Department of State, Top Secret Summary
"Argentina's drubbing on the April 4 UNSC resolution probably surprised Buenos Aires. The extensive planning for the occupation of the Falkland Islands does not appear to have adequately addressed the international aspects. Calculations of short-term domestic benefits undoubtedly outweighed all else in Argentina's decision." [….]
"Argentina's UNSC defeat indicates diplomatic efforts did not keep pace with military planning." [….]
"President and Army Commander Galtieri had a personal as well as an institutional interest in exploiting the Falkland Island situation. He wants to hold on to the Army's top slot through 1984 and perhaps the presidency through 1987. The Argentine leader may have been excessively shortsighted, however. The popular emotion that welcomed the invasion will subside…"
April 6, 1982 – UK: Thatcher's Falkland Dilemma
Department of State, Confidential Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR) analysis
"The British Fleet will reach the Falkland area around April 20. We believe that Thatcher will be under heavy pressure to order it into action if no compromise has been negotiated or is in prospect ... the effectiveness of the fleet, far from its maintenance bases, will rapidly deteriorate after its arrival on station. [Thatcher's] damaged leadership could not survive a futile 'voyage to nowhere.'" [….]
"Argentina's invasion of the Falkland Islands puts at risk Thatcher's own position." [….]
"If Thatcher fails to redeem her reputation and the Nation's honor, she could be finished as a Tory leader and Prime Minister." [….]
"During the next two weeks, Thatcher will search for a political solution that does not appear to reward Argentine aggression … [T]he British insist on principle that an Argentine withdrawal must form a part [of a diplomatic solution] … On the diplomatic front, the British will look to their allies to help pressure Argentina economically and politically."
No comments:
Post a Comment