The Sudanese Air Force has operated several types of combat
aircraft acquired from multiple sources since its founding in 1956. While
current types such as the MiG-29SEh, Su-25 and Su-24 are well known for their
involvement in the Sudanese Civil War and Operation Decisive Storm, older types
such as the F-5E and MiG-23MS have been poorly documented while in the Sudanese
Air Force ever since their inception in the 1980s.
Although the Sudanese Air Force (SuAF) is no stranger to
Soviet-manufactured combat aircraft, the Sudan actually never ordered any
MiG-23s from the Soviet Union. Instead, the SuAF received its MiG-23s from
Libya, which deployed up to twelve Libyan Arab Air Force (LAAF) examples to
Sudan in the late eighties. This deployment was accompanied by a large number
of Libyan pilots and technicians responsible for operating the aircraft while
in Sudanese service.
When the Libyan contingent departed Sudan about two years
later, the Sudanese Air Force was left with aircraft it couldn't really fly nor
maintain. And thus, after just several years of operations, the survivors were
placed in storage at Sudan's largest airbase, Wadi Sayyidna. Here they joined
an increasing number of MiG-21Ms, J-6s and F-5Es also placed in storage due to
a lack of spare parts. It wasn't until two decades later when the MiG-23s
resurfaced again.
Starting from the end of 2010, up to four MiG-23s could be
seen parked on the tarmac outside one of Safat Maintenance Center's hangers on
satellite imagery. All four aircraft were previously moved here to clear space
in the hangars used by the Sudanese Air Force. But with an increasing number of
projects on its hands, SAFAT soon found itself in lack of space too, forcing
the technicians to move the MiG-23s outside when other aircraft had to be
serviced in the hangar housing the MiG-23s.
These movements allowed one of the many Belarusian or
Russian pilots and technicians present at Wadi Sayyidna to aid the SuAF with
operating its fleet of MiG-29s, Su-25s and Su-24s, to pose with one of the
three remaining MiG-23MS's. The aircraft shows clear traces of long-time storage,
with the aircraft's roundel and flag slowly fading away to reveal the original
Libyan markings. The serial number '09055' was originally assigned to this
aircraft by the Libyan Arab Air Force and simply left in place by the Sudanese.
While Libya was in a state of war with the Sudan during the
early eighties, mainly related to Sudan's support for Chadian rebels fighting
against the Libyan Army operating in Northern Chad, it was quick to establish a
close relationship with its former foe after the ousting of President Nimeiry
in 1985. Having bombed Sudan's largest city Omdurman with a Tu-22 and having
provided both financial and materiel support to rebels fighting the Sudanese
Army in Northern Sudan and Southern Sudan, it now held talks for a possible
merger between the two countries. While this merger never occured, the newly
forged relationship between the Sudan and Libya would prove extremely
beneficial for the Sudan, and the Sudanese Air Force in particular.
Starting from 1987, Libya began donating large amounts of
military equipment to the Sudan. This mainly included desperately needed
reinforcements for Sudanese Air Force, which by then was on its last breath due
to a sharp decline of its operational capabilities. Within a year, the SuAF was
strengthened by the addition of up to twelve MiG-23MS', as well as at least one
MiG-23UB, several Mi-25s and two MiG-25R(B)s flown and maintained by Libyan
pilots and technicians. This contingent was to form the core of Sudanese Air
Force, and was quickly put to the test when the Sudanese People's Liberation
Army (SPLA) launched a series of offensives in 1987 and 1988.
In response, the Sudanese Air Force retaliated with
airstrikes based on intelligence gathered by the MiG-25R(B)s, which flew
reconnaissance sorties over Southern Sudan. These sorties were followed by
airstrikes conducted by MiG-23MS' and Mi-25s against SPLA-held villages and
camps. The skies above Southern Sudan proved particularly unhealthy for the
MiG-23MS' however, with only six airframes still believed to be operational
after a year of operations. After the Libyan contingent withdrew in 1989 or
1990, the four remaining MiG-23MS' were soon stored, likely to never fly again.
The two MiG-25R(B)s remained Libyan possession throughout their stay in Sudan
and both returned to Libya. The remaining Mi-25s continued operations until
replaced by newer Mi-24s and Mi-35s sourced from Eastern Europe in the late
1990s and early 2000s, with their career ending at the military side of
Khartoum International Airport (IAP). For more information on Libya's
involvement in the Sudanese Civil War, click here.
Although the Libyan contingent did not prove to be
particularly successful in increasing the operational capabilities of the SuAF
in the long term, it set a precedent for further donations made by Libya to
several air forces across Africa, which are to be covered in a future article.
The partial remains of an ex-Libyan MiG-23MS '06918' that made a crash landing
in Jonglei State, (what is nowadays known as) South Sudan can be seen below.
The poorly applied Sudanese markings quickly washed out under the Sudanese sun,
thus revealing the original Libyan markings.
The MiG-23MS is a prime example of the so-called 'monkey
models'; downgraded equipment sold by the Soviet Union to friendly nations in
the Middle East and Africa. These 'monkey models' included everything from
tanks to naval ships and aircraft, which had sensitive equipment removed,
lacked modern weaponry or had inferior armour compared to their Soviet
counterparts. In order to create an export derivative of the MiG-23M, the
Soviets went to entire new lengths to create what many deem the worst combat
aircraft ever to have been made, basically resulting in a powerful engine with
an aircraft built around it. Equipped with electronics already deemed useless
after years of conflict in the Middle East and armed with the infamously
incapable R-3S air-to-air missile, the aircraft proved both a nightmare to fly
and maintain.
While the air forces of Egypt, Iraq and Syria, left without
an answer to the Israeli F-4E Phantom II, were eager to get their hands on new
aircraft matching the F-4E's performance, they were less than impressed with
their new mount. When Libya began its search for large quantities of weapons
during the 1970s, the Soviet Union soon offered the MiG-23MS to Libya. But
contrary to the delivery and training of Iraqi pilots on the MiG-23MS, which
spend most of their time on the ground instead of flying the aircraft to its
extremes, the Soviet Union not only marketed the aircraft as an adversary to
the F-4 Phantom, but also to the F-14 Tomcat. The LAAF was angered by the gap
between promised capabilities and reality, and invested considerable time and
resources into increasing the combat capabilities of the squadrons operating
the MiG-23MS. The delivery of MiG-23MS was amongst the reasons for the break of
relations with the Soviet Union.
Despite its abysmal records, there is still some argument to
make for the MiG-23MS' reintroduction into the Sudanese Air Force. Having
enjoyed the fruits of the large oil reserves present in Southern Sudan, the
Sudan lost its primary means of income after the separation of South Sudan in
2011. This not only meant the Sudan had less to spend on its military, it also
meant the Sudan was now unable to buy weaponry in exchange for oil. With no
significant financial boost in sight, the SuAF is unlikely to amass sufficient
funds to acquire more modern combat aircraft in the near future, and has to
soldier on with what its got.
Furthermore, the establishment of the Safat Maintenance
Center (more commonly known as the Safat Aviaton Complex, part of the larger
Safat Aviation Group) allowed the Sudan to overhaul an increasing number of
aircraft and helicopters locally. Although most of these projects are
undertaken with foreign technicians and help, it is considerably cheaper than
transporting these aircraft to the Ukraine, Belarus or Russia for overhaul
there. This means the Sudan can overhaul aircraft that would otherwise be
deemed not worth the effort due to the costs involved in transporting these
aircraft back and forth from maintenance centers abroad.
With this in mind, the SuAF began looking to overhaul
several types of aircraft previously in storage. Once thought to have been
grounded for the rest of their days, the MiG-23s were to receive an extensive
overhaul after decades of storage. As the Sudan never truly operated nor
maintained the MiG-23MS, SAFAT lacked the technical expertise to overhaul the
MiG-23 all by itself, which forced it to look for assistance abroad. A partner
was found in neighbouring Ethiopia, whose Dejen Aviation Industry proved
capable of performing the required maintenance.
Dejen (formerly known as DAVEC, Dejen Aviation Engineering
Complex) is responsible for the overhaul of a wide range of aircraft in service
with the Ethiopian Air Force, and is one of the few maintenance centers to be
fully qualified in overhauling the complex Su-27. Dejen, then still called
DAVEC, was originally founded to allow Ethiopia to maintain its fleet of Soviet
aircraft (mainly MiG-23BNs, MLs and UBs) locally, and thus has plenty of
experience in overhauling this type of aircraft. The Tumansky R-29 engine of
one of the four MiG-23s after undergoing revision at SAFAT can be seen below.
For the purpose of overhauling the aircraft at least ten
Ethiopians from Dejen were present at Sudan's SAFAT, and Ethiopia also provided
the pilots for the flight testing of the newly refurbished airframes, stressing
the large role it played in bringing the MiG-23MS back to operational status.
Additionally, as no Sudanese are currently believed to be trained in flying the
MiG-23, it is likely Ethiopia will also provide training and spare parts (such
as the new cockpit canopies already installed) for the aircraft.
The choice of armament for Sudan's MiG-23MS' is limited,
consisting of several types of unguided bombs and UB-16 and UB-32 rocket pods
for 57mm rockets. Although the SuAF once possessed stocks of R-3S air-to-air
missiles for its MiG-21Ms, it is unlikely that any of these missiles still
survive. Although theoretically Libya's donation of the aircraft to Sudan could
have been accompanied by R-3S air-to-air missiles from Libyan stocks, the
shelf-life of these missiles ran out decades ago. Thus, the MiG-23MS's role is
restricted to fighter-bomber in Sudanese service. While the delivery of weapons
by the MiG-23MS is unlikely to be even remotely accurate, a lack of accuracy
has never posed a problem to the SuAF during the decades long conflicts ranging
in the country.
Unfortunately for the SuAF, one of the four overhauled
MiG-23s made a crash-landing at Wadi Sayyidna shortly after a test-flight. The aircraft
caught fire and was subsequently dumped into a corner of the airbase. While not
even back in operational service, the SuAF was already one MiG-23 down. It
remains unknown if the airframe was a UB or a MS, but the loss of their only
MiG-23UB would force the SuAF to purchase another airframe from abroad, making
this project significantly more expensive.
While the overhaul of the MiG-23s provided the SuAF with
four airframes at only marginal costs, the complicated nature of the MiG-23MS
raises the question if it was really worth the effort. Already one aircraft
down due to a crash-landing, and with more airframes sure to be lost in flying
this highly complex aircraft, the MiG-23MS's second career in Sudan could turn
out to be a short one.
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