Soon after, the Germans informed the Italians that joint operations would be reconsidered. Fault was not, and could not be fully placed on the shoulders of the inexperienced Italian captains. In most cases, failure to properly communicate was caused by the German High Command’s unwillingness to place German communication personnel aboard the Italian boats. Thus, after a sighting, an Italian boat would have to inform Bordeaux and this base would later inform Paris . At best, the delay amounted to an hour, unless the Teletype line between the two commands was down. Furthermore, it was recognized that the Italian submarines were ill equipped for the harsh conditions of the north Atlantic.
The engines did not have an air intake built into the cunning tower, thus the turret hatch had to be left open, causing water to often rush into the hull. Italian boats were also slower than their German counterpart, larger in size, easier to detect and lacking “aiming angle calculators” to properly adjust the launch of torpedoes. Most of these shortcomings were remedied, with the assistance of the Germans , by altering the structure of the boat. The work of Rear-Admiral (E) Fenu, supported by Commander Hans Rösing and later Commander Franz Becker, allowed for the Italian submarines to acquire some greater level of efficiency. It was, under all aspects, a Herculean task. Still, in terms of supplies, including diesel fuel, all equipment, ordinance, and provisioning was shipped from Italy via train.
Although Italian captains in general were not allowed to train aboard German submarines, Commander Primo Longobardo was permitted to complete a patrol aboard Otto Kretschmer’s U 99. The experience acquired during this patrol allowed Longobardo, as captain of the Torelli, to sink four ships for a total of 17,409 tons in a single patrol . Nevertheless, the performance of the Italian forces was considered marginal, and some vessels were rerouted to the central Atlantic where climatic conditions were considered better suited for crews and vessels. In this crucial period, the Germans were left with only 16 U-Boats; 4 operating in the north Atlantic, 2 returning to base, and 10 in Lorient refitting.
Second attempt of collaboration with the German forces
January 1941 was the low point of German activity in the Atlantic. As said, there were only 16 U-Boats. This forced Dönitz to reconsider joint operations with the Italians, despite earlier failures. After initial alterations made to some of the Italian submarines, the Germans considered a second attempt at joint operations. Between February 19th and March 23rd, 1941 a total of 47 U-Boats and 16 “sommergibili” attacked 9 British convoys. The Germans lost 4 U-Boats, the Italians lost the Marcello . Once again, the 154,743 tons sunk by the Germans were not matched by the Italians who only sank 12,292 tons. All three ships sunk by the Italians were units dispersed from a convoy.
Thus, it was realized that, amongst many other reasons, the speed and displacement of the Italian submarines made them more suitable for independent operations rather that “wolf pack ” attacks. March 1941 would be a terrible month for the German forces. After the loss of Gunther Prien’s U 47 , the two high scoring captains Kretschtner and Schepke were also lost. The confidence of the Germans was shaken, and at the same time the Italians failed to provide for much support, barring Cappellini’s assistance offered to U 97 during the chase of the boarding vessels Camito and Sangro.
End of Joint Operations
End of Joint Operations
With the arrival of new boats and crews from Germany, Admiral Dönitz was ready to cease joint operations with the Italians. Meantime, the increased successes obtained by the British were not coincidental. In February 1941, Admiral Sir Percy Noble was made Commander in Chief of the Western Approaches and he moved his headquarters to Liverpool. He reorganized the defenses, setting up a tracking room, and began integrating “Liberators”, large four-engine bombers, which Great Britain was receiving from the United States, into the coastal defenses. Fifty old destroyers were also acquired from the United States under a controversial deal orchestrated by President Roosevelt, and fitted with new antisubmarine weapons and tracking devices. On May 14th, Admiral Parona met again with Dönitz and it was agreed that joint operations would be suspended and the Italian boats would move their patrol area west of the Strait of Gibraltar and possibly off Freetown. Meantime, the submarine Giuliani was transferred to Gotenhafen , on the Baltic, at the German submarine school where Italian officers and crews were trained on attack techniques and methodologies employed by the Germans . The experience acquired training with the Germans was very valuable and demonstrated that, if collaboration had started earlier, it could have produced much better results. Thus, in May Italian boats began patrolling the central Atlantic and successes began crowning these long patrols. Operations continued until September with the Marconi, Da Vinci, Morosini, Malaspina, Torelli, Barbarigo all achieving results. Italian successes came at a price; the Baracca and the Malaspina were lost, followed in October by the Marconi . On October 25th, the Ferraris was scuttles after aerial bombing followed by an attack by the British destroyer H.M.S. Lamerton east of the Azores Islands.
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