Doing It Right - Democratic Republic of the Congo (formerly Zaire)

Since late March, when the UN officially created the Intervention Brigade, South African government officials have repeatedly expressed concern with the brigade’s explicit offensive mission in the Congo.  South Africa participates in many UN peacekeeping operations and indicated that many South African citizens fear that the offensive mandate sets a bad precedent. Future peacekeeping missions could be more difficult and more dangerous because rebels will see the peacekeepers as a foreign invader. Other governments around the world have expressed similar concerns. South Africa is still dealing with the blowback from this year’s Central African Republic (CAR) peacekeeping fiasco. In January 2013 South Africa sent 400 soldiers to serve with an emergency peacekeeping force in the CAR. Before their unit was fully deployed, Seleka guerrillas (the main CAR rebel force) attacked the peacekeepers. The peacekeeping mission became a combat mission. South Africa suffered 13 killed in action and 27 wounded. The South African people were understandably shocked at the high number of casualties. Many South Africans thought the UN gave the South African soldiers an impossible mission. UN planning was inadequate and local intelligence was very poor. The South African government is assuring its citizens that there will never be another CAR disasters. The government and officers in the South African National Defense Force (SANDF, South African military) are insisting that the Intervention Brigade be completely ready to fight before the operation begins. The South African contingent consists of an 850-soldier infantry battalion.  

South Africa has a very professional military which believes in realistic training (fight like you train, train like you fight). The CAR operation was slapped together in haste. That is not the South African style. Recently the South African military reported that personnel who assigned to the brigade have been conducting some very specific training exercises. At a training area in South Africa, Intervention Brigade soldiers attacked a simulated rebel-held enclave. The simulated enclave was built to resemble the border enclave occupied by M23 rebels. South African attack helicopters and jet fighter-bombers supported the attack. Why leak the training details? M23 reads press reports. The South African government wants M23 to know that if South African infantry assaults its enclave, South Africa’s high-quality infantrymen will have high quality air support and fire support. M23 should consider surrender. That way everyone stays alive. (Austin Bay)

 

July 1, 2013: Congolese civilians reported that M23 has expanded its enclave and taken control of several villages in the Masisi area (near Goma, North Kivu province).  This could be the case, but often these occupations are short-lived. M23 often conducts probes to gauge Congolese Army and UN peacekeeping force strength in a particular area. 

 

Sanctions have failed to curtail the trade in Congolese gold. Gold smuggling has “almost” no oversight. This should surprise no one. The Congolese government estimated in 2009 that smugglers export 40 metric tons (worth $1.6 billion) of Congo-produced gold every year. The Ituri district and North Kivu province (M23’s stomping ground) are the Congo’s primary gold-producing areas. Ituri was part of Congo’s Orientale province, and according to some Congolese, it still is a district. Ituri, however, is a special district. Since 2003 an interim administration runs Ituri (which borders Uganda).

 

A Mai Mai militia attacked a jail in the town of Beni (North Kivu province) and released 250 prisoners. One Congolese Army soldier was killed in the attack. Witnesses reported that the attacker used explosives to breach the prison walls and doors. Beni is a major gold producing area in North Kivu.

 

June 30, 2013:  The UN believes that sympathetic Rwandan officials  and military officers continue to provide support for the M23 rebel movement. However, overall support for M23 from Rwanda is much less than it was in late 2012. UN investigators claim they have evidence that M23 still recruits inside Rwanda, and certain Rwandan officials turn a blind eye to the operation. UN investigators also reported that there is evidence which supports Rwandan allegations that some Congolese Army units have collaborated with the Democratic Forces for the Liberation for Rwanda (FDLR) rebel group. 

The FDLR was founded by Hutu extremists who were directly involved in the 1994 genocide.

June 28, 2013: The government is considering selling tin ore stockpiled in the eastern Congo. Over 400 tons of tin ore mined before the ban on exporting conflict minerals went into effect, is stored in Goma (North Kivu province). Reportedly, two Chinese export companies want to buy the tin ore. 

 

June 27, 2013: MONUSCO (United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Congo) has begun deploying 100 Egyptian Army special operations troops to Congo’s Katanga province. The Egyptian special forces unit will likely conduct operations against the Bakata Katanga separatist militia. MONUSCO said that several peacekeeping battalions (conventional units) have already deployed to Katanga.

 

June 26, 2013: The UN accused M23 rebels of murdering Congolese civilians. UN security personnel reported that M23 claims it is conducting area search operations (patrols). However, M23 rebels arbitrarily arrest and harass civilians.  UN personnel have evidence that M23 fighters executed 26 Congolese farmers between June 16 and 19. The farmers lived in the villages of Busanza and Jomba. M23 immediately denied the accusations and accused the UN of lying.

 

June 21, 2013: M23 continues to run government-like operations. UN officials in Congo were outraged when M23 told reporters that it had arrested several men for illegal weapons possession. M23 says it does not allow crime in its area and it operates its own courts. UN diplomats accused M23 of operating an illegal parallel governmental administration.

 

June 20, 2013: The Ugandan government said that both M23 and the Congo government now have negotiating teams in Kampala.

 

June 16, 2013: M23’s senior field commander, general Sultani Makenga, said that his fighters are prepared to defend their land against the UN’s Intervention Brigade.

 

June 15, 2013:  UN sources reported that approximately around 25 percent of the personnel pledged to serve in the Intervention Brigade have arrived in the Congo.  Logistical problems in Goma) North Kivu province) continue to plague force deployment. The brigade has an authorized end strength of 3,069 soldiers.  Malawi, Tanzania and South Africa are providing the combat troops. 

 

June 14, 2013: M23 representatives in Kampala, Uganda, accused the Congolese government of reneging on a promise to re-start peace negotiations. On June 9 both the Congolese government and M23 agreed to begin a new round of talks.

Rwanda - Putting Down The M23 Problem

The UN has come out full force in support of Rwanda’s economic development strategy. However, it is not like the strategy is anything new. Rwanda has been pursuing international investment for a decade and implementing common sense economic reforms for the last five years. The government has also been cracking down on corruption, at least the bribe-taking government regulator form of corruption. So why the new vocal UN support? It looks like it is part of the pay-off for Rwanda agreeing to support the UN intervention brigade in the Congo and crack down on Rwanda-based support for the M23 Congolese rebel movement.  There is also another read some African commentators have made.  The UN response to the 1994 Rwanda genocide was haphazard and in retrospect very inadequate. Support for Rwandan economic reform is belated payback for that failure. 

This falls into the realm of maybe, but probably not. The UN Security Council was very hard on Rwanda regarding allegations and evidence that Rwandans supported M23. However, when Rwanda was elected to serve on the Security Council as a non-permanent member, it was seated, over Congolese objections. The Security Council seat makes more sense as a payback for the UN’s 1994 failure.

 

April 23, 2013: In Rwanda 200 Burundi national police officers have begun a four months-long training program. The training program prepares police for deployment with peacekeeping forces. The Rwandan Police Training School (located in Gishari) sponsors the program. 

 

April 22, 2013: The U.S. State Department issued a travel warning for Burundi. Because Burundi has a military unit involved in peacekeeping operations in Somalia, the Somali militant Islamist terrorist group al Shabaab continues to threaten to carry out attacks in Burundi. The State Department said that U.S. installations, companies and citizens in Burundi could be targeted by al Shabaab. 

 

April 21, 2013: Some 9,000 Rwandan Hutu refugees have been living in a Ugandan refugee camp located at Nakivale. Some of the refugees arrived in 1994 during and after the Rwandan genocide. Rwnada recently announced that it wants all Rwandan citizens to return to Rwanda. Many of the Hutus at the camp, however, have told Ugandan officials that they believe Rwandan Tutsis will harm them if they return to Rwanda.  The refugees say they will not accept enforced repatriation. African investigators have reported that some of the Hutu refugees may have been involved in the genocide, making them liable to be prosecuted if they return.

 

April 18. 2013: The Rwandan government announced that it wants all Rwandans who fled the country to return to Rwanda. The government intends to treat the returnees as citizens, not refugees.

April 11. 2013: Two international business and economic organizations have rated Rwanda in the top ten of African countries positioned to take economic and social advantage of digital communication technologies. Rwanda was the top ranked East African nation. It ranked sixth in Africa overall.

 

April 3, 2013: The U.S. has put out a reward of five million dollar for information leading to the arrest of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR) leader Sylvestre Mudacumura.  In 2012 the International Criminal Court (ICC) issued a warrant for his arrest on charges of war crimes and crimes against humanity. Mudacumura was involved in the 1994 Rwandan genocide that killed over 800,000 people. Since then the Rwandan government has been asking for help in either arresting or eliminating Mudacumura.

 

Police reported that someone launched a grenade attack in a bus station in the Kirironko area of Kigali (Rwanda’s capital).  

 

April 2, 2013: The Rwandan government has moved 682 former M23 Congolese rebels from a border area to a camp inside Rwanda. Most of the M23 fighters have been identified as Congolese Tutsi tribesmen. They belong to the M23 faction that was loyal to Bosco Ntaganda but lost out in a fight with a rival faction which split M23 in March. The government said the move was made in order to comply with international conventions which state that refugees should be placed in camps at least 50 kilometers from the border of their home country.

 

April 1. 2013: Rwanda assumed temporary leadership of the UN Security Council. The Rwandan UN ambassador will preside over Security Council meetings throughout the month of April. Ironically, Rwanda was also a member of the Security Council in 1994, when the Rwandan genocide occurred.

March 28, 2013: The UN Security Council approved the creation of an intervention brigade for deployment in Congo’s eastern provinces. The unit will deploy three infantry battalions plus a recon company, a special forces company and an artillery battery. Rwanda agreed to support the creation of the brigade.

 

March 27, 2013: Rwanda and Congo have released more information about Bosco Ntaganda’s surrender. U.S. intelligence officers helped arrange Ntaganda’s surrender at the U.S. embassy in Rwanda. Around 650 M23 fighters loyal to Ntaganda also entered Rwanda and surrendered.  However, a rival M23 faction loyal to M23 commander Sultani Makenga is still operating in Congo. 

 

March 25, 2013: The government confirmed that a unit of the Rwandan Army (Rwanda Defense Force, RDF) has deployed to Nepal to participate in a multi-national peacekeeping exercise. The exercise is code-named Shanti Prayas II. The exercise will last two weeks.

 

March 20, 2013: The March 18 surrender of M23 rebel leader Bosco Ntaganda caught many Rwandans by surprise. Ntaganda was the rebel Congolese general who formed the M23 rebel movement. After a fight with a rival M23 faction Ntaganda fled to Rwanda. He formally surrendered at the U.S. Embassy in Rwanda (in Kigali). Ntaganda told U.S. embassy officials that he wanted to turn himself in to the International Criminal Court.

 

March 10, 2013:  Will Rwandan president Paul Kagame leave power in 2017? Though the next election is four years away Rwandan media are already asking what the county calls the big question. Rwanda’s constitution says Kagame cannot have another term. However, Kagame is the most powerful man in Rwanda and is regarded as the intellectual and political force behind the country’s modernization effort. He also has the respect of the Rwandan Army. Kagame recently indicated he plans to step down in 2017.

 

March 3, 2013: The 2004 Arusha peace agreement stated that the Burundian Army had to undergo an extensive reform process. One requirement was that the army have a 50-50 ethnic balance between Hutus and Tutsis. However, at the moment no one is quite sure if the military has reached that goal. The army has around 30,000 soldiers and a billet in the Burundian Army is regarded as a prestigious job. Moreover, the pay is exceptionally good for Burundian soldiers who are serving with the African Union peacekeeping force in Somalia (AMISOM).  When they are deployed, each soldier earns $1,028 a month. The government takes a cut in taxes (around $100) but the rest goes into a personal bank account in the soldier’s name. In 2012 the Burundian military earned the country about $45 million, if the value of UN and AU provided equipment is included. In addition, international sources also pay for logistics costs. Burundian soldiers did not always make $1,028 a month. In 2010, Burundian soldiers, who were earning around $750 a month, learned that other UN peacekeepers were receiving more. They lodged a protest. Ultimately, the UN raised their pay.

 

February 22, 2013:  The Rwandan military is reportedly holding around 300 deserters in a prison located on Iwawa Island in Lake Kivu.  The island prison has not been inspected by the Red Cross.

 

February 21, 2013: The UN announced that Burundi’s political reconciliation program is making progress. Burundi’s next national elections are scheduled for 2015.  The UN wants Burundi to hold fair and credible elections. 

 

February 19, 2013: The UN Security Council and the UN Secretary General once again accused Rwanda of providing external support to the rebel M23 group in the Congo. UN investigators concluded that M23’s ability to provide its ground attacks with well-coordinated fire support demonstrated that it was receiving outside aid.

 

February 15, 2013:  The UN Security Council voted to extend for another year the mandate to maintain the UN Office in Burundi (BNUB). The office serves as the residual headquarters of what was the UN peacekeeping effort in Burundi.