If nothing else, this series on access denial shows that anti-access
strategy comes in many varieties. Vietnam
too is pursuing such a strategy, founded on a squadron of six Kilo-class
submarines Russia
is building for the Vietnam People’s Navy under a contract inked in 2009. In
August the Vietnamese press reported that the first boat has been launched, and
that all six will be delivered by 2016. The elusive Kilos should make
a lethal access-denial force. While China’s
People’s Liberation Army Navy operates Kilos itself, it has
conspicuously neglected antisubmarine warfare hardware and techniques. It seems
South China Sea waters will remain opaque to Chinese
commanders for the foreseeable future despite the PLA Navy’s overwhelming
superiority over the Vietnam People’s Navy.
First consider the politics of access denial, as we did with Iran
and North Korea.
Vietnam and China,
like North and South Korea,
are contiguous powers with vital interests at stake in the same waters. Vital
interests like territory beget strong passions. Whereas Iran prizes its ability
to manage offshore waters and skies more than the United States cares about
operating there—and thus commands a political edge—both Hanoi and Beijing are
impassioned about their maritime claims in the South China Sea. Both are
prepared to wage efforts of serious magnitude and duration,commensurate with
their material capacity to carry on the competition. Neither is likely to
relent after dispassionately tallying up the costs and hazards of operating in
waters its opponent wants to place off-limits. The result: a combustible
situation.
Several tactical and operational characteristics of Vietnamese access denial
are worth pondering. Its anti-access force, like all such forces, is asymmetric
to the adversary it is designed to oppose. But unlike relatively balanced
Iranian and North Korean forces, the Vietnamese access-denial contingent is
almost purely one-dimensional. Hanoi
doubtless chose well if it could select only one platform to execute its
strategy. Submarines offer enormous bang for the buck, and they are survivable.
Still, this also means that advances in Chinese antisubmarine warfare could
nullify Vietnam’s
effort to fend off the PLA Navy. Next, Vietnamese access denial could take on
an offensive as well as a defensive character. Vietnamese Kilos could,
say, loiter unseen off the Chinese naval station at Sanya, on Hainan Island,
holding PLA Navy submarines at risk at the delicate moment when they are
entering or leaving port—exposing them to enemy action.
Access denial—a strategically defensive posture—could therebytake on an
escalatory hue.The inception of a Vietnamese undersea fleet will further crowd
the already crowded waterspace of Southeast Asia, complicating efforts to
discriminate among friend, foe, and bystander. China
operates Kilos; so will Vietnam;
even India
could conceivably dispatch Kilos to the region. And this leaves aside
the different submarine types deployed by Singapore,
Malaysia, and
other regional seafaring states. The chances for miscalculations and mishaps
will only grow as access-denial strategies take shape.
Not long ago, pundit Robert Kaplan pronounced the South China Sea
“the future of conflict.” Kaplan may have spoken truer than he knew.
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