The Argentinian Story
It was not until the night of 13 June that the British Paratroopers launched their final offensive. It was a bitterly cold night. It would snow later. There was still plenty of fight left in the Argentines. Thirteen of the British soldiers were killed and over seventy wounded in the final battles. In an effort to save the lives of the British Paratroopers every means of fire support available was used. At Wireless Ridge, the 2nd Parachute Battalion, now commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel David Chaundler, had the benefit of full fire support. Two British warships, two field artillery batteries, and sixteen 81 millimetre mortars and four light tanks fired over 6,000 rounds in something like 48 hours between 12-14 June!
All the soldiers in Lieutenant-Colonel Omar Gimenez's 7th 'Colonel Pedro Conde' Regiment were dirty, tired, wet and numbed by the softening up fire. Nevertheless the Argentines fought hard. Behind Lieutenant-Colonel Omar Gimenez was a battery of 105 millimetre Oto Melara pack howitzers. Major Emilio Guillermo Nani acted as Lieutenant-Colonel Gimenez's forward artillery observation officer. Defensive fire was also provided by the mortars of the 6th 'General Juan Viamonte' Regiment's 'B' Company on the north-east shoulder of Tumbledown. On 14 June, at about 2230 local time, using tanks to lead an attack for the first time, 'D' Company, 2nd Parachute Battalion took 'Rough Diamond' hill from an Argentine company ('C' Company under First Lieutenant Hugo Garcia) of mainly exhausted and terrified teenagers. The results of British artillery fire as a death-dealer and as a life-saver were written on 'Rough Diamond' by Argentine corpses and unused machineguns and ammunition. 'C' Company, 7th Regiment in the form of First Lieutenant Raul Castaneda's 1st Platoon had done well in its first battle, Mount Longdon. More than 21 in 'C' Company, 7th Regiment were killed, wounded or taken prisoner on Mount Longdon as Castaneda lost ground after initial successes.
At about 2255 local time the sound of approaching Canberras filled the air. At about 2230, a Canberra (B-108) of 'Grupo 2 de Bombardeo' was shot down over Mount Kent, after bombing the 2nd Parachute Battalion, by a Sea Dart fired by the Type 42 destroyer 'Exeter'. One Para, Private Steele was wounded in the last Argentinian air raid of the war. It was now the turn of the 7th Regiment's 'A' Company. First Lieutenant Jorge Calvo's 'A' Company, on 'Apple Pie' hill, despite only having two platoons held off the first attack. Sergeant 'Mac' French of 'A' Company, 3rd Parachute Battalion, had a grandstand view on Mount Longdon of the frontal assault by 'A' and 'B' Companies, 2nd Parachute Battalion which was repulsed by the Argentines:
They tried going over the top first, but the incoming fire was too heavy, so they went back behind the peat and waited for more artillery to soften them up.
The British retaliated by shelling 'A' Company mercilessly. Within 30 minutes the Paras had broken through and Jorge Calvo's 'A' Company was in retreat. Thirty-seven of these men found no option but to surrender. At about 2340 local time the massed pieces of the 4th Airborne Artillery Group sought to slow the advance of the 2nd Parachute Battalion. But implacably, the British advance rolled on. The Cordoba red-bereted gunners fought bravely, but the dispersed Paras prevented the artillery fire from being concentrated to inflict maximum damage. At about the same time two Troops of 'D' Squadron, and one Troop of 'G' Squadron, 22nd Special Air Service Regiment, reinforced by six members of the Special Boat Squadron, in four landing crafts, attempted to land in the Cambers Peninsula but had the misfortune to be heard by a National Gendarmerie Commando on board the 'Almirante Irizar' and the 3rd Marine Infantry Battalion platoon dug in on Cortley Ridge, repelled the British force. Three of the landing craft were hit by shore fire, one sinking. A Special Boat Squadron NCO and three Special Air Service personnel were wounded. Meanwhile shot and shell were flying on 'Blueberry Pie' ridge and Major Emilio Nani was cut by flying shrapnel. The 7th Regiment Command Post on 'Blueberry Pie' was shelled several times. Out of the seven officers around Lieutenant-Colonel Gimenez, he had five wounded. First Lieutenants Jorge Calvo and Hugo Garcia were evacuated to hospital with severed tendons and deep lacerations. Despite the pain Major Nani was determined to resist the British attack to the death. One of the soldiers who had been tasked to help carry Major Nani to the regimental aid post at Moody Brook was Private Felix Barreto:
I was told one of our officers, a lieutenant-colonel had been wounded. Major Carrizo told me to go up there and get him. I was to avoid the fighting and get him back to Moody Brook. We made our way up, but the battle was everywhere. The gorse was on fire and we had to fight our way to the command post. When we got there and found the officer he said he had no intention of withdrawing to Moody Brook with us, so we turned round and went back.
The retreat of the 7th Regiment's 'A' and 'C' Companies was a depressing affair. Discipline also cracked among the Reconnaissance Platoon dug in on the western crags of 'Blueberry Pie', and battle planning broke down in Lieutenant-Colonel Omar Gimenez's command bunker. Very many were wounded, and some conscripts in a hysterical condition; their withdrawal did not appear to be an organised military action and strongly resembled a rout. A veteran of the battle later reported that the infuriated Major Antonio Perez-Cometto cursed the retreating conscripts. With the 2nd Parachute Battalion literally at Stanley's gates, the Argentinians seemed to be in a state of schizophrenia - and the Xth Brigade Command seemed equally mad. Private Jorge Abud tells us what happened in the final hours:
There were thousands of rumours. I was even told that some English Commandos had infiltrated Argentine troops, that they spoke perfect Spanish, and that some had even made a company retreat, saying that they had orders from the commander. [The unit may have been First Lieutenant Hector Mino's 1st Amphibious Engineer Company platoon on the centre of Tumbledown Mountain that, at about 0200 local time, sought safety on the eastern end of Tumbledown.] I don't know if it was true, but a lot of people in the town were afraid there were English mixed in among us. Until then, when someone approached we said, 'halt', and asked for identification. But there was so much fear that the system was no good anymore.
Progressively the 7th Regiment remnants increased and massed on the verge of Felton Stream. It was now absolutely necessary to increase the Military Police presence in order to take control and prevent complete disorder. Brigadier-General Jofre immediately informed the 181st Military Police Company commander and the Army Police, 5th Marine Infantry Battalion Military Police Detachment and 2nd Assault Section, 601st Commando Company were ordered to shoot British Special Forces in Argentinian military dress on sight! For over two hours, 7th Regiment regulars and the Military Police and Commandos discussed the tense situation. To the west, on Wireless Ridge could be heard bursts of gunfire and the occasional dull anti-tank rocket explosion. The British were presumably hitting the last Argentinian dug-outs.
Lieutenant-Colonel Gimenez had to ask Brigadier-General Jofre for help, and he responded with two 10th Armoured Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron platoons commanded by First Lieutenant Luis Bertolini and Second Lieutenant Diego Harrington. When Captain Rodrigo Soloaga arrived on the western crags of 'Blueberry Pie' there was no sign of the enemy. At about 0400 the cavalry platoons under Captain Soloaga moved at bayonet point to a position on the western end of 'Blueberry Pie' and the cavalry platoons were to spend the next hour in this beaten zone. Captain Soloaga was all over the place, darting from one platoon to another. It was frustrating fighting. He called down artillery fire, but had problems getting it to fall in the right place. It was during this Argentine counterattack that the 10th Armoured Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron mortar platoon at Moody Brook engaged the British light tanks. The cavalrymen on Wireless Ridge fought heroically, several taking turns at serving a Czekalski anti-tank gun while under fire, in some cases engaging the British tanks.
That morning between 0400 and 0440 the cavalry platoons were shelled continuosly for about half an hour. The British light tanks inflicted great slaughter on the Argentine cavalrymen. Sergeant Adolfo Cabrera and Corporal Alberto Chavez were killed, several other cavalry NCOs were wounded. Eventually the cavalrymen withdrew. At one point the cavalrymen had had the unnerving experience of being heavily shelled by the 4th Airborne Artillery Group. The cavalrymen were utterly devastated. They had had enough of it. In terms of battle casualties, no Argentine unit in the Falklands faced a more severe trial than those in the 10th Armoured Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron. The cavalry unit had 5 killed and around 50 wounded during this action. British softening up fire continued and it started to snow. In spite of the British Artillery's sustained barrage the remaining Argentines put up resistance. Lieutenant-Colonel Gimenez had now barely 100 men left, including a signals platoon under the wounded Lieutenant Jorge Guidobono. The signallers were ordered to prepare for hand to hand combat. Guidobono shouted encouragement to his men. The signallers fought in little groups from boulders, shooting at enemy flashes and Private Graham Carter of 'D' Company, 2nd Parachute Battalion, came within a whisker of death:
I had a bullet bounce off my helmet, then when our artillery shells came in on us, one landed 15 feet away-but thankfully was a dud. It could have killed at least three of us.
British tank fire rained down on the remaining Argentine positions and then the ground assault went in against the Argentine 2nd Airborne Infantry Regiment platoon.
At about 0600 on 14 June Guidobono's men and the Argentine Paratrooper platoon were hit by a company-sized attack. The Argentine Paratroopers communicated to he signallers that the British were about to get up and charge. Then with a hallow roar of a football crowd they were on the Argentine Paratroopers. The rest was confusion. The Paras were moving as close as possible to the Argentines to avoid the Argentine artillery fire. Preceeded by a field artillery and naval bombardment, Major Philip Neame's 'D' Company, after suffering its ninth and last dead (Private Francis Slough) in the Falklands , broke the ring around Lieutenant-Colonel Gimenez's command bunker. The Argentine Paratroop platoon, although nearly having lost half its strength, moved back grudgingly. Soon there was a lot of action going above and around Moody Brook. Major Oscar Jaimet's 'B' Company , 6th Regiment and First Sergeant Jorge Lucero's 3rd Platoon, 'N' Company, 5th Marine Infantry Battalion, were busy shooting at Major Philip Neame's men, and them too, shooting back at the Argentines. Jofre reacting to the British threat materializing from the north of Moody Brook ordered a major counterattack against the 2nd Parachute Battalion's 'D' Company. Major Guillermo Ruben Berazay:
It was like a theatre. I had never seen anything like it before. After the artillery fire came the fire of the infantry action - a lot of tracer. I could actually see the British working their way along the ridge by the light of the star-shells. Between 03.00 and 04.00 I heard Commander Robacio of the marines telling Jofre on the radio that 'Guillermo' - that was my call sign - could be released to help the 7th Regiment. I thanked Robacio for that doubtful honour. Jofre told me to prepare my men to cross the valley and then, fifteen to twenty minutes later, ordered me to Moody Brook to meet guides from the armoured car men and a company from the 25th Regiment which Jofre was sending. I got to Moody Brook, but there were no guides from the armoured car people - they were already in action - nor anyone from the 25th Regiment. I reported all this to 'Oscar' - Jofre's call sign. 'Okay,' he said. 'Just go up the hill and you will meet Colonel Gimenez.' The tracer fire seemed to have died down, so I presumed that the British had taken all of the hill. I placed the company commander and the heavy weapons [under Lieutenant Jose Luis Dobroevic] in a fire support base among the trees around a small house. Nothing happened for a few minutes, so we moved forward with the machine-guns but got no more than a hundred metres when the British opened up. I ordered the officers [Rodriguez-Perez, Aristegui and Monez-Ruiz] to take the rifle platoons up - not in a column but in line.
The actual attack took place in the dark. The company moved in one long line. The company had virtually reached the Moody Brook barracks when all of a sudden the British illuminated the company with flares, firing five or six anti-tank missiles and commenced firing with machineguns. Second Lieutenant Diego Aristegui's men dropped themeselves on the ground. Some soldiers ran away. But most stayed calm under all the pressure. The men just reacted by instinct. One of the problems was that the ground was so bare. No real cover at all. After a few long minutes Aristegui's 2nd Platoon went up. This platoon was rapidly dealt with. The 2nd Platoon leader was hit in the neck and the platoon sergeant Juan Vallejos, was seriously wounded in the stomach. As a result the whole of the 2nd Platoon was rendered ineffective. First Lieutenant Victor Hugo Rodriguez-Perez's 1st Platoon now went into action. The 1st Platoon advanced through the 2nd Platoon, dodging as much as they could, taking cover when they had to. They laid down a lot of fire and Lieutenant Jonathan Page's 12 Platoon of 'D' Company, 2nd Parachute Battalion seemed to pull back. By then it was like the Wild West. Each individual had to charge towards 12 Platoon and do the best he could to close with the Paras.
Privates Julio Ruben Cao, Jose Reyes-Lobos and Julio Cesar Segura succeeded in getting into the British position but were killed and casualties among the Argentinian NCOs and soldiers were high. After two hours of fierce fighting (See John Frost, 2 Para: Falklands - The Battalion at War, p. 147, Buchan & Enright, 1983) 12 Platoon got the upper hand, and finally drove the Argentinians off. Private Patricio Perez was in one of the platoons:
As we climbed up the ridge we came under heavy fire. The worst thing was the cries of the wounded, shouting for help. You felt a lot of pain but you also wanted to avenge them. I remember thinking how important it was to cover my legs. I always thought that if I was hit in the arm or chest or stomach I could always walk out. The main thing was to keep the legs covered. I didn't want to lose my legs. At one point I took cover behind a rock. I was carrying two rifles and I noticed that there was a sniper who was pinning me down. I wanted to come out of the rock and kill him but I couldn't because the firing was so intense. At that moment I heard somebody shout that he had seen the sniper. I came out, saw that he was leaning over the rock and shot at him and his gun fell silent. I saw him fall but I don't know whether he was wounded or dead. That kind of combat among the rocks is like a Western, but it all happens so fast that you don't quite realise what is going on.
What I felt at that moment was mostly hatred. I wanted revenge. I had forgotten fear by then, what sort of risk I was taking; the only thing I wanted to do, my obsession, was to avenge my fallen comrades. Whenever I saw one of my friends hit it was worse, it just made me want to continue fighting, it didn't matter for how long or at what cost. I didn't care about death at that time, the main thing was revenge. Looking back, I now think it was all quite mad, very strange. I once heard a Vietnam veteran talk about the 'drunkenness of war'. He was quite right, it is like being drunk and I enjoyed it at that moment. As children we all play at war because we have seen it on television or films, so as a child you play up to this role with a wooden gun, only this time I had a real gun in my hands and perhaps I forgot that I could actually kill and be killed. Some of us went looking for the wounded. We thought they could make it back. I heard they had killed my friend Private Horacio Benitez, and the feeling for revenge came over me again.
We sent the wounded down and returned to the battle and fought on for four hours. Luckily after the surrender I found out that Horacio had survived. People greeted the surrender with relief. They were all crying. That wasn't how I reacted. I had been fighting for many hours and I was not prepared to give up my rifle until forced to do so. It's different for those who had been in actual combat. I couldn't give my rifle back until they took it away from me, and when I did give it back I made sure it was completely unusable.
The 3rd Regiment conscripts shot very accurately. There was considerable confusion in 'D' Company, 2nd Parachute Battalion and Private Graham Carter had been forced to throw himself on the snow-stained ground and to remain largely lain, pressing himself into the ground to avoid the attention of the Argentine bullets:
We were out in the open on limb, and it looked like 10 and 11 Platoons were shooting at us. [Several 3rd Regiment conscripts of Rodriguez-Perez's platoon managed to sneak into the rocks through which Neame's 'D' Company had come earlier] We asked the OC [Major Philip Neame] to come over and check our position. He bimbled across seeming oblivious to tracer all around him, then wondered back. We thought, 'silly bugger'. Then our platoon commander [Lieutenant Jonathan Page] stood up, shouted to everyone to keep down and was knocked over himself, hit in the leg. He was screaming and shouting, but when the medic stripped him off there was no wound, just massive bruising where the round had hit his ammunition pouch.
Even after daybreak, Major Philip Neame's 'D' Company remained under intense pressure, and at about 0900 was hit by a renewed effort to break through 'D' Company, this time by Major Carlos Carrizo-Salvadores. Although the men of the 7th Regiment had suffered grievous losses, several responded to Carrizo-Salvadores' call for one final effort. "It was a suicidal mission," says Major Carrizo-Salvadores. "We were about 50 against a company of the British red berets. It was to me the greatest counterattack of the war. For the first time I saw British Paratrooper faces. We got that close." Commando-trained 7th Regiment conscript Santiago Gauto, whose heritage is Guarani, describes the counterattack more graphically:
Outside the Church they gave us a magazine each for our rifles and told us to gather at the artillery positions on the edge of Stanley. Major Carrizo was organizing a counterattack. I met Felix Barreto and we watched and listened to what was going on. There had been other attacks and they had failed. Major Carrizo asked a colonel [Eugenio Dalton] for a radio and was refused. We stood watching them arguing. Carrizo told him: 'We'll never win a war like this.' He was right. Then he turned to us and said: 'Those who've got balls, follow me. We advanced. Around me guys had tears running down their faces. Inside we knew we were not going to get very far, we were going to die, we were marching to death. The British were firing down on us with machineguns, mortars, artillery. It was like advancing through the gates of hell itself.
Carrizo-Salvadores' last-ditch attack was defeated, but it won the admiration of Major Philip Neame who described this counterattack as "quite a sporting effort". The Argentines withdrew at about 0915 and not a moment too soon. A napalm strike on Wireless Ridge was in progress as the Argentine force moved into the area, which was hardly a good omen.
Towards the end of the action Lieutenant Jonathan Page's 12 Platoon reported that hundreds of Argentinian soldiers were forming up near and around the 35 millimetre anti-aircraft artillery battery on Stanley Racecourse, apparently for a counterattack. It turned out that these were men under Lieutenant-Colonel David Ubaldo Comini, followed by members of the 25th 'Special' Infantry Regiment, perhaps about a thousand Argentinian troops. Back in 3 Commando Brigade Headquarters Nick van der Bijl who wrote Nine Battles to Stanley listening to the radio conversations in Spanish realised the Argentinians were preparing to mount a counterattack.
Fortunately for all concerned Brigadier-General Oscar Jofre knew the war was nearly lost and cancelled the move. It was all over. Lieutenant-Colonel Omar Gimenez's carefully laid out aggressive defence plan had been torn to shreds by the weight of firepower unleashed on Wireless Ridge. During the 12-hour long Wireless Ridge battle the Argentine casualties totalled about 150, of whom about fifteen 7th Regiment conscripts, four 3rd Regiment conscripts and five 10th Armoured Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron conscripts and regulars were killed, about 50 taken prisoner, with around 75 percent of the killed and wounded being inflicted by high explosive rounds. Lieutenant-Colonel Gimenez had lost practically all his platoon commanders, including the commander of the 7th Regiment's Reconnaissance Platoon, Lieutenant Ramon Galindez-Matienzo. In each 2nd Parachute Battalion objective the Argentines had been hammered by superior firepower. Like the British infantry, British Artillery and the Royal Navy had mastered the techniques of night combat. Three Paras were killed and 11 wounded taking Wireless Ridge. To this total of 14 killed and wounded must be added the British Special Forces wounded attacking Cortley Ridge. Lieutenant Horacio Monez-Ruiz's advance was a fizzler. How different would Major Guillermo Berazay's counterattack have been had Lieutenant Monez-Ruiz's 3rd Platoon, 'A' Company, 3rd Regiment continued on to Wireless Ridge?
Second Lieutenant Diego Aristegui and First Lieutenant Victor Rodriguez-Perez had reached the Moody Brook barracks when Brigadier-General Oscar Jofre changed the whole plan to the surprise of Major Berazay. Learning the lesson of the under-strength Argentinian attacks on the night of Friday 11 June, Jofre had decided that the 25th 'Special' Regiment counterattack had to take place simultaneously. Rodriguez-Perez and Aristegui did not know of the order to stop. Communications in the platoons were poor. With radio communications lost with the platoons of Rodriguez-Perez and Aristegui, Berazay had set off in a jeep to the Xth Brigade Headquarters to collect radios and explain the seriousness of the situation.
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