Submarine development and construction is a notoriously
opaque subject, hard enough to analyse in open societies and even more
difficult in a secretive environment such as that of China's
military. Nevertheless, open sources are providing information that indicates
important trends and potential problems in China's ambitious efforts to create
a second-strike ballistic missile submarine force, at the same time as it
produces both nuclear attack submarines and large numbers of modern conventionally
propelled patrol units.
The Taiwanese report cited in Sam Roggeveen's post
claiming that none of China's
new ballistic missile submarines (or the accompanying missile) is yet
fully operational may be a straw in the wind to suggest that the People's
Liberation Army-Navy (PLA-N) is struggling to achieve its ambitions in
this complex area of naval capability.
Another comes in the recent reports that China
plans to order at least four of an export version of the Russian LADA (Type
677) class patrol submarine. Although there are significant doubts as to
the status of the plan, what is interesting about this scheme is the suggestion
that the Russians themselves have accepted that their protracted development of
the LADA needs help. Only three boats have been completed since the first was
laid down in 1996 and it is arguable that even the lead unit is not yet fully
operational. The failure of the type has forced Russia
to revive KILO (Type 636) production for its own navy.
Russia
has also now apparently resumed a cooperative relationship with the
Italian Fincantieri shipbuilder, with the obvious hope of incorporating western
European technology into its boats (something that had already to be done for
the water-making systems and batteries of the units Russia
exported to India
in previous years).
If China
is joining this program, even if only as a buyer, this indicates that it is not
confident its indigenous production effort will achieve results in good time.
This may be an issue of quantity – in China's
strategic situation, numbers have a value all their own – but it is much more
likely to be one of quality.
This should not be a surprise. China
faces extraordinary challenges in effectively managing three separate major
submarine programs from its own resources. Despite national security and
commercial intellectual property restrictions, most Western submarine operators
can and do share a great deal of technology and doctrine through alliance arrangements
and bilateral relationships. China
enjoys no such access (at least not legitimately so).
It has had to hedge its bets before, with the purchase of a
dozen Russian KILO class boats – four in 1993 and eight in 2002. While the
first buy could be seen as providing a window on the much more advanced state
of Russian design and construction at the time, the second can only have been
because the Chinese-designed SONG (Type 039) class was not proving to be all
that the PLA-N wanted. Certainly, the first unit needed several years of trials
before commissioning and the second and subsequent boats had to be greatly
modified.
The SONG class has been followed by the YUAN (Type 041;
pictured), whose appearance suggests that its design was strongly influenced by
that of the KILO. This boat is now in large scale production and Jane's
Fighting Ships predicts a class size of 20. However, many of its
systems and sub-systems represent older technology, and a truly up to date
design will be required to meet the operational challenges of the future.
Chinese participation in a Russo-Italian program may provide
the access it needs to a range of technologies, although Russia
is likely to agree to the scheme only if China
buys enough boats to avoid the accusation that its intent is simply reverse
engineering.
This will not, in the short term, solve China's
problems with its ballistic missile submarines or the nuclear attack boats, but
it will help relieve pressure on China's
ship design personnel and facilities – pressure which must be intense, given
the number of construction programs the PLA-N has in hand for both surface and
sub-surface units. It is not often realised that limited stocks of
drawing-office design expertise, draughtsmen and naval architects have long
been one of the major constraints for naval development in every nation with
pretensions to building its own warships, including, at times, both the UK
and the US.
This is a reality China
is now facing.
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