Showing posts with label us. Show all posts
Showing posts with label us. Show all posts

Saturday, 22 December 2012

Small Navy, Strong Navy



Our friends at the Center for International Maritime Security are running a “Maritime Futures Project” and requested some input on the following question, among others: “What advice would you give to a smaller nation on the maritime investments it should pursue, and why?”

Response –

Lesser maritime nations often seem to assume they have to compete symmetrically with the strong in order to accomplish their goals. That would mean that, say, a Vietnam would have to build a navy capable of contending on equal terms with China's South Sea Fleet in order to fulfill its strategic aims. That need not be true. Here at the U.S. Naval War College we sometimes debate whether small states have grand strategies, or whether grand strategy is a preserve of the strong. Small coastal states do have grand strategies. In fact, there's a premium on thinking and acting strategically when you have only meager resources to tap. Our Canadian friends, for instance, take pride in operating across interagency boundaries. Small states can't simply throw resources at problems and expect to solve them. They have to think and invest smart. That's my first bit of advice.

What kinds of strategies and forces should the weak pursue? Here's the second bit of advice. They should consult great thinkers of the past. The French jeune ecole of the nineteenth century formulated some fascinating ideas about how to compete with a Royal Navy that ruled the waves. Sir Julian Corbett fashioned a notion of active defense by which an inferior fleet could prevent a greater one from accomplishing its goals. In effect it could hug the stronger fleet, remaining nearby to keep the enemy from exercising command of the sea. Mao Zedong's writings about active defense also apply in large part to the nautical domain. The notions of sea denial and maritime guerrilla warfare should resonate with smaller powers today. Clinging to an adversary while imposing high costs on him is central to maritime strategies of the weak.

And third, what does that mean in force-structure terms? It means smaller maritime powers should look for inexpensive hardware and tactics that make life tough and expensive for bigger powers. I have urged the Taiwan Navy to downplay its sea-control fleet in favor of platforms like missile-armed fast patrol boats that could give a superior Chinese navy fits. Such acquisitions are worth studying even for a great naval power like Japan. So long as Tokyo caps defense spending at one percent of GDP, it has to get the most bang it can for the buck. Sea denial should be in its portfolio.

Bottom line, lesser powers should refuse to despair about their maritime prospects. They should design their fleets as creatively as possible, taking advantage of the home-field advantage all nations enjoy in their immediate environs. That may mean a navy founded on small craft.

Wednesday, 31 October 2012

Rescuing a submarine and its sailors: India practices with US help



What happens if one of India's 15 submarines malfunctions underwater and sinks with its crew on board? As India is forced to operate an aging fleet - some over two decades old - the prospect of facing such a situation is almost real. It is perhaps to address this gap that for the first time India-US will be carrying out an exercise to rescue its trapped submarines. This is first that the Indian Navy will carry out such a complex exercise.

The Indo-US submarine rescue exercise named 'INDIAEX-2012' will start tomorrow and is likely to continue for nearly a month. During the exercise, four Indian submarines are likely to sail into the Arabian Sea off the coast of Mumbai and simulate a distress situation.

The Deep Submergence Rescue vehicles ( DSRV) of the US Navy's Undersea Rescue Command will then get into action and try to pull out the trapped sailors.
"The exercise will be carried out at various depths and differing conditions," a senior Navy officer told NDTV. In a complicated operation, once the distress signal is received, the Indian Navy will use the last known positions, route map, speed and other parameters to try and establish the likely location of the submarine in trouble.

That information will be passed onto the US team, who will then make a dash to the spot and lower a DSRV, which is essentially a mini-submarine equipped with robotic arms, underwater cameras and pressurized chambers capable of transporting about 20 -22 sailors at a time.

"Once the disabled submarine is located and its condition ascertained, the DSRVs, using a complicated and delicate underwater maneuver, mates the escape hatch of the disabled submarine and pulls out the trapped sailors," a senior Naval officer told NDTV.

DSRVs can operate up to a depth of about 610 meters underwater.

Currently, Indian submarines depend on pressurized escape suits and deep sea divers to rescue submarine crews. But this procedure to evacuate trapped sailors is effective in only in very shallow depths.

On August 12, 2000, K-141 Kursk of the Russian Navy - perhaps the biggest nuclear-powered attack submarine - sank following two explosions on board. All the 118 sailors on board died in the accident. Nine days after the incident, when Russia finally accepted international help, deep sea navy divers reached the boat on the sea-bed to find that 23 sailors including the captain had escaped the first explosion and secured themselves in the stern of the boat. But by the time the navy divers reached them, it was too late.

India operates a submarine fleet of 15 including a recently-acquired nuclear-powered hunter killer submarine from Russia - INS Chakra. The indigenously-produced INS Arihant is capable of carrying nuclear warheads and is likely to start its sea trials soon. And by 2015, India is likely to get the first of the much-delayed Scropene submarines from France. The Navy will get a total of six Scorpene submarines by 2020 if there are no further delays.

The Indian Navy's effort to procure its own DSRV has been struck in bureaucratic delays for years. As an alternative, it entered into an agreement with the Undersea Rescue Command of the US Navy in 1997. But it's only now that the deal is being implemented.

Last year, India has floated the first "Request for Proposal (RFP)" to purchase a DSRV. "A Russian and British firm has responded to the RFP and negotiations are at a very preliminary stage" officers told SW.

Sunday, 7 October 2012

Procurement - Screwing The French



The U.S. has angered the French Air Force by reneging on a 2010 contract to upgrade the four French E-3F AWACS (Air Warning And Control System) aircraft. The agreed on price is $466 million, and now the U.S. wants to tack on another $5 million so the promised technology can be degraded. This is all because some American bureaucrat decided that some of the upgrade technology was too sensitive for the French and had to be taken out of the upgrade. The French are being asked to pay for this change. The French are not happy. The U.S. insists such changes are allowed for these deals but are having a hard time convincing the French.

The upgrade will replace ancient (mainframe based) computers with PC type networked hardware. This will enable regular upgrades with new processors and data storage equipment. New software will introduce a Windows type interface and joysticks. This is similar to an upgrade performed on American AWACS. French AWACS will remain able to closely cooperate with E-3 type AWACS used by other nations. The new American restrictions mainly involve new software.

E-3 AWACS development began in the late 1960s, and the first prototypes were flying in the late 1970s, and it went into regular use in 1982. Flying far enough inside friendly territory to avoid enemy anti-aircraft missiles, the AWACS radar has a range of between 200 km (for small aircraft or cruise missiles flying close to the ground) to 600 km (for large aircraft flying at high altitude). The AWACS tracks several hundred friendly and enemy aircraft at once. The AWACS acts as an airborne command center for aircraft. Friendly planes are kept out of each other's' way (there has not been a friendly air-to-air collusion since the 1991 Gulf war and the first major use of the E-3). Enemy aircraft are spotted, identified and friendly interceptors assigned to take care of the threat. One or more AWACS is used to control an air operation and each can stay up eleven hours at a time, or up to 22 hours with refueling and extra crew on board to man the equipment. The AWACS functions as a combination radar platform and command center.

During its first wartime workout, during the 1991 Gulf war, the AWACS proved its worth, often in more ways than anticipated. The use of over a hundred tankers to refuel combat aircraft would not have been possible without the AWACS being there to efficiently link tankers and aircraft needing fuel. Forming up the Wild Weasels (electronic warfare aircraft), and coordinating their use with the bombers they escorted, was much easier using an AWACS. Just keeping track of who was who and going where would not have been possible without the AWACS. The communications equipment on board an AWACS allows information gathered by one AWACS to be quickly shared with other AWACS in the vicinity, other combat aircraft in the area as well as units at sea or on the ground. This function, which was eventually made to work, gave generals and admirals the goal of trying to link together all the sensor and communications of every ship, aircraft, and ground unit in the area. But first, an AWACS for ground operations was needed.

The Gulf War experience was immediately put to use during the Afghanistan war and insured that the bombers, and the aerial tankers that kept everyone flying, were always where they were needed. This was later repeated in the 2003 Iraq war. This sort of thing doesn't make the news but without AWACS a lot of those newsworthy bombs would have never made it to their targets.

Tuesday, 2 October 2012

Iran warns against outside interference in Syria



Iranian Foreign Minister Ali Akbar Salehi speaks at the Council for Foreign Affairs on Park Avenue, Monday, Oct. 1, 2012, in New York.

Iranian Foreign Minister Ali Akbar Salehi today described Tehran as a "strong ally of the people of Syria" and warned outside powers not to interfere in the conflict.

But in an interview with Australia's SBS television, Salehi also said the Syrian government needed to recognise the opposition that has been waging an 18-month-old rebellion against President Bashar al-Assad's regime.

"When it comes to outside interference, and to the internal affairs of Syria, and when outside powers dictate upon the Syrian people that 'Look, your president should step down, and this should happen', this is not the right way to do things," he told the broadcaster's Dateline programme.

"What we are saying is that both sides have to recognise the other side. In other words, the government has to recognise the opposition, and the opposition has to recognise the government." The United States charges that Iran is arming the Syrian government in the brutal repression of its opponents but Salehi insisted his Islamic republic was working for peace.

"What we can do is to facilitate this, to facilitate sitting between the government and the opposition, so that they find a way out from this crisis," he added in the interview in New York, where he was attending the UN General Assembly.

Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad last week said Tehran was working to set up a contact group on the conflict in Syria.

He refused to divulge which nations had been approached by Iran to join the group, saying he was hopeful the Iranian foreign ministry would make an announcement in the coming days.

Tehran is already included in another so-called "contact group," involving Iran, Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Turkey, and has called for observers to be sent to Syria to try to end the violence there.

At least 30,000 people, including more than 2,000 children, have died in the conflict since it erupted in March 2011, according to figures supplied by the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights.

Sunday, 23 September 2012

Acquiring of Javelin missiles from US hits a roadblock


A proposal to acquire Javelin anti-tank guided missiles from the US has hit a roadblock over transfer of critical technology and reluctance of the American government to participate in the field trials.

India is looking to acquire the third-generation anti-tank guided missiles for modernising its more than 350 Infantry units and provide them the capability to destroy enemy armoured regiments.

The US is not agreeing to provide critical technologies of the missile demanded by India and has also shown reluctance to make available the missiles for being evaluated by Indian experts in the field trials, sources told a news agency here.

Till the time these issues are sorted out, it would be difficult for the Indian side to proceed further on the deal, they said.

In response, US missile manufacturer Raytheon said, "The Javelin JV stands ready to respond to all requests of the Indian government relating to the evaluation and procurement of the combat-proven missile while ensuring it adheres to a US and Indian governments' agreement."

The Javelin missile is manufactured by a JV of Raytheon and Lockheed Martin but sold to global customers through the US government under the Foreign Military Sales route.

The company said the missile was a superior solution on offer to the Indian Army and was "worth the wait as the two governments continue discussions."

Javelin along with the Israeli Spike missile was planned to be evaluated by India for the requirements of its infantry units.

The deal has been stuck for more than two years as Defence Minister AK Antony had said in August 2010 that a Letter of Request would be sent to the US for procuring these missiles along with Transfer of Technology requirements.

The Javelin missiles have only been demonstrated to the Indian Army in military exercises involving the forces of the two countries.

The development has taken place at a time when the US has been assuring India about supplying critical technologies for its various programmes.

During his recent visit to India, US Defence Secretary Leon Panetta had also assured Antony that the US would initiate measures to provide access to technology.

The denial of dual-use items by the US to various laboratories under the Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) was a key issue for discussion between the two sides.

DRDO chief V K Saraswat had recently said US President Barack Obama's assurance on removal of DRDO from the entities list and easing exports of dual use items had only remained on paper.

Thursday, 13 September 2012

Yemen protesters attempt to storm US embassy, repelled by police


Yemeni police reportedly shot a protester, as hundreds of demonstrators stormed the US embassy in the capital city of Sanaa. Police forced the crowd to leave the embassy premises.

Conflicting casualty figures have emerged: Chinese news agency Xinhua reported that at least one person was killed in the clashes, citing witnesses, while the Yemeni embassy in Washington denied reports of fatalities.

Embassy staffers were taken to a secure location, the Yemen Times reported.

Plumes of smoke rose outside the embassy as protesters chanted "Death to America", witnesses reported.

Two cars exploded after two bombs were thrown into the embassy compound, and heavy gunfire was also heard in the area, local media reported.

The crowds also burned tires near the embassy and smashed windows at the entrance to the compound, reports said.

Security forces responded by deploying water cannons, and were prepared to use them against the crowd.

Earlier, the demonstrators had allegedly breached the embassy grounds but had been unable to enter the building. The embassy denied reports that protesters had entered its offices, saying that the clashes took place at the perimeter of the embassy grounds.