China's as yet unnamed aircraft carrier will soon begin another round of sea trials before its planned commissioning in August. It has yet to conduct a full range of flight operations and its fixed-wing air component remains largely in the prototype and testing phase.
It will be several months, if not years, before it can fulfill many of the key roles attributed to a modern aircraft carrier and will not achieve full operational capability, including a complete fixed-wing and helicopter equipped air wing, nor full integration into fleet operations before 2016-2017.
Commissioning of the carrier nonetheless will mark a major milestone in China's progress towards becoming a major ocean-going naval power. The carrier will significantly improve the fleet's air defenses and broad ocean strike capabilities, but its full strategic significance cannot be understood without examining its role within China's increasingly aggressive posture in the South China Sea and complex fleet force structure.
Beijing's fleet modernization program has involved the patient acquisition and development of the surveillance, sensor, command and control, and weapons systems integral to a balanced, modern ocean-going fleet. The People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) has introduced these new systems incrementally, building primarily upon technology acquired openly from Europe, Israel and Russia as well as incorporating American systems obtained from a variety of sources.
As a result, the latest Chinese surface ships and submarines are equipped with an array of first-rate sensor and weapons systems. The former have area air-defense systems not unlike America's Aegis-system, albeit with capabilities more akin to earlier rather than the latest models. The Luyang-II class guided missile destroyers are a formidable platform equipped with the HHQ-9 area air defense surface-to-air missile (SAM) system and both YJ-82 anti-ship (ASCM), and more ominously for neighboring Southeast Asian nations, HN-2 land attack cruise missiles (LACMs).
With those high-end platforms entering service in growing numbers, China's new carrier will extend the fleet's reach, reinforcing its strike power and providing a command, control, communications, computer and intelligence (C4I) platform for an embarked fleet commander. The question moving ahead will be which roles dominate and under what conditions.
All militaries balance their plans and structure against two often competing mission requirements: the most dangerous situation they will face and the most likely one. For the PLAN, the sea denial mission is perceived as countering the most dangerous. That is, denying a hostile fleet from controlling its most critical waters as defined in China's 2008 Defense White Paper, starting from the referred to "first island chain" stretching from the Yellow Sea down to the eastern and southernmost reaches of the South China Sea.
For that strategic concern, the carrier can play a forward command role, extend the fleet's and nation's air defense umbrella by an additional 200 nautical miles, and protect reconnaissance platforms flying out from shore bases. The embarked admiral can command all the naval and forward air forces involved, including coordinating with the 2nd Artillery Corps in its employment of China's DF-21D anti-ship ballistic missiles (ASBMs). With ASBMs targeting enemy carriers, China's aircraft carrier could be used as a quick reaction strike platform against the enemy's other surface combatants.
The carrier will be able to perform a similar mission under what Chinese leaders probably see as a more likely conflict scenario: a limited regional war under high technology conditions. China's recent emphasis on defending its "territorial sovereignty" in the South China Sea is of growing regional concern due to the extensive nature of its maritime claims.
China's recent confrontation with the Philippines at Scarborough Shoal is the latest example of its growing assertiveness over the contested area. Beijing's elevation last month of the South China Sea islands of Xisha, Zhongsha and Nansha to prefecture status is indication of Beijing's hardening political commitment to these claims. The 2011 White Paper reiterated China's strong commitment to defending its claimed national territory and Beijing is increasingly employing military forces to fortify related maritime claims.
Although the sea denial scenario would still apply in a limited regional war, the carrier's role against China's weaker neighbors would focus more on sustaining air and maritime superiority. China's fleet will likely rely on the carrier's air wing to intercept any enemy ASCM-carrying aircraft and attack any surface ships that move into position to threaten China's surface units or island garrisons. Chinese leaders probably view this last mission - the enforcement of maritime sovereignty over the South China Sea - as a likely scenario, especially should its growing coast guard prove insufficient to the task.
Learning by doing
For now, the carrier is more significant strategically for what it portends than what it is. China's leaders say they built the carrier primarily for experimentation and study and those roles will certainly dominate its early operations. However, China does not possess a pool of experienced aircraft personnel to fulfill the carrier's crew requirements. Although China has studied aircraft design and operation for over 20 years, the crew will still have to learn largely by doing. Based on its large number of sea trials, including at least eight since last August, the PLAN is taking a cautious and incremental approach to preparing the carrier and its crew for August's commissioning.
Carriers are the world's most complex warships, involving the simultaneous operation of dozens of systems and hundreds of personnel at very close quarters. That is especially true during flight operations, the most dangerous of military activities outside of combat. Simulations and pier-side drills can help crews to prepare, but there is no substitute for actual operations. China's carrier is expected to begin simple one-two plane flight deck operations later this year, starting with "touch and goes" where planes simply touch the deck before resuming flight and later daytime landings and launches.
Notwithstanding those exercises, China's carrier will enter service without a fully composed air wing. Its primary fixed-wing aircraft, the Shenyang J-15, has not entered production and is not expected to before 2014. China's Russian-built Sukhoi Su-33MKKs are reportedly carrier capable, but only J-15 prototypes have been seen flying off the carrier's deck. It appears that the Sukhoi aircraft were acquired specifically to build a pool of qualified aviators to facilitate the establishment of the carrier's air wing once its fixed wing component was operational.
If the J-15 follows traditional aircraft development and production patterns, China will commission its first fully operational squadron by either late 2015 or early 2016. Several months of carrier workups will likely follow. Until then, the carrier's primary air wing components will consist of helicopters, primarily the Z-9 anti-submarine and Z-8 logistic models. There is no indication so far that China is developing a ship borne airborne warning and control system (AWACS), aerial refueling tanker, electronic warfare capability or maritime patrol aircraft.
Those shortcomings mean China's carrier must rely on shore-based aircraft for those missions. Although jet aircraft can carry "buddy stores" to refuel their mates on long missions and carry electronic countermeasures pods or anti-radiation missiles to defeat enemy air defenses, their inclusion comes at the expense of ordnance and other payloads.
The carrier's accompanying guided missile destroyers (DDGs) can also use their land attack cruise missiles against key enemy air defense centers and sites to clear the way for the air wing.
There has been speculation that China is developing an airborne early warning (AEW) version of the Z-8, China's license-built model of the French SA-320 Super Frelon. While that helicopter has the lift and endurance to carry a long-range surveillance radar, it cannot service the command and control systems required to conduct AWACS missions. It can, however, detect and warn of incoming low-altitude cruise missiles and provide outstanding just-beyond-the-horizon surveillance, warning and targeting. But in a high intensity naval operation there is no substitute for an AWACS with its battle space management and long-range surveillance capabilities.
To be sure, China's Z-9 ship borne helicopters are outstanding close-in surveillance and anti-submarine warfare (ASW) platforms, but they are no substitute for long-range or long endurance fixed-wing ASW search and localization aircraft. Perhaps China's military planners believe unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) can fill its AWACS and long-range ASW and maritime surveillance roles.
Given the carrier's long incubation period, that seems quite plausible - although such platforms will not be combat-ready and integrated into fleet operations before the end of this decade. Until then, the carrier's capabilities against a conventional takeoff or landing (CTOL) carrier or fully integrated enemy air and fleet defense system will be limited.
Missions beyond war
At the same time, aircraft carriers have significant uses beyond their war potential. With a likely eventual air wing of 20-30 fixed wing fighters and 12-18 helicopters, once fully operational, China's carrier will offer a full range of surveillance, helo-borne transport and fighter capabilities to support various combatant and non-combatant contingencies.
China's maritime trade now stretches around the globe and requires ever rising levels of protection, a fact that has been driven home to China's political and naval leaders over the last four years. Indian Ocean piracy has hit China's trade hard, driving it to deploy small naval contingents to conduct anti-piracy operations; its 12th anti-piracy contingent recently departed for the western Indian Ocean. However, meeting the small surface action groups' needs without a forward base has provided challenging lessons and significant on-the-job logistics training for China's naval crews.
The PLAN has already negotiated a series of access agreements reaching from the shores of Pakistan down to Djibouti to facilitate these missions. Regional media have speculated that China is also seeking an access arrangement, if not a permanent basing agreement, with the island nation of Seychelles. Although costs and geopolitical considerations will probably preclude China from seeking a permanent base in the Indian Ocean within this decade, anti-piracy missions and related logistics requirements will remain a key PLAN focus.
Over the last three years China has needed to rapidly evacuate its citizens from three far-flung countries - Libya, Kenya and Yemen - which have suffered from violent political turmoil. With over 5.5 million of its citizens officially working overseas, many in countries facing stability challenges, Beijing has likely given thought to expanding its capacity to evacuate them on short notice. The domestic political pressure for readiness will grow in the years ahead, driving the political leadership to at least consider a naval presence in waters near those areas. With its large helicopter contingent, the soon-to-be-commissioned carrier is second only to an amphibious task group in its ability to evacuate or assist large numbers of people in distant lands.
Looking beyond the evacuation of its citizens, Beijing cannot have missed the important role America's carriers performed during the massive international relief effort that followed the 2004 Asian tsunami disaster. China's carrier will be able to perform similar missions, though humanitarian assistance operations rarely receive much notice in Beijing's budgetary or military planning debates. The return in diplomatic and public goodwill, however, could help to mitigate neighboring countries' threat perceptions associated with the carrier.
Beijing has long wanted a carrier force and for decades is known to have studied closely carrier operations, design and technology. The prohibitive costs and political implications of acquiring a carrier made it the subject of much internal debate throughout the 1980s and 1990s. With those financial and political obstacles now overcome, military planners will gain intimate knowledge of a carrier's uses, costs and challenges. The latter should not be underestimated as carriers require significant logistical support, far beyond that needed for guided missile destroyers and lesser combatants. Discussions about China's carrier have so far seemingly overlooked issues related to integration with the PLAN's existing operations and coordination with its growing submarine force.
Coordinating surface fleet and air operations with submarines adds yet another level of complexity to an already complicated military operation. By building and commissioning a carrier, China has signaled it aims to become a great naval power. How the PLAN employs its carrier-bolstered fleet over the next two to five years will largely shape regional and global perceptions of China and its intentions. Even the carrier's name, once christened, will carry political significance outside China's shores. With growing power comes growing responsibility - the world will be watching how Beijing responds to both challenges.
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