The decision-making problems revealed by the state comptroller's report on the 2010 disaster are particularly relevant in light of the failure of talks between Tehran and the West.
The problems revealed by the state comptroller's report on the 2010 Carmel forest disaster regarding the executive branch's lack of preparedness and the decision-making process among Israeli officials should come as no surprise - especially in light of last week’s comptroller report on the 2010 Gaza flotilla incident.
One issue addressed by the Carmel report is the home front’s preparedness for the possibility of an emergency situation - security-related or otherwise. The Fire and Rescue Services, whose failures were exposed in the report, are a significant part of the forces used during any emergency scenario. The firefighters’ skills and level of preparedness are critical, whether during a deadly forest fire or during a barrage of rockets from Lebanon or Iran.
Now, in light of the failure of the talks between Tehran and the West in Moscow, and due to the growing fears of an Israeli attack on Iranian nuclear sites, this issue is as relevant as ever.
There are experts who tell us that the threat of missiles on the home front is not as serious as it seems - that following the Home Front Command's instructions, alongside improved deterrence, will reduce the likely damages from an attack. But defending the home front is dependent on how well the various rescue services function, especially in light of the fact that they work independently of one another.
The report shows that a lack of training materials and drills for firefighters, a low operational level and a gap in equipment - all of these were known to the decision-makers before the disaster. Many more problems occurred among officers in the police and senior firefighters during the fire, including arriving at the scene, the lack of ability to put together credible situation reports and a lack of control over forces.
A year and a half after the Carmel disaster, the gaps in the home front’s preparation can still be felt: public bomb shelters are still in bad condition, millions of shekels are lacking for defensive measures (while huge amounts are being budgeted in order to prepare for offensive aspects), and the lack of preparation kits for more than a third of the population is even more worrisome in light of the prospect of chemical weapons trickling out of Assad’s Syria.
There is no doubt that much is being done in the home front in the wake of the failures exposed after the Second Lebanon War and later the Carmel fire. It is doubtful, however, if enough has been done since then to fix the oversights. “I have a hard time believing that Netanyahu and Barak don’t understand the ramifications of a possible Iranian attack on the Israeli home front. It is impossible that they are knowingly ready to fail,” said a former senior official, who currently serves as an advisor to the Israeli leadership.
Alongside the politicians’ evasions, the attacks which have since become routine on State Comptroller Micha Lindenstrauss and the blame game among all those involved were the explanations given Tuesday over the ways in which Israel’s firefighting services have dramatically improved since the disaster. The discussion, like the one over the home front preparedness, is reminiscent of the ongoing disagreement over the fitness of military reserves. The IDF has put more of an emphasis on equipping and training reserve units after the trauma of 2006.
But Lindenstrauss’ monitoring reports still reveal many worrying gaps. On Tuesday, a Knesset Committee held a discussion on the issue. Reserve officers told MKs hair-raising stories from their personal experiences. In contrast, IDF representatives explained that the situation has never been better.
Now try a thought experiment: Based on life experience in Israel, which stance is more believable? The worries of civilians and the revelations of the comptroller's report or the soothing words of the authorities?
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