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E.O. 12065: RDS-2 4/30/02 (SHLAUDEMAN, HARRY W.) OR-M TAGS: PBOR, MILl, UK, FA, AR SUBJ: FALKLANDS CRISIS: ~RESPECTlVE US MEASURES REF: GILLESPIE/KING SECURE TELEPHONE CALL 1. SECRET ENTIRE TEXT. 2. FOLLOWING RECEIPT OF SUBJECT PHONE CALL, I ASKED TO SEE PRESIDENT GALTIERI AND WAS RECEIVED AT MIDNIGHT. ARMA ACCOMPANIED, ME,AS, HE HAS THROUGHOUT,THESE-CRITICAL MEETINGS-.-'?-" _ ;,
'2. I TOLD GALTIERTTHAT .WECAME:WIT:HOUT?,INSTRUCTIONS AND WITHTHR,'ONLY ~RUPOSE:.OE SEEING ~WHAT'WE:;COULD DO TO HEAD OFF A FATAL CONFRONTATIOR,;: I POINTED OUT.TO THE PRESIDENT THAT WE HAD- NOT,? RECEIVED AN ADEQUATE'RESPONSE TO OUR, PROPOSAL AND THAT WE WOULD ANNOUNCE TOMORROW SEVERAL MEASURES AGAINST ARGENTINA. DURING MORE THAN AN HOUR'S CONVERSATION, HE DEMONSTRATED NO GIVE WHATSOEVER ON THE PROPOSAL.
3. I REPEATEDLY' ASKED HIM WHAT HE SAW AS A WAY OUT OF THIS IMPASSE. HIS RESPONSE WAS, AS MIGHT BE EXPECTED, THAT THERE SHOULD BE A STAND DOWN TO GIVE AN OPPORTUNITY FOR NEGOTIATIONS. I JUST AS REPEATEDLY POINTED OUT SECRET PAGE 02 BUENOS 02640 300558Z'
TO HIM THAT SUCH A BACK OFF WOULD GIVE ARGENTINA THE VICTORY IT SOUGHT. 4. AT'THE END OF OUR CONVERSATION, AND ON MY OWN INITIATIVE, I SUGGESTED TO GALTIERI THAT THE GOA MIGHT ANNOUNCE UNILATERALLY A WITHDRAWAL OF ITS TROOPS FROM THE MALVINAS AS A FIRST STEP TOWARD A PEACEFUL
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE REVIEW AUTHORITY: ALAN H FLANIGAN DATE/CASE In: 26 MAR 2007 200601451
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SOLUTION AND AS A GESTURE OF GOOD FAITH. HE SEEMED TO TAKE THIS SUGGESTION SERIOUSLY, WROTE IT DOWN,.BUT SAID AGAIN, AS HE HAD SEVERAL TIMES BEFORE, THAT HE WAS ONLY ONE OF THREE WHO MADE THESE DECISIONS. 5. I RECOMMEND MOST STRONGLY THAT WE NOTAT NOT ANNOUNCE THE MEASURES CONTEMPLATED UNTIL I HAVE HAD A CHANCE TO FOLLOW UP WITH GALTIERI TOMORROW MORNING. I THINK THERE IS STILL A CHANCE, ALTHOUGH A SLIGHT ONE, THAT WE CAN HOLD THESE PEOPLE OFF. 6. BOTH ARMA AND I (AND GALTIERI PARTICULARLY LISTENED TO THE FORMER) BORE DOWN VERY HEAVILY ON THE ABSOLUTE NECESSITY FOR ARGENTINA NOT REPEAT NOT TO TAKE THE FIRST OFFENSIVE ACTION. GALTIERI SAID THAT HE HAD ALREADY STOPPED SUCH ACTIONS THREE TIMES IN THE LAST FEW DAYS, BUT INDICATED THAT HE COULD NOT DO SO FOR MUCH LONGER. HE MADE A POINT, AS WE ALL KNOW, THAT THE NAVY IS HUNGRY FOR ACTION. HE ALSO SAID THAT THE ARGENTINES PLAN TO RE-SUPPLY THE ISLANDS TOMORROW (APRIL 30) BY AIR ESCORTED BY MILITARY AIR CRAFT. 7. GALTIERI SEEMED TO ME AND TO ARMA ANXIOUS TO FIND A WAY OUT WITHIN THE VERY TIGHT CONSTRAINTS IN WHICH "HE OPERATES..l", HE..:;SAi[D, ??AGAIN :"THAT"ARGENTINA SECRET .WOULD NOT:BE THE'FIRSTONE" TO FIRE AND EMPHASIZED. <. TO US THAT HE HAS SPENT CONSIDERABLE POLITICAL CAPITAL IN PREVENTING THE ARGENTINE ARMED FORCES FROM GOING ON THE OFFENSIVE. HE CLOSED THE CONVERSATION BY PROMISING TO KEEP IN CLOSE TOUGH WITH ME, PARTICULARLY ON THE IDEA OF A UNILATERAL WITHDRAWAL FROM THE MALVINAS. I THINK THAT WE MAY HAVE GOTTEN THROUGH TO HIM AND IF WE ARE ABLE TO OFFER HIM A LITTLE TIME THAT WE MIGHT BE ABLE TO MOVE FORWARD.
SHLAUDEMAN SECRET
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