurilien Demaurex also expressed relief that the aid workers had been rescued and said the company was “immensely grateful to all parties involved in ensuring their swift and safe return.”

Shams ul-Rahman, the deputy governor of Badakhshan province, said the hostages had been held in Gulati, a village in Shahri Buzurg district, near the Tajikistan border.

“Mostly smugglers are based in those areas, but of course the smugglers have the support of the Taliban,” Rahman said.

He said Afghan elders in the area had been working to seek the release of the aid workers.

“A group of elders was about to go to the village and start negotiations,” Rahman said. “Based on intelligence reports that Afghan forces received, a successful operation was conducted that resulted in the release of the hostages and the killing of the kidnappers.”

Separately, a NATO service member died Saturday following an insurgent attack in southern Afghanistan. The coalition released no other details about the death. So far this year, 177 foreign troops have been killed in Afghanistan.

Also in the south, Abdul Salaam, the Taliban’s military leader for three districts in southern Helmand province, was killed Friday in a joint operation by the Afghan and coalition forces in Kajaki district, the provincial governor’s office said Saturday. Abdul Salaam was the brother of Qayum Zakir, a member of Taliban’s leadership council known as the Quetta Shura after the Pakistani city of the same name, said Fared Ahmad Farhang, a spokesman for the police in Helmand province.

In the east, NATO and Afghan forces detained a militant commander who allegedly planned and coordinated an attack on a coalition base in eastern Khost province Friday. Several other insurgents were detained during the operation in Sabari district. Militants detonated a truck bomb outside Forward Operating Base Salerno on Friday, then tried to storm the site, but coalition forces repelled the attack, killing 14 militants. No foreign or Afghan troops were killed.