Not long after midnight Aug. 12, the destroyer Porter cleared the
Strait of Hormuz and entered the Persian Gulf. Five months into their
deployment, it was the ship’s 13th straits transit and the commanding
officer, Cmdr. Martin Arriola, left the pilothouse to attend to other
matters.
Meanwhile, the destroyer was on a course to dart through tankers headed in the opposite direction.
Arriola
returned to the bridge. He and his watchstanders saw a ship ahead that
seemed to show the international signal warning other ships to stay
clear. Porter turned to port, an unusual move, and crossed ahead of it.
Then they spotted something a mariner never wants to see: the bow of
another ship, which had been hidden behind the other vessel.
The
officer of the deck recommended turning right immediately, the standard
maneuver. Arriola disagreed. The ship slowed instead, the crew weighing
their options. But the supertanker continued bearing down. The OOD
recognized that the merchant was crossing ahead of them but didn’t press
the issue. In the confusion, Arriola made a fateful choice — turn left
and streak across a vessel’s bow for the second time.
“Hard left
rudder!” Arriola bellowed, according to a pilothouse recording. Arriola
ordered five whistle blasts, the danger signal, and full speed to try to
make it across the tanker’s path.
“All engines ahead flank,” Arriola ordered. “Let’s go. Get me up there, flank!”
Porter
did not make it clear in time. The most complete and vivid picture of
these missteps and what happened next has emerged from newly released
ship logs and recordings, including a four-minute audio tape of the
collision, all obtained by Navy Times via a Freedom of Information Act
request.
Within 30 seconds, the supertanker’s bow smashed the
destroyer’s side with a “boom,” the harrowing sound of a ship as long as
an aircraft carrier and moving at roughly 14 knots ramming the warship,
tearing a gaping hole in the Porter’s hull forward of the pilothouse.
Sleeping sailors were flung awake. Minor flooding and fires broke out.
Circuits flickered. Sailors picked themselves up and registered what had
happened.
Miraculously, no one was injured on either ship in the collision, which took the destroyer out of service for a month and will cost the service upward of $50 million to fix.
Three weeks later, Arriola was fired
after Navy investigators found a series of mistakes leading up to the
collision: The ship was going too fast, Arriola was distracted by
releasing routine reports, the ship did not call the merchants to
arrange passage and made a highly unusual turn to port. Correcting any
of these errors could have prevented the collision, a safety
investigation concluded, noting that no one questioned the CO’s call to
turn left.
Many aspects of the collision, one in a series of 2012 mishaps,
remain cloudy. The Office of the Judge Advocate General of the Navy and
the Naval Safety Center have denied open records requests for
investigative reports.
The released files were not produced for
these investigations but a Naval Surface Force Atlantic spokesman
declined to discuss them, citing the possibility of litigation by the
owner of the supertanker Otowasan. The Navy had not been sued as of May
9, said Jen Zeldis, an OJAG spokeswoman, in an email.
Porter returned to Norfolk, Va., in early November under a new CO and is now slated to start repairs at a shipyard there.
Arriola, 43, who was reassigned to SURFLANT, did not respond to emails and phone messages seeking comment.
The aftermath
After the collision at 12:53 a.m., the ship set general quarters to
contain fires and flooding.
Meanwhile, the other warship in the column,
dock landing ship Gunston Hall, came near to assist and took photos of
the damage.
Repair lockers manned up to fight small fires that had
broken out. Others set to pumping out water and securing ruptured
pipes. The impact downed countless communications networks, computers
and weapon systems, some temporarily and others permanently. It affected
everything from the rudders to the digital charting system, the logs
show.
Scribbled notes on over a dozen pages detail the crew’s
damage control efforts over the ensuing hours that night. They made
notes on scratch paper in pen and grease pencil detailing the damage and
progress containing it. “Aux 1 pway airlock flooding. Radio chill water
inside radio,” one of these sheets said, for example.
Many
questions remain. What was the relative position of the three ships in
the minutes before the collision? Did the combat information center make
maneuvering recommendations or even speak up?
Why was the bridge
surprised by the supertanker, which radar should have picked up?
Still,
the new records detail many of the ship’s mistakes and, here and there,
contain cautionary notes that went unheeded. The operations officer
penned one in the night orders reviewed by each watch team.
“We
are heading towards the SOH this evening for an overnight transit,” this
officer wrote. “Make sure your head is in the game.”
Arriola signed the night orders without a note.
But in italicized type above his signature block was the solemn warning, “Eternal vigilance is the price of safety.”
About the audio
The pilothouse recording above begins immediately after Porter turned left to pass ahead of a ship going the opposite direction. The destroyer, with another warship following, had been headed southwest on course 230 at 20 knots.
About the audio
The pilothouse recording above begins immediately after Porter turned left to pass ahead of a ship going the opposite direction. The destroyer, with another warship following, had been headed southwest on course 230 at 20 knots.
The officer of the deck wanted to steer right to come back to this base course. This aggravated Porter’s commanding officer, Cmdr. Martin Arriola, who was focused on shipping traffic headed the opposite way and converging on the channel back through the Strait of Hormuz. Arriola and the OOD are the most prominent voices in the recording. Others relayed course and speed changes to the amphibious dock landing ship Gunston Hall, which was following Porter.
After clearing the vessel, the OOD spotted another ship — later determined to be a supertanker — behind it and realized Porter was in danger. Arriola decided to turn left, an unusual maneuver, to streak ahead of aship’s bow a second time.
Shortly after the collision, about 3 minutes and 47 seconds into the recording, a voice announces the collision was on Porter’s port side. That is incorrect: The impact was on the ship’s starboard side, just forward of the pilothouse.
typical USN at work. They are not mariners and are at best rank amateurs.
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