Yes or No, £3bn boost for Faslane nuclear submarine base

Plans for the jobs bonanza are now fully developed, say sources, despite the threat posed to the ­Royal Navy’s future on Gare Loch.

 

The revelation has led to ­renewed speculation that if there is a Yes vote next month, the Ministry of Defence expects to strike a deal to keep the UK’s nuclear deterrent in Scotland.

 

In the event of a No vote, Faslane will become Britain’s only ­specialist submarine base with the ­capacity for 16 vessels by 2022.

 

It will house seven new nuclear-powered Astute Class attack subs, currently being built at a cost of £1bn each, as well as the four Trident-carrying Vanguard Class vessels.

 

Two attack boats, HMS Astute and HMS Ambush, are already based at Faslane after being ­handed to the Royal Navy by ­defence contractor BAE Systems.Scotland will also become the sole maintenance home for the submarine fleet, following the ­closure of Portsmouth dockyard last year and after the Devonport base near Plymouth is scaled down by 2017.

 

While the MoD estimates that around 1,500 military and civilian jobs will be added at Faslane, ­thousands more jobs will be ­created as construction begins.

 

A source said: “The blueprints have been drawn up and the transition plans for the new Faslane are now under way. The original facility was designed to hold seven ­submarines, but under the new plans, a ­total of 16 will be hosted at any given time. The design plans are currently before the MoD and will effectively double the size of the facility and bring thousands of new jobs to the area. It’s a massive boost for Scotland.”

 

A Royal Navy spokesman said: “HM Naval Base Clyde is the ­biggest employment site in ­Scotland, with direct employment of 6,700 military and civilian jobs.

 

“Numbers of personnel at HM Naval Base Clyde are set to increase to an estimated 8,200 by 2022 as it becomes the UK’s Sub- marine Centre of Specialisation.

 

“There are currently six sub- marines and seven mine hunters base-ported at the site. By 2022 we expect that all the Royal Navy’s submarines, and seven mine ­hunters, will be at Clyde.”

 

In response to the latest developments, the Scottish Government reiterated its plans to remove ­Trident by 2020 and keep Faslane as Scotland’s main naval base. The SNP has said the country would inherit a share of Royal Navy ­vessels, as well as investing in an undisclosed number of “new ­frigates, conventional submarines and maritime patrol aircraft”.

 

A Scottish Conservative spokesman said the investment would be a massive boost for Scotland, but warned: “Unfortunately, all we hear from the Scottish Government is how they can’t get rid of the base quickly enough. As a result, a Yes vote in September would be hugely

Why sea-based nuclear weapons won't stabilise the Indo-Pacific

China, India and possibly Pakistan intend to deploy nuclear weapons at sea. Ultimately, such deployments may well have a stabilising effect — that is, they may reduce the risk of full-scale war and nuclear use. Sea-based nuclear weapons might, for instance, fit well with 'no-first-use' doctrines.

 They might also encourage reduced investment in more destabilising forces such as weapons fired from fixed sites, which are vulnerable and thus suited to a 'first strike'. And after all, sea-based nuclear weapons were widely seen as stabilising during the Cold War. 

 

However, we should beware of applying simple retrospective visions of the US-Soviet balance to the Asian strategic scene. There are various reasons to doubt that deployment of sea-based nuclear weapons in Indo-Pacific Asia will be stabilising. 

 

First, to state the obvious, there are three independent centres of nuclear power in Asia: China, India and Pakistan. And that is before counting the US and Russia, as well as North Korea, which one day could also want to base some of its weapons at sea. This fundamental element of the Asian nuclear scene will remain regardless of where weapons are based.

 

Second, although wanting the permanent presence of nuclear weapons at sea as a second-strike capability to guarantee their survival is arguably a stabilising factor, that may not be the driving motivation of all three countries. There seems to be strong interest in China and India, at least, in the symbolic value of strategic submarines, including for parochial or bureaucratic reasons. In addition, these two countries may prefer to avoid deploying nuclear-armed sea-launched ballistic missiles, in order to maximise political control over the weapons. It should also be added, regarding China, that the choice of a secure SSBN base on Hainan island, where berths are largely immune to a first strike, puts less pressure on Beijing to adopt a practice of continuous at-sea deterrence. 

 

Third, deployment of nuclear weapons at sea in Indo-Pacific Asia does not only mean strategic missiles based on submarines.

 

It may include cruise missiles on vulnerable surface platforms. It will also probably include theatre systems designed to target naval forces, notably by Pakistan. This would not be a stabilising factor if command-and-control dilemmas for such systems are resolved in a way that dilutes the ability of national authorities to maintain the highest degree of political control over the weapons at all times. It should be remembered that probably the closest call for the use of nuclear weapons since 1945 concerned naval theatre weapons: it was in Cuba in October 1962.

 

Fourth, Indo-Pacific waters lend themselves less easily to the deployment of non-detectable submarines than was the case for the Cold War confrontation, when the Atlantic and the Pacific oceans offered more opportunities. This is especially true since India and Pakistan are likely to field only medium-range systems for some time, forcing their submarines to operate relatively close to the adversary's shores. It is also worth mentioning that unlikely accidents can happen, as was the case in 2009 when British and French SSBNs collided, and it took them a while to realise what had happened.

 

More generally, the transition period towards the deployment of operational SSBNs by China, India and Pakistan is likely to be long, tortuous and dangerous, for technical and budgetary reasons. What happens if one (or two) of the three countries manages to have a secure sea-based second-strike capability well before the others? 

 

Simply put, it is impossible to argue that the deployment of sea-based nuclear weapons in Indo-Pacific Asia will be inherently stabilising.

The dangers of SSBN proliferation in Indo-Pacific Asia

It has become commonplace to lament the arms races underway in Indo-Pacific Asia.

 

China's military modernisation over the last two decades has helped provoke heightened political tensions and growing concern in capitals from Tokyo to New Delhi to Washington and Moscow.

 

North Korea's continued pursuit of nuclear weapons and missile delivery systems keeps tensions in Northeast Asia high. The Indian subcontinent is home to two nuclear powers that have fought four wars over the last 65 years. Many countries in the Asian littoral have undertaken serious rearmament programs, and across the region strategists see a proliferation of missiles of all types — anti-access systems, aerospace capabilities and naval platforms, among others

. 

Regional nuclear modernisation programs, especially the development of submarines (nuclear powered or conventional) armed with nuclear weapons, are of special concern.

 

China and India are committed to producing more nuclear-capable delivery systems and weapons with greater range, accuracy and features that make them more lethal and thus more threatening to potential adversaries. Meanwhile Pakistan is pursuing its own program to acquire more capable submarines from China. While no one is arguing, as yet, that Pakistan intends to acquire ballistic missile submarines, some analysts hint that nuclear-tipped cruise missiles are a real possibility. Given Pakistan's record on nuclear proliferation over the past decades, such fears appear real. 

 

With the possible exception of America, powers external to the Indo-Pacific (Russia, for example) are also pursuing strategic modernisation. Russia, lest anyone forget, is an Indo-Pacific nuclear power by virtue of its Pacific Fleet, complete with its latest model SSBNs (in the American lexicon: Ship, Submersible, Ballistic, Nuclear), the Borei class, armed with Bulava missiles. Even the US is investing in the research and development preliminary to building a replacement for the Ohio-class submarines that currently constitute the sea-based leg of the American nuclear triad. American strategic modernisation is not a driver in the region's strategic dynamics, but insofar as the US is executing an Asian 'pivot', American military capabilities, nuclear and conventional, remain important. 

 

This short post will not attempt a net assessment of regional or bilateral rivalries. A full analysis would need to look more closely at all dimensions of military power as well as the impact of American forces in the region. But a simple scan of the table above allows one small observation for a region that may soon be in the grips of a full-blown nuclear arms race. The prospects for stable, long-term peace (meaning greater strategic stability, the reduction of crisis instability, and fewer opportunities for accidents, chance and misperception to lead to conflict) depend, in part, on taking steps sooner rather than later to rein in potentially destabilising developments. At present, regional SSBN programs are not so advanced, and the numbers of platforms and weapons are not so large, that steps cannot avert a widening arms race. 

 

Growing numbers of submarines with nuclear-armed ballistic missiles may preserve second-strike capabilities for their possessors (and thus, debatably, contribute to strategic stability). But in the increasingly crowded seas of  Indo-Pacific Asia, greater numbers also lead to more opportunities for accidents, chance and misperception.

 

Submarine accidents are not unknown: the national tragedy of a lost boat and its crew might quickly become a regional or even global crisis if reactors or nuclear weapons have problems. Submarine operations in cramped seas also raise the possibility that one side or another will encounter the other in a crisis, with unpredictable results. Slowly maturing command and control (C2 ) and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) technologies still have a ways to go (look how long it took in US and the Soviet Union to develop their systems).

 

Furthermore, few speak of the challenge of ensuring the political and professional reliability of crews (while the mature nuclear powers rarely focus today on crew reliability, such concerns were quite real in the not-so-distant past). Nor are SSBNs and ballistic missiles in the Indo-Pacific the only aspect of undersea warfare and nuclear weapons that should trouble us: surface fleets, mine warfare, anti-submarine warfare and so forth increase the danger of incidents at sea, and they could raise the potential for a nuclear crisis. Knowledgeable analysts are concerned that the next stage of the Indo-Pacific naval arms race will involve still more submarines with nuclear sea-launched cruise missiles. 

Three 'nots'

If regional actors (not just the states currently pursuing SSBNs but other concerned parties) are to act to avert further arms racing and stabilise the emerging undersea deterrent, they must recognise the situation for what it is. A nuclear arms race at sea is:

• Not simply a local or regional issue.
• Not simply a military issue.
• And not simply a navy or maritime issue.

A nuclear arms race at sea is a global problem with far-reaching implications for proliferation, conventional arms modernisation, and the possibility of arms control. The mere existence of such systems makes it more likely that the so-called nuclear taboo might finally be broken. An undersea nuclear race is deeply political because it affects the geopolitical rivalry among great and regional powers, not to mention alliance structures and patterns of regional governance.

 

For all regional military forces, such a nuclear arms race at sea is not simply the business of navies: SSBNs affect joint and combined operations in ways big and small, and blur important distinctions between conventional and nuclear systems. It is worrisome that despite some recent developments there has been, in general, asymmetric progress in developing weapons systems versus the C2, ISR, training/readiness, and nuclear doctrine necessary to deploy sea-based deterrent systems safely and reliably. 

 

Although prudence on the part of India, China and other regional powers may alleviate these concerns, it may not be sufficient for those interested in regional stability. In the end, although it is not fashionable to advocate for arms control much less naval arms control, strategists and policy makers should remember the words of Schelling and Halperin: 'the essential feature of arms control is the recognition of the common interest, of the possibility of reciprocation and cooperation even between potential enemies with respect to their militaries.' And, in the words of Robert Jervis, which seem especially prescient with regard to naval nuclear arms racing in the Indo-Pacific, 'because the security dilemma and crisis instability can exacerbate if not create conflicts, potential enemies will have an interest in developing arms control arrangements.'

In Defense of the Nuclear Triad

CATO Institute researchers, in a new report, conclude we can kill our nuclear bombers and land based missiles and save $20 billion a year. They assert bombers and missiles have a sharply diminishing role in that you cannot use such weapons against terrorist threats. They further claim the world is so safe that there is no adversary that would seek to destroy our nuclear deterrent, so reducing our force from 500 potential targets (bombers, missiles and submarines) to less than 10 (just the submarines) is without risk.

 

Though both Russia and China are modernizing their nuclear arsenals at a pace not seen even during the height of the Cold War, CATO’s team says we should cut ours unilaterally.  

 

CATO’s claims are without foundation.  

 

The cost of all nuclear forces today is $23 billion a year, according to Deputy Defense Secretary Ash Carter. That includes 60 nuclear bombers, 12 Trident submarines and 450 intercontinental ballistic missiles, plus their associated facilities. It also includes related nuclear laboratories and communications capability. 

 

Killing all ICBMs would save at most $1 billion a year, if there were no costs to closing the three related Minuteman bases. But closing bases costs money, and those costs will eat 40 percent of the projected savings. . Eliminating the new strategic bomber from a nuclear deterrent role saves at most 5 percent of the acquisition and R&D costs, or $250 million a year. Eliminating the conventional capability of these bombers as well -- which CATO is unclear on whether it supports -- would eliminate a significant ability of the United States to strategically project a conventional force overseas. Substituting a carrier battle group capability or forward deployed tactical aircraft would cost tens of billions more each year. So, annual savings from cutting all ICBMs and the nuclear capability of our bombers would account for less than $1 billion a year over the first ten years and slightly more over the next decade after that. Putting aside the paltry savings, is there merit to rethinking the Cold War-era U.S. nuclear deterrent strategy that CATO says is no longer relevant?

 

Much is made of the notion that nuclear weapons have no role against terrorists. But our conventional and police capability also did not deter 9/11. So, should we conclude such capabilities are not relevant to our security? And despite our soldier’s heroic efforts, state-sponsored terrorism remains a top threat and is not easy to contain.

 

CATO misses the mark entirely when it comes to U.S. nuclear security doctrine. The central mission of our nuclear deterrent is to prevent the use of nuclear weapons by any of the great world powers. It is not to actually use them in war. And at least four of our adversaries have nuclear weapons. Fifteen times in the past half-decade, Russians have explicitly threatened the use of nuclear weapons against the U.S. and its allies.

 

The key issue is whether the U.S. and Russia might come eyeball to eyeball. In a crisis, we may then find our interests are being threatened. Russia may seek to keep the U.S. out of a theater of operations and have a free hand with which to operate. And thus it may contemplate the use of military force -- including nuclear weapons -- to achieve its objectives.

 

In that respect, our nuclear forces must have three characteristics. They must be credible to our adversaries. They must invite stability, meaning any adversary must conclude the use of such weapons cannot be undertaken successfully. And our nuclear deterrent must hold at risk an adversary’s forces so they cannot remain in a sanctuary, freely able to threaten the US.

 

Practically, what does this mean? Credible means that the American nuclear force must be invulnerable to any future change in technology. Nothing can change the current ability of 450 separate ICBM silos and 50 launch control facilities to withstand an attack. No sane Russian planner would contemplate trying to simultaneously destroy all of these targets.

 

But a technology “surprise” could make the U.S. submarine force vulnerable. Adm. Jonathan Greenert, chief of naval operations and a former submariner, in the July 2012 issue of the naval magazine Proceedings, said that an ability to find ships at sea was a capability on the horizon that most worried him. Over time our submarines at sea could be attrited without our being able to determine who was taking them out. A too limited or small force is an invitation to the Russians and Chinese to "come get us".

 

Having all three legs of our triad means we have technology insurance -- if there are problems with any one of our legs, the other two can do the job while we repair the first. Bombers are recallable and subs cannot now be found. The ICBMs remain highly stabilizing in that they cannot be attacked with stealth. They require such a high number of attacking warheads to take them out that we leave an adversary with two choices: invite Armageddon or do nothing with nuclear weapons.

 

For nearly 70 years of the nuclear age, our adversaries have concluded just that -- do nothing with nuclear forces. Our 500 nuclear assets when presented to an adversary during a crisis quickly leads to their conclusion: "Not today, comrade". Reducing our deterrent to 12 submarines, which CATO recommends, puts our nuclear eggs in very few baskets -- eight submarines at sea and the rest at two naval bases.  

 

In a world of 400 current conflicts involving militias, terror groups, state sponsors of terror, guerilla groups and tribal armies, in some 62 countries, it is remarkable that no central nuclear power has been drawn into using nuclear weapons. That is because our deterrent has worked perfectly for nearly 70 years.

 

Finally, the U.S. cannot do these things in a vacuum. Unilaterally wiping out some 1000 to 1200 or more American nuclear warheads would be a harsh jolt to the security of the international system. Already Japan, South Korea and our NATO allies have expressed concern they will be forced to adopt nuclear weapons in their respective national arsenals if we diminish our deterrent.  

 

In short, CATO's radical and unwise plan saves very little money; creates huge instabilities; invites attack over time on our remaining deterrent the U.S. nuclear deterrent force; and threatens to divorce our allies in Europe and East Asia from our nuclear umbrella, spurring further nuclear proliferation. On top of which, the threats to our security from nascent nuclear weapons states -- North Korea and Iran -- are where real serious nuclear dangers lie, whether from the surreptitiously delivery of nuclear weapons in an electromagnetic pulse, or EMP, attack on our country or the detonation of an Iranian nuclear device somewhere in an American city. Those are serious threats that much be addressed as well. CATO diverts our attention to the wrong issue -- the U.S. nuclear deterrent.

 

The central role of our nuclear deterrent triad is to keep any crisis from escalating to a nuclear conflict. That requires a credible, stable and effective deterrent triad. Each successive administration from Eisenhower to the present, through 70 years of nuclear history, has so concluded

U.S. Navy Undersea Warfare Director Defends SSBN(X) Plans

With several defense analysts calling for the U.S. Navy to abandon its efforts to develop a new design for its SSBN(X) Ohio-class submarine replacements, the service’s undersea warfare director is defending the current course.

“Recently, a variety of writers have speculated that the required survivable deterrence could be achieved more cost effectively with the Virginia-based option or by restarting the Ohio-class SSBN production line,” says Rear Adm. Richard Breckenridge, in a recent blog. “Both of these ideas make sense at face value—which is why they were included among the alternatives assessed—but the devil is in the details. When we examined the particulars, each of these options came up short in both military effectiveness and cost efficiency.”

A Virginia-based SSBN design with a Trident II D5 missile, Breckenridge says, was “rejected due to a wide range of shortfalls.” The concept, he says, was not stealthy enough due to poor hull streamlining and lack of a drivetrain able to quietly propel a much larger ship; would have had longer refit times and a longer mid-life overhaul; would carry fewer missiles and warheads; would have exceeded cost targets because of the required extensive redesign of Virginia systems to work with the large missile compartment; and would have required a larger fleet of submarines.

“Some have encouraged the development of a new, smaller missile to go with a Virginia-based SSBN,” Breckenridge says. “This would carry forward many of the shortfalls of a Virginia-based SSBN, and add to it a long list of new issues. Developing a new nuclear missile from scratch with an industrial base that last produced a new design more than 20 years ago would be challenging, costly and require extensive testing. We deliberately decided to extend the life of the current missile to de-couple and de-risk the complex (and costly) missile development program from the new replacement submarine program.

“A smaller missile means a shorter employment range requiring longer SSBN patrol transits. This would compromise survivability, require more submarines at sea and ultimately weaken our deterrence effectiveness.”

Some have argued, he notes, that the Navy should reopen the Ohio production line and resume building the Ohio design SSBNs.

“This simply cannot be done because there is no Ohio production line,” Breckenridge says. “It has long since been retooled and modernized to build state-of-the-art Virginia-class SSNs using computerized designs and modular, automated construction techniques.”

Simply redesigning the Ohio-class subs to be built using new production methods and machinery would be a mistake, he says, since some of the newer technology would not carry over to the old design and building the ship to existing missile specifications could lead to some treaty issues.

Retirement in Sight for United States' Heavy Hitters

In a twist of bad timing, the nation’s venerable triad of nuclear-capable bombers, ballistic missile submarines and intercontinental ballistic missiles all have retirement in sight, just as the Pentagon’s budget takes a sharp downward turn.

While many details are not known about the platforms that will replace the aging delivery systems, one thing is certain: They will be expensive.

The first leg of the triad that demands attention — and significant resources — is the replacement of the 14 Ohio-class submarines now in the Navy’s fleet. The Navy requested $1.1 billion for fiscal 2014 to continue developing the new submarine, with the goal of buying the first of 12 ships in fiscal 2021.

The Navy expects that first vessel to cost a staggering $12 billion — almost as much as the service’s next aircraft carrier. But costs for the rest of the fleet are expected to be significantly lower, between $4.9 billion and $5.4 billion apiece, measured in fiscal 2010 dollars.

Despite budget pressures, officials can’t afford to delay if they want to avoid a significant gap in capability. The Ohio-class has an expiration date, with the first scheduled to leave the force in 2027, 42 years after it entered the water and 12 years later than originally planned.

Meanwhile, the Air Force has requested $379 million in fiscal 2014 to continue developing a next-generation bomber. Service officials hope to buy 80 to 100 new bombers, the first of which would enter the force around 2025. The cost for each of the planes could hit $550 million, with the total cost of the program climbing to $36 billion to $56 billion over the aircraft’s anticipated 50-year life.

The plan for a replacement for the 1970s-era Minuteman III ICBMs is far less clear. The Air Force invested more than $7 billion in the missiles between 2001 and 2010 to keep them operational until 2030. But military programs can take more than a decade to develop and build, forcing service officials to begin to think now what they will need by 2030.

Retired Gen. James E. Cartwright, the former vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, said the military should view these platforms as 50-year investments and should think critically about what the service’s strategic needs will be well into the century.

“What are the attributes you want? Really haven’t been debated other than to be better than what we had before,” Cartwright said. “I think that’s kind of the mantra out there. To me, that’s not enough from a strategy standpoint.”

Capability of Russia’s Ballistic Missile Submarine Force Questioned

The Federation of American Scientists (FAS) recently obtained information from the U.S. Navy suggesting that, though Russia is undergoing a much-publicized push to modernize its ballistic missile submarine force, the actual patrol rate amongst vessels in service remains extremely low. 

Figures suggest that the entire fleet of nine operational nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines (SSBN) made just five deterrent patrols in all of 2012, according to the organization.

FAS analysts noted that this was likely not sufficient to sustain a constant deterrent presence, and the overall tempo of patrols has continued to decline since the end of the Cold War, when the SSBN fleet reached a record of 102 patrols in 1984.

There was a slight resurgence 2008 with ten patrols (up from 3 in 2007), but these again declined, despite Russian pronouncements that they were ready to maintain a constant at-sea deterrent. The overall number of patrols also suggests that there are long periods in which boats go without extended deployments, meaning SSBN crews lack hands-on training, according to FAS.

Russian Navy planners are currently working to replace the currently in-service Soviet-era Delta III and IVs with Borei-class vessels, which are expected to be fully operational by the mid-to-late 2020s.

Russian SSBN Fleet: Modernizing But Not Sailing Much

The Russian ballistic missile submarine fleet is being modernized but conducting so few deterrent patrols that each submarine crew cannot be certain to get out of port even once a year.

During 2012, according to data obtained from U.S. Naval Intelligence under the Freedom of Information Act, the entire Russian fleet of nine ballistic missile submarines only sailed on five deterrent patrols.

The patrol level is barely enough to maintain one missile submarine on patrol at any given time.

The ballistic missile submarine force is in the middle of an important modernization. Over the next decade or so, all remaining Soviet-era ballistic missile submarines and their two types of sea-launched ballistic missiles will be replaced with a new submarine armed with a new missile (see also our latest Nuclear Notebook on Russian nuclear forces).

The new fleet will carry more nuclear warheads than the one it replaces, however, because the Russian military is trying to maintain parity with the larger U.S. nuclear arsenal.

Sluggish Deterrent Patrols

The operational tempo of the Russian SSBN fleet – measured in the number of deterrent patrol conducted each year – has declined significantly – actually plummeted – since the end of the Cold War.

At their peak in 1984 – the year after the Russian military became convinced that the NATO exercise Able Archer was in fact disguised preparations for a nuclear first strike against the Soviet Union, Russian SSBNs carried out 102 patrols. Under Mikhail Gorbachev, operations quickly declined in the second half of the 1980s. But even as the Warsaw Pact collapsed and the Berlin Wall fell in 1989, the fleet was able to muster a slight comeback in 1990.

As the Cold War officially ended in 1990, the Soviet Union dissolved and Russia descended into financial recession, the SSBN force increasingly stayed in port until in 2002, when no deterrent patrols were conducted all.

Since then, the performance has been a mixed bag. After a slight whiff of new life with 10 patrols in 2008 (up from 3 in 2007), the number of SSBN patrols has declined again to around five in 2012.

The recent decline contrasts with the Russian Navy’s declaration last year that it would resume continuous deterrent patrols from mid-2012. Assuming the five patrols occurred throughout the year and not just in the last six months, the fleet would have had a hard time maintaining a continuous at-sea presence with only five patrols. Theoretically, it could be done if each patrol lasted an average of 73 days. That is how long a U.S. SSBN deploys on a good day. But Russian SSBNs are thought to do shorter patrols, probably 40-60 days each, in which case most of the five patrols would have had to occur between July and December to maintain continuous patrol from mid-2012.

Even if the navy were able to squeeze a more or less continuous at-sea presence out of the five patrols, it would at best have consisted of a single SSBN – not much for a fleet of nine submarines or demonstrating a convincing secure retaliatory capability.

Perhaps more significantly, the five deterrent patrols conducted in 2012 are not enough for each SSBN in the fleet to be able to conduct even one patrol a year. The five patrols by nine SSBNs indicate that only five or less submarines are active. That means that submarine crews do not get much hands-on training in how to operate the SSBNs so they actually have a chance to survive and provide a secure retaliatory strike capability in a crisis. Crews probably compensate for this by practicing alert operations at pier-side at their bases.

Unlike U.S. SSBNs, which can patrol essentially with impunity in the open oceans, Russian deterrent patrols are thought to take place in “strategic bastions” relatively close to Russia where the SSBNs can be protected by the Russian navy against the U.S. and British attack submarines that probably occasionally monitor their potential targets.

The Russian navy remembers all too well the 1980s when the aggressive U.S. Maritime Strategy envisioned using attack submarines to hunt down and destroy Soviet SSBNs early on in a conflict, a highly controversial strategy [see here and here] that could likely have triggered escalation to strategic nuclear war. Hunting Russian SSBNs is no longer a primary mission for U.S. attack submarines, but it is probably still part of the mission package and one that Russian planners cannot afford to ignore. As a result, Russian SSBNs probably continue to patrol in the areas used in the late-1980s and early-1990s (see map) to provide maximum protection.

Force Structure
Russia currently operates 10 ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs), of which three Delta IIIs based in the Pacific are outdated and six Delta IVs based in the Barents Sea have recently been refurbished to serve for another decade or so. The 10^th SSBN added in January 2013 is the first of a new type of Borei-class SSBNs that are scheduled to replace all Deltas by the mid/late-2020s.

The first Borei-class (Project 955) SSBN, Yuri Dolgoruki, entered service after more than 15 years of design and construction, marking the first time in 25 years that the Russian Navy had commissioned a new SSBN. A second Borei has been launched and a third is under construction. Russia has announced plans to build a total of eight Boreis. Each Borei is equipped with 16 SS-N-32 (Bulava) SLBMs, a missile that Russia has declared can carry up to six warheads.

The fourth and subsequent Borei-class SSBNs will be of an improved design, known as Borei-II or Project 955A). Russian news media is full of rumors that the improved Boreis will be equipped with 20 SLBMs instead of 16 on each of the first three boats. Some Russian officials dispute that, saying all Boreis will be equipped with 16 missiles.

This force structure plan has implications for Russia’s nuclear posture and strategic priorities. The replacement of the Delta SSBNs with eight Borei SSBNs will reduce the size of the Russian SSBN fleet and the number of SLBMs, but result in a 23-percent increase in the number of sea-based warheads because the SS-N-32 carries more warheads than the SS-N-18 and SS-N-23 SLBMs it replaces.

In other words, Russia will be placing more eggs in fewer baskets at sea, which increases the importance of each SSBN – something strategists say is bad for crisis stability.

Conclusions and Implications

The Russian SSBN force is in the middle of a transition from Soviet-era weapons to a smaller but more warhead-heavy fleet of new submarines.

This means that the SSBN fleet will carry a growing portion of Russia’s strategic missile warheads – up from about a third today to nearly half by the mid-2020s.

The trend of increased warhead loading on sea-launched ballistic missiles is similar to the development on land where reduction of the Russian ICBM force will result in a greater portion of the remaining force being equipped with multiple warheads.

This is perhaps the most dominant trend of Russia’s nuclear forces today: fewer launchers but each carrying more warheads. Not that Russia will have more total nuclear warheads than before (their arsenal is declining), but that military planners have fallen for the temptation to place more nuclear eggs in each basket.

They appear to do so to compensate againt the larger U.S. nuclear missile force and its significant reserve of additional warheads. But it would be helpful if the Russian government would declare how many Borei-class SSBNs it plans to build in total and limit the number of missiles on each to 16.

The Russian modernization is motivating Cold Warriors in the U.S. Congress to argue that the United States should not reduce but modernize its nuclear forces. They are wrong for many reasons, not least because the two postures are very different.

The U.S. SSBN fleet is more modern with another 15 service years left in it, and it carries many more missiles that are much more reliable with more warheads. The U.S. could in fact easily reduce its SSBN fleet to ten boats, perhaps fewer.

Moreover, in contrast with U.S. SSBN operations, where each operational submarine conducts an average of 2-3 patrols each year, Russian SSBN crews do not get a lot of operational training with an average of less than one patrol per submarine per year.

Rather than opposing further reductions, U.S. lawmakers should support limitations on the growing asymmetry between U.S. and Russian strategic nuclear forces – an asymmetry that is significantly in the U.S. advantage – to help limit further concentration of nuclear warheads on Russia’s declining numbers of strategic missiles. That would actually help the national security interests of all.

Could New SSBN Program “Sink” U.S. Navy?

The immense cost of the Ohio-class replacement program to build the United States’ next generation ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) threatens to jeopardize the rest of the fleet, Navy leaders and lawmakers are warning.

The program envisions replacing the current 14 Ohio-class submarines with 12 new SSBNs that will have reactor cores that will last the entire service life of the vessels, meaning each submarine will spend less time in maintenance.

Still at a cost of anywhere between US$4-6 billion a ship, the expense of this program will be an immense burden on the Navy’s shipbuilding budget. Indeed, although the procurement phase of the program isn’t scheduled to begin until FY 2021, the Pentagon’s proposal for its FY 2014 budget already calls for appropriating US$1 billion for R&D purposes.

At an industry breakfast last week, Vice Adm. William Burke, the outgoing deputy chief of Naval Operations Warfare Systems, said the cost of the program would undermine the Navy’s ability to field a 300-ship fleet during the procurement phase that stretches from FY2021 through FY2035.

“If we buy the SSBN [the planned 12 replacement strategic submarines for the current 14 Ohio class now in service] within existing funds, we will not reach 300 ships. In fact, we’ll find ourselves closer to 250. At these numbers, our global presence will be reduced such that we’ll only be able to visit some areas of the world episodically,” Vice Adm. Burke said, the Washington Post reported.

Vice Adm. Allen Myers, deputy chief of naval operations for integration of capabilities and resources echoed Burke during a Congressional hearing on April 24: "It's an understatement to say that that's going to challenge us…. It challenges our shipbuilding account, and it challenges us when you look at that time frame."

At the same hearing Sean Stackley, assistant secretary of the Navy for research, development and acquisition, went into greater detail when, in reference to the Ohio-replacement program, Stackley said, “Clearly, that program, which in then-year dollars, when you consider the R&D [research and development] investment and procurement dollars, we’re talking about $100 billion, roughly, over about a 12- to 15-year period.”

While Stackley assured lawmakers the service was seeking to further reduce the costs of the submarines, he warned them that “all of our efforts to improve affordability of that boat program will not be sufficient to bring our shipbuilding requirement during that period down to within our historical budget.”

The U.S. is not the only country struggling with the enormous costs of maintaining a nuclear arsenal, of course. Still, this strikes at the very core of the USN’s twin missions of being both the holder of the most survivable leg of the U.S. nuclear triad, and a global navy capable of projecting force across the world.

In light of this, some lawmakers are proposing that the nuclear submarines be funded at least in part outside the Navy’s normal shipbuilding fund, while the Navy is considering purchasing some ships earlier than currently scheduled to leave the shipbuilding fund open during the Ohio-replacement program’s procurement period.

But some, like Hans M. Kristensen of the Federation of American Scientists, questions whether there is even a need to build so many SSBNs at all. As he recently pointed out on his Strategic Security Blog:

“The number of deterrent patrols the U.S. SSBN fleet conducts each year has declined by more than 56 percent from 64 patrols in 1999 to 28 in 2012. The decline has reduced the number of annual patrols to the lowest level since 1962.”

Kirstensen also notes: “Each SSBN now spends less than half of the year on deterrent patrol – the purpose for which it was built – compared with 60-70 percent a decade ago. The decline means that each submarine today conducts an average of 2.3 deterrence patrols per year, down from 4.1 a decade ago. In fact, today’s patrol rate is the lowest ever for the Ohio-class SSBNs.”

Whether the Navy can reduce the number of SSBNs all depends on the outcome of the nuclear policy review the Obama administration is reportedly conducting.

Chinese Boomers/Bombers A Bust

Taiwanese intelligence officials recently revealed (while answering questions before parliament) that China’s Type 94 SSBN (ballistic missile carrying nuclear powered boat, also called "boomers") has not yet been commissioned. This was apparently in response to reports that a Type 94 class sub was seen recently undergoing what appeared to be sea trials. Taiwanese officials also stated that the JL-2 SLBM (Sea Launched Ballistic Missiles) that the Type 94 is designed to carry is still undergoing testing.

 

It’s no secret that China is eager to actually send one of its SSBNs out on a combat patrol. That’s because, to date, China has never been able to do this. America, Russia, Britain, and France have all done so and still do. The U.S. has had SSBNs going out with nuclear armed, and ready to fire, missiles for over half a century. What is going on with China? There appears to be a combination of technical and political problems. Some of these problems are no longer state secrets but are being discussed in the state controlled media. 

 

What is known is that China has already produced two generations of SSBNs. In the early 1980s, the Type 92 SSBN was launched but had a lot of problems and never made it into service. It only went out for training in Chinese coastal waters. Only one was built. 

 

In the last decade the Type 94 showed up. This was believed, in the West, to be the Chinese SSBN that would go on patrol. This has never happened, at least not yet. Turns out that the Type 94 also had technical problems, and Chinese workers have been seen working on Type 94s for years.

 

The Type 94 seemed like it would enter service because it is simply a variant of the  Type 93 class SSN (nuclear powered attack sub), which looks a lot like the three decade old Russian Victor III class SSN design. The first Type 93 entered service in 2006. 

 

The Type 94 SSBN looks like a Victor III with a missile compartment added. Taking a SSN design and adding extra compartments to hold the ballistic missiles is an old trick, pioneered by the United States in the 1950s to produce the first ever SSBNs. The Chinese appear to have done the same thing by taking their new Type 93 SSN and creating a larger Type 94 SSBN boat of 9,000 tons displacement. Priority was apparently given to construction of the Type 94, as having nuclear missiles able to reach the United States gives China more diplomatic clout than some new SSNs. The first Type 94 was completed two years ago. But it still has not gone to sea equipped with nuclear missiles.

 

This may be because after the first two new, 7,000 ton, Type 93 class SSNs went to sea, China apparently found their performance was not impressive at all. Not much more was expected from the Type 94s, except that they might be reliable enough to make a few combat patrols, just for the record. The 93s were too noisy and had a long list of more minor defects as well. It's unclear how many 93s will be built, probably no more than six (four already exist). More resources are apparently being diverted to the next SSN class, the 95, and the next SSBN, the Type 96. The first Type 95 is under construction and not expected to enter service until 2015. The Type 96 SSBN is still in the planning stages, apparently waiting to see how well (or not) the Type 95 SSN design works out.

 

The Type 93 and Type 94 were both over a decade in development and construction. Work began on the 94 class in the 1990s. For years all that was known was that the Chinese were having technical problems with the new design. The Type 94 is a modern SSBN, using technology bought from Russia, plus what was developed by the Chinese in their earlier nuclear submarine building efforts. 

While the Chinese have had a hard time building reliable and quiet nuclear subs, they are determined to acquire the needed skills. You do that by doing it and eating your mistakes. U.S. intelligence experts believe that China is now concentrating on the design of the new Type 96s. That may still be the case, and the Type 94 seen at sea may be testing new technology meant for the Type 96.

 

But there are other problems. The Chinese government is apparently uneasy with sending off an SSBN, armed with twelve or more SLBMs, each with one or more nuclear warheads. Western nations carefully select the officers and crews of their SSBNs and use a host of codes and procedures (PAL or "Permissive Action Links") to insure that a single madman cannot use any of those SLBMs. Russia also screened crews and had PAL codes but also had, in effect, representatives of the secret police on the SSBN, whose main job was to insure that the SLBMs were used as the government back in Moscow commanded. China has always been much less trusting of the armed forces when it comes to nuclear weapons. China also appears to lack the advanced PAL technology found in the West. All this doesn't get much mention in the West but it is very real inside China. So when the Type 96 shows up, sometime late in this decade, it will be revealing to see if the Chinese have overcome their reluctance to trust a crew of Chinese sailors with all those nukes.

France denies nuclear sub axe plan

Claims that the French government is planning to scrap one of its four nuclear submarines and make other swingeing cuts to its military capabilities, have been dismissed as "fanciful" by defence officials.

The country's Le Parisien newspaper claims the threat to axe a nuclear sub – leaving France without the ability to maintain a continuous nuclear presence at sea – is among a series of shock proposals in the French defence white paper for 2015-19, due for publication in January next year.

The newspaper claims one proposal is to save an estimated 2.6bn euros (£1.6bn) by no longer carrying airborne nuclear warheads on Mirage 2000 and Rafale jets.

And on the plans to the French nuclear submarine fleet from four to three vessels Le Parisien said: "Given maintenance needs, France would no longer be able to be present at sea 365 days a year."

Other cost-cutting proposals cited by the newspaper include cutting the number of military bases in France from 60 to 20, and radically reducing the number of new recruits to the French Army.

But a French defence ministry spokesman slammed the reported proposals as "fanciful".

"These appear to come from very partial military sources discussing working scenarios for the future rather than documents from the defence ministry, and have nothing to do with the white paper," he told The Daily Telegraph.

"The paper outlines political and military strategy for the coming years, not military restructuring. Questions about allocating means will only come afterwards in a military programmatic law sometime next June," he said.

The spokesman also insisted that the two pillars of France's nuclear deterrent – seaborne and airborne – were non-negotiable and would be "maintained during President François Hollande's entire (five-year) mandate."

SSBN Verkhoturye Puts Off for Trials in White Sea

Zvezdochka Ship Repair Center started shipyard's sea trial program of nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine (SSBN) Verkhoturye. 

Upon completion of trials and elimination of all found defects, the nuclear submarine will be recommissioned into Russian Navy and head for her permanent basing site.

Works on the submarine's technical recovery and 5-year service life extension started in the fall of 2010. The shipyard has repaired the sub's hull, outboard fittings, ballast tanks, mechanisms of propeller-rudder system and other onboard systems. The submarine was withdrawn from covered slipway in March 2012.

K-51 Verkhoturye nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine was laid down in Feb 1981 at Sevmash shipyard in Severodvinsk, put afloat in Jan 1984, and commissioned in Dec 1984. That was the first submarine in her class deployed in the Arctic with nuclear-headed ballistic missiles onboard in 1987.

She is a second-generation Project 667BDRM Delfin nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine, lead sub in her class. Six submarines of this project still make the core of Russia's maritime nuclear deterrence force.

Performance

Surface speed: 14 knots
Submerged speed: 24 knots
Operating depth: 320 - 400 meters
Test depth: 550 - 650 meters
Endurance: 90 days
Crew: 135 - 140 men

Dimensions

Surface displacement: 11,740 tons
Submerged displacement: 18,200 tons
Extreme length (at design waterline): 167.4 meters
Extreme beam: 11.7 meters
Mean draft (at design waterline): 8.8 meters

Armament

4 x 533-mm bow torpedo tubes (12 torpedoes or 24 mines instead)
16 SLBM R-29RM launchers
MANPADS 9K310 Igla-1/9K38 Igla launcher (combat load - 8 SAMs)

Report: Russian Nuclear Attack Submarine Detected Near US

A Russian nuclear-powered attack submarine was detected within 200 miles of the East Coast last month — the first time that particular class of submarine had been detected near a U.S. coast, defense officials told Submariners World.

While I can’t talk about how we detected it, I can tell you that things worked the way they were supposed to,” one defense official told the Beacon, stating that the Russian submarine “poses no threat whatsoever.”

The defense officials spoke on condition of anonymity because of the sensitive nature of anti-submarine warfare efforts.


Identified by its NATO designation as a Russian Seirra-2 class submarine, the vessel is believed to be based with Russia’s Northern Fleet.

The submarine was believed to have been conducting anti-submarine warfare efforts against U.S. ballistic and cruise missile submarines based at Kings Bay, Ga., one official told SW.

But a second official told SW that the submarine did not sail close to Kings Bay and also did not threaten a U.S. aircraft carrier strike group that was conducting exercises in the eastern Atlantic.

Kings Bay Naval Submarine Base is just north of Jacksonville, Fla. It is the base for two guided missile submarines and six nuclear missile submarines.

The submarines are known to be a target of Russian attack submarines, the report said.

“A Russian AGI and an SSN in the same geographic area as one of the largest U.S. ballistic missile submarine bases — Kings Bay — is reminiscent of Cold War activities of the Soviet navy tracking the movements of our SSBN’s,” yet another U.S. official told the publication, referring to the designation for ballistic missile submarines, SSBN.


Naval analysts told the publication that the Russian attack submarine was outfitted with SS-N-21 anti-submarine warfare missiles, as well as SS-N-16 anti-submarine warfare missiles. It also is equipped with torpedoes.

The U.S. Navy deploys underwater sonar sensors set up at strategic locations near the United States that detected the submarine late last month, according to the report.

This Is America’s New Ballistic Missile Submarine

The U.S. Navy’s fleet of aging Ohio-class nuclear missile submarines are finally up for replacement after more than 30 years in service. The new nuclear-powered, ballistic missile toting submarine isn’t scheduled to be on deck until 2027, but in federal terms, that’s practically light speed.

The new sub will be only slightly larger than the old one, but will have fewer missile tubes. It will also carry the same Trident II D5 nuclear warhead-tipped ballistic missiles. Smaller and slightly repetitive: sounds un-American, no? Well, take solace in the fact that like so many other improvements nowadays, this one is comprised mostly of better technology.

As with planes, and now cars, the new Ohio-class subs will be fully drive-by-wire, with their onboard nuclear power plants generating electricity to drive electric propulsion motors. The move away from direct propulsion, along with high tech hull treatments, are expected to make the subs quieter that their predecessor; less detectable by sonar.

All we really need to make this thing official is a Michael Bay film about heroic, video game-playing sailors defeating a mob of drunk, unshaven pirates from a former Soviet satellite state or something.

Photo credit: U.S. Naval Institute

Russia - Borei Bombers Delayed Yet Again

The new Russian Borei class SSBNs (ballistic missile nuclear subs or "boomers/bombers") was supposed to enter service at the end this year. Then problems were discovered in the software that runs the missile launching and other systems on the boat. Because of that the first Borei won’t enter service until next year. This boat, the Yuri Dolgoruky, was launched five years ago, after being under construction since 1996. Money shortages and technical issues slowed progress. Yuri Dolgoruky was further delayed after launch because of power plant and other equipment problems. Yuri Dolgoruky was the first new Russian SSBN since 1990 and there seemed to be no end of problems. Part of this is because the new Borei class boats makes extensive use of modern electronics. It’s all digital and flat screens inside. Lots of microprocessors and modern sonar, which the navy insisted would make these boats more aware of their underwater surroundings than previous designs. The possible complications from debugging all this new tech were never mentioned. 

Externally, the Boreis are closer in design to the older Delta IVs than to the more recent, and much larger, Typhoon boats. The Boreis are 170 meters (558 feet) long and 13 meters (42 feet) wide. Surface displacement is 15,000 tons, and 16 Bulava SLBMs (Sea Launched Ballistic Missile) are carried. Work on the first Borei, the Yuri Dolgoruky, was delayed for several years because the first missile being designed for it did not work out. As a replacement, the successful land based missile, the Topol-M, was quickly modified for submarine use. This Bulava was a larger missile, cutting the Boreis capacity from twenty to 16 missiles. The boat also has four torpedo tubes and twelve torpedoes or torpedo tube launched missiles. The Borei also sports a huge sonar dome in the bow. 

The Boreis have a crew of 107, with half of them being officers (a common Russian practice when it comes to high tech ships like nuclear subs). Each of these boats cost at least two billion dollars. This high cost, by Russian standards, is partly because many factories that supplied parts for Russian subs were in parts of the Soviet Union that are not now within the borders of present day Russia, so new factories had to be built. All components of the Boreis, and their missiles, will be built in Russia. A dozen Boreis were originally planned, but for now only eight are being built. All are supposed to be in service by the end of the decade. The last five are referred to as Borei-A and will carry 20 missiles and contain a number of other improvements. 

The Boreis will replace the aging Cold War era Delta class SSBNs that are being retired because of safety and reliability issues. Nuclear submarines are one area of military spending that did not get cut back sharply after the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991, but there are still limits to the navy budgets and the Boreis are being built, in part, to be cheaper to operate. Two Borei boats are now completed and waiting for all these glitches to be fixed before entering service. The more recent, but massive, Typhoon SSBNs will be retired in two years, mainly because they are so expensive to operate.

India’s SSBN Shows Itself

A new satellite image appears to show part of India’s new SSBN partly concealed at the Visakhapatnam naval base on the Indian east coast (17°42’38.06″N, 83°16’4.90″E).

Could it be? It is not entirely clear, but a new satellite image might be showing part of India’s first nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine, the Arihant.

The image, taken by GeoEye’s satellite on March 18, 2012, and made available on Google Earth, shows what appears to be the conning tower (or sail) of a submarine in a gap of covers intended to conceal it deep inside the Visakhapatnam (Vizag) Naval Base on the Indian east coast.

The image appears to show a gangway leading from the pier with service buildings and a large crane to the submarine hull just behind the conning tower. The outlines of what appear to be two horizontal diving planes extending from either side of the conning tower can also be seen on the grainy image.

The Arihant was launched in 2009 from the shipyard on the other side of the harbor and moved under an initial cover. An image released by the Indian government in 2010 appears to show the submarine inside the initial cover.

The new cover, made up of what appears to be 13-meter floating modules that can be assembled to fit the length of the submarine, similarly to what Russia is using at its submarine shipyard in Severodvinsk, first appeared in 2010. Images from 2011 show the modules in various configurations but without the submarine inside.

The movement of the Arihant from the initial cover building to the module covers next to the service facilities and large crane indicates that the submarine has entered a new phase of fitting out. The initial cover building appeared empty in April 2012 when the Indian Navy show-cased its new Russia-supplied Akula-class nuclear-powered attack submarine: the Chakra.

It is thought that the Arihant is equipped with less than a dozen launch tubes behind the conning tower for short/medium-range nuclear-armed ballistic missiles. Before it can become fully operational, however, the Arihant will have to undergo extensive refitting and sea-trials that may last through 2013. It is expected that India might be building several SSBNs.

Like the other nuclear weapon states, India continues to modernize its nuclear forces, despite pledges to work for a world free of nuclear weapons.