Residents Flee West Mosul As Fighting Nears Old City, Key Mosque

Thousands of Iraqis were fleeing west Mosul during lulls in heavy fighting as government troops closed in on the Old City and a strategic mosque in their campaign to drive Islamic State (IS) militants out of Iraq's second-largest city.

Officials on March 18 said Iraqi forces were facing strong resistance as they attempted to retake the crowded, narrow streets of west Mosul in a drive launched with U.S. air support on February 19.

Government troops captured the eastern half of the militants’ so-called capital in Iraq in January after 100 days of fighting.

Iraqi troops are focused on encircling the Old City and the important Al-Nuri Mosque in west Mosul, Lieutenant General Raed Chaker of the Federal Police said.

Another Federal Police official on March 18 said troops had recaptured two heavily populated neighborhoods, Al-Kur and Al-Tawafa, in the Old City.

Food and water remained scarce and security was precarious in newly liberated areas. Many residents were seen fleeing to safer areas during lulls in fighting.

"We have been trapped for 25 days. No water, no food, everyone will die, and they will have to pull us from the rubble," a resident of Bab Jdid district said.

"It is terrible. Islamic State has destroyed us. There is no food, no bread. There is absolutely nothing," another resident said.

U.S. officials estimated as many as 750,000 civilians may have been in west Mosul at the start of the offensive, along with some 2,000 IS fighters.

Elements of the Federal Police and Rapid Response forces are leading the campaign around the Old City and the mosque.

Rain and heavy clouds were hanging over the area, limiting air cover.

"The weather is cloudy and rainy, but our forces are advancing toward their targets," Federal Police Major General Haider Dhirgham said.

IS militants were fighting back with sniper fire, mortars, and armored suicide car bombs, officials said.

Mosul and the Al-Nuri Mosque are of major symbolic importance to IS because it was where leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi declared his so-called caliphate in 2014.

IS’s stronghold in Syria, Raqqa, is also under pressure from U.S.-backed forces.

IS militants seized large portions of northern Iraq and Syria in an offensive in 2014.

The group has been accused of numerous atrocities and has claimed responsibility for major terrorist attacks in Europe and elsewhere.

Britain expands role in Iraq as warplanes monitor Isis positions

Britain is stepping up its military involvement in the fight against jihadi forces from the Islamic State in Iraq after the defence secretary Michael Fallon confirmed that British warplanes are flying deeper into Iraq in a mission that could last "months".

 

As David Cameron declared that Britain should be prepared to deploy its "military prowess" to help defeat the jihadis, Fallon said that Britain's involvement in Iraq is fast expanding beyond the initial humanitarian mission to relieve Yazidi refugees besieged on Mount Sinjar.

 

"This is not simply a humanitarian mission," the defence secretary said as it was confirmed that RAF Tornado jets, which were deployed to the region last week to identify the location of Yazidi refugees, are now monitoring Islamic State (Isis) positions deep into Iraq.

 

The UK move came as the US announced its most concerted bombing campaign yet over northern Iraq to drive Isis forces back, helping Kurdish forces to reclaim Mosul dam.

 

American warplanes and drones carried out more than 20 strikes at the weekend near the crucial dam that Isis forces took earlier this month. More than a dozen Isis vehicles were destroyed, the Pentagon said. The bombing is designed to help Kurdish forces regain the initiative in fighting for territory in northern Iraq that Isis has seized over the past three months.

 

"Mosul Dam was liberated completely," Ali Awni, an official from Iraq's main Kurdish party, told Agence France-Presse, a statement also confirmed by another party official and a Kurdish security forces officer.

 

Britain was encouraged by the progress over the weekend though Downing Street believes that the US, the Kurds and forces of the Iraqi state face a lengthy battle to defeat the Isis jihadis.

Fallon's declaration that British involvement was expanding beyond a humanitarian mission contrasted with the cautious language of Downing Street last week when officials said that the British mission was limited to providing humanitarian relief for Yazidi refugees besieged on Mount Sinjar.

Britain announced towards the end of last week that it would be prepared to arm Kurdish forces fighting the extremists.

 

Fallon said: "We and other countries in Europe are determined to do what we can to help the government of Iraq combat this new and very extreme form of terrorism that Isil [the Islamic State] is promoting."

 

The defence secretary was speaking at RAF Akrotiri in Cyprus as six Tornado fast jets and a spy plane push beyond the Kurdish region in the very north of Iraq – the focus of the humanitarian crisis – into parts of mainland northern Iraq that were taken over by Islamist militants in the past two months.

 

The aircraft are providing footage and other intelligence on displaced families to assist with the humanitarian effort and also on the movement of jihadis on the ground. It is studied by British analysts before being used to help Kurdish and Iraqi security forces.

 

British intelligence is shared directly with the US military, which has been conducting air strikes against Islamic State positions for the past 10 days.

 

"We are helping the Iraqi authorities and the Kurdish forces build up a better picture of where Isis is, where it is likely to strike next," Fallon said in an interview conducted by the defence editor of the Times and pooled on behalf of the major newspapers including the Guardian.

 

This means that British information could be used by the Iraqi military in planning attacks against jihadis – a development that brings Britain closer to a direct combat role, which could cause alarm among some MPs who are concerned about mission creep.

 

The Rivet Joint spy plane, a sophisticated, electronic surveillance aircraft, has been conducting missions since last week. Its information is combined with intelligence from daily patrols conducted by pairs of Tornado fighter jets, kitted with surveillance pods.

 

The RAF is also flying planeloads of ammunition, rifles and machine guns from former Soviet bloc countries in eastern Europe into Irbil in order to strengthen the fighting power of the Iraqi Kurdish security forces who are combatting the jihadis.

 

In addition, the government is looking at what British gear, such as night-vision goggles and body armour, it could send directly to the country to boost the Kurdish Peshmerga fighters.

 

The defence secretary praised a group of about three dozen airmen and soldiers from the various different units at the RAF base for their work in distributing aid. Fallon then signalled an expansion of the mission which could last months when he said: "This mission isn't over. The humanitarian needs are there…There may well now be in the next few weeks and months other ways that we may need to help save life, protect people. We are going to need all of you again and the surveillance you are able to give us."

 

The signals from Fallon of a greater British military involvement, which will stop short of deploying combat troops, came as the prime minister laid the ground for greater British military involvement in confronting Isis.

 

In a Sunday Telegraph article Cameron warned that Isis has declared an "extremist caliphate" that could soon lead to a "terrorist state on the shores of the Mediterranean and bordering a Nato member [Turkey]".

 

The prime minister, who warned of a "generational struggle" against a "poisonous and extremist ideology" that will last for the rest of his political lifetime, wrote: "I agree that we should avoid sending armies to fight or occupy. But we need to recognise that the brighter future we long for requires a long-term plan for our security as well as for our economy.

 

"True security will only be achieved if we use all our resources – aid, diplomacy, our military prowess – to help bring about a more stable world. Today, when every nation is so immediately interconnected, we cannot turn a blind eye and assume that there will not be a cost for us if we do."

The prime minister, who was furious when Ed Miliband blocked his plans to launch military strikes against the regime of the Syrian president Bashar al-Assad last year amid fears of a repeat of the mistakes of the invasion of Iraq in 2003, said that people should make judgments on the world of today.

 

He wrote: "The creation of an extremist caliphate in the heart of Iraq and extending into Syria is not a problem miles away from home. Nor is it a problem that should be defined by a war ten years ago. It is our concern here and now. Because if we do not act to stem the onslaught of this exceptionally dangerous terrorist movement, it will only grow stronger until it can target us on the streets of Britain."

 

Sir Menzies Campbell, the former Liberal Democrat leader, said: "The prime minister is right to emphasise that the effects of any continuing instability in Iraq will not be confined to the region. But it will be necessary to meet the challenge of terrorism by constructing a coalition of allies from both the EU and Nato. A unified approach will be essential with no room for dissent or compromise between countries. The jihadists of IS [the Islamic State] will most certainly test political resolve as well as security challenges."

 

In his interview the defence secretary confirmed that a small number of regular British soldiers were also sent briefly into the semi-autonomous Kurdish north of the country. The troops from 2nd Battalion the Yorkshire Regiment were flown into Arbil, the capital of Iraqi Kurdistan, last week to prepare for a possible deployment of Chinook helicopters on a mission to save families from a little-known religious sect who were stuck on a mountainside.

ISIS plans to take holy war to Xinjiang

ISIS leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi makes his first public appearance from a mosque in Mosul in northern Iraq on July 5, 2014, calling on all Muslims around the world to join him in a holy war against the West. (Photo/CFP)
 

The Islamic State, the jihadist group better known as ISIS, is planning to expand its holy war to northwest China's restive Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region, reports the Chinese-language magazine Phoenix Weekly.
 

ISIS, which claims religious authority over all Muslims across the world, is currently facing US air strikes in Iraq aimed at protecting American diplomats and religious minorities from what US president Barack Obama called a "potential act of genocide."
 

On July 4, US Independence Day, ISIS leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi released a video detailing the group's explansion plans, declaring that he planned to seek vengeance against those who took away the rights of Muslims in 20 countries across the world, of which China was placed first. Other areas mentioned included India, Palestine, Somalia, the Arabian Peninsula, and Caucasus.
 

"By God, we will take revenge. Even if it takes a while, we will take revenge and we will retaliate doubly and more," Al-Baghdadi said, adding, "the day will come when Muslims will be walking everywhere as noble masters. Those who dare to stand up against them will be disciplined and all hands that reach out to them will be cut off."
 

In the video, Al-Baghdadi referenced China and Xinjiang numerous times, criticizing Beijing's policy against Muslims in the region and asking all Chinese Muslims to plead allegiance to him.
 

Xinjiang is home to the Muslim Uyghur ethnic minority, who have long accused the Chinese government of suppressing their religious and cultural freedoms. Uyghurs have been largely blamed for a spate of terror attacks in and out of the region in recent years, including a riot late last month which authorities say led to 100 deaths and over 200 arrests. It is the most violent incident to rock the region since the infamous 2009 riots in the capital of Urumqi that left 197 people dead and another 1,700 injured.

 

 

China's minister of Public Security, Guo Shengkun, has visited Xinjiang three times this year alone to oversee counter-terrorism and social stability campaigns.

Israel: The Dead End Strategy

The fighting in Gaza has left nearly 2,000 dead, over 96 percent of them Palestinian. Hamas says it won’t stop fighting until the Israeli-Egyptian blockade is lifted. Israel and Egypt refuse to do that until Hamas drops its support for terrorism and disarms. Since Israeli troops left Gaza (and Hamas took control in 2007) Gaza has become a sanctuary for Islamic terrorists. Most seek the destruction of Israel but a growing number seek to establish a religious dictatorship in Egypt. Hamas does not expect to get the blockade lifted but does see itself gaining respect (and cash donations along with more diplomatic support) in the Moslem world. At the moment Hamas is still designated an international terrorist organization by the UN, most Western nations and even some Moslem ones.

 

Israel has plenty of electronic and video evidence of Hamas using ceasefires to move weapons and personnel and prepare to continue firing on Israel. Broadcasting this evidence is opposed by Israeli intelligence officials because putting the evidence out there enables Hamas to see where and how they are vulnerable to detection. With this knowledge Hamas can better hide its activities in the future.

  

Hamas has fired over 3,300 rockets since July 9^th. Some 70 percent landed in Israel but less than four percent hit populated areas (killing three and wounding 85 civilians) . Iron Dome intercepted about a quarter of the rockets fired at Israel as the Iron Dome computers predicted these would land in or near a populated area. About 20 percent of the rockets fired towards Israel were defective and landed inside Gaza or were aimed at targets in Gaza. This included some of the 11 percent of all rockets were fired at Israeli troops inside or near Gaza. Some 69 percent of the rockets were fired from northern Gaza (where most of the Israeli counterstrikes have been) while 13 percent were launched from central Gaza and the rest from southern Gaza. Over 80 percent of the rockets were fired from unpopulated areas but at least 18 percent were fired from locations that were clearly civilian (including schools, Mosques and medical facilities.) Hamas was believed to have had about 10,000 rockets in early July. Since then over 3,000 have been fired and over 4,000 destroyed before they could be fired. Israeli aircraft, helicopters, ships, armored vehicles and ground troops have attacked nearly 5,000 targets in Gaza since July 9^th and about a third of those attacks were against rocket launching sites, often while rockets were being prepared for launch. Hamas rockets have killed three Israeli civilians and 64 military personnel (and 670 wounded) so far. Some 82,000 Israeli reservists have been mobilized and most have been sent to the Gaza border. Hamas considers each Israeli they kill a victory and plays that up in their media. The Israeli military casualty rate is about the same as the U.S. suffered at the height of the fighting in Iraq. In other words; historically quite low. 

  

Some Israeli leaders want the ground troops to go back in and shut down Hamas once and for all. But that would involve a lot of combat and if Gaza were to be completely cleared of Islamic terrorists hundreds of Israeli troops would die and thousands wounded. Most Israeli politicians do not believe Israelis in general are willing to pay that high a price. Instead Israel will continue using its intelligence capabilities to find Hamas personnel and weapons and attack them with smart bombs and missiles. Other Islamic terrorist groups in Gaza are also being hit. But the Islamic terrorists are hiding among the 1.8 million civilians in Gaza. There are several hundred thousand buildings and hundreds of tunnels and bunkers. Less than one percent of these structures holds terrorist weapons or personnel and the Israelis already know that they cannot watch all of Gaza in great detail all the time. Israeli military leaders point out that there would be a lot of Palestinian civilian casualties because Hamas deliberately surrounds its weapons and key personnel with civilians. While some Palestinians answer the Hamas propaganda and volunteer for this duty, most do not and will flee if given a chance. For Hamas victory is simply surviving and still being able to issue victory statements. Israeli victory is suppressing terrorist capabilities. Ultimate victory is eliminating the terrorist threat but given the massive support for destroying Israel in the Arab world, ultimate victory remains a long term goal, not one that can be won right now in Gaza. Right now most media in the Arab (and Moslem) world portray Hamas as misguided but valiant fighters for a cause (the destruction of Israel) that still has a lot of popular support in the Moslem world. Most Westerners, especially journalists, don’t grasp that aspect of the situation and try to portray Gaza as a humanitarian disaster that only Israel can fix. Most Israelis are exasperated at the attitude of so many non-Moslems overseas and attributes it to ignorance, greed (oil-rich Arab states have spent billions to push the Arab point of view towards Israel) or anti-Semitism.

  

Despite the continued hostile attitude in the Arab world, Israel is seeing some progress. A growing number of Arab states officially classify Hamas as a terrorist organization. The most obvious of these is Egypt. This influences media coverage of the fighting in Arab media. This time around there is more emphasis on the suffering of Gaza civilians and not the Hamas fighters. Many Egyptian journalists and pundits openly call for Israel to destroy Hamas once and for all. A growing number of Arabs are giving up on Islamic radicalism as a solution for anything and many are calling for more international efforts to crush this latest round of Islamic terrorism.

  

Israel also wants to kill the military leadership of the Qassam Brigades (the military/terror portion of Hamas), who are believed to be the prime proponents of constant rocket attacks on Israel, despite ceasefires that the political leaders of Hamas have negotiated. The key Hamas official here is the head of the Qassam Brigades; Muhammad Deif. Israel see Deif the way the Americans did Osama bin Laden, as the one guy responsible for many attacks. There are at least ten key Qassam Brigades personnel Israel consider largely responsible for the persistent (despite five ceasefires) rocket attacks as well as the effort to send Islamic terrorists through tunnels into Israel. A growing number (up to a quarter) of the Hamas rockets are either damaged or launched incorrectly. This indicates the cumulative damage on the rocket supply and the personnel trained to launch them. In addition to a few remaining tunnels into Israel, Hamas is also believed to have several thousand rockets left and hundreds of Qassam Brigades fanatics willing to anything to launch them. 

  

The current war between Israel and Hamas was only partly about the persistent rocket attacks against Israel. Israel made it clear, soon after the fighting broke out in early July, that  one of its primary objectives was to find and destroy all the tunnels Hamas had dug into Israel over the last few years. This could only be accomplished if Israeli troops were inside Gaza and able to search for the places where the tunnels started. Hamas boasted about how it had lots of these tunnels and planned to use them to get terrorists into Israel to capture or kill Israelis. So far Israel has found and destroyed 32 tunnels that extended into Israel and several more that were just used inside Gaza. Israeli intelligence, because of the several weeks Israeli troops were inside Gaza, has a better idea where additional tunnels are and Israel is hustling to come up with more effective detection methods. Currently the best method is using a large mobile drill (normally used for digging wells) to go deep dozens of times in an area where a tunnel is suspected until it is found. That method is being used now on the Israeli side of the border but it is slow work. The most obvious opportunity here is for better sensors. One idea is a series of wireless sensors buried a few meters down all along the Gaza border that will broadcast the unavoidable sounds the Hamas men would make as they dug towards the surface to “open” a tunnel on the Israeli side. For obvious reasons the Israelis are giving out any details on this sort of thing but at the moment it’s one of the best potential solution for the tunnel threat. Meanwhile Israel is trying to make the UN and other major Hamas donors (like Arab oil states) understand that a large chunk (over $10 million in the last few years) of their aid money has gone to this enormous tunnel project and that better management of aid to Gaza could reduce the amount being spent on tunnels and terrorism in general.

  

The tunnels are not a new problem. The Palestinians in Gaza have been building tunnels (mainly into Egypt for smuggling) since the 1980s. The Egyptians long tolerated this because the local Egyptian police and soldiers got bribed and that kept everyone happy. But tunnels into Israel were another matter, because these were not for smuggling but for killing or kidnapping Israelis. No bribes involved here, just murder and abduction (for ransom). Israeli combat engineers had been trained to destroy discovered tunnels, which was not easy because Hamas had booby-trapped some of them. 

  

Lost amidst all the other stories is the fact that Israeli negotiators are trying work out a deal to get back the bodies of two Israeli soldiers that Hamas made away with. Israel is offering to release 25 Palestinians from prison for the bodies but Hamas wants a whole lot more. Earlier negotiations over the remains of dead Israelis went on for years.

  

Another story that does not get covered is the fact that most of Gaza is unharmed. Despite the thousands of Israeli bombs, missiles  and artillery shells fired into Gaza in the last month over 96 percent of the structures in Gaza are intact. Israel is using smart bombs and guided missiles meaning that most of the attacks destroy or damage individual structures, not entire neighborhoods as in the past (before smart bombs became standard). Images of all those intact Gaza towns and neighborhoods do not attract a lot of eyeballs and are not considered newsworthy. Another bit of non-news is the 40,000 tons of humanitarian aid (most of it food and medical supplies) Israel has allowed into Gaza since July 9^th. Also non-news are the thousands of Israeli attacks called off at the last minute because civilians were detected in the target area.

  

In Egypt several thousand additional soldiers and dozens of armored vehicles have been sent to the Libyan border in the last week. This is all to deal with the growing smuggling activity there, much of it involving Islamic terrorist groups bringing in weapons stolen from army warehouses left unguarded during the 2011 revolution. Those weapons have been selling briskly on the black market in Egypt. The customers are gangsters, Islamic terrorists and people seeking some illegal protection.

 

Meanwhile the military revealed that since the end of July soldiers and police had killed 61 Islamic terrorists in Sinai and arrested more than a hundred known or suspected Islamic terrorists there. The raids had also captured large quantities of weapons, ammo and bomb making material. Also seized was 650 kg (1,430 pounds) of marihuana. In the last year over 500 soldiers and policemen have died fighting Islamic terrorists.

  

August 10, 2014: Israel and Hamas agreed to another 72 hour ceasefire to begin at 9 PM GMT (11 PM local time). Hamas has fired over a hundred rockets since the latest ceasefire collapsed on the 8^th.

August 9, 2014: Hamas managed to fire five more rockets into Israel, but there were no casualties or damage. Israel responded with attacks on at least 20 targets in Gaza. A bomb that hit a mosque killed three people, including a senior Hamas leader. Hamas has fired at least 70 rockets since the latest ceasefire collapsed on the 8^th.

  

In Egypt a court dissolved the political wing of the Moslem Brotherhood (which was outlawed last September). This cuts off Moslem Brotherhood members from an legitimate participation in Egyptian politics. Earlier this year Egypt elected another military man, who replaces one who was overthrown in 2011. The government has arrested over 10,000 people since the coup a year ago but now the military is in charge legally. The newly elected president (Abdul al Sisi) is a former general and is determined to crush the Moslem Brotherhood and other more radical Islamic terrorist groups.

 

Hundreds of Islamic radicals have been sentenced to death or long prison terms in the last year. This is all a repeat of what happened twenty years ago during the last Islamic radical uprising against a corrupt and inefficient government. The army promises it will be different this time, but they always do that and it never is. President Sisi has made it clear that he sees Islamic terrorism as the greatest danger the region faces. At the same time Sisi is making moves to get the economy going although it’s doubtful he will do anything about the corruption.

  

August 8, 2014:  Another ceasefire ended with Hamas firing 61 rockets at Israel. These resulted in two Israelis wounded by rocket fragments. Israel promptly responded with attacks on 70 terrorist targets in Gaza. The resumption of fighting was disappointing to Egypt, which is trying to persuade Hamas to make a long-term peace deal. While the Egyptian diplomats can appeal to Hamas as fellow Arabs, Hamas tends to have difficulty of hiding their contempt for Egypt, which Hamas considers traitors for classifying Hamas as a terrorist organization and cracking down on Islamic terrorist groups inside Egypt. Many Egyptians believe Islamic terrorism is a dead end strategy, but Hamas believes just the opposite. 

  

In Egypt (along the Gaza border) several army raids left eleven Islamic terrorists dead and several smuggling tunnels destroyed.

  

August 5, 2014: Israel pulled its ground troops out of Gaza as another 72 hour ceasefire went into effect. Hamas announced that former Hamas spokesman Ayman Taha was found dead in a bombed building. Several days later rumors began coming out of Gaza that Taha had been executed. Medical staff and others saw his body at the hospital and morgue and despite orders to keep quiet, began talking. Taha was apparently being punished for secretly supplying Egypt with information on Hamas activities. Unwilling to admit that such a high-ranking official was a traitor, Hamas went with the “killed by an Israeli bomb” angle after putting Taha in front of a firing squad. 

  

In Egypt (North Sinai) soldiers killed three Islamic terrorists and captured six others who were being sought. One raid also seized an SUV and sixteen motorcycles used for terrorist attacks. Elsewhere (outside Alexandria) five policemen and four Islamic terrorists died in a clash on a road to the beach. 

  

August 4, 2014: Iran openly boasted of sending long range rockets to Gaza and ordered that an effort be made to get modern surface to air missiles into Gaza so Hamas can shoot down Israeli warplanes and helicopters. Actually, the shoulder fired missiles have been in Gaza for some time but Israeli aircraft have effective defenses against these missiles. Iran apparently wants to get larger and more effective anti-aircraft systems into Gaza. Iran has not commented on the fact that the Hamas use of rockets this time around has been a complete failure, with only three Israeli civilian (the main target for these rockets) deaths resulting mainly because of the Israeli Iron Dome anti-rocket system.

  

August 3, 2014: Israel pulled most of its troops out of Gaza.

  

August 2, 2014: Israel announced that one of its soldiers might have been captured. It later turned out that the soldier had been killed in combat while cut off from other troops. 

  

August 1, 2014: A ceasefire in Gaza collapsed hours after it began when more rockets were fired at Israel.

Intelligence: Islamic Terrorism Is The Result

Ever since World War II there have been a growing number of advocates for CI (Cultural Intelligence, also known as "cultural topography") within the U.S. military. This sort of thing involves the study, analysis and understanding of the cultural traditions, habits and beliefs of opponents, allies, and even the U.S. This is all part of an effort to seek better insight into what all concerned are capable of and who is likely to do what next.

 

In the United States the cultural intelligence found a home in the U.S. Army Special Forces, an organization that grew out of the World War II OSS (Office of Strategic Services). The CIA also evolved out of the OSS. Despite the success of the OSS that organization created a lot of enemies within the U.S. and was deactivated soon after the World War II ended in 1945. It did not take long for the OSS to be missed and thus the CIA and Special Forces were created by 1950.

  

Until the arrival of cheap and powerful computers, huge amounts of data available from all over the world and analysis software to mine (not just data mining) all this is was difficult to get people (especially military and government bureaucrats) to appreciate how important and useful CI actually was. During World War II the OSS used CI successfully a lot as have many others have throughout history. Same with the Special Forces during Vietnam and in subsequent conflicts. Gradually the senior military and intelligence officials began to accept the importance and usefulness of CI. After the 1990s the data mining and other analysis of large quantities of data from different cultures made it difficult to dismiss CI as irrelevant and not useful.

  

Case in point is the use in CI in determining the causes of the current outbreak of Islamic terrorism and possible solutions. That effort has encountered problems because CI frankly discusses firmly held myths. Take for example the fact that most Moslem victims of war and terrorism are killed by other Moslems and despite over half a century of animosity towards Israel by a larger, and because of oil income, quite wealthy Arab coalition, Israel not only still exists but thrives compared to its Arab opponents. By every measure the much reviled Jews have done better than the Arabs. To explain away this Israeli success it is accepted fact (by most Arab leaders, journalists and so on) that all this was only possible because of vast conspiracy engineered by the United States and the West in general. This is considered absurd in the West but is still widely accepted in the Arab world.

 

Unfortunately this key cultural difference is rarely mentioned in Western media. Yet any Western diplomat or businessman working in the Arab world quickly becomes aware of this different attitude and adjusts their own behavior to survive (or at least get the job done).

  

Until recently Arabs openly discussing these truths faced arrest or violence (often fatal) from those opposed to freely talking about a lot of forbidden subjects. But after decades of living the lies more and more Arabs, including many leaders and senior business, government and religious officials are mentioning the unmentionable. This discussion often includes pointing out those Arab states that seem to be doing better; like Dubai and some other states like the UAE/United Arab Emirates are the ones that take a more “Western” approach to things. Naturally the successful Arab states are much less corrupt, better run and, well, more like Israel (but without lots of Jews).

 

In the past reference, especially by Israelis or Westerners, to cultural differences to explain Arab problems was immediately jumped on by political demagogues and media pundits worldwide as a racist remark. But it was never that and now that is more obvious because as Arab leaders have been openly discussing the same problem. Those discussions are often ignored by the demagogues and pundits, especially in the West. More's the pity because there is a cultural crisis in the Arab world in particular and the Moslem world in general and it is very serious, very real and very explainable. The result of this crisis is a lack of economic, educational and political performance. By whatever measure you wish to use; Nobel prizes, patents awarded, books published or translated, GDP growth, the Arabs have fallen behind the rest of the world. Part of the problem is the Arab tendency to blame outsiders, and to avoid taking responsibility. Tolerating tyranny and resistance to change doesn't help either. Those attitudes are shifting, and for most of the last decade the war in Iraq became the center of this cultural battle.

 

Arabs, even Arab leaders, know they need some changes that actually work. They have tried so many different ideas that don’t work, as well as repeating ancient customs (dictatorship and rampant corruption and exploitation of your own people) that don’t work no matter how often you keep at it, that radical (for the Arab world) ideas are becoming acceptable. But it isn’t easy. The corruption and general lack of a “civic society” seem to alien to most Arabs that it appears impossible for such alien ideas to work. CI has made it more obvious to Arab, and Western, leaders why this is so and that a lot of effort will be required to enact real, lasting and effective reform. Such change is strong medicine for the current Arab leadership, and many would rather just talk about it and go no further. And that is the problem in the Arab world. Islamic terrorism is the result.

Counter-Terrorism: Morocco Had A Plan And It Worked

Of all the Arab countries Morocco has had the least problems with Islamic terrorism. There are several reasons for this. First there is geography. Morocco is the westernmost (from Arabia) Moslem country and like the easternmost nation (Indonesia) is least affected by the Islamic radicalism that arose in Arabia in the 7th century and has survived there ever since. Then there is the ethnic factor. While Morocco is nominally an Arab country most of the people were originally Berber, the people native to North Africa for over 40,000 years. Many Moroccans are aware of their Berber ancestry and take pride in it. Berbers resisted, often successfully, the initial advance by Arab Moslem armies and while most eventually converted to Islam, they tend to wear their religion lightly and are not considered the best recruits for Islamic terrorist groups. Yet Islamic radicalism and Arab nationalism still appeals to some young Moroccans but not nearly as many as in other Arab countries. At least a thousand Moroccans are fighting with rebel groups in Syria and since September 11, 2001 thousands of local Islamic radicals have been arrested in Morocco. Most of these were freed largely because they had decided to abandon and avoid Islamic radicalism and actually did so.

 

The main Moroccan antidote to Islamic terrorism is an ancient monarchy that follows the moderate Malikite form of Sunni Islam. Most North Africans are nominally Malikite but outside of Morocco a greater number are tempted to sample the much more radical Wahhabism from Saudi Arabia. In Morocco the ancient monarchy was always at the center of Malikite worship. The last two kings (Hasan II 1961-99 and Mohammed VI from 1999 to the present) have encouraged democracy and good government as well as adherence to the moderate Malikite Islam. For example the current king has had over 1,600 Malikite religious teachers trained since 2006 and sent them to the 50,000 mosques throughout the country to show local clergy how to better serve their congregations and resist the temptations of Islamic radicalism. This program was in response to radical missionaries sent to Morocco by Saudi Arabia and Iran in the last decade as well as the radical propaganda spread by the Internet and Arab language satellite news channels.

  

Islamic terrorist groups have tried to establish themselves in Morocco since the 1990s but have found the going very difficult. There have been few Islamic terrorist attacks and those that do occur are swiftly dealt with. For example, in April 2011 a terrorist bomb went off a popular tourist café in Marrakech killing 16 people. Most of the dead were foreign tourists and it was the worst terror attack in eight years. The bomber was sloppy however and police were able to track him down along with two accomplices. What they found was a determined al Qaeda admirer who was unable to connect with al Qaeda central or travel to current terrorist hotspots (Pakistan, Afghanistan, Somalia, Yemen, Iraq, Chechnya) because the Moroccan police were monitoring anyone going to those places. But the arrested man was able to get a workable bomb design on the Internet, and was able to get bomb making materials locally. There is a lot of official al Qaeda "how to be a terrorist" stuff on the Internet, but wannabes tend to pay insufficient attention to the need for security. The incident also demonstrated that as long as there is a lot of pro-terrorist propaganda out there some small percentage (often less than one percent) of the population will buy into to it, and seek to carry out terror attacks. Since there are so few terror attacks in places like Morocco, each one that does occur is a big deal. But it's not much of a trend.

 

A year earlier Morocco announced it had destroyed a 24 man terrorist cell. Four of those arrested had previously been in jail for terrorist activities. This cell was not only planning attacks, but had also been active in recruiting Moroccans for terrorist groups in Afghanistan, Iraq and Somalia. Since 2003, when Islamic radicals throughout the Arab world became enraged by the American invasion of Iraq, Morocco shut down 60 Islamic terrorist cells. In early 2010 there were over a thousand Islamic radicals jailed in Morocco. Despite all this, Morocco was having a peculiar problem with Islamic radicalism. Iran sent missionaries for a while. These fanatics were armed with lots of cash and engaged in aggressive attempts to convert Moroccans to the militant brand of Shia Islam favored in Iran. This so angered Morocco that diplomatic relations with Iran were cut in 2009. Morocco also cracked down on Wahhabi missionaries from Saudi Arabia, and Islamic radicals in general. The king had an advantage in that he is a direct descendent of the Prophet Mohammed (important for any Moslem leader) and is generally popular. The Moroccan government is not as corrupt and inept as others in the Arab world, but is not a whole lot better either.

 

Meanwhile Morocco helps other North African and Sahel countries deal with Islamic terrorism. Morocco sends religious teachers and is always ready to discuss specific problems that Morocco had already taken care of at home. One problem Morocco has handled well is economics. Without oil Morocco has prospered by making it easy to start and operate businesses and resisted the temptation to nationalize sectors of the economy. While Morocco does not have the highest per-capita GDP in North Africa it recognized as having the best quality of life.

Obama's intervention: Iraq is not Syria

The limited use of military force announced by President Obama was likely prompted by concern at the success of ISIS's latest offensives across Syria and Iraq. The jihadist group has recently redoubled its efforts in Raqqa, Syria, in an effort to take the remaining pockets of Syrian Government-held territory in the province. At the same time, ISIS's performance against Kurdish forces would have raised concern in Washington and Baghdad, and led to a re-assessment of  some overly optimistic judgments about Kurdish capabilities.

 

The situation facing the Yazidis and the Christians is of grave humanitarian concern. The fact that the refugees are geographically concentrated would have made air support an attractive option for the president. Add to this the fact that the sovereign Iraqi Government invited the intervention, and the stage was set for a dual humanitarian/limited direct military intervention operation to which Obama could agree.

 

There will of course be accusations that Obama is a hypocrite for intervening in Iraq but not Syria. That argument is simplistic and wrong. If the US is obliged to intervene militarily everywhere there is a humanitarian need, it would never stop intervening. Obama said as much in his speech. He is one of the few US leaders to understand the limits of American power. 

 

Moreover, the situation in Syria is far more complex. To have assisted one side would have meant breaching a nation's sovereignty (no big deal) and potentially assisting the very Islamist forces that pose a security threat to the region and the West (a very big deal). The intervention in Iraq requires Obama to do neither of those things, so the calculus is completely different.

 

In his speech, Obama was careful to emphasise the need for an Iraqi political solution to the crisis engulfing the country. As long as Maliki remains prime minister, there will be little appetite for substantive US air support. The intriguing question is whether a more politically inclusive Iraqi prime minister might prompt a more robust US response in terms of air support and stand-off weapons.

Counter - Terrorism ----- Russia Learns To Kill With Kindness

Over the last decade Russia and the United States have been cooperating more closely in dealing with Islamic terrorism. While a lot of this is about exchanging information on wanted terrorists and what they are up to, there has also been some detailed discussions about counter-terror techniques. While some Russian techniques are illegal in the West (more extreme forms of torture and taking relatives of terror suspects’ hostage) the Russians have found some Western methods useful. In particular the Russians have adopted the U.S. practice of offering large rewards for not just for the most senior terrorists, but for a lot of lower ranking ones as well. The Russians were impressed at the large number of terrorists the Americans captured or killed this way. The Russians also learned, and adopted, other American ideas that made the reward program so effective. This included adopting the American Witness Protection Program (“Witsec”). The U.S. began this program in 1970 to encourage witnesses against organized crime (which had a reputation for killing witnesses) to testify in court.

 

The Russians were impressed at how effective Witsec has been in protecting those within the program and the U.S. provided the Russians with assistance in putting together a Russian version. This included the addition of a few embellishments, like greater use of plastic surgery and putting some people in the program outside Russia. Once word of the Russian Witsec got around, more people were willing to risk talking about Islamic terrorists for the reward money.

 

Meanwhile the American program continues to provide useful tips on where bad guys are. Informants are quietly paid and sometimes moved, with their families, to a safer place where they can spend the reward money without fear of terrorist assassins seeking vengeance. The U.S. often uses the tips to kill terrorists via missile armed UAVs. While capturing these fellows alive is preferred, that is often not practical if they are deep in bandit country. While you can launch a large commando operation, there are not sufficient resources for a lot of these raids and with each one there’s the risk of losing some of your commandos or support troops (like helicopter crews.) So the unexpected missile is the only alternative to nothing at all. 

  

While the media likes to make much of terrorists with multimillion dollar rewards on their heads, most of the terrorists captured or killed because of much smaller rewards, often less than $100,000 and rarely more than a few hundred thousand dollars. There are a dozens of terrorists with multimillion dollar rewards attached, but these are the best protected and well hidden people. Often these senior bad guys are eventually located via several less-costly underlings who are identified via smaller rewards. This is especially the case if these underlings can be captured and interrogated.

  

Year by year more Pakistanis and Afghans are taking advantage of the reward program, and living to spend the money. That's a big change, and it has made the Taliban leadership, on both sides of the border, very uneasy. The U.S. has given Pakistan's main intelligence agency; ISI (Inter Service Intelligence agency), tens of millions dollars for rewards, since September 11, 2001. The U.S. money was paid as rewards for the capture or killing of wanted Islamic terrorists. The live ones were turned over to the United States. Pakistan says it captured over 800 of these terrorists, but the actual number is believed to be greater. The U.S. did not look closely at exactly who got the reward money.

 

Osama bin Laden had a $25 million price on his head since late 2001 (before that it was $5 million). Did anyone collect all or part of that reward? Because of the way Witsec works, that will be a secret for a long time. With that much money at stake, many people wondered why someone had not ratted him out by sooner. The main reason was that large cash rewards usually, but do not always, work.

 

Getting someone to drop a dime (make a phone call) to turn someone in for a reward only works if there are phones available and faith in the ability of those paying the reward to ensure the recipients will live to spend it.

 

It was back in 1984 that the United States began offering rewards of one to seven million dollars for information leading to the capture of terrorists, and lesser amounts to those who provided evidence against a terrorist or provided good information about a planned terrorist act. The informer, and his family, were also offered removal to a safe place (including the United States).

 

By September 11, 2001, five major terrorists had been captured because of this program. Over $6 million was been paid out to in over 20 cases. Some 42 percent of the informants requested security protection and another 42 percent sought relocation for themselves and family members to another country or region to avoid of retaliation.

 

Since then, the number of high value people captured via this program has more than tripled and the amount of money paid out has increased even more. However, one problem with the reward program is that it does not pay attention to the realities of international terrorism. Most major terrorists, like Osama bin Laden, are well protected and hidden. Sure, there are people who know where they are, and can get in contact with people around the bad guy. But an operation to nab one of these men requires a getting the message out to those who have the information, and providing informants with a realistic way to call in, and then collect.

 

Getting the word out is not as easy as it sounds. The FBI has undertaken several advertising campaigns in Pakistan, using matchbook covers, posters and other media to remind people in the tribal territories that rewards of up to twenty-five million dollars are being offered for prominent al Qaeda members. In addition to the cash rewards, "relocation (to another country, for the tipster and immediate family) is available". At least half a dozen al Qaeda big shots have been caught this way, and rewards paid.

  

Collecting the reward is difficult. The wanted men are surrounded by bodyguards and aides. They hide out in neighborhoods or villages full of people who share their beliefs. There are also cultural problems. Most of the al Qaeda big shots who have not yet been captured or killed are known to be (or believed to be) taking refuge among pro-Taliban Pushtun tribes along the Afghan border. The people there are generally poor, illiterate and not very well informed. Many have never seen anyone outside their village or valley. Most of the people with modern gadgets (like cell phones) are working for the terrorists. The people with some education and wealth, like local tribal leaders, have to worry about their large families. Anyone who turns in someone carrying a huge reward would be marked for murder if they suddenly displayed signs of wealth.

 

The fact is, there are lots of spies in the tribal areas. Selling information to outsiders has long been a recognized (if not entirely approved) way for a poor tribesman to make some money, or earn some valuable favors. But getting stuff out is difficult for these people, who have little privacy in their lives, and are constantly under the control of family and tribal elders. You can't just walk out, either.

 

Wandering through the territory of another tribe or clan (as in the next valley over), can get you killed. Strangers are seen as enemies, and treated accordingly. Cell phones changed that over the last decade and the Islamic terrorists tried, unsuccessfully, to keep the cell phone service out of remote tribal areas in Pakistan and Afghanistan.

  

Meanwhile, U.S. troops have learned to forget about the big payoffs, and concentrate on the small ones. As U.S. Army Special Forces operators have long known (and constantly teach the regular army troops they work with), little favors (that won't be noticed by the Taliban enforcers) get you little bits of information. These bits add up and some have led to nailing whales (guys with big prices on their heads). One of the more popular favors in the backcountry is medical care. Out there, not much is to be had. For this reason, the two medics in each Special Forces Alpha Detachment ("A-Team") have been taught to treat common maladies encountered in poor, isolated, areas. An astute diagnoses, and prompt application of some antibiotics can save the life of someone dear to the heart of somebody else with information you need. Sometimes the troops will bring a surgeon in, to perform a lifesaving (or life altering) procedure. This yields much good will, and loosens tongues.

 

The big thing about medical care is that it's not as visible as a pile of cash (which usually results in something flashy being bought, and dangerous queries from the local Taliban), but means a lot more than mere things. Pakistani or Afghan doctors don't like travelling to the tribal territories. Too dangerous. Those who can afford medical care, travel to a town or city that has it. But the U.S. and NATO soldiers have access to drugs and medical care wherever they are. Sharing it is often more valuable, or at least more practical, than a $25 million reward.

 

The Russians have adapted many of these techniques to their own situation. Some of these ideas are not new to Russia. Offering favors or scarce resources to people in return for cooperation has long been used in Russia, especially by the Soviet era secret police. But since the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991 a free market economy has made a lot of economic goodies and opportunities freely available. So the Russian police are open to new ideas from the West.

Afghanistan - Taliban Killing Taliban

Despite Taliban boasts that this year’s Summer Offensive would do great damage to Afghan and foreign forces, the results were quite dismal. For example, last month only 12 foreign troops were killed, less than half the number killed in September 2012. For the year so far, foreign troop deaths are down 58 percent compared to last year. The Taliban effort to kill foreign troops via Afghan troops or Taliban in Afghan uniforms was way down (over 70 percent) this year compared to last. Much of the decline in foreign troop casualties is due to Afghan forces taking over primary responsibility for security in most of the country this year. Last year 10-11 Afghan soldiers or police were killed each day. This year it is more like 15 a day, and at least half are from landmines and roadside bombs.

 

Taliban losses have been higher and the Taliban goal of demoralizing Afghan soldiers and police was not achieved. The Taliban hoped greater use of roadside bombs against Afghan forces would terrorize these troops into staying in their bases and leaving the Taliban and drug gangs to do as they wished. That has not happened. Afghan police and soldiers, using equipment and techniques developed by the Americans, keep contested roads open and kept after the Taliban.

 

Efforts to negotiate terms for remaining U.S. troops (after all other NATO forces have left after 2014) continue to go nowhere. Even the recent visit by the American Secretary of Defense made little difference. The Afghan politicians have been playing hardball with the Americans on this, refusing to agree to continue American immunity from the corrupt Afghan justice system after 2014. The U.S. has told the Afghans that if they don’t get a Status of Forces (immunity) agreement by the end of 2014, then the U.S. will withdraw all their forces. Such “Status Of Forces” agreements are standard practice for foreign troops overseas and, in the case of Afghanistan, are necessary to protect American troops from abuse by corrupt Afghan judges and prosecutors. If the U.S. withdraws completely a lot of the foreign aid might stop coming as well, as well as essential logistical, training, and air support for Afghan security forces. The implication here is that if the Afghans prove unable to govern themselves and the country once more becomes a terrorist haven, the bombers and commandoes will come back and the Afghan leaders responsible will be primary targets. That threat carries more weight since Osama bin laden was finally taken down in 2011. So far this threat has not persuaded the Afghan leaders to compromise. They know they can do that at the last minute, and in the meantime their stubbornness costs them nothing and is, by Afghan standards, entertaining and potentially profitable.

October 15, 2013: In Logar province (southeast of Kabul) the Taliban killed the provincial governor by planting a bomb in a copy of the Koran. The governor was giving a speech in a mosque at the start of a Moslem holy day. The Taliban threatened to kill a lot of senior officials this year but had had few successes. Killing someone in a mosque using a bomb in a Koran will not win the Taliban many new friends in Afghanistan or the Islamic world in general. The dead governor was known to be an honest and particularly effective official, just the sort of man the Taliban want out of the way.

  

October 13, 2013: The Taliban fired several rockets into the Bagram air base but caused no casualties or property damage.

  

October 10, 2013: In the east (Khost province) a Taliban suicide car bomber attacked a NATO convoy but managed to wound four ivilians. None of the foreign troops were hurt. The Taliban later announced heavy NATO casualties but the locals know better because some of them stood around watching the aftermath and noted that the only casualties being taken away were Afghans, and the only fatality was the driver of the car with all the explosives. The roadside bombs, while intended for Afghan and foreign security personnel, tend to mainly hurt civilians and the civilians know it. The Taliban stick with these weapons because fighting the security forces directly is suicidal and makes Taliban recruiting impossible. 

  

October 8, 2013: In the east (Kunar province) Afghan Taliban attacked a Pakistani Taliban camp near the Pakistan border and killed three Pakistani Taliban leaders and several of their followers. Battles like this have been more common since earlier this year. That’s because after years of pleading by Pakistan, Afghanistan (both the government and the Taliban) agreed to go after Pakistani Taliban who have set up camps just inside Afghanistan. From there they raid into Pakistan and then retreat back across the border if facing an intense army or police reaction. But the armed force assembling to go after the Pakistani Taliban camps are not Afghan soldiers or police but Afghan Taliban and tribal militias. This is the result of the Afghan Taliban agreeing to join with the Pakistani Army in an attack on the Pakistani Taliban. There has long been bad blood between the Afghan and Pakistani branches of the Taliban. Part of it is due to the usual feuds between rival Islamic terror organizations. But the basic problem is that each branch wants to take control of the country they are from and that means Pakistani Taliban are welcome (unofficially) in Afghanistan and the Afghan Taliban (officially) in Pakistan. The Afghan Taliban depends on the Pakistani sanctuary it has in and around Quetta, the largest city in Baluchistan (southwest Pakistan). Quetta is safe because Pakistan will not let American UAVs to operate there. Quetta is where the Afghan Taliban leadership has been sheltered since 2002 and is right across the Afghan border from the Taliban heartland in Kandahar and Helmand provinces. Since the Afghan Taliban has not made (or sponsored) terrorist attacks in Pakistan, there has been an unofficial truce with the Pakistani government. For over a year now the Pakistani military has been trying to persuade the Afghan Taliban to help deal with anti-Pakistan Islamic terrorists in Pakistan. Most of these attacks are carried out by the Pakistani Taliban, whose main base area is in North Waziristan, where the pro-Pakistan Haqqani Network also takes shelter. Haqqani is mostly Afghans and only attacks inside Afghanistan. For years the U.S. has been pressuring Pakistan to shut down the North Waziristan sanctuary. Now it appears that Pakistan might possibly sort-of do that but will probably leave Haqqani alone. The Afghan Taliban will help by going after the growing number of Pakistani Taliban camps just across the border in Afghanistan. The Afghan Taliban refuse to admit to this plan and say that they will only carry out attacks outside Pakistan, which is mainly inside Afghanistan.

  

Some Afghan Taliban are still supporting the Pakistani Taliban. Both branches of the Taliban are composed of many factions or, in the case of the Pakistani Taliban, independent groups that joined the Pakistani Taliban coalition. All the Pakistani Taliban can agree on is the need to replace the current elected government of Pakistan with a religious dictatorship. That is not popular with most Pakistanis, which has been a major problem for Pakistan.

  

October 7, 2013: In eastern Afghanistan (Khost province, near the Pakistan border) U.S. troops captured Latif Mehsud, a Pakistani Taliban media official. Mehsud was in charge of arranging meetings between Pakistani Taliban officials and journalists. The Pakistani Taliban waited a few days before admitting Mehsud had been taken. Mehsud was in Afghanistan to negotiate the ransom for some Afghans the Pakistani Taliban had kidnapped. Mehsud apparently felt he would have no problem with Afghan security forces, but he was stopped by American troops. President Karzai was angry over Mehsud being arrested as Karzai is trying to negotiate some kind of peace deal with the Pakistan Taliban. 

  

October 2, 2013: In Tajikistan the parliament approved an extension of the military cooperation treaty with Russia to 2042. This includes Russia continuing to station four-thousand troops there, mainly on the Tajik southern (Afghan) border to help keep out drugs and Islamic terrorists. This involves running three Russian bases in Tajikistan. Russia also continues to train Tajik military personnel (mainly officers) and supply weapons and ammo at low cost or for free. In Afghanistan many Taliban operate to provide security for heroin smuggling. The Central Asian route (via Tajikistan to West Europe and North America) is long but for most of the way you can bribe your way past border security. The Taliban are much more unpopular in northern Afghanistan and are often informed on or even attacked by hostile tribesmen. With Russian help the Tajiks have made their border guards more resistant to Taliban bribes and more likely to prevent smuggling. This can be seen by the numerous seizures of drugs and gun battles with the heavily armed smugglers. A lot of drugs do get through, but for the Russians every ton that is stopped is helpful. Drug addiction is a big problem in Russia.

Making Terrorism Pay

Islamic terrorists cannot operate without supplies. They need weapons, ammo, vehicles, communications, and all manner of other supplies to operate and survive. While terrorist groups will accept contributions of goods, they prefer cash. Thus the most successful terrorist groups are the ones who can get their hands on the most cash. For a long time one of the easiest ways to obtain a lot of cash was to kidnap a Westerner (or anyone from a wealthy family) and hold them for ransom. This only works if the potential victims make themselves available to grab. In countries where law and order are weak, those worth kidnapping tend to take good care of their personal security. Western tourists or workers in Moslem countries used to be good targets, but all it took was a few kidnappings to halt the tourism and put tight security on Westerners who had to be there. Finally, many Western countries enacted “no ransom” policies. While not always enforced, this made it more difficult, sometimes impossible, to get a lot of money for Western hostages.

 

There were all manner of other criminal acts terrorists could, and still do, use to obtain cash. But these all entail the risk of getting killed or captured and the locals come to consider the Islamic radicals just another bunch of bandits, and this hurts recruiting and grassroots support. When desperate, Islamic terrorists will take from whoever they can find in order to survive. But if this means angering the people they depend on for new recruits and popular support, going the bandit route is usually a sign that the group is on its last legs. 

  

The most reliable source of funds is Islamic charities and foreign charities in general. The charity route sometimes involves deception, but often the donors know exactly where their money is going and approve of how it is used. Much of the charitable contributions come from private donations, NGOs, madrasas (Islamic religious schools), and businesses throughout South Asia, the Middle East, and Europe. Most of it tends to come from Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, where many terrorist groups have considerable support not only among local and expatriate Moslems but also patronage of the royal families and other higher ups in both these countries. This allows some terror groups to solicit quite openly. Often in the country where the terrorists are operating they can raise cash from local businessmen, industry leaders, farmers, and others willing to donate freely. These donations are collected throughout the year, sometimes in the name of religion and often, openly, for jihad. 

  

Fund raisers will often issue receipts for donations. To placate Western nations trying to shut down Islamic terrorists the fundraisers often operate through front companies or Islamic charities and are registered as such with the local government. Donations are particularly heavy during the Hajj (the last month of the Moslem calendar when pilgrimages to Mecca are undertaken) and Ramadan (the 9th month of the Moslem calendar, when observant Moslems fast and pray a lot). The Islamic calendar is lunar, meaning it follows the phases of the moon and thus these dates move relative to the fixed calendar used in most of the world. People are much more likely to give during these two months.

  

Over the last decade Saudi Arabia and other Gulf Arab states have been under increasing Western pressure to crack down on this terrorist fundraising. Saudi Arabia, in particular, has cracked down since 2003 (when al Qaeda began making attacks there), after denying that there was a big problem with wealthy, and generous, Islamic conservatives in the kingdom. In the United States several Islamic charities have been successfully prosecuted since September 11, 2001, for sending money to terrorists.

  

Terrorist organization prefer to set up support organizations in Europe and North America, as they can safely stash their families and key operatives there by having them all claim asylum. This, until recently, was something these nations were often quick to offer and were quite tolerant of terrorist activity. But these nations, especially the ones that were subjected to terrorist attacks since 2001, are much less accommodating these days. 

  

The terrorists constantly adapt. Decades of efforts to curb their fund raising have had an impact. It is much harder for terrorists to raise cash now, but they still do so. This has increased the importance of terrorists who specialize in fundraising. These men (and some women) develop lists of known donors, or potential ones, and assign other specialists to travel around and personally visit these donors. By way of introduction these visitors are authenticated by smartphone videos from some prominent cleric or terrorist leader, often in the presence of the visitor, saying that this man is authorized to collect funds for the cause. If a donation is forthcoming this brings into play another specialist who knows how to get the money safely from the donor to the terrorists. Meanwhile, yet another new fundraising specialist has come into play: the media advisor. Terrorists have learned that working the media (Western and in Moslem countries) is crucial for getting attention for specific terrorist groups in need of money. The media advisor recommends what types of attacks to make and what kind of press releases to put out afterward in order to get favorable attention from specific donors or groups of donors. The media advisors keep track of attitudes in countries or expatriate populations that are likely donors to identify individuals or organizations the fund raisers can approach and what types of terrorist actions will make such visits the most lucrative. 

  

Every terrorist organization has specific needs and donor communities most likely to give. Terrorist groups that survive and thrive are the ones that are most successful at raising cash. Western counter-terror operations now concentrate on all these fundraising specialists. These fellows are wanted alive, because of all the valuable things they know. But failing that, a Hellfire missile in their SUV will work too.

Counter-Terrorism ----- Algeria, The Other Threat Grows

The January raid on a natural gas facility in southern Algeria (near the Tunisian border) that got 70 people killed (including all the Islamic terrorist attackers) has resulted in much tighter security around the facility and all others. The foreign firms are satisfied with the new security arrangements and are allowing their citizens to return to work at the plant. Without the foreigners, full production has not been resumed and a lot of other technical work had to be postponed.

 

Oil and natural gas account for 95 percent of exports and the foreign currency needed to buy imports. Most food is imported and over the last three decades the economy has stagnated because of corruption and continued belief in centralized control. If the current leadership (who have been in power since France left in the 1960s) wants to prevent another rebellion they have to fix the economy. But as long as the leaders refuse to allow foreign investment and local entrepreneurs to operate freely economic revival is not happening. Official unemployment is 10 percent but that includes a lot of marginal jobs provided by the government. For men under 30, the government admits there is a much higher unemployment rate (over 20 percent), and these are the people who would start and sustain another revolution. Few of these young men are attracted to Islamic terrorism any more, but most want some economic and social changes and so far all the government offers are admissions that there is a problem but no real solutions. Meanwhile, oil income is shrinking because current oil and gas fields are running dry and government investment restrictions and inept management hamper efforts to find new fields. The population increases and those who do not flee the country become angrier and more impatient.

  

The government believes that 4 diplomats taken captive by Islamic terrorists in Mali in April 2012 are still alive. But there is no direct contact with the captors and trying to free the 4 is difficult. The government does not want to pay ransom, so as not to encourage more such attacks.

  

October 11, 2013: Across the border in Tunisia, soldiers raided a house near the Kasserine Pass where a terrorist leader and some followers were reported (by a local informant) to be. After an hour long gun battle the Islamic terrorists escaped, leaving behind a phone and some ammo. Tunisian border police and soldiers have spent over 4 months hunting for up to 50 Islamic terrorists who are operating near the Kasserine Pass and Mount Chaambi in the Atlas Mountains just across the border.

 

Tunisian security personnel are searching a hundred square kilometers of sparsely populated forests and mountains without much success. This is the first time Tunisia has had to deal with armed Islamic terrorists since 2007. These armed men have been active in the area since January. Some of these terrorists fled Mali earlier this year and others are from Algeria.

 

October 10, 2013: Algerian security forces on the southern borders with Mali and Libya killed 8 Islamic terrorists and captured weapons, documents, and vehicles. Unlike the operations in the Atlas Mountains up north, the border patrols have been more successful at killing and capturing Islamic terrorists.

  

Parliament is introducing stricter laws against terrorism and smuggling. The smugglers often work for Islamic terrorists, getting weapons and personnel in and out of the country. The new laws will make it easier to go after the smugglers. 

  

October 3, 2013: West of the capital a roadside bomb went off, wounding 3 civilians. In the southern oasis town of Ghardaia, violence between Arab and Berber residents over water and religion led to 4 arrests and 6 policemen wounded while breaking up riots.

  

October 2, 2013: Tunisian police arrested 4 Islamic terrorists near the Algerian border. In the last 3 days police have arrested 31 actual (armed) or suspected Islamic terrorists in Tunisia. While several dozen armed Islamic terrorists are operating in the Atlas Mountains near the Algerian border, there are hundreds more throughout the country trying to organize an uprising that would establish a religious dictatorship. Most Tunisians want nothing to do with this.

 

October 1, 2013: Last month army personnel cleared over 4,800 mines along the eastern and western borders. Many of these mines date back to the 1960s.

Counter-Terrorism ----- Fatal Contradictions

Al Qaeda leader Ayman al Zawahiri recently released an audio message, via the Internet, in which he blamed moderate Moslems for preventing more conservative or radical Moslems from taking control in the wake of the Arab Spring uprisings in 2011. This is a remarkable statement because in the past al Qaeda and other Islamic radical groups called on moderate Moslems to join them in overthrowing oppressive governments and share power once that was done. But Zawahiri correctly noted that whenever that happened the Islamic radicals pushed the more moderate Moslems aside and tried to establish an Islamic (religious) dictatorship. This failed because the moderates were more numerous and unwilling to submit to another dictatorship. At least that’s what happened in Tunisia and Egypt. In Iraq and Afghanistan the Islamic radicals never got to share power because in both those places the radicals revealed themselves as violent thugs early on.

 

Al Qaeda and Zawahiri accuse the moderate Moslems as being bad Moslems for their opposition to using Islamic law (sharia) to govern secular and religious affairs. During the 7^th century, when Islam was founded, the intent was that sharia would apply to all aspects of life for Moslems. But those who had to actually govern found that this did not work in practice, in part because there was no (and still is not) supreme authority to interpret sharia law. Thus the rulers and the clergy were feuding over the true meaning of sharia from the beginning. Naturally, the guys with the weapons won these arguments. This is how al Qaeda justifies the use of weapons and terror to establish the true religious dictatorship they believe Islamic law requires. Unfortunately, even among Islamic fundamentalists there is still no agreement on how to interpret sharia, which is why Islamic radical groups often fight each other. This tendency to drift into constant feuding and violence has been a problem with militant Islamic conservatives for over a thousand years. While modern technology makes this Islamic terrorism more widespread and lethal, the built-in self-destruction of Islamic radicalism remains and most Moslems realize it.

Counter-Terrorism ----- The Wakeup Call In Algeria

The 32 AQIM (Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb) terrorists who attacked an Algerian natural gas facility (at Amenas) on January 16^th initially succeeded because of inadequate security measures by the Algerian government. That’s the conclusion of a study of the incident by one of the two foreign companies (Statoil) that operates the facility. The Algerian government is saying little about the raid, much less the inability of the government to detect the raiders or prevent the attack.

 

The initial government investigation into the terrorist attack on Amenas did admit the operation was made possible by poor security procedures at the natural gas facility. The government later said those deficiencies were being fixed and more armed guards and better physical defenses and local intelligence collecting procedures were being implemented. No details of these new measures have been revealed, but that’s to be expected, because you don’t want potential attackers to know exactly what to expect. There is some more visible security at the facility, but what made the January attack possible was the failure of  Algerian intelligence and “outer security” (surveillance, patrols, and checkpoints around the remote facility). Other Middle Eastern nations have taken more effective security measures and the effectiveness of those efforts has been tested. Saudi Arabia has detected several major attacks, while the terrorists were still planning and organizing. In one major attack that was not detected, attackers headed for the largest Saudi refinery were stopped at the gates. At Amenas the attackers not only got to the gates but quickly shot their way through.

  

In Algeria the poor security was the result of decades of local Islamic terrorists not attacking Algerian oil and gas facilities because so many Algerians depended on the oil and gas revenue to survive.

 

Thus, a terrorist attack on these facilities would be very unpopular and hurt the terrorists, and local terrorists observed this unwritten rule. But the January attack involved only one Algerian. Most of the attackers did not care what the Algerian people thought.

 

The Amenas attack involved thirty-two men, one of whom used to work at the facility. Thus the terrorists knew the internal layout and routines. Some eight-hundred people worked (and most lived) at the facility. The terrorists concentrated on capturing one-hundred and thirty-two foreign workers (thirty-nine of whom died, plus one security guard) but most workers escaped. The terrorists failed (largely through incompetence) in blowing up the facility and twenty-nine of them were killed when the Algerian military moved in on the 17^th. Fighting was over by the 21^st, but most of the violence occurred on the 18^th and 19^th. Three of the terrorists were captured, making it possible to obtain details of how the attack was planned and carried out.

  

Several foreign countries offered to help Algeria improve its oil and gas facility security but it’s unclear how much of that assistance was accepted. Production was resumed on February 22^nd but has not returned to normal. That is expected to happen before the end of the year because the foreign companies that supply technical personnel and special services for the facility have agreed that the new security measures are adequate and have allowed their personnel (all non-Algerian) to return.

Counter-Terrorism ---- The Downside Of Victory

Even before September 11, 2001 counter-terrorism experts were becoming aware of how crucial money and other forms of material support are to even the most fanatical terrorist organizations. The intense scrutiny of Islamic terror groups in the last two decades revealed some other interesting angles to international terrorism. For example, after the Cold War ended many in the West were surprised to discover the extent to which the Soviet Union had provided support for terrorist groups.

 

There was not only an extensive network of terrorist training schools in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe but also cash subsidies, weapons and specialized equipment as well as technical advisors for terrorists outside the Soviet controlled countries. Western counter-terrorism organizations knew this support existed but not, until the Soviet Union fell in 1991 and their archives were opened for a few years, the extent of that support.

 

Islamic radical terrorists did not get much support from the Soviet Union because these groups considered the Soviets anti-Islam and prime targets for Islamic terrorism. The Soviets managed to keep the Islamic terrorists out of the Soviet Union and cut off from any Soviet support. The Islamic radicals learned to adapt by relying on pious, newly rich, Arabs from countries with lots of oil to export. After the Arab led oil cartel was formed in the 1970s and forced up oil prices there was a lot more Islamic charity for Islamic terrorist groups to tap into.

  

This brings us around to Somali Islamic radical group al Shabaab. Originally the fanatic wing of a more moderate Somali movement trying to impose law and order after more than a decade of chaos, al Shabaab soon became a major law and order problem itself. There are still several thousand armed al Shabaab men in Somalia after several years of fighting and losing to African peacekeepers and Somali troops. Al Shabaab suffered major losses last year and has scattered into smaller groups that hide out in remote parts of Somalia. At the moment al Shabaab is more interested in raising cash as the group is broke following its expulsion from the lucrative cities of Mogadishu and Kismayo over the last two years. There are now fewer opportunities to kidnap foreigners and the pirates, who used to share ransoms with al Shabaab, have not taken a ransomable ship in over a year. In short, al Shabaab needs money.

  

The effort to further weaken (and eventually obliterate) al Shabaab has now shifted to the group’s finances. This is a battle that gets little publicity and is easy to keep out of the news because it is, well, stuff that mostly happens out of public view. Al Shabaab is believed to be seeking cash from wealthy Arabs in Arabia, These are men who like to donate to Islamic charities that support Islamic radicalism. For nearly a decade both oil rich Arab countries and their Western allies have been trying to stop this source of terrorist funding, but have only been able to reduce it. The money still gets through to Islamic terror groups that have lots of media coverage. For that reason it is believed al Shabaab will try to carry out more spectacular attacks outside Somalia. That way al Shabaab can gain more media coverage and easier access to wealthy donors. 

  

This strategy is easier now because a recent power struggle within the organization has left the “Foreign” faction in charge. For years al Shabaab had been divided as the “Somalia” nationalist faction opposed the foreign volunteers who were eager for al Shabaab to carry out more terrorism outside Somalia. The Somalia faction wanted to hold off on this until they had all of Somalia under their control. But the Foreign faction believed that would take too long, especially once the foreign terrorists came to understand how fragmented Somalia was by clan and warlord politics. The foreigners concluded that Somalia would never be united, because it had never been united (for long) in the past. This is something most Somalis do not want to dwell on. Meanwhile in the past year many prominent al Shabaab nationalist (keep operations inside Somalia) faction leaders were killed or driven away from al Shabaab, which now sees itself primarily as an international terrorist organization. Thus the eagerness of American, Israeli, British and other European countries to help destroy al Shabaab in Somalia once and for all. As long as al Shabaab survives in Somalia the organization can reach out to Somali communities in other countries, especially the West, for donations, new recruits and overseas targets.

  

The loss of Kismayo last year was a major blow to al Shabaab finances because that port could be used to smuggle illegal goods (especially ivory) out of the country. Al Shabaab also collected fees on anything leaving or entering via Kismayo. Now al Shabaab has limited, and irregular, access to smaller ports on the coast. The financial loss to al Shabaab has been huge. Al Shabaab charged fees (for protection from al Shabaab retaliation) to businesses in all areas it controlled. This covered an enormous amount of legal and illegal trade via Kismayo. Kismayo alone was worth over $50 million a year to al Shabaab. For every million dollars of income al Shabaab could keep 400-500 armed men in action. Major operations, like suicide car bombings, can cost several thousand dollars (to get the car, build the bomb and train the suicide bomber) and intelligence gathering costs money, if only because bribes are an easy way to find out things but that can be expensive, even in Somalia. 

  

With most of that income gone in the past year, al Shabaab has begun to unravel. The loss of income led to many desertions and the inability to make attacks within Somalia. This is a common pattern in Islamic terror organizations. The less cash they have the fewer senior staff they have. This group includes skilled leadership and technical experts (for building bombs, planning attacks and working the media). These core members usually have families to support and need cash to do their work. Without the spectacular attacks potential recruits and donors won’t know you exist and you will fade away. Counter-terrorism efforts now try to induce this form of natural selection and al Shabaab is one of the primary targets. Al Shabaab is adapting and trying to establish branches in nearby countries with ethnic Somali populations. Thus al Shabaab becomes a more widespread threat and it becomes weaker overall. When the rats abandon a sinking ship the rats show up somewhere else.