Our friends at the Center for International Maritime
Security are running a “Maritime Futures Project” and requested some input on
the following question, among others: “What advice would you give to a smaller
nation on the maritime investments it should pursue, and why?”
Response –
Lesser maritime nations often seem to assume they have to
compete symmetrically with the strong in order to accomplish their goals. That would
mean that, say, a Vietnam
would have to build a navy capable of contending on equal terms with China's
South Sea Fleet in order to fulfill its strategic aims. That need not be true.
Here at the U.S. Naval War College we sometimes debate whether small states
have grand strategies, or whether grand strategy is a preserve of the strong.
Small coastal states do have grand strategies. In fact, there's a premium on
thinking and acting strategically when you have only meager resources to tap.
Our Canadian friends, for instance, take pride in operating across interagency
boundaries. Small states can't simply throw resources at problems and expect to
solve them. They have to think and invest smart. That's my first bit of advice.
What kinds of strategies and forces should the weak pursue?
Here's the second bit of advice. They should consult great thinkers of the
past. The French jeune ecole of the nineteenth
century formulated some fascinating ideas about how to compete with a Royal
Navy that ruled the waves. Sir Julian Corbett fashioned a notion of active
defense by which an inferior fleet could prevent a greater one from
accomplishing its goals. In effect it could hug the stronger fleet, remaining
nearby to keep the enemy from exercising command of the sea. Mao Zedong's
writings about active defense also apply in large part to the nautical domain.
The notions of sea denial and maritime guerrilla warfare should resonate with
smaller powers today. Clinging to an adversary while imposing high costs on him
is central to maritime strategies of the weak.
And third, what does that mean in force-structure terms? It
means smaller maritime powers should look for inexpensive hardware and tactics
that make life tough and expensive for bigger powers. I have urged the Taiwan
Navy to downplay its sea-control fleet in favor of platforms like missile-armed
fast patrol boats that could give a superior Chinese navy fits. Such
acquisitions are worth studying even for a great naval power like Japan.
So long as Tokyo caps defense
spending at one percent of GDP, it has to get the most bang it can for the
buck. Sea denial should be in its portfolio.
Bottom line, lesser powers should refuse to despair about
their maritime prospects. They should design their fleets as creatively as
possible, taking advantage of the home-field advantage all nations enjoy in
their immediate environs. That may mean a navy founded on small craft.
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