Canada - Canadian Submarines - Rock bottom

WHEN Canada paid Britain C$750m (then around $500m) for four lightly used, diesel-electric submarines in 1998, it looked like a bargain. The vessels cost more than double that to build, and had only been in service a few years when they were mothballed in 1994, after the British government decided its submarine fleet would be nuclear-powered.

However, expensive problems began to surface almost immediately. The most spectacular was a fire on the HMCS Chicoutimi (formerly HMS Upholder) on its maiden voyage to Canada in October 2004, in which one person died and eight others were injured. Following reports of cracked valves, corroded pipes and a dent in the hull of the HMCS Victoria (formerly the HMS Unseen), even the Canadian navy admitted internally in 2009 that the purchase had been “fraught with many issues and faced a number of setbacks”.

That was before photos from a naval repair yard leaked in February showed a large hole in the nose of the HMCS Corner Brook (HMS Ursula), which has been out of commission since it hit the ocean floor off Canada’s west coast last June. Although naval authorities dismissed the accident as “a fender-bender “and pointed out that the hole did not pierce the important inner hull of the submarine, the revelations revived the public debate about the deal and renewed the finger-pointing over who is to blame for a fleet that spends more time in port than at sea.

Ministers in the current Conservative government publicly tie the purchase to their Liberal predecessors, and say they would prefer nuclear submarines. However, governments of both stripes have had a hand in creating the problem. It was a government led by the Progressive Conservatives (who later merged into the current Conservatives) in the 1980s that told the navy to prepare for nuclear submarines and then scrapped the idea three years later, leaving naval authorities scrambling to replace Oberon-class vessels that were nearing the end of their useful lives.

The Liberals, who took over in 1993, were unsure whether Canada needed submarines at all. By the time the government decided the answer was yes, there were few alternatives to the used British fleet, which had been partially taken apart and put in storage. At least some of the subsequent problems can be traced to the need to reactivate the submarines, although this does not include the fire on the HMCS Chicoutimi. By one estimate, an additional C$1.5 billion ($1.5 billion) has been spent to repair and equip them for Canadian needs.

The navy and the Conservative government are now faced with shoring up public support for submarines. In theory that should be easy in the country with the longest coastline in the world, even though they lack the capability to operate under the Arctic ice. Naval releases describe them as “extremely quiet and stealthy” and well suited to participate in fisheries, immigration, law enforcement and environmental patrols. One reason that is rarely mentioned is that belonging to the submarine club means other countries have to let Canada know where their underwater vessels are being deployed. While the risk of collision with a Canadian submarine is minimal at the moment, as none is fully operational, at least Canada knows who else is out there.