Tuesday 3 January 2012

China's pearls unstrung (for now) - Part 1

China's Pearls Unstrung

China's "string of pearls" consists of port and airfield construction projects, diplomatic ties and force modernization. These "pearls" range from the coast of mainland China to the recently upgraded military facilities on Hainan Island, China's southernmost territory.

They extend through the South China Sea to the Strait of Malacca, over to the Indian Ocean and along the coast of the Arabian Sea and Persian Gulf. They include an airstrip on Woody Island in the Paracel archipelago east of Vietnam. A container shipping facility in Chittagong, Bangladesh, a deep-water port in Sittwe, Myanmar, and a potential naval base in Gwadar, Pakistan are also "pearls", all of them representing Chinese geopolitical influence or military presence.

Ever since the introduction of the string of pearls theory in 2004 by Booz Allen, it has been controversial and debatable. According to a 2011 Congressional Research Office report, China might be building, or may want to eventually build, a series of naval and other military bases in the Indian Ocean to support Chinese naval operations along the Sea Lane of Communications (SLOCs) linking China to Persian Gulf oil sources.

On the other hand, China is building commercial port facilities in the Indian Ocean and has not yet established any naval bases there, instead pursuing what US officials call a "places not bases" strategy. In The Military Balance 2011 by the International Institute for Strategic Studies, a retired Chinese naval officer suggested that the People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN, or PLA Navy) could set up China's first permanent overseas base in an unspecified location in the Middle East. The Chinese Ministry of National Defense subsequently distanced itself from these comments, stating that it has no plans for an overseas naval base.

Although it remains to be seen whether the string of pearls is real, the perceived pearls and provocative discourse from a hawkish Chinese navy unsettle the region. Indians, for instance, fear that China is surrounding their country with ports. Even though these deep sea ports are ostensibly for trade, China "could call them in for military or strategic purposes if oil becomes scarce."
Popular as it might be, the string of pearls theory is a more a matter of speculation than hard reality. For one, commercial ports do not necessarily lead to naval bases. The Diplomat writes that according to conventional wisdom, "China will settle for access to 'places, not bases' in the Indian Ocean. Beijing is negotiating agreements that grant Chinese vessels the right to call at ports like Gwadar, Hambantota, and Chittagong to rest, refuel, and perhaps refit. China entertains little desire for a wholly-owned base network."

Fear for the string of pearls also masks the reality that China has yet to achieve the capability to turn these ports into naval bases. Visiting Gwadar for a week in 2008, defense expert Robert Kaplan "was struck not only by how isolated it was, between pounding sea and bleak desert, but how unstable was the region of Balochistan, which lies immediately beyond the port in all landward directions".
According to Kaplan, the security situation is fraught with peril and a pipeline network from Gwadar into Central Asia and China must await the political stabilization of Afghanistan and Pakistan. Until such a day, Gwadar, although a potentially useful coaling station for a budding Chinese navy, remains "a road to nowhere". For the time being, the string of pearls is more a Chinese dream (or the rest of the world's nightmare) instead of reality.

Nevertheless, as The Diplomat put it, "Absence of evidence is not evidence of absence." The string of pearls might not be real now, yet that does not guarantee China will not build naval bases in the future. Nor should it overshadow the larger picture of China's long-term modernization of its naval capabilities.

The string of pearls theory, real or not, raises the question: how much has China's naval capability improved and what implications does it have on China's neighbors and the United States? It is not the validity of the string of pearls that matters, but the projection of Chinese naval capability and the rationale behind it that counts.

China's naval capabilities

Historically, the development of China's navy lags behind that of the army. According to a report by the Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI), in the early years of the People's Republic of China, defense was shaped to contend with perceived threats that were predominantly continental.

Until recently, China lacked the technical and industrial capacity to build a modern navy. Starting from the 1990s, China kicked off its naval modernization effort by acquiring a range of new weapons including anti-ship ballistic missiles (ASBMs), submarines and surface ships. China is also developing the world's first anti-ship ballistic missile, a system specifically designed to defeat US carrier strike groups. To quote the ONI report, "China's military modernization program has brought a range of new capabilities to the PLA Navy."

The PLA Navy has the largest force of principal combatants, submarines and amphibious warfare ships in Asia, excluding the United States. After years of neglect, the force of missile-armed patrol craft is also growing. According to the Pentagon's 2010 Annual Report to Congress, as of 2009, the PLA Navy Submarine Forces has a modernization rate of 50%, followed by its Air Defense Force (40%), Naval Surface Forces (roughly 25%), and Air Force (25%).

The navy's investment in platforms such as nuclear-powered submarines and progress toward its first aircraft carrier (a refurbished Russian Kuznetsov-class carrier) suggest China is seeking to support additional missions beyond a Taiwan contingency. The PLA Navy has also demonstrated the capability to conduct limited deployments of modern surface platforms outside the Taiwan Strait.
Meanwhile, it has acquired new classes of ships capable of supporting conventional military operations as well as humanitarian assistance and disaster relief missions.

As mentioned in the Department of Defense report, the PLA Navy's submarine forces have undergone the most substantial modernization. According to Jane's Fighting Ships 2010-2011, as of 2010, the cumulative total for all types of PLA Navy Submarine Commissioning is 42, including several nuclear-powered subs. China also has 27 guided missile destroyers. For a rough sense of comparison, Japan has nine while the United States has 61.

Even more impressive is China's development of Anti-Ship Ballistic Missiles (ASBMs), which are theater-range ballistic missiles equipped with Maneuverable Reentry Vehicles (MaRVs) designed to hit moving ships at sea. The Pentagon believes that with its ASBM, China can attack aircraft carriers, other US Navy ships, or ships of allied or partner navies operating in the Western Pacific.

China's aircraft carrier has probably received the greatest media coverage, with observers speculating that China is planning to conduct future military operations far from its coastline. "Politically," writes Ronald O'Rourke for the Federation of American Scientists, "aircraft carriers could be particularly valuable to China for projecting an image of China as a major world power, because aircraft carriers are viewed by many as symbols of major world power status." Chinese aircraft carriers could also be used for humanitarian relief, anti-piracy operations, and to evacuate non-combatants.

As for China's naval aviation force, a RAND Corporation 2010 analysis reveals that its capabilities to conduct naval strike operations and defend naval bases against enemy air attack have improved: "Most significantly, the PLAN has acquired a squadron [ie 24] of Su-30 MK2s armed with the supersonic Kh-31A [AS-17A] air-to-surface missile." Not only has the hardware been upgraded, "the organization, doctrine and training to effectively employ" these aircraft have also improved.

According to the Pentagon, China's airborne early warning and control and aerial-refueling programs would permit extended air operations into the South China Sea. Advanced destroyers and submarines could protect and advance China's maritime interests, and improvements in China's command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, and surveillance and reconnaissance, including space-based and over-the-horizon sensors, could enable Beijing to identify, track, and target military activities deep into the western Pacific.

A recent New York Times article suggests that China is "increasing its maritime surveillance force to 15,000 people by 2020, up from 9,000 now" and that the navy "has been trying to grow its operational influence over civilian ships, which often patrol disputed territorial waters like the South China Sea".
China has claimed the entire South China Sea and, as columnist George Will put it, "seems increasingly inclined to define the oceans off its shores as extensions of the shores - territory to be owned and controlled like 'blue national soil', which is incompatible with the idea of the oceans as a 'common'." Although the United States and others consider the South China Sea an international waterway, China deems it as a "core interest". Just three weeks ago, China accused Vietnam of undermining its interests and rights within its waters following a spat involving a Vietnamese oil-drilling research boat in the South China Sea.

Consequently, China's aggressiveness creates an uneasy feeling among its neighbors. Vietnam, the Philippines and Japan have all complained of China's maritime actions and have sent ships or planes to back up their concerns.

At a meeting of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Regional Forum in Hanoi, 12 Southeast Asian countries complained of Chinese assertiveness in the South China Sea, and US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton declared freedom of navigation within the South China Sea to be a national interest of the United States.

The Chinese responded by warning the US to stay out of the increasingly tense territorial disputes and maritime conflicts in the South China Sea. In response, China's neighbors have begun to increase their own capabilities.

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